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1.0 Project Overview 
 
There are over 800,000 hazardous materials (hazmat) shipments over the nation’s roads 
each day. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), terrorist 
activity related to the transportation of hazardous materials represents a significant 
threat to public safety and the nation’s critical infrastructure. Specifically, the federal 
government has pointed to the government’s inability to track hazmat shipments on a 
real-time basis as a significant security vulnerability. 
 
In 2004, the U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) completed 
a study to determine if “smart truck” technology such as GPS tracking, wireless 
modems, panic buttons, and on-board computers could be used to enhance hazmat 
shipment security. The FMCSA study concluded that smart truck technology will be 
highly effective in protecting hazmat shipments from terrorists. The FMCSA study also 
concluded that smart truck technology deployment will produce a huge security benefit 
and an overwhelmingly positive return on investment for hazmat carriers. 
 
The FMCSA study led to the U.S. Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) 
Hazmat Truck Security Pilot. This congressionally mandated pilot program was 
undertaken to demonstrate if a hazmat truck tracking center was feasible from a 
technology and systems perspective and to determine if existing truck tracking systems 
can interface with government intelligence centers and first responders. The Hazmat 
Truck Security Pilot demonstrated that a hazmat truck tracking center is feasible and in 
August 2007, Congress enacted legislation that directs TSA to develop a program - 
consistent with the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot - to facilitate the tracking of motor 
carrier shipments of security-sensitive materials. 
 
In a different initiative, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is interested in 
implementing an electronic manifest rule that would allow companies to use electronic 
manifests instead of paper manifests for their hazardous waste shipments.  Hazardous 
waste is a small subset of the much larger hazmat universe and the transportation of 
hazardous waste is co-regulated by EPA and the U.S. Department of Transportation.  
EPA and DOT regulations recognize EPA’s hazardous waste manifest as satisfying DOT’s 
hazmat shipping paper requirement.  EPA estimates that the use of electronic manifests 
instead of paper manifests has the potential to generate over $300 million/year in cost 
savings.  EPA has expressed strong interest in using a public/private partnership to build 
a national hazardous waste electronic manifest processing center.  Under this approach, 
a private party would build and operate the processing center at its own expense and 
collect a transaction fee for processing electronic manifests.   
 
The Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) of the University of Kentucky led a 
project funded by DHS via the Southeast Region Research Initiative (SERRI) to evaluate  
TSA and EPA needs. SERRI is managed by BWXT Y-12 of Oak Ridge, TN.  KTC project 
partners for the SERRI project were: Morehead State University (Morehead, KY); 
Coldstream Digital LLC (Lexington, KY; Great Falls, VA); General Dynamics 
Advanced Information Systems (Buffalo, NY), and ThoughtWorks Inc. (Chicago, 
IL).  
 
KTC’s SERRI project began August, 2007 and was completed October 2008. The project 
was designed to assess the feasibility of establishing the North American 
Transportation Security Center in Kentucky. The Transportation Security Center, as 
envisioned by the KTC project team, will serve as the implementing tool for a model 
hazmat regulatory program in Kentucky that will require: 
 
• high-risk hazmat transporters to install “smart truck” technology on their vehicles; 
 
• shippers and carriers to send electronic manifests and electronic route plans to the 
Transportation Security Center; 
 
• carriers to report vehicle location and alerts to the Transportation Security Center 
(real-time XML data feed); and 
 
• companies to pay hazmat regulatory fees. 
 
The Transportation Security Center will also serve as the implementing tool for a model 
hazardous waste electronic manifest regulatory program. 
 
 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration seminal study – 
“smart truck” technology and 
hazmat shipment security. 
 
 
Hazardous waste is a subset of 
the much larger hazardous 
materials universe.  Waste 
shipments are co-regulated by 
DOT and EPA.   
TSA demonstrated that a truck 
tracking system is feasible. PL 
110-53 directs TSA to develop a 
truck tracking program.   
 
DHS’s Southeast Region 
Research Initiative funded the 
North American Transportation 
Center project.   
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Figure 1.a illustrates the hazmat tracking features of the Transportation Security 
Center.  A “smart truck” equipped with an on-board computer, GPS receiver, and a 
wireless modem will use an internet connection (satellite or cellular) to interact with the 
Transportation Security Center and a commercial fleet tracking data center.  E-manifest 
transactions between the carrier and the Transportation Security Center will provide the 
Transportation Security Center with information on the types and quantities of materials 
the transporter is hauling as well as shipment status (i.e. awaiting pickup, in transit, 
etc.). Data from the carrier’s fleet tracking data center will provide the Transportation 
Security Center the carrier’s exact location at all times.  The shipper and/or carrier will 
also submit route plans. Alerts from the shipper or carrier will be generated when 
different events occur. The Transportation Security Center will merge e-manifest, vehicle 
location, route and alert data to provide government officials real-time visibility into the 
security status of hazmat shipments.  In the event of a security incident, the 
Transportation Security Center will interact with State and Federal operations centers 
Kentucky’s Intelligence Fusion Center is the state action agency in the Commonwealth. 
 
 
Figure 1.a Hazmat tracking at the North American Transportation Security Center. 
 
 
 
The project team examined four types of market “drivers” that influence the design and 
operation of the North American Transportation Security Center.  They are: 
 
• regulatory and legislative drivers; 
 
• technology drivers; 
 
• lessons learned (experience drivers); and 
 
• business drivers. 
 
Market driver analyses supported development of plans for the design and operation of 
the Transportation Security Center as well as plans for a model regulatory program.  The 
project team prepared four deliverables. 
 
1. A high-level systems plan for the North American Transportation Security Center 
describes how Transportation Security Center systems will be structured and how they 
will function.   
 
 
The North American 
Transportation Security Center 
will merge information on 
shipment and vehicle location to 
enable real-time shipment 
tracking.  
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2. A concept of operations plan for the North American Transportation Security 
Center describes the needs the Transportation Security Center will satisfy and how it will 
be structured to meet those needs.   
 
3. A regulatory program plan presents model statutes/regulations that would be 
implemented in conjunction with hazmat tracking and hazardous waste electronic 
manifest programs by Kentucky’s Cabinet agencies. 
 
4. Recommendations regarding Kentucky’s membership in the Alliance for Uniform 
Hazmat Transportation Procedures (the Alliance) are presented. The Alliance is a 
state-based organization sponsored by the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL) and established in conjunction with the FMCSA.  The Alliance has established 
uniform procedures for state hazmat registration and permitting programs.  Three states 
bordering Kentucky – Ohio, West Virginia, and Illinois – are Alliance members.    
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2.0 Regulatory & Legislative Drivers  
 
This section examines regulations and legislation that will drive the design and operation 
of the North American Transportation Security Center.   
 
Section 2.1 examines how the Federal government regulates the transportation of 
hazardous waste and hazardous materials.  Sections 2.2 – 2.6 describe how hazmat 
truck security concerns are influencing recent federal hazmat transportation regulations 
and legislation.  Included in this examination is an analysis of PL 110-53, the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007, that requires TSA to implement a hazmat truck security 
program.   
 
Section 2.6 describes EPA’s efforts to improve the current hazardous waste manifest 
process by introducing electronic manifests to the manifest business process.   
 
Section 2.7 examines how states are managing their hazmat permitting and licensing 
programs through membership in the Alliance for Uniform Hazmat Transportation 
Procedures, an organization affiliated with the National Conference for State 
Legislatures.   
 
 
2.1 How does the Federal government regulate the transportation of 
hazardous waste and hazardous materials? 
 
Hazardous materials include many products in commerce such as chemicals, bulk fuels, 
and other materials requiring special care during transport.  There are over 800,000 
hazardous material shipments per day over the U.S. road system including 75,000 
shipments by tanker trucks.  
 
The United States Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for regulating 
the transportation of all hazardous materials including hazardous waste.  DOT’s hazmat 
regulations cover: 1 
 
• preparation of a package for transportation (e.g., packaging, marking, labeling);  
 
• preparation of shipping papers (e.g. to accompany hazmat shipment); 
 
• hazmat storage incidental to transportation; 
 
• hazmat vehicle loading and preparation (e.g. placarding); 
 
• movement of the hazmat vehicle over the road system; and  
 
• hazmat vehicle unloading at the ultimate consignee. 
 
According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), terrorist activity 
related to the transportation of hazardous materials represents a significant threat to 
public safety and the nation’s critical infrastructure.  A typical gasoline tanker truck, for 
example, carries as much fuel as the jets that hit the World Trade Center and could be 
used by terrorists as a weapon of mass destruction.  DHS and other federal agencies 
have initiated a number of efforts to secure the nation’s hazardous materials supply 
chain against terrorist threats.  Under the Patriot Act, DHS requires background checks 
and special state licensing for hazmat drivers.  In 2003, DOT issued regulations for 
hazmat shippers and carriers that require implementation of security plans, including 
training for employees.   In late 2004, DOT/FMCSA completed a study to determine how 
“smart truck” technology such as GPS tracking, panic buttons, and on-board computers 
could be used to enhance hazmat shipment security.   
 
Despite the efforts made to date in securing hazmat shipments, it is notable that neither 
federal nor state governmental officials can track the location or movement of hazardous 
materials over the nation’s highway system on a real-time basis. 2  In Kentucky, for  
                                                            
1 For an overview of hazmat regulations -  Federal (DOT) http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety-security/hazmat/complyhmregs.htm  &  State 
(California) http://www.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/cdl_htm/sec9_a.htm 
 
2 Military munitions and certain radioactive and sensitive materials are exceptions.  The federal government tracks these shipments 
using commercial satellite/GPS truck monitoring systems.  For example, the Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS) 
monitors more than 47,000 arms, ammunition, and explosive shipments by commercial motor carriers each year in the continental 
There are over 800,000 
hazmat shipments per day 
over the nation’s highways 
including 75,000 shipments by 
tanker trucks.   
 
DOT regulates all hazmat 
shipments, however, DOT & EPA 
co-regulate hazardous waste 
shipments.   
 
Terrorists can use hazmat 
shipments as weapons of mass 
destruction.  Securing hazmat 
shipments is an important DHS 
objective. 
   
 
6 
 
 
example, state officials have almost no visibility into the movement of hazardous 
materials over the roads even though three major interstate corridors cut through the 
Commonwealth.  The technology that would allow government agencies to track hazmat 
shipments on a real-time basis is commercially available and cost-effective, but 
federal/state regulatory programs are not sufficiently evolved to spur on its deployment. 
 
Hazardous waste is a subset of the much larger hazardous materials (hazmat) universe.  
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations require companies 
to track the movement of hazardous waste from the point of generation to the point of 
disposal (“cradle to grave”) using a hazardous waste manifest form.  There are about 
four million hazardous waste shipments in the United States each year. 
 
The manifest form is a shipping paper/bill of lading tailored to meet the needs of the 
hazardous waste regulatory business process.  It must accompany all waste shipments.  
The parties to the waste shipment (generators, transporters, receiving facilities) apply 
their signatures to the manifest form as custody of the waste shipment changes hands.  
Currently, companies must use a multi-part paper manifest form.  The use of paper 
manifests is cumbersome and expensive, and EPA plans to issue regulations that will 
allow companies to use electronic manifests (e-manifests) instead of paper manifests for 
hazardous waste shipments.  EPA regulations governing hazardous waste shipments are 
described in Appendix A. 
 
EPA and DOT share regulation of hazardous waste shipments and DOT accepts EPA’s 
hazardous waste manifest form in satisfaction of its shipping paper requirement (note: 
EPA’s regulatory role does not extend to the hazmat universe beyond hazardous waste).  
While there is some regulatory overlap between DOT and EPA, it is important to note 
that the two agencies operate off very different regulatory paradigms.   DOT’s hazmat 
regulatory focus is on maintaining the safety and security of hazmat shipments while 
EPA’s regulatory focus is on maintaining waste shipment chain of custody to prevent 
illegal disposal.  DOT places most of the responsibility for meeting its regulatory 
requirements on the hazmat carrier while EPA places most of its regulatory emphasis on 
the waste generator.  Under EPA’s regulatory view, a transporter is a passive party 
chosen by the generator to move waste from the generator to the generator’s 
designated waste management facility.  The generator retains full responsibility for 
ensuring that the waste shipment reaches its destination and is disposed of properly 
(e.g. full “cradle to grave” responsibility).   
 
Since 9/11, DOT has increasingly emphasized the homeland security aspects of its 
hazmat transportation mission.  EPA has not, however, expanded its regulatory focus 
even as it has worked on developing its e-manifest regulations.  EPA views its e-
manifest initiative primarily as a paperwork burden initiative and has not, to date, 
viewed its e-manifest program in the context of the nation’s homeland security program. 
 
The federal hazardous waste and hazmat programs are implemented in partnership with  
the States.  In fact, the responsibility for managing hazardous waste and hazmat 
regulatory programs in the U.S. has been largely delegated to the States by the federal 
government.  EPA/DOT issue federal regulations and provide funding for State 
programs.  The States develop their own regulations which must be at least as stringent 
as EPA/DOT federal regulations.  In Kentucky, the Environment and Public Protection 
Cabinet manages the hazardous waste regulatory program in lieu of EPA and develops 
the hazardous waste regulations that Kentucky companies follow.  The Transportation 
Cabinet and the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet manage the hazmat regulatory 
program in lieu of DOT and develop State hazmat regulations and driver licensing 
programs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
United States. DTTS continuously monitors in-transit status of these shipments, providing GPS-derived location reports and 
coordinating emergency response efforts for accidents and other incidents. 
  
Government officials have 
almost no visibility into hazmat 
movement over the roads even 
though the technology for real-
time tracking is commercially 
available & cost-effective. 
 
 
EPA rules will allow companies to 
use electronic manifests for 
“cradle to grave” tracking of 
hazardous waste shipments. 
 
EPA and DOT have different 
regulatory paradigms.  EPA is 
concerned about illegal waste 
disposal and is focused on 
maintaining chain of custody 
control over waste shipments.  
DOT is concerned about 
shipment safety and security. 
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2.2 Hazmat security is driving the development of new regulations. 
 
The government’s focus on hazmat transportation has widened since 9/11.  Prior to 
9/11, the regulatory and legislative primary focus was on hazmat shipment safety.  But  
since 9/11, the federal government has pursued an expanded regulatory and legislative 
agenda that recognizes the need to protect the hazmat supply chain from terrorists. 
 
Figure 2.2.a presents a timeline of regulatory and legislative developments that affect 
hazmat shipment security.  Sections 2.2 - 2.5 discuss the implications of these 
developments on the design and operation of the North American Transportation 
Security Center. 
 
Figure 2.2.a  Timeline - Hazmat Security Regulations and Legislation  
 
 
  
2.2.1 Shippers and carriers of certain hazardous materials must prepare 
security plans and conduct security training (RSPA/PHMSA). 
 
On March 25, 2003, DOT’s Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) 
established requirements to enhance the security of hazmat shipments (HM-232; 49 CFR 
172.8). 3  4  Under HM-232, hazmat shippers and carriers of certain hazardous materials 
must develop and implement security plans.  In addition, HM-232 requires shippers and 
carriers to include a hazmat security component in their training programs. 
 
HM-232 applies to all shippers and carriers who offer for transportation or transport the 
following types and quantities of hazardous materials: 
 
• a hazardous material in an amount that must be placarded in accordance with 
Subpart F (Part 172) of DOT’s hazardous materials regulations; or 
 
                                                            
3 http://www.myregs.com/beginners/hm-232.pdf  
 
4  DOT created the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in February 2005.  Hazmat transportation safety 
responsibilities shifted from the Research and Special Programs Administration to the PHMSA upon its creation. 
Shippers and carriers of 
certain hazardous materials 
must prepare and follow  
written security plans 
including plans for en-route 
shipments. 
Since 9/11, the government’s 
regulatory emphasis for 
hazmat shipments has shifted 
from safety to security. 
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• a hazardous material in a bulk packaging having a capacity equal to or greater than 
13,248 L (3,500 gallons) for liquids or gases or more than 13.24 cubic meters (468 
cubic feet) for solids; or 
 
• a select agent or toxin regulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
under 42 CFR Part 73; or 
 
• a highway route-controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive) material; or 
 
• more than 25 kg (55 pounds) of a Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 (explosive) material; or 
 
• more than one L (1.06 qt) per package of a material poisonous by inhalation that 
meets the criteria for Hazard Zone A; or  
 
• a shipment in other than a bulk packaging of 2,268 kg (5,000 pounds) gross weight or 
more of one class of hazardous materials amount that must be placarded in 
accordance with subpart F. 
 
Shippers and carriers subject to HM-232 must develop and implement written security 
plans.  In developing these plans, they must conduct risk assessments on their 
operations and develop security measures to address personnel security, facility 
security, and en route security.   A security plan must include an assessment of possible 
transportation security risks for shipments and appropriate measures to address the 
assessed risks.  At a minimum, a security plan must include the following three 
elements: 
 
• personnel security - measures to confirm information provided by job applicants hired 
for positions that involve access to and handling of the hazardous materials covered 
by the security plan; 
 
• unauthorized access - measures to address the possibility that unauthorized persons 
may gain access to the hazardous materials covered by the security plan or to 
transport conveyances being prepared for transportation of the hazardous materials 
covered by the security plan; and  
 
• en-route security - measures to address the security risks of shipments of hazardous 
materials covered by the security plan en route from origin to destination, including 
shipments stored incidental to movement. 
 
Shippers and carriers must also provide hazmat employees with in-depth training on 
their security plan and its implementation. This training must include company security 
objectives, specific security procedures, employee responsibilities, actions to take in the 
event of a security breach, and the organizational security structure.  
 
The FMCSA published an on-line hazmat security plan guidance for hazmat shippers and 
carriers.5  In addition, the RSPA published an Advisory Notice in the Federal Register 
to help shippers and carriers prepare en route security plans.6  RSPA’s Advisory Notice 
was published in advance of its formal rulemaking.  Figure 2.2.b is the en-route 
security advice that RSPA offered hazmat shippers. 
 
It is important to note that both the shipper and carrier must prepare security plans 
under HM-232.  However, a shipper is not required to determine if a carrier’s security 
plan meets the requirements of HM-232.  DOT advises shippers to work with their 
carriers to address en route security issues for the hazardous materials the carrier will 
be hauling on behalf of the shipper.  In some cases, the shipper and carrier might 
develop a joint plan.  In others, the shipper and carrier might have separate plans.  
However, a shipper’s security plan should indicate the measures the shipper has taken 
 
 
                                                            
5Guide To Developing An Effective Security Plan For The Highway Transportation Of Hazardous Materials  
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety-security/hazmat/security-plan-guide.htm  
 
6 Advisory Notices do have not regulatory force.  They are for guidance purposes only.  Enhancing the Security of Hazardous 
Materials in Transportation; Federal Register: February 14, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 31); Page 6963-6966; Research and Special 
Programs Administration DOT; RSPA-2002-11270, Notice No. 02-4;  http://hazmat.dot.gov/regs/notices/misc/2002_11270_4.htm 
Hazmat security starts with 
security programs in place at 
the shipper’s location.  
RSPA’s security guidance for 
hazmat shippers recommends 
use of vehicle tracking systems 
and crisis communications 
systems. 
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to address en route security, such as coordination with the carrier to determine that the 
shipper’s security plan covers en route security risks associated with the shipment. 
 
Figure 2.2.b DOT’s En-Route Security Guidance for Hazmat Shippers  
 
Shippers and carriers can work together to assure the security of hazardous materials shipments en route from origin to 
destination: 
 
Shippers should assess the transportation modes or combinations of modes available for transporting specific materials and 
select the most appropriate method of transportation to assure efficient and secure movement of product from origin to 
destination. 
 
Know your carriers. Have a system for qualifying the carriers used to transport hazardous materials. Use carrier safety 
ratings, assessments, safety surveys, or audits and ask the carrier to provide information on security measures it has 
implemented. Verify the carrier has an appropriate employee hiring and review process, including background checks, and an 
on-going security training program. 
 
Verify the identity of carrier and/or driver prior to loading a hazardous material. Ask the driver for photo identification and 
commercial driver’s license and compare with information provided by the carrier. Ask the driver to tell you the name of the 
consignee and the destination for the material and confirm with your records before releasing shipments. 
 
Identify preferred and alternative routing, including acceptable deviations. Strive to minimize product exposures to 
communities or populated areas, including downtown areas; avoid tunnels and bridges where possible; and expedite 
transportation of the shipment to its final destination. 
 
Minimize stops en route; if you must stop, select locations with adequate lighting on well-traveled roads and check your 
vehicle after each stop to make sure nothing has been tampered with.  
 
Consider using two drivers or driver relays to minimize stops during the trip. Avoid layovers, particularly for high hazard 
materials. 
 
If materials must be stored during transportation, make sure they are stored in secure facilities. 
 
Train drivers in how to avoid highjacking or stolen cargo--keep vehicles locked when parked and avoid casual conversations 
with strangers about cargoes and routes. 
 
Consider if a guard or escort for a specific shipment or hazardous material is appropriate. 
 
Consider utilizing advanced technology to track or protect shipments en route to their destinations. For example, you may 
wish to install tractor and trailer anti-theft devices or utilize satellite tracking or surveillance systems. As an alternative, 
consider frequent checks with drivers by cell phone to ensure everything is in order. 
 
Install tamper-proof seals on all valves and package or container openings. 
 
Establish a communication system with transport vehicles and operators, including a crisis communication system with 
primary and back-up means of communication among the shipper, carrier, and law enforcement and emergency response 
officials. 
 
Implement a system for a customer to alert the shipper if a hazardous materials shipment is not received when expected. 
When products are delivered, check the carrier's identity with shipping documents provided by the shipper. 
 
Get to know your customers and their hazardous materials programs. If you suspect you shipped or delivered a hazardous 
material to someone who may intend to use it for a criminal purpose, notify your local FBI office or local law enforcement 
officials. 
 
Report any suspicious incidents or individuals to your local FBI office and to local law enforcement officials. 
 
 
 
The requirements of HM-232 are particularly important to the chemical industry.  Under 
the Responsible Care® program, chemical companies have banded together to develop 
standards and best management practices to help member companies meet their 
environmental, health, and safety responsibilities.  Figure 2.2.c summarizes the 
relationship of HM-232 to the practices and standards developed under the Responsible 
Care® program. 
 
Figure 2.2.c illustrates the degree to which the chemical industry has internalized 
hazmat security programs for off-site shipments of hazardous materials.  Additional 
requirements for enhanced hazmat security control of off-site hazmat shipments will not 
be unexpected by industry, and should not be uncomfortable from a compliance 
perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The chemical industry has 
incorporated HM-232 
requirements into its 
Responsible Care® program. 
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Figure 2.2.c Relationship between HM-232 and the chemical industry’s Responsible Care® program. 
 
 
RSPA HM-232 Rule 
Requirements 
 
 
Responsible Care® Security 
Management Practice 
 
 
Responsible Care® Implementation and 
Compliance Tools 
 
Develop and adhere to a security 
plan.  Components of the plan 
include: risk assessment; methods 
for confirming information provided 
by job applicants; measures to 
address the possibility of 
unauthorized persons that may 
attempt to gain access to hazmat 
or hazmat vehicles being prepared 
for transportation; and en route 
security. 
 
 Plans should be in writing, 
retained, available to employees, 
and updated as needed. 
 
Management Practice 1: Leadership 
Commitment 
 
Management Practice 2: Analysis of 
Threats and Vulnerabilities and 
Consequences 
 
Management Practice 3: 
Implementation of Security Measures 
 
Management Practice 5: 
Documentation 
Management Practice 8: Response to 
Security Threats 
 
Management Practice 12: 
Management of Change 
 
Management Practice 13: 
Continuous Improvement 
 
Implementation Resource Guide for 
Responsible Care Security Code of 
Management Practices for Value Chain 
Activities (www.rctoolkit.com/security ): 
 
Appendix 5: Value Chain Security 
Procedure/Plan Overview 
 
Appendix 3: Value Chain Security Risk 
Assessment Methodology 
 
Appendix 4: Examples of Security Measures 
 
RSPA Advisory Notice Issued on February 14, 
2002, “Enhancing the Security of Hazardous 
Materials in Transportation” 
(http://hazmat.dot.gov/regs/notices/misc/2002
_11270_4.htm ) 
 
Each hazmat employee must be 
trained on the plan and its 
implementation including company 
security objectives, specific 
procedures, responsibilities, actions 
in the event of a security breach, 
and organizational security 
structure 
 
Management Practice 6: Training, Drills, 
and Guidance  
 
Management Practice 7: 
Communications, Dialogue and 
Information Exchange 
 
Management Practice 8:  
Response to Security Threats  
 
Management Practice 9: Response to 
Security Incidents 
 
TRANSCAER® (Transportation Community 
Awareness and Emergency Response) 
(http://www.transcaer.org/downloads/resource
s/CommunityGuide.pdf ) 
 
Implementation Resource Guide for 
Responsible Care Security Code of Management 
Practices for Value Chain Activities: Appendix 
6: Examples of Security “Red Flags” 
(www.rctoolkit.com/security ): 
 
CHEMTREC® (Chemical Transportation 
Emergency Center) (www.chemtrec.com) 
Chemical Sector ISAC 
(http://chemicalisac.chemtrec.com) 
 
Security awareness training should 
be provided to all hazmat 
employees.  Training should include 
awareness of security risk, methods 
designed to enhance transportation 
security, and how to recognize and 
respond to possible 
security threats. 
 
Management Practice 3: 
Implementation of Security Measures 
 
Management Practice 6: Training, 
Drills, and Guidance 
 
Management Practice 8: Response to 
Security Threats 
 
Management Practice 9: Response to 
Security Incidents 
 
The Department of Transportation’s 
“HAZMAT Transportation Security 
Awareness Training Module” 
(hazmat.dot.gov/hmt_security.htm .)  
 
Implementation Resource Guide for 
Responsible Care Security Code of 
Management Practices for Value Chain 
Activities Appendix 6: Examples o Security 
“Red Flags” 
(www.rctoolkit.com/security): 
 
Chemical Sector ISAC 
(http://chemicalisac.chemtrec.com/) 
 
 
 
2.2.2 States must perform security checks before licensing hazmat drivers. 
 
Drivers have been required to have a commercial driver’s license (CDL) in order to drive 
a commercial motor vehicle (CMV) since April 1, 1992.  The U.S. Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) has developed and issued standards for testing and licensing 
CMV drivers. Among other things, the standards require States to issue CDLs to their 
CMV drivers only after the driver passes knowledge and skills tests administered by the 
State related to the type of vehicle to be operated. Drivers need CDLs if they are in 
 
 
 
 
 
Since 1992, drivers of 
commercial motor vehicles have 
been required to obtain a 
commercial driver’s license 
(CDL).  Drivers hauling 
hazardous materials have to 
obtain an additional 
endorsement on their CDL. 
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interstate, intrastate, or foreign commerce and drive a vehicle that meets one of the 
following definitions of a CMV:  
 
• Class A -- Any combination of vehicles with a GVWR of 26,001 or more pounds 
provided the GVWR of the vehicle(s) being towed is in excess of 10,000 pounds.  
 
• Class B -- Any single vehicle with a GVWR of 26,001 or more pounds, or any such 
vehicle towing a vehicle not in excess of 10,000 pounds GVWR.  
 
• Class C -- Any single vehicle, or combination of vehicles, that does not meet the 
definition of Class A or Class B, but is either designed to transport 16 or more 
passengers, including the driver, or is placarded for hazardous materials.  
 
Drivers who operate special types of CMVs also need to pass additional tests to obtain 
any of the following endorsements on their CDL:  
 
• T - Double/Triple Trailers (Knowledge test only)  
 
• P - Passenger (Knowledge and Skills Tests)  
 
• N - Tank Vehicle (Knowledge Test only)  
 
• H - Hazardous Materials (Knowledge Test only)  
 
• X - Combination of Tank Vehicle and Hazardous Materials  
 
Since January 2005 commercial truck drivers who want to renew or transfer their 
licenses to transport hazardous materials have undergone mandatory fingerprint and 
background checks, under a rule implemented by the U.S. Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA).7 
 
TSA implemented the program to meet the requirements of Section 1012 of the USA 
Patriot Act (October 2001), which prohibits states from issuing a commercial drivers 
license (CDL) to individuals to transport hazardous materials in commerce unless a 
determination has been made that the driver does not pose a security risk.  Fees are 
collected from hazmat CDL applicants to cover the cost of background checks.   
 
TSA estimates there are about 2.7 million truckers licensed to carry hazardous materials 
in the U.S. In January, Truckers must renew licenses to carry hazardous materials at 
least once every five years, although a state may require more frequent renewals. If 
TSA disqualifies an applicant, the driver can appeal the finding or seek a waiver from the 
agency.   
 
 
2.2.3 Carriers of security-sensitive hazardous materials must obtain a hazmat 
safety permit (FMCSA). 
 
Beginning January 2005, Federal Motor Carrier Administration regulations require 
carriers of the following security-sensitive hazardous materials to obtain a hazmat safety 
permit (Section 385.403). 8  
 
1. Radioactive Materials: A highway route-controlled quantity of Class 7 material, as 
defined in 173.403 of 49 CFR. 
 
2. Explosives: More than 25kg (55 pounds) of a Division 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3 material, or 
an amount of a Division 1.5 material requiring a placard under Part 172 Subpart F 
of 49 CFR. 
 
 
                                                            
1. HAZMAT Endorsement Threat Assessment Program – United States Transportation Security Administration  
http://www.tsa.dhs.gov/what_we_do/layers/hazmat/index.shtm  
 
8 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations: Hazardous Materials Safety Permits; Final rule (69 FR 39350); June 30, 2004 49 CFR 
Parts 385, 386, and 390 View PDF File  
 
Hazardous Materials Safety Permits; Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM); August 19, 2003 49 CFR Parts 385, 
390, and 397  View PDF File   
 
 
 
FMCSA requires carriers of 
security-sensitive shipments 
to obtain hazmat safety 
permits. 
 
 
Since January 2005, TSA rules 
have required states to conduct 
security background checks on 
drivers before they are issued 
state licenses to haul hazardous 
materials. 
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3. Toxic by Inhalation Materials:  
 
• Hazard Zone A: More that one liter (1.08 quarts) per package of a "material poisonous by 
inhalation," as defined in 171.8 of 49 CFR, that meets the criteria for "hazard zone A," as 
specified in 173.116(a) or 173.133(a) of 49 CFR. 
 
• Hazard Zone B: A "material poisonous by inhalation," as defined in 171.8 of this title, that 
meets the criteria for "hazard zone B," as specified in 173.116(a) or 173.133(a) of 49 CFR in a 
bulk packaging (capacity greater than 450 L [119 gallons]).  
 
• Hazard Zone C & D: A "material poisonous by inhalation," as defined in 171.8 of this title, that 
meets the criteria for "hazard zone C," or "hazard zone D," as specified in 173.116(a) of this 
title, in a packaging having a capacity equal to or greater than 13,248 L (3,500 gallons). 
 
4. Methane: A shipment of compressed or refrigerated liquefied methane or liquefied 
natural gas or other liquefied gas with a methane content of at least 85% in a bulk 
packaging having a capacity equal to or greater than 13,248 L (3,500 gallons) for 
liquids or gases.  
 
To obtain a hazmat safety permit, a carrier must have a “satisfactory” safety rating.  
FMCSA will not issue a hazmat safety permit to a carrier that: 
 
• does not certify that it has a satisfactory security program as required in Sec. 
385.407(b); or 
 
• has a crash rate in the top 30 percent of the national average as indicated in the 
FMCSA Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS); or 
 
• has a driver, vehicle, hazardous materials, or total out-of- service rate in the top 30 
percent of the national average as indicated in the MCMIS. 
 
In addition, a motor carrier must certify that it has a satisfactory security program 
to obtain a hazmat safety permit.  The carrier must certify that it has: 
 
• a security plan meeting the requirements of part 172, subpart I that addresses how 
the carrier will ensure the security of the written route plan required by this part; 
and 
 
• a communications plan that allows for contact between the commercial motor 
vehicle operator and the motor carrier to meet the periodic contact requirements in 
Sec. 385.415(c)(1); and 
 
• successful completion by all hazmat employees of the security training required in 
Sec. 172.704(a)(4) and (a)(5) of this title; and 
 
• registration with the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA). The 
motor carrier must be registered with RSPA in accordance with part 107, subpart G. 
 
There are a number of operational requirements that hazmat carriers must meet to 
obtain and keep a hazmat safety permit.  Carriers are required to: 
 
• maintain a "satisfactory" safety rating in order to obtain and hold a safety permit; 
 
• maintain their crash rating, and their driver, vehicle, hazardous materials or out-of 
service rating so they are not in the worse 30 percent of the national average as 
indicated in FMCSA's Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS);  
 
• have a satisfactory security program (and associated training) according to 49 CFR 
173.800 in place;  
 
• maintain registration with RSPA;  
 
• develop a system of communication that will enable the vehicle operator to contact 
the motor carrier during the course of transportation and maintain records of these 
communications (Section 385.415);  
 
• have written route plan required for radioactive materials set forth in 49 CFR 
397.101 and for explosives in Part 397.19 (currently required); and 
 
• perform a pre-trip inspection (North American Standard (NAS) Level VI Inspection 
Program for Radioactive Shipments) for shipments containing highway route 
controlled Class 7 (radioactive) materials.  
 
 
 
Hazmat safety permits focus 
on both safety and security 
performance of hazmat 
carriers. 
Carriers have to maintain 
frequent contact with drivers 
and keep records of contact 
made.  FMCSA recognizes 
wireless GPS systems as 
satisfying communications 
requirements. 
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The communications requirements of Section 385.415 are notable.  The FMCSA has 
specifically recognized that an electronic GPS tracking system or other periodic wireless 
tracking system will fulfill the communications requirements of Section 385.415.  
However, the carrier (or driver) must keep a record of communications with the 
necessary information (date, time, location, driver's name, truck ID). These records can 
be kept electronically. The information may be stored in separate databases, as long as 
the information can be correlated at the request of an official in a timely manner. 
 
The FMCSA estimates that about 3,100 carriers will be covered by its hazmat security 
regulations. 
 
Figure 2.2.d  Number of carriers requiring FMCSA hazmat safety permits. 
Carriers 
Number of  
small carriers 
Total carriers 
Total Number of Carriers for List  
of Materials Covered    
2,436 3,131 
Number of Interstate Carriers  1,664 2,139 
Number of Intrastate Carriers  772 992 
 
According to the FMCSA, the major driver of hazmat carrier costs is the cost to record 
and maintain communication records. This cost item represents about 99 percent of the 
total annual costs to hazmat carriers to comply with the permit program requirements.  
 
 
2.2.4 Chemical facility anti-terrorism standards focus on hazmat security (DHS). 
 
The FMCSA study acknowledged the implementation problem of industry-led voluntary 
programs by suggesting that “government intervention” (e.g. regulations) might be 
needed.  The argument for “government intervention” is buttressed by DHS’s experience 
in its efforts to beef up security at chemical production plants in urban areas.  In that 
case, an industry-led voluntary initiative to upgrade chemical plant security resulted in 
such a tepid industry response that DHS sought legislation authorizing DHS to develop 
and implement a framework to regulate the security of high-risk chemical facilities in the 
United States.9 
 
In October 2006, the President signed the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act of 2007, which in Section 550 authorized DHS to require high-risk 
chemical facilities to complete security vulnerability assessments, develop site security 
plans, and implement risk-based measures designed to satisfy DHS-defined risk-based 
performance standards. The Act also authorized DHS to enforce compliance with the 
security regulations, including conducting audits and inspections of high-risk facilities, 
imposing civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day, and shutting down facilities that fail to 
comply with the regulations.10 
 
DHS published an Interim Final Rule (IFR), the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Standards (CFATS), on April 9, 2007.  The rules contain a list of 300 chemicals (called 
Appendix A), and any facility which stores an Appendix A chemical in greater than a 
threshold quantity (also listed on Appendix A) is considered a chemical facility.  A 
chemical facility that possesses a chemical of interest at or above the screening 
threshold quantity (STQ) must complete and submit an assessment called a Top-Screen 
assessment within 60 calendar days of coming into possession of the listed chemicals at 
or above the listed STQs.  
 
DHS estimates the Top-Screen will take between thirty and forty hours to complete. The 
Top-Screen must be submitted by an officer of the corporation, or by someone 
designated by an officer, and that person must attest to the accuracy of the information. 
 
After completing the Top-Screen, a facility may be notified to take further actions, 
including submission of a Security Vulnerability Assessment and a Site Security Plan. 
                                                            
9 Chemical and Engineering News; Chertoff Calls for Legislation: DHS Secretary Wants Federal Regulation of Chemical Industry 
Security; March 27, 2006 http://pubs.acs.org/cen/news/84/i13/8413notw1.html  
 
10 DHS Critical Infrastructure: Chemical Security webpage http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1169501486179.shtm  
About 3,100 hazmat carriers 
will receive hazmat safety 
permits.  Maintaining 
communications records 
represents almost the entire 
compliance cost for hazmat 
carriers. 
DHS’s Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards focus on 
the security of chemicals 
(hazardous materials) made or 
stored at chemical facilities. 
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 Chemical facilities may be subject to inspection by DHS officials.  Inspectors may review 
records, take photographs, and talk with employees. 
 
Unlike EPA inspections, the information DHS obtains is placed in a confidential file and is 
not subject to FOIA requests from the public.  However, there is some overlap between 
the CFATS rules and the Tier Two Hazardous Chemical Inventories which are provided to 
state and local governments and with the hazard communication program required by 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).   Also, Appendix A contains 
different chemicals and different thresholds than the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and OSHA requirements.   
 
For each Appendix A chemical, DHS justifies its inclusion on the list based on a number 
of factors including:  
 
Release, Theft, or Sabotage 
Potential 
 
o Minimum Concentration (%) 
 
o Screening Threshold 
Quantities (pounds) 
 
Security Issue 
 
o Release – Toxic 
 
o Release – Flammable 
 
o Theft – chemical weapons or chemical weapons 
precursor 
 
o Theft – weapons of mass effect 
 
o Theft – explosives or improvised explosive device 
precursor 
 
o Sabotage or Contamination 
 
 
2.3 In 2007, TSA assumed the lead federal responsibility for hazmat 
transportation security rulemaking. 
 
DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA) published a notice in 
the Federal Register on June 27, 2007 advising that the Transportation Security 
Administration has assumed the lead role from PHMSA for rulemaking addressing the 
security of motor carrier shipments of hazardous materials.   
 
The action was consistent with and supportive of the respective transportation security 
roles and responsibilities of the Department of Transportation and DHS as delineated in 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed September 28, 2004, and of TSA and 
PHMSA as outlined in an Annex to that MOU signed August 7, 2006. 
 
The PHMSA also used the Federal Register notice to withdraw an Advanced Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) related to hazmat transportation security that the 
PHMSA had published on July 16, 2002.  The ANPRM solicited comments on a variety of 
security measures that might be required of hazmat carriers to improve hazmat supply 
chain security including the use of vehicle tracking and monitoring systems, emergency 
warning systems, and remote shut-offs.  Follow-up action to the ANPRM had been put on 
hold in light of the FMCSA’s Field Operations Test (refer to Section 4.1 of this report) 
and TSA’s Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (refer to Section 4.2 of this report) as well as the 
shifting responsibilities of DOT and DHS. 
 
With this Federal Register notice, TSA will be responsible for all future security 
regulations for hazmat motor carriers. 
 
 
2.4 TSA issued guidance for shippers and carriers of highway security-
sensitive materials on June 26, 2008. 
 
Almost one year to the day that TSA formally assumed the lead federal responsibility for 
hazmat transportation security regulations, TSA issued guidance for shippers and carriers 
of highway security-sensitive materials.  The guidance was issued by TSA’s Assistant 
Administrator for Transportation Sector Network Management on June 26, 2008. 11  TSA’s 
guidance recognizes two tiers of highway security-sensitive materials. 
 
                                                            
11 Letter to Highway and Motor Carrier Stakeholders; John P. Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector Network 
Management, US Transportation Security Administration; June 26, 2008. 
 
TSA has the lead responsibility 
for hazmat transportation 
security rulemaking. 
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1. Tier 1 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 1 HSSM) – HSSM 
transported by motor vehicle whose potential consequences from an act of terrorism 
include a highly significant level of adverse effects on human life, environmental 
damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption. A full list of Tier 
1 HSSM may be found in Appendix B.   
 
2. Tier 2 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 2 HSSM) - HSSM 
transported by motor vehicle whose potential consequences from an act of terrorism 
include moderately significant level of adverse effects on human life or health, 
environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption.  A 
full list of Tier 2 HSSM may be found in Appendix B.    
 
 
2.4.1 TSA’s security recommendations incorporate/enhance earlier DOT 
guidance. 
 
TSA developed its guidance in conjunction with other Federal agencies including DOT’s 
Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) and DOT’s Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration.  The TSA guidance builds upon existing PHMSA and 
FMCSA hazmat regulations including PHMSA’s hazmat safety regulatory provisions in 
49CFR172.704 and 172.800 that require hazmat carriers to develop and implement 
security programs and to train employees in security matters.  TSA has, however, 
enhanced earlier guidance to strengthen en-route security measures for shippers and 
carriers of high-risk materials. 
 
TSA’s guidance is not mandatory for hazmat shippers and receivers.  Shippers and 
carriers are, however, advised by TSA to implement security programs consistent with 
TSA June 26th guidance. 
 
2.4.2 TSA recommends more stringent security measures for Tier 1 highway 
security-sensitive materials. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.4.a,TSA listed 23 Security Action Items (SAI) in its June 26th 
guidance.  The SAIs were divided into four categories 1). general security; 2). personnel 
security; 3). unauthorized access; and 4). en-route security.   
 
 
TSA recommends that shippers and carriers of Tier 2 HSSMs adopt the first sixteen SAIs 
and that shippers and carriers of Tier 1 HSSMs, the riskiest materials from a security 
perspective, adopt the first sixteen SAIs as well as TSA’s security action items 17-23.  A 
discussion of TSA’s security action items 17-23 follows.   
 
Figure 2.4.a TSA HSSM Security Action Items 
TSA HSSM Security Action Items 
 
General Security: 
 
1. Security Assessment and Security Plan Requirements. 
 
2. Awareness of Industry Security Practices. 
 
3. Inventory Control Process. 
 
4. Business and Security Critical Information 
 
Personnel Security: 
 
5. Possession of a Valid Commercial Drivers License - 
Hazardous Materials Endorsement. 
 
6. Background Checks for Highway Transportation Sector 
Hazmat Employees other than Motor Vehicle Drivers 
with a Valid CDL with HME. 
 
7. Security Awareness Training for Hazmat Employees. 
 
Unauthorized Access: 
 
8. Access Control System for Drivers. 
 
9. Access Control System for Facilities Incidental to 
Transport. 
 
 
En-Route Security: 
 
10. Establish Communications Plan. 
 
11. Establish Appropriate Vehicle Security Program. 
 
12. Establish Appropriate Cargo Security Program. 
 
13. Implement a Seal/Lock Control Program. 
 
14. High Alert Level Protocols. 
 
15. Establish Security Inspection Policy and Procedures. 
 
16. Establish Reporting Policy and Procedures. 
 
17. Shipment Pre-Planning, Advance Notice of Arrival, and 
Receipt of Confirmation Procedures. 
 
18. Preplanning Routes. 
 
19. Security for Trips Exceeding Driver Hours of Service. 
 
20. Dedicated Truck. 
 
21. Tractor Activation Capability. 
 
22. Panic Button Capability. 
 
23. Tractor and Trailer Tracking Systems 
 
 
 
 
TSA’s highway security-sensitive 
security guidance recognizes two 
classes of highway security-
sensitive materials: 
 
• Tier 1 which can cause highly 
significant adverse effects 
from terrorist actions; and  
 
• Tier 2 which can cause 
moderately significant adverse 
effects from terrorist actions. 
SAIs 17-23 apply only to 
Tier 1 HSSM shipments. 
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Security Action Item #17.  Shipment Pre-Planning, Advance Notice of Arrival 
and Receipt Confirmation Procedures with Receiving Facility – The shipper 
(consignor), motor carrier and receiver (consignee) should conduct shipment pre-
planning to ensure shipments are not released to the motor carrier until they can be 
transported to destination with the least public exposure and minimal delay in transit. 
Shipment pre-planning should include establishing the estimated time of arrival (ETA) 
agreeable to consignor, motor carrier, and consignee; load specifics (shipping paper 
information), and driver identification. When shipments are in transit, the motor carrier 
should coordinate with consignee to confirm the pre-established ETA will be met, or 
agree on a new ETA. Upon receipt of the shipment consignees should notify the shipper 
that the shipment has arrived on schedule and materials are accounted for. Methods for 
advance notice and confirmation of receipt of shipments include electronic mail and 
voice communications. When practical, consignees should immediately alert the 
appropriate shipper or motor carrier if the shipment fails to arrive on schedule or if a 
material shortage is discovered. Methods for immediate alert notifications should be 
made by voice communications only. Where immediate notification is not practical (for 
example at unmanned facilities), the consignor, the motor carrier, and consignee should 
agree on alternate confirmation (method and time) of delivery and receipt. Consignees 
should make every effort possible to accept a shipment that arrives during non-business 
hours due to unforeseen circumstances.  
 
Security Action Item #18. Preplanning Routes – Employers should ensure 
preplanning of primary and alternate routes. This preplanning should seek to avoid or 
minimize proximity to highly populated urban areas or critical infrastructure such as 
bridges, dams, and tunnels. Policies governing operations during periods of Orange or 
Red alert levels under the Homeland Security Advisory System should plan for alternate 
routing for TIER 1 HSSM shipments away from highly populated urban areas and critical 
infrastructure. The motor carrier or law enforcement officials may determine when to 
implement alternate routing. Drivers should be encouraged to notify the company’s 
dispatch center when substantial en-route deviation is necessary.  
 
Security Action Item #19. Security for Trips Exceeding Driving Time under the 
Hours of Service of Drivers Regulation (49 CFR Part 395) – Employers should 
examine security in light of hours of service available and take steps to mitigate the 
vulnerabilities associated with extended rest stops for driver relief. Examples include 
methods such as constant vehicle attendance or visual observation with the vehicle, 
driver teams, or vetted companions. Other examples include arranging secure locations 
along the route through mutual agreement with industry partners and stakeholders, or  
 
Security Action Item #20. Dedicated Truck  – Employers should implement policies 
to ensure that, except under emergency circumstances, contracted shipments remain 
with the primary carrier and are not subcontracted, driver/team substitutions are not 
made, and transloading does not occur unless the subcontractor has been confirmed to 
comply with applicable Federal safety and security guidance and regulations and 
company security policies.  
 
Security Action Item #21. Tractor Activation Capability – Employers should 
implement security measures that require driver identification by login and password or 
biometric data to drive the tractor. Companies should provide written policies and 
instructions to drivers explaining the activation process.  
 
Security Action Item #22. Panic Button Capability – Employers should implement 
means for a driver to transmit an emergency alert notification to dispatch. “Panic 
Button” technology enables a driver to remotely send an emergency alert notification 
message either via Satellite or Terrestrial Communications, and/or utilize the remote 
Panic Button to disable the vehicle.  
 
Security Action Item #23. Tractor and Trailer Tracking Systems – Employers 
should have the ability of implementing methods of tracking the tractor and trailer  
throughout the intended route with satellite and/or land-based wireless GPS 
communications systems. Tracking methods for the tractor and trailer should provide 
current position by latitude and longitude. Geo-fencing and route monitoring capabilities 
allow authorized users to define and monitor routes and risk areas. If the tractor and/or  
 
 
 
SAI #17 calls for close 
coordination between shipper 
and receiver including 
establishment of 
communication systems to 
establish ETA and to track 
delivery schedules. 
SAI #18 suggests shippers 
and carriers establish primary 
and alternate routes.  Carriers 
should avoid highly populated 
urban areas or critical 
infrastructure during Orange 
or Red alerts. 
SAI #19 suggests carriers 
take security precautions 
when trips are interrupted so 
that drivers meet hours of 
service requirements. 
SAI #20 suggests that Tier 1 
shipments not be 
subcontracted or transloaded 
unless the subcontractor is 
security cleared. 
SAI #21 suggests that 
carriers user in-cab devices 
that require drivers to log-in 
to drive the tractor.  SAI #22 
suggests that drivers have 
access to a panic button (in-
cab and/or remote). 
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trailer deviates from a specified route or enters a risk area, an alert notification should  
be sent to the dispatch center. An employer or an authorized representative should have 
the ability to remotely monitor trailer “connect” and “disconnect” events. Employers or 
an authorized representative should have the ability to poll the tractor and trailer 
tracking units to request a current location and status report. Tractor position reporting 
frequency should be configured at not more than 15-minute intervals. Trailer position 
reporting frequency should be configured to provide a position report periodically when 
the trailer has been subject to an unauthorized disconnect from the tractor. The 
reporting frequency should be at an interval that assists the employer in locating and 
recovering the trailer in a timely manner. The tractor and trailer tracking system should 
be tested periodically and the results of the test should be recorded 
 
Figure 2.4.b lists Tier 1 HSSMs and the number of annual U.S. shipments of each 
HSSM. 
 
Figure 2.4.b TSA Tier 1 HSSMs 
DOT Hazard Class Hazmat 
Placard 
Threshold Quantity Number of Annual U.S. 
Shipments 12 
 
Division 1.1 
Division 1.2 
Division 1.3 
Explosives 
 
 
 
 
Any quantity 
 
 
Domestic - 11,868 
NAFTA – 524 
 
 
Division 2.2 
Non-Flammable Gas (also 
meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation) 
 
 
 
 
Anhydrous ammonia (UN1005) in single bulk 
packaging >300 L or 3000 kg 
 
 
Domestic - 563,771 13 
NAFTA - 6,767 
 
 
Division 2.3 
Toxic (Poison) Gas 
 
Division 2.3 
Toxic (Poison) Gas 
 
 
 
Hazard zone A & B >5lbs. in a single package 
 
Hazard zone C & D in single bulk packaging 
>3000L or 3000kg 
 
Domestic - 960,871 
NAFTA - 8,233 
 
Class 3 Flammable Liquids (also 
meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation) 
 
 
 
PG I in single bulk packaging > 3000 L or 3000 
kg 
 
Domestic - 62,015,889 14 
NAFTA - 119,816 
 
 
Division 6.1 Poisonous Materials 
(also meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation) 
 
 
 
Hazard zone A & B > 5 lbs. in a single package 
 
Domestic - 307,244 
NAFTA - 18,213 
 
 
Division 6.1 Poisonous Materials 
(also meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation) 
 
 
 
Hazard zone C & D in single bulk packaging > 
3000 l or 3000 kg 
 
Class 7 Radioactive Materials 
 
 
 
IAEA Code of Conduct Category 1 and 2 
materials including Highway Route Controlled 
quantities as defined in 49 CFR 173.403 or 
known as radionuclides in forms as RAM-QC by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
 
Domestic - 7,777 
NAFTA - 7,265 
 
 
 
                                                            
12 Data on the number of Tier 1 HSSM shipments was provided by David Cooper, Program Manager, Highway & Motor Carrier 
Division, U.S. Transportation Security Administration.  Data represents 2005 projections for US domestic and NAFTA truck traffic for 
select hazmat commodities. 
 
13 This figure includes shipments of Tier 2 Division 2.2 Non-Flammable Gases (subsidiary hazard Oxidizer Division 5.1). 
 
14 This figure includes shipments of : 1). Class 3 Flammable Liquids (PGI and II in single bulk packaging > 300L or 3000 kg; and 2). 
Class 3 Flammable Liquids (any quantity desensitized explosives) – both of which are Tier 2 HSSM. 
 
SAI #23 suggests the use of 
tractor and trailer tracking 
systems.  Systems should 
allow for route adherence 
tracking and monitoring of 
trailer “connect” and 
“disconnect”. 
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Class 8 Corrosive Materials (also 
meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation) 
 
 
 
Packing group I and II in single bulk packaging 
> 3000 L or 3000 kg 
 
Domestic - 4,548,595 15 
NAFTA - 95,703 
 
 
 
Other Materials 
  
Any quantity of chemicals listed by the 
Chemical Weapons Convention on Schedules. 
 
 
unknown 
    
Domestic – 1,287.760 16 
NAFTA – 34,235 
 
 
 
2.5 The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (PL 110-53/H.R. 1) requires 
TSA to take action on hazmat shipment tracking. 
 
On August 3, 2007, President Bush signed the “Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007”.  This comprehensive legislation consists of 24 Titles 
addressing a broad range of matters intended to enhance homeland security and 
counter the terrorist threat. 
 
The Act is a consolidation of three former House and Senate bills – H.R. 1, which bore 
the title “Implementing the 9-11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007”; S. 4, 
“Improving America’s Security Act of 2007”; and H.R. 1401, “Rail and Public 
Transportation Security Act of 2007.” 
 
Subject areas covered in the Act include homeland security and emergency management 
performance grants; communications interoperability; strengthening use of the incident 
command system; improving intelligence and information sharing and Congressional 
oversight of intelligence; preventing terrorist travel; privacy and civil liberties; private 
sector preparedness; improving critical infrastructure security; enhanced defenses 
against weapons of mass destruction; enhancing transportation security; preventing 
weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism; international cooperation on 
security technologies; 9/11 Commission international implementation; and advancing 
democratic values. 
 
 
2.5.1 Earlier legislative initiatives paved the way for PL 110-53. 
 
To date, adoption of smart truck technology to protect hazmat shipments has been 
voluntary on the part of trucking fleets.  And, many fleets – especially the larger, long-
haul fleets – have extensive smart truck technology systems in place.  For example, 
Qualcomm – a participant in the FMCSA smart truck technology study – has installed its 
commercial communications and position-reporting technology on more than 500,000 
commercial vehicles.  Qualcomm’s customers include more than 1,500 trucking 
companies, and 34 of the top 35 truckload fleets.  However, even with the commercial 
success of Qualcomm and others, the FMCSA study concluded that smart truck 
technology has not been deployed extensively enough in the hazmat supply chain and 
that the government security infrastructure is not sufficiently developed to provide the 
level of protection the country needs for hazmat shipments.   
 
A number of regulatory/legislative initiatives have been undertaken by government 
agencies to accelerate the deployment of smart truck technology to protect hazmat 
shipments. 
 
 
                                                            
15 This figure includes shipments of Class 8 Corrosive Materials (Packing group I in single bulk packaging > 3000L or 3000kg) which 
is a Tier 2 HSSM. 
 
16 This figure does not include Tier 1 Division 2.2 Non-Flammable Gas (also meeting the definition of a material poisonous by 
inhalation) or Tier 1 Class 3 Flammable Liquids (also meeting the definition of a material poisonous by inhalation) or Class 8 
Corrosive Materials (also meeting the definition of a material poisonous by inhalation).  Data is unavailable on the number of these 
shipments. 
 
 
President Bush signed P.L. 110-
53 on August 3, 2007.  It 
includes provisions to enhance 
transportation security. 
Use of smart truck technology 
is voluntary, but legislative & 
regulatory pressure for 
mandatory deployment is 
increasing. 
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In 2004, the State of California considered legislation (AB 575) that would have 
required all California registered trucks engaged in the transportation of flammable and 
combustible liquids in cargo trucks to be equipped with a GPS system.  The GPS system 
would enable the motor carrier to find the truck’s location at any time.   The legislation 
also required installation of remote vehicle shutdown (RVS) devices on all California-
domiciled trucks carrying hazardous materials.  The RVS devices had to be accessible to 
California Highway Patrol (CHP) officials so that CHP would be able to remotely disable a 
truck by activating the truck’s RVS device.  AB 575 was designed to give law 
enforcement and fleet owners more control of hazmat trucks in the event of a hijacking 
by a terrorist or a mentally unstable individual.   
The bill had particularly strong support from California’s law enforcement community – 
especially the California Highway Patrol.  CHP’s support of the bill was due, in part, to an 
incident that occurred in early 2001.  In that incident, a driver slammed an 18-wheeler 
into California’s state Capitol building.  The driver – an ex-convict and mental patient – 
was killed in the crash.  The truck was destroyed by fire and $10million in damage was 
done to the Capitol building.  According to CHP officials, had the truck been carrying a 
flammable or explosive substance, the entire Capitol building would have been destroyed.   
AB 575 passed easily in the state assembly but was sidetracked in the California senate in 
the face of opposition by the trucking industry which argued that it would place too much 
financial burden on hazmat transporters and that too little thought had been given to 
implementation, especially related to CHP access to RVS devices on the trucks.  California 
legislators plan to reintroduce the bill in modified form in the future.   
The need to protect the hazmat supply chain has captured the attention of U.S. 
legislators.  In the 108th Congress, the United States Senate considered an amendment 
introduced by Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) to the Department of Homeland Security’s 
appropriations bill that would have required: 
 
1. trucks transporting hazardous materials to be equipped with global positioning 
satellite (GPS) tracking devices; and 
 
2. written route plans to be prepared and filed with DHS prior to transporting hazardous 
materials.   
 
Noting the growing preference of terrorists to use truck bombs in their attacks, Schumer 
remarked on the Senate floor,  
 
...”You can buy a car and pay a couple hundred bucks more and have a GPS system 
which tells exactly where the vehicle is. Wouldn’t it make sense that every truck carrying 
hazardous material was required to have such a GPS system? That would mean if the 
truck were stolen, if the truck were taken to a far different location than where it should 
be and the company wished to find out where it was, we could find it in a minute.” 
 
Schumer’s amendment drew opposition from the American Trucking Associations (ATA).  
The ATA criticized the measure as unnecessarily burdensome and characterized GPS-
based tracking systems as expensive and “easily defeated.”  Republicans and several 
farm state Democrats combined to defeat the measure. Sen. Thad Cochran (R-
Mississippi), chairman of the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, argued that other measures were already in place to address 
hazmat security, including shipper training and Highway Watch® programs as well as a 
research effort by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to test and evaluate a 
variety of technologies, including GPS, for identifying potentially dangerous vehicles.  
 
The Senate voted 55-34 to table the Schumer amendment, instead adopting a more 
modest proposal from Sen. Harry M. Reid (D-Nevada) that appropriated $2 million to 
support efforts for identification and tracking of trucks carrying hazmat cargoes and $53 
million to continue and expand upon the background check system for commercial driver 
licenses with a hazmat endorsement. 
 
In the October 2004 issue of GPS World, a leading trade magazine, the magazine’s 
editor criticized ATA’s opposition to GPS-based tracking systems for hazmat shipments 
 
The amendment was opposed 
by the American Trucking 
Associations, and tabled in the 
U.S. Senate. 
Since 9/11 federal legislators 
have become concerned about 
the use of hazmat shipments as 
weapons of mass destruction. 
 
In 2004, California considered 
requiring all hazmat 
transporters to install GPS and 
remote vehicle shutdown 
devices on their trucks. 
AB 575 was opposed by the 
trucking industry and was 
tabled in the California Senate. 
 
In 2004, the U.S. Senate 
considered an amendment to the 
DHS appropriations bill requiring 
hazmat GPS tracking and written 
route plans. 
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 as being disingenuous and short-sighted. 17 
 
“…Ironically, for years a rapidly growing number of trucking companies have been 
outfitting their fleets with just the kind of capability that ATA dismisses as an expensive, 
vulnerable, and cumbersome mandate, primarily because of the increased productivity 
that results.  
 
Of course, this is not the first instance of an industry resisting a security mandate. After 
9/11, commercial airlines resisted some suggestions for methods of increasing security 
against terrorists, or argued that the government should pay for these measures.  The 
dissenters usually have some credible reasons for not complying with the directive. 
Privacy. Cost. Bureaucratic burden. Inadequate preparation time. But the unspoken 
motive often seems to come from just not wanting to be obliged to do something.  
 
It brings to mind the closing stanza of Rudyard Kipling’s poem, “The Lesson,” composed 
in the wake of the disastrous Boer War: “We have forty million reasons for failure, but not 
a single excuse.”  
 
Clearly, GPS is not a complete solution for the security needs of the U.S. transportation 
system. But just as clearly GPS should be a part of that solution. It’s past time to make it 
so. “ 
 
In the 109th Congress, Senate Bill 1052 – sponsored by Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) 
and co-sponsored by Schumer and others – would have required the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and the Secretary of Transportation to develop a National Public 
Sector Response System patterned on the PSRC concept from the FMCSA hazmat 
security study.   The bill was referred out of committee for debate by the full Senate on 
February 27, 2006 and has yet to be scheduled for full debate.   Senate Bill 1052 failed 
to survive Senate debates, but it is notable in that it recognized the need for a Hazmat 
Public Sector Reporting Center and embraced the idea that a regulatory “push” – like 
that implemented in Singapore - is needed to promote smart truck technology 
deployment. 
 
 
2.5.2  PL 110-53 requires TSA to develop a hazmat truck tracking program. 
 
Section 1554 of PL 110-53 directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security, through the TSA Administrator, to develop a program to facilitate the tracking 
of motor carrier shipments of security-sensitive materials and to equip vehicles used in 
such shipments with technology that provides frequent or continuous communications, 
vehicle position location and tracking capabilities, and a feature that allows the driver to 
broadcast an emergency distress signal.  The text of Section 1554 follows. 
 
SECTION 1554. MOTOR CARRIER SECURITY-SENSITIVE MATERIAL TRACKING. 
 
(a) Communications.-- 
 
(1) In general.--Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, 
consistent with the findings of the Transportation Security Administration's 
hazardous materials truck security pilot program, the Secretary, through the 
Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration and in consultation with the 
Secretary of Transportation, shall develop a program to facilitate the tracking of motor 
carrier shipments of security-sensitive materials and to equip vehicles used in such 
shipments with technology that provides-- 
 
(A) frequent or continuous communications; 
 
(B) vehicle position location and tracking capabilities; and 
 
(C) a feature that allows a driver of such vehicles to broadcast an emergency distress 
signal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
17 “Hazmat Keeps On Truckin’,”  October 1, 2004, GPS World http://www.gpsworld.com/gpsworld/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=126157 
 
 
 
 
PL 110-53 requires TSA to 
develop a hazmat truck 
tracking program. 
 
 
PL 110-53 requires that TSA’s 
truck tracking program be 
consistent with the findings 
of TSA’s Hazmat Truck 
Security Pilot.   
 
U.S. Senate Bill 1052 would 
have authorized DHS/DOT to 
develop a hazmat PSRC; 
regulations would drive smart 
truck technology adoption. 
 
 
The trucking industry’s motivation 
for resisting the amendment’s 
hazmat GPS tracking requirement 
was motivated by “just not 
wanting to be obliged (by the 
government) to do something…. 
 
…Clearly, GPS is not a complete 
solution for the security needs of 
the U.S. transportation system. 
But just as clearly GPS should be 
a part of that solution.  It's past 
time to make it so.” 
 
 Editor - GPS World 
 October 2004 
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(2) Considerations.--In developing the program required by paragraph (1), the Secretary 
shall-- 
 
(A) consult with the Secretary of Transportation to coordinate the program with any 
ongoing or planned efforts for motor carrier or security-sensitive materials tracking at the 
Department of Transportation; 
 
(B) take into consideration the recommendations and findings of the report on the 
hazardous material safety and security operational field test released by the  Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration on November 11, 2004; and  
 
(C) evaluate-- 
(i) any new information related to the costs and benefits of deploying, equipping, and utilizing tracking 
technology, including portable tracking technology, for motor carriers transporting security-sensitive 
materials not included in the hazardous material safety and security operational field test report 
released by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration on November 11, 2004; 
 
(ii) the ability of tracking technology to resist tampering and disabling; 
 
(iii) the capability of tracking technology to collect, display, and store information regarding the 
movement of shipments of security-sensitive materials by commercial motor vehicles; 
 
(iv) the appropriate range of contact intervals between the tracking technology and a commercial 
motor vehicle transporting security-sensitive materials; 
 
(v) technology that allows the installation by a motor carrier of concealed electronic devices on 
commercial motor vehicles that can be activated by law enforcement authorities to disable the vehicle 
or alert emergency response resources to locate and recover security-sensitive materials in the event 
of loss or theft of such materials; 
 
(vi) whether installation of the technology described in clause (v) should be incorporated into the 
program under paragraph (1); 
 
(vii) the costs, benefits, and practicality of such technology described in clause (v) in the context of 
the overall benefit to national security, including commerce in transportation; and 
 
(viii) other systems and information the Secretary determines appropriate. 
 
(b) Funding.--From the amounts appropriated pursuant to section 114(w) of title 49, 
United States Code, as amended by section 1503 of this Act, there shall be made 
available to the Secretary to carry out this section-- 
 
(1) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2008 of which $3,000,000 may be used for equipment; 
 
(2) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2009 of which $3,000,000 may be used for equipment; 
and 
 
(3) $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2010 of which $3,000,000 may be used for equipment. 
 
(c) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the issuance of regulations under subsection (a), 
the Secretary shall issue a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the 
program developed and evaluation carried out under this section. 
 
(d) Limitation.--The Secretary may not mandate the installation or utilization of a 
technology described under this section without additional congressional authority 
provided after the date of enactment of this Act. 
 
 
2.5.3 PL 110-53 requires DHS to evaluate hazmat truck routes. 
 
Section 1553 of PL 110-53 directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security to: (1) document existing and proposed routes for the transportation of 
hazardous materials by motor carrier; (2) assess and characterize such routes to 
identify measurable criteria for selecting routes based on safety and security concerns; 
(3) prepare guidance materials for state officials to assist them in identifying and 
reducing safety concerns and security risks when designating routes for hazardous 
materials; and (4) complete an assessment of the safety and national security benefits 
achieved under existing requirements for route plans for explosives and radioactive 
materials.  The text of Section 1553 follows. 
 
SEC. 1553. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS HIGHWAY ROUTING 
 
(a) Route Plan Guidance.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary, shall-- 
 
The TSA hazmat truck tracking 
program must factor the FMCSA 
Field Operations Test results 
into its design (refer to Section 
3.1).  
The law requires TSA to consider 
a number of things including: 
 
• cost/benefit of “smart truck” 
technology deployment; 
 
• ability to resist tampering and 
disabling; 
 
• contact intervals (polling 
rates); and 
 
• vehicle immobilization. 
 
PL 110-53 allocates $7 million 
for the current fiscal year and 
$7 million/year for the following 
two fiscal years to fund TSA’s 
hazmat truck tracking program. 
 
 
PL 110-53 requires DHS to 
evaluate truck transportation 
routes for radioactive and 
nonradioactive hazardous 
materials. 
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(1) document existing and proposed routes for the transportation of radioactive and 
nonradioactive hazardous materials by motor carrier, and develop a framework for using 
a geographic information system-based approach to characterize routes in the national 
hazardous materials route registry; 
 
(2) assess and characterize existing and proposed routes for the transportation of 
radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous materials by motor carrier for the purpose of 
identifying measurable criteria for selecting routes based on safety and security 
concerns; 
  
(3) analyze current route-related hazardous materials regulations in the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico to identify cross-border differences and conflicting regulations; 
  
(4) document the safety and security concerns of the public, motor carriers, and State, 
local, territorial, and tribal governments about the highway routing of hazardous 
materials; 
  
(5) prepare guidance materials for State officials to assist them in identifying and 
reducing both safety concerns and security risks when designating highway routes for 
hazardous materials consistent with the 13 safety-based nonradioactive materials 
routing criteria and radioactive materials routing criteria in subpart C part 397 of title 
49, Code of Federal Regulations;18 
  
(6) develop a tool that will enable State officials to examine potential routes for the 
highway transportation of hazardous materials, assess specific security risks associated 
with each route, and explore alternative mitigation measures; and 
  
(7) transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the actions taken 
to fulfill paragraphs (1) through (6) and any recommended changes to the routing 
requirements for the highway transportation of hazardous materials in part 397 of title 
49, Code of Federal Regulations. 
 
 (b) Route Plans.-- 
  
(1) Assessment.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Transportation shall complete an assessment of the safety and national 
security benefits achieved under existing requirements for route plans, in written or 
electronic format, for explosives and radioactive materials. The assessment shall, at a 
minimum-- 
 
(A) compare the percentage of Department of Transportation recordable incidents and 
the severity of such incidents for shipments of explosives and radioactive materials for 
which such route plans are required with the percentage of recordable incidents and the 
severity of such incidents for shipments of explosives and radioactive materials not 
subject to such route plans; and 
 
(B) quantify the security and safety benefits, feasibility, and costs of requiring each 
motor carrier that is required to have a hazardous material safety permit under part 385 
of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to maintain, follow, and carry such a route plan 
that meets the requirements of section 397.101 of that title when transporting the type 
and quantity of hazardous materials described in section 385.403, taking into account 
the various segments of the motor carrier industry, including tank truck, truckload and 
less than truckload carriers. 
  
(2) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of Transportation shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees 
containing the findings and conclusions of the assessment. 
 
 
                                                            
18 Refer to 49CFR 397.71.  In establishing, maintaining, or enforcing a specific non-radioactive hazmat route, a state must consider 
the following federal standards:  population density; type of highway; types and quantities of NRHM; emergency response 
capabilities; results of consultation with affected persons; exposure and other risk factors; terrain considerations; continuity of 
routes; alternative routes; effects on commerce; delays in transportation; climatic conditions; and congestion and accident history.  
 
PL 110-53 requires DHS to 
develop a tool that will enable 
State officials to examine 
potential hazmat routes and to 
assess security risks associated 
with each route. 
Under PL 110-53 DOT must 
require motor carriers subject to 
FMCSA’s hazardous material 
safety permitting requirements 
to maintain, follow, and carry a 
route plan in written or 
electronic format. 
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(c) Requirement.--The Secretary shall require motor carriers that have a hazardous 
material safety permit under part 385 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to 
maintain, follow, and carry a route plan, in written or electronic format, that meets the 
requirements of section 397.101 of that title when transporting the type and quantity of  
hazardous materials described in section 385.403 if the Secretary determines, under the 
assessment required in subsection (b), that such a requirement would enhance security 
and safety without imposing unreasonable costs or burdens upon motor carriers. 
 
 
2.5.4  TSA plans to expand on its recently completed Hazmat Truck Security 
Pilot program. 
 
PL 110-53 requires TSA to develop its hazmat tracking program to be consistent with the 
findings of TSA’s Hazmat Truck Security Pilot.  The TSA Hazmat Truck Security Pilot was 
completed April 2008 and is described in Section 4.2 of this report.  On February 25, 
2008, the project team met with representatives of TSA’s Transportation Sector Network 
Management Branch of the Highway Motor Carrier Programs Office.  The project team 
was provided with a document describing TSA’s high-level plan for implementing H.R. 1.  
It is included in this report as Appendix C.   
In its plan for implementing H.R. 1, TSA stated that its Hazmat Truck Security Pilot 
demonstrates the feasibility of implementing a hazmat truck tracking program. 
“The pilot project has shown that the transition from pilot to program is feasible.  It has 
demonstrated a prototype for a centralized truck tracking center.  The truck tracking 
center was used to coordinate incident response with appropriate first responders and a 
government intelligence operations center.  The truck tracking center system collected 
data in real-time from carrier-operated systems utilized in the field.  Upon receiving an 
alert notification or upon detection of an abnormal condition, truck tracking center 
dispatchers helped manage the process of notifying stakeholders and coordinating 
responses to transportation security incidents.” 
 
Furthermore, TSA pointed out in its plan that its Hazmat Truck Security Pilot established 
the foundation for satisfying the three general requirements of §1554(a)(1) of H.R. 1. 
 
• Frequent or continuous communications – TSA has developed a set of tested 
protocols that are capable of interfacing with (a) existing truck tracking systems, (b) 
state/local law enforcement agencies and first responders and (c) with federal 
intelligence and emergency management centers. 
 
• Vehicle position location and tracking capabilities – TSA has implemented a 
tested and functioning truck tracking center that allows TSA to “continually” monitor 
truck locations and track load types in all of the continental United States. 
 
• A feature that allows a driver of such vehicles to broadcast an emergency 
distress signal – TSA has developed a concept of operations that has gone through 
considerable testing and being vetted by government and industry volunteers.  This 
concept of operations facilitates effective responses to drivers’ emergency distress 
signals. 
 
TSA plans to take the following actions as a follow-up to the Hazmat Truck Security 
Pilot: 
 
1. further develop its standards-based communications interface to adapt to evolving 
technical and functional requirements; 
 
2. fully develop and implement a scalable truck tracking center to function as a central 
operations control area to (i) collect data from motor carriers, (ii) monitor events 
and coordinate a response, and (iii) facilitate communications to support a 
coordinated response; and 
 
3. further refine the systems and algorithms that provide the foundation of truck 
tracking center system’s risk-based approach to transportation event management. 
 
 
 
TSA’s Hazmat Truck Security 
Pilot has proven that a hazmat 
tracking program is feasible.  
TSA believes the pilot program 
has established a solid 
foundation for implementing PL 
110-53.  
 
 
TSA has prepared a high-level 
implementation plan to meet its 
legislative responsibilities under 
PL 110-53; TSA will enhance the 
functionality of the pilot program 
prototype. 
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2.6 EPA wants to implement a hazardous waste electronic manifest 
program. 
 
EPA is interested in promoting e-manifest use and is considering a model in which a 
private company would build and operate a national processing system for hazardous 
waste electronic manifests.  The system would be connected as a node to EPA’s 
Centralized Data Exchange (CDX), and data would flow into CDX as e-manifest 
transactions take place.  EPA would allow the company to collect fees in exchange for 
building and operating the national e-manifest system. 
 
This section describes EPA’s initiative to develop its electronic manifest regulatory 
program and EPA’s difficult experience in attempting to implement a national e-manifest 
processing center.  Figure 2.6.a illustrates how EPA’s e-manifest initiative has unfolded 
over the years.  The following sections describe EPA’s experience in more detail. 
 
 
 
2.6.1 EPA’s hazardous waste manifest requirements are burdensome and 
expensive. 
 
Since 1980, the hazardous waste manifest system has provided a paper trail to track 
hazardous waste shipments from “cradle to grave.'' Waste generators, transporters, and 
waste management firms each participate in documenting the movement of waste 
shipments through the use of the current paper manifest system The current “as-is” 
manifest business process is illustrated in Appendix A.  A copy of the hazardous waste 
manifest form may also be found in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 2.6.a Timeline for EPA’s electronic manifest initiative. 
 
 
 
 
EPA wants to use a business 
approach in which a private 
company would build and 
operate a national hazardous 
waste e-manifest processing 
center. 
 
The hazardous waste manifest 
system has been in place in the 
U.S. since 1980. 
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About 28 states currently collect completed manifest copies from hazardous waste 
generators and waste management facilities, manually keying or scanning the data into 
state tracking databases. These states utilize manifest data for program management, for 
identifying trends in waste management, for enforcement and for assessing waste 
management fees. 
 
EPA estimates that there are there are 2.2-5 million hazardous waste shipments in the 
United States each year.  Given the volume of manifests circulated each year and the 
number of copies that must be signed sequentially and retained in files for inspection, the 
paperwork burden attributed to the manifest system is one of EPA’s largest. EPA 
estimates that the paperwork burden associated with its hazardous waste manifest is 
about 3 million person-hours per year and costs waste handlers and states between $193 
million and $595 million per year.   
 
 
2.6.2  Electronic manifests have the potential of generating savings of more than 
$300 million/year. 
 
Electronic manifests will save money.  On a unit cost basis, EPA estimates that an e-
manifest transaction will generate cost savings of about $75/manifest.  As illustrated in 
Figure 2.4.b cost savings will be captured by waste generators, waste transporters, 
waste firms, and state agencies.  With about 4 million hazardous waste shipments in the 
U.S. each year, electronic manifests have the potential to generate savings of more than 
$300 million per year.19 20 
 
Figure 2.4.b EPA Estimated E-Manifest Cost Savings 
 
 
 
Unit Cost Savings 
% Distribution 
 
Unit Cost Savings 
$ Distribution 
Waste Generators 22% $16.67 
Waste Management Firms 47% $34.96 
Waste Transporters 20% $14.99 
State Agencies 11% $8.20 
EPA 0% $0.00 
Total 100% $74.82 
 
 
Waste transporters and waste management firms together capture about two-thirds of 
available e-manifest cost savings – about $50/manifest transaction.  Many waste 
transporters are captive transporters – ie. they are owned by waste management firms 
and haul exclusively for their parent companies.  When viewed in this light, the waste 
management firms will be the largest beneficiaries of EPA’s e-manifest program.  Note 
that EPA does not capture cost savings under an e-manifest program as responsibility for 
management of hazardous waste programs is fully delegated to the states.  EPA is not a 
party to the manifest business process and has no operational role in the day-to-day 
running of the hazardous waste programs in the states. 
 
Given the huge paper burden associated with its manifest program, EPA is interested in 
transforming the manifest system from its current paper-based approach to one that 
takes greater advantage of electronic information technologies. Successful 
implementation of an e-manifest system will substantially reduce the costs and 
paperwork burden associated with the current manifest system, improve the ability to 
track waste shipments and improve the quality and timeliness of manifest data.   
 
 
 
                                                            
19 EPA estimates that there are 2.2-5 million hazardous waste manifest transactions in the U.S. each year.  The hazardous waste 
manifest unit cost figures are from the 2002 EPA Hazardous Waste Cost/Benefit Analysis – Table 5-12, Unit Cost Savings Over As-Is 
Model.   
 
20 A later study for EPA by the Logistics Management Institute in 2002 estimated that a centralized e-manifest system tied to EPA’s 
CDX would generate savings of at least $100 million/year 
EPA’s expects e-manifests will 
reduce paperwork burden on 
industry and government 
agencies.   
According to EPA, electronic 
manifests will generate a 
cost savings of ~$75 per 
manifest transaction.  
EPA does not share in e-
manifest cost savings because 
the states run hazardous waste 
programs in the U.S. 
 
Electronic manifests have the 
potential of generating savings 
of more than $300 million per 
year in the U.S. 
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2.6.3 EPA wants to build a national hazardous waste e-manifest processing 
center using a public/private partnership. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.6.a, EPA has labored for a considerable time to introduce 
electronic manifests.  Initially in 2001, EPA planned to issue a rule that would allow 
companies and states to use e-manifests.  EPA expected that the market would respond 
and that the states and the regulated community would adopt e-manifest programs 
without a direct EPA implementation role.  EPA moved away from that position over time 
and began to envision a more direct implementation role for itself.   
 
In 2004, EPA tried to use federal “share-in-savings” contracts to enter into an 
arrangement with a private company that would build and operate a national e-manifest 
processing center.  The private company would build and operate the system at its 
expense and recover its costs though an e-manifest processing fee.  EPA was unable to 
use the “share-in-savings” approach and in 2006, sought legislation that would provide 
the agency “share-in-savings” type authority.  EPA’s first legislative initiative failed, and 
in June 2008, a new legislative initiative began. 
 
Sections 2.6.3.1 – 2.6.3.8 describes EPA efforts over time to build a national hazardous 
waste e-manifest processing center and the current status of EPA’s efforts. 
 
 
2.6.3.1 EPA’s original electronic manifest NPRM in 2001 established basic e-
manifest requirements. 
 
On May 22, 2001, EPA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) aimed at 
reducing the manifest system's paperwork burden on users, while enhancing the 
effectiveness of the manifest as a tool to track hazardous waste shipments from the site 
of generation to treatment, storage, or disposal facilities (TSDFs). The proposed rule 
included proposed two manifest system reforms: (1)revisions to the manifest form itself 
and the procedures for using the form; and (2) revisions to the paper-based manifest 
system aimed at replacing it with a nearly paperless electronic approach for completing, 
signing, transmitting and storing manifests, and tracking hazardous waste shipments 
(hereafter, e-manifest).  
 
The proposed e-manifest regulation represented a decentralized approach in which EPA 
would issue several information technology (IT) standards, and private parties such as 
waste management firms and IT vendors would develop and market their own e-
manifest systems complying with EPA's standards. The proposed standards addressed 
such areas as Electronic Data Interchange(EDI) transaction sets and mapping 
conventions, Extensible Markup Language (XML) representations of the manifest, 
electronic signature methods, and computer security standards that were viewed as 
necessary to ensure trustworthy systems and data that would be free from tampering or 
corruption. Significantly, under the proposed rule approach, EPA's role would be limited 
to the development of the e-manifest standards, and the Agency would not have had 
any role in developing an IT system or in collecting electronic manifests. 
 
The proposal discussed the type of standards that EPA intended to develop.  These 
standards included a minimal set of controls and procedures applicable to computer 
systems that would prepare and process electronic manifests. EPA expects these system 
controls, when combined with the requirement that electronic manifest  copies be signed 
with secure types of electronic signatures, would assure users and regulators of the 
authenticity and integrity of electronic manifest records. Specifically, EPA expected the 
proposed electronic signature requirements and computer security controls would 
address five key issues related to the reliability and enforceability of electronic 
documents. 
 
• Identity. The proposed controls would assist in demonstrating who affixed their 
signature to the document. Specifically, such controls as access checks, audit trails, 
signature agreements, and/or signature verification processes would help prevent 
unauthorized use of electronic signatures. 
 
• Intent. The proposed security provisions would assist in showing that the signor 
acted with the required intent to adopt the document being signed or to be bound  
 
In 2001, EPA published its 
vision for an electronic manifest 
program.  It addressed technical 
standards and EPA’s 
implementation role. 
EPA wants to build a national 
hazardous waste e-manifest 
processing center using a 
public/private partnership. 
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by its contents. This would involve a showing that the signor understood the 
significance of the signature act, so that he or she could not later repudiate their 
signature as unintended or mistaken. Signature procedures that include warnings 
about the consequences of affixing a signature, and an opportunity to review and 
verify the data presented for signature, would help demonstrate intent. 
 
• Tamper-resistance. The proposed security provisions would also assist in 
demonstrating that a document was not altered after signature, since the ability to 
alter data after signature would permit the signor to later repudiate a document as 
different from the one that he or she actually signed. Signature methods that use 
encryption processes to inextricably bind the signature to the data signed would 
safeguard electronic documents from subsequent alteration, as would system audit 
checks that would disclose any changes to a record, or attempts to change a record. 
 
• Availability. Copies of electronic manifests would be maintained in such a manner 
as to be accessible throughout the record retention period. System controls which 
require the retention of information on software and hardware versions used to 
create archived records, as well as requirements to retain and maintain previous 
versions of software, hardware, and system documentation, would ensure that this 
capability is not compromised. 
 
• Interoperability and error detection. Systems that would exchange electronic 
manifests would be interoperable, so that data are accurately and reliably 
processed, signatures verified, and security features necessary to data integrity 
maintained throughout the exchange of the electronic documents. In addition, 
electronic systems would be able to detect errors (i.e., altered/corrupt data or 
invalid signatures), so that invalid records can be flagged and corrected. System 
security controls, validation requirements, signature verification requirements, and 
requirements to respond to detected errors and invalid signatures can minimize the 
possibility of invalid documents being passed by electronic systems. 
 
Prior to issuing its NPRM, EPA conducted a small pilot program to test basic e-manifest 
technology.  As part of the pilot, EPA used an early electronic forms product and melded 
it to a workflow software package to build a crude working prototype of an electronic 
manifest.   
 
The electronic manifest ``forms'' EPA used in its pilot tests retained both the form 
structure and the manifest data, and were signed with digitized signatures using a 
commercial signature software package. The electronic manifest in the pilot tests had the 
following functionality. 
 
• Retention of all the graphical elements familiar to the paper form. The manifests 
could be processed (prepared, signed, transmitted, and stored) in an entirely digital 
manner, or printed in hard copy. 
 
• Inclusion of numerous on-line help features and edit checks, to assist users with the 
process of completing the manifest accurately and quickly. 
 
• Packaging of form structure and data together in a single file that could be easily 
archived and retrieved. 
 
• Integration with workflow or work group software so that the manifests could be 
routed to appropriate trading partners, while complying with organizations' specific 
business processes and logic rules. 
 
• Support for mapping data directly to a variety of back-end data bases, including 
Oracle, Sybase, SQL Server, and ODBC-compliant data bases. 
 
Public comments on EPA’s proposed rule indicated diverse and substantial levels of 
support for an e-manifest system, but cast doubt on the viability of EPA's assumption that 
waste handlers or others would develop and broadly deploy low-cost, interoperable 
systems. EPA decided to defer final action on the e-manifest portion of the May 2001 
proposed rule and to examine alternatives to its proposed approach.  
 
 
In the 2001 NPRM, EPA 
described its criteria for the 
electronic manifest program. 
 
EPA acknowledged electronic 
forms in terms of  the value 
they hold for an electronic 
manifest system. 
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2.6.3.2 EPA held a public meeting in May 2004 to discuss the future of its e-
manifest program. 
 
EPA explained in the 2001 proposed rule that it did not collect paper manifests from the 
public, nor did it intend to create either a centralized reporting system for electronic 
manifests or a national data base for tracking manifest data. While the Agency desired 
to foster the development of electronic manifest systems by issuing national standards 
that would guide the system development efforts of private parties, EPA did not envision 
playing a role with respect to electronic manifesting that was any different from the 
standard-setting role the Agency had played in the past with respect to the Uniform 
Manifest paper form.  
 
However, a number of public comments criticized the decentralized approach and 
instead stated that the e-manifest system would be unreliable without a nationally 
centralized approach under which EPA would develop a single national IT system to host 
e-manifest services. Lobbyists for the commercial waste management industry were 
particularly critical of EPA’s approach and pressed for an EPA centralized approach.  
 
In May 2004 EPA held a two-day public meeting to discuss the future of its e-manifest 
program.   EPA presented as a favored option the idea of a centralized e-manifest 
processing center, and drew out of its discussions with meeting participants that there 
was a consensus of opinion that EPA should pursue the centralized option.  EPA also 
presented the idea of using a public/private partnership to build a national e-manifest 
processing center.  In exchange for building and operating the e-manifest system, the 
private developer would be allowed to collect e-manifest transaction fees.   
 
EPA’s interest in a public/private partnership to build the national e-manifest system is, 
in large part, a reflection of the fact that EPA’s lacks sufficient budget capacity to 
internally fund development of an e-manifest system.  Instead, it has to rely on private 
capital to support development its development.   
 
 
2.6.3.3 EPA’s uniform manifest rule and its Cross Media Environmental 
Reporting Rule (CROMERR) laid the foundation for an e-manifest rule. 
 
After the May 2004 public meeting, EPA began issuing rules to pave the way for a 
national hazardous waste e-manifest program. 21  On March 4, 2005 EPA published a rule 
in the Federal Register that established a uniform national manifest form.  Under the old 
rule, States were allowed to add additional data fields to the standard manifest form.  
EPA’s rule eliminates that option for states.  Since September 4, 2006, all jurisdictions 
use the exact same form.  A copy of the uniform hazardous waste manifest form may be 
found in Appendix A.   
 
The March 4th rule also presented a fundamental shift in the relationship between waste 
generators and waste transporters.  The rule discusses the new role of “offeror” in the 
EPA hazardous waste manifest process.  The status of an offeror is well developed under 
DOT’s hazardous materials regulations.   Under DOT rules, an offeror is any person 
involved with performing certain ``pre-transportation'' functions that occur before 
hazardous materials are transported in commerce.  An offeror may prepare shipping 
papers on behalf of hazmat shippers and sign the shipper’s certification on the DOT 
shipping papers.  EPA has adopted DOT’s concept of offeror, and will allow offerors to 
sign hazardous waste manifests on behalf of the waste generator.   The preamble 
discussion describing EPA’s new offeror role may be found in Appendix A. 
 
On October 13, 2005 EPA published the Cross Media Environmental Reporting Rule 
(CROMERR 40 CFR Part 3) in the Federal Register.22  CROMERR provides a uniform, 
technology-neutral framework for electronic reporting across all EPA programs; allows 
EPA programs to offer electronic reporting as they become ready (without any additional 
rule-making beyond CROMERR); provides states with a streamlined process – together 
with a uniform set of criteria – for approval of their electronic reporting implementations  
                                                            
21 EPA regulation – uniform hazardous waste manifest form http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-WASTE/2005/March/Day-
04/f1966.htm   
 
22 EPA regulation – Cross Media Environmental Reporting Rule - http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-GENERAL/2005/October/Day-
13/g19601.htm        http://www.epa.gov/cdx/cromerrr/index.html   
 
In May 2004, EPA reversed its 
position on its implementation 
role.  EPA would build a 
centralized system in 
conjunction with a private 
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business process – the 
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prepare and sign a manifest 
for a hazardous waste 
generator. 
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for all their EPA-authorized programs; and ensures that electronic reporting under EPA 
and EPA-authorized state programs does not compromise the enforceability of 
environmental programs.  Specifically, CROMERR’s electronic reporting (ER) provisions: 
 
• modified existing requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) to remove any 
obstacles to ER and allow regulated entities to submit any report electronically, but only after 
EPA announces that ER is available for the specific report; 
 
• required submission of electronic reports to EPA's Central Data Exchange (CDX) or to another 
designated EPA system; 
 
• required validation of electronic signatures on reports submitted to EPA through CDX (or 
another designated EPA system) and ensured that valid electronic signatures have the same 
legal force as their "wet-ink" counterparts; and 
 
• set forth requirements that EPA-authorized programs must satisfy when implementing ER, and 
provided a streamlined process for these programs to get EPA approval of their ER 
implementations. 
 
CROMERR is an EPA agency-wide rule that establishes electronic reporting standards for 
all EPA programs including standards for digital signatures, data integrity, and identity 
authentication.  EPA’s future hazardous waste e-manifest rule will incorporate the 
requirements of CROMERR by reference.   
 
As an Agency-wide rule, CROMERR is important because: 1). it sets the design/operating 
standards that a hazardous waste e-manifest system must meet; 2). it establishes e-
manifest requirements for state authorized programs; and 3). it establishes the 
foundation for EPA’s upcoming hazardous waste e-manifest rule.  CROMERR establishes 
the infrastructure for EPA’s hazardous waste e-manifest program.  Of particular 
relevance is Section 3.200 which establishes requirements that state electronic 
document receiving systems must meet.   Relevant text from Section 3.200 may be 
found in Appendix A.  
 
 
2.6.3.4 EPA’s attempt to use GSA’s Share-In-Savings contract program in 2005 
was unsuccessful.  
 
Based on the mandate EPA believed it captured in its May 2004 public meeting, the 
Agency began to explore models for building a centralized hazardous waste e-manifest 
processing center using a public/private development approach.  EPA entered into 
discussions with the General Services Administration (GSA), which managed the E-
Gov Act Share-in-Savings program, on a possible procurement action that might have 
enabled the centralized e-manifest system to be developed and operated for EPA by an 
information technology (IT) vendor under a “Share-in-Savings'' (SiS) type contract. 
 
The SiS IT contracting mechanism was authorized under the E-Gov Act of 2002 on a 
provisional basis as an innovative tool for Federal agencies to develop new IT systems 
with little direct Federal investment. The premise of the SiS contracting approach was 
that the IT vendor awarded an SiS contract would build the IT system at the vendor's 
initial expense, and then recover its costs and profit from the cost savings or enhanced 
revenue that results to the sponsoring agency from the new IT system. With this 
approach, for example, the successful e-manifest IT contractor would have incurred the 
initial financial risk and outlay to build the centralized e-manifest system to meet EPA's 
performance objectives, and then would have recovered its costs and earned its agreed 
profit from the revenue stream generated by the service fees paid by the users for 
manifest transactions. 
 
In a 2002 study by the Logistics Management Institute, EPA estimated a centralized e-
manifest system tied to EPA CDX would have start-up costs ranging from $2.0 million to 
$7.0 million in the initial year (2002 dollars), plus $0.8 million to $3.2 million per year 
for future annual operation and maintenance (O&M). 
 
EPA’s plan to use the GSA share-in-savings contract program to build a national e-
manifest system suffered a major setback in January 2006 when the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) Council, the group that sets federal acquisition rules, withdrew a rule it 
proposed in 2004 that would have set parameters for share-in-savings contracting.  The 
FAR Council withdrew its proposed rule after Congress chose to not renew statutory 
authority for share-in-savings contracts that expired in September 2005. The 
Congressional decision was influenced by a U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO)  
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Reporting Rule defines the 
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study issued July 2005 that focused on problems with the share-in-savings program and 
barriers to its acceptance by government agencies. 23   
 
Effectively, EPA was left without a clear path forward for implementing a national 
hazardous waste e-manifest processing center.   
 
 
2.6.3.5 EPA’s Public Notice (Federal Register April 18, 2006) reaffirmed EPA’s 
intent to use a public/private partnership. 
 
On April 18, 2006 EPA issued a Federal Register notice stating the Agency’s intent to 
move forward with its e-manifest rule and its interest in building a national hazardous 
waste e-manifest processing center.24  EPA explained that it was considering a 
model in which a private developer would build and operate the e-manifest system.  The 
system would be connected to EPA’s Centralized Data Exchange (CDX) and would be 
built to meet EPA CROMERR requirements.  Data would flow into CDX as e-manifest 
transactions take place.  The private developer running the national processing center 
would collect e-manifest transaction fees in exchange for incurring the cost of building 
and operating the national e-manifest system.  
 
EPA’s Public Notice set the stage for a push to obtain GSA share-in-savings type 
authority via legislation. 
 
The following is a direct extract from the April 18th Public Notice that described EPA’s vision for a 
centralized e-manifest system. 
 
The Agency's General Approach to a Centralized E-Manifest System 
 
Today's notice announces that EPA's preferred approach, at this time, for proceeding 
with the e-manifest rule is to develop a centralized web-based IT system that EPA will 
host on its IT architecture. This national system likely would be funded, in whole or in 
part, by service fees that would be paid to EPA or its contractor. This notice discusses a 
conceptual design of the nationally centralized e-manifest system and requests comment 
on our approach. 
 
Today, we are announcing that EPA intends to develop a final rule to authorize the use 
of electronic manifests that are created and transmitted through the use of a centralized 
e-manifest system. EPA will consider the comments received pursuant to this notice, 
along with comments on the emanifest proposal in the May 2001 proposed rule and the 
May 2004 Stakeholder meeting, as we prepare a final rule on the e-manifest. The final 
rule would amend existing manifest regulations which require manifests to be created 
only as paper forms. These regulatory changes would be necessary to ensure that 
electronic manifests are as valid as the traditional paper manifests that are signed with 
ink and manually processed and transmitted. The usage of EPA's national e-manifest 
system to obtain and process valid electronic manifests would be the key component of 
the final rule.  EPA believes that as a result of this change in approach for the e-manifest 
system, the final regulation authorizing the use of electronic manifests would be much 
simpler than the regulation suggested by the May 2001 proposed rule. 
 
The final rulemaking will be constrained in its scope to authorizing the use of electronic 
manifests created and transmitted in the national system, and to several other key 
policy issues that must be resolved prior to implementation. EPA thus expects to limit, 
as far as possible, the subject matter of the final rule on electronic manifesting to the  
key policy issues associated with authorizing the use of electronic manifests and with 
implementing the electronic manifest as a means of tracking hazardous waste shipments 
and recording and transmitting waste shipment information. EPA believes it is far more 
sensible to address the more detailed technical system design and performance 
requirements for the centralized e-manifest system within the contracting process than 
to codify performance requirements and other technical matters within the rulemaking 
process. We also recognize that State participation and input during the planning stage 
of the e-manifest development process is critical, because there will be significant  
                                                            
23 July 2005; U.S. Government Accounting Office; Share-In-Savings Initiative Not Yet Tested http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05736.pdf 
24 EPA Public Notice, Federal Register, April 18, 2006. http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-WASTE/2006/April/Day-18/f5745.htm  
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implementation issues associated with moving to an electronic manifest system. EPA will 
work closely with our State partners as we develop both the final rulemaking and the 
detailed system design and performance requirements. 
 
Conceptual Design of the E-Manifest System 
 
The centralized e-manifest system will include the necessary applications and 
components to supply, complete, electronically sign, transmit, and retain electronic 
manifests. The centralized e-manifest system that will be developed initially will provide 
only the core  
services necessary to manage the basic waste shipment tracking and waste data 
collection functions of the manifest process, including manifest creation, completion, 
signing, routing and communication services (i.e., services required to create, view, 
update, transmit, and close manifests) and the collection, distribution, and archiving of 
official manifest records. In accordance with requests expressed by stakeholders in the 
May 2004 public meeting, the system initially will not support any more advanced 
reporting or business integration services. The system would be designed with scalability 
so that additional EPA reporting functions (e.g., Biennial Report integration or 
transboundary waste reporting), or additional commercial services that may be desired 
by users could be added as future upgrades.  
 
The development of the e-manifest system will use a web services-oriented architecture 
and will be hosted on EPA's CDX (http://www.epa.gov/cdx) and NEIEN architecture. The 
CDX would act as the Agency's central reporting hub for receiving, processing, and 
routing the in-bound electronic manifests to waste shipment management entities and 
to state governments. As the emanifest would be hosted within our CDX/Exchange 
Network architecture, the submission of e-manifests to the national system would be 
governed by the standards and procedures included in EPA's Cross Media Electronic 
Reporting Rule (CROMERR), which EPA published in the Federal Register on October 13, 
2005 (70 FR 59847). The CROMERR Rule provides the legal and policy framework for 
electronic reporting to the CDX hub, and will address such matters as user registration, 
user authentication, execution of electronic signatures, and the procedures for producing 
records of electronic manifest submissions. 
 
We believe that the use of a services-oriented architecture involving web services 
applications will enable a high level of interoperability with users' legacy and future 
system investments. Thus, EPA plans to develop the emanifest applications in 
conformance with Internet ``web services'' standards which now are supported by CDX. 
Also, schemas (i.e., models for describing the structure of information within a 
document to allow machine validation of document structure) and stylesheets developed 
in the Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) will be the means EPA will use for the 
electronic exchange of e-manifest data, and these XML documents will conform to the 
data elements of the hazardous waste manifest (EPA Form 8700-22) and continuation 
sheet (EPA Form 8700-22A) that EPA recently announced in the March 4, 2005 Form 
Revisions final rule (70 FR 10776). 
 
 EPA further will develop the e-manifest applications with the appropriate access controls 
to ensure that only authorized users may enter the system, complete and sign 
manifests, and access manifest data. We plan to limit access to particular manifest 
records and related data to only those entities that are involved with the handling of a 
waste shipment, as well as to RCRA regulators. The centralized e-manifest system also 
will support, as far as possible, the provision of reliable and uninterrupted manifest 
services to the user community and will adopt necessary measures and controls that 
meet EPA and Federal policies for protecting information security, privacy, and 
confidential business information (CBI). 
 
 
2.6.3.6 EPA supported an unsuccessful legislative attempt to gain “share-in-
savings” type authority (Senate Bill 3871 – September 2006).  
 
With the demise of GSA’s share-in-savings program, EPA sought legislative authority to 
implement a private contracting approach for its e-manifest program.  Senate bill S. 
3871, the Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest Establishment Act, was introduced by 
Sen. John Thune (R-SD) in September 2006.  It would have given EPA share-in-savings 
type authority to implement a hazardous waste e- manifest program.  
 
The e-manifest system will: 
 
1. Use a web services-oriented 
architecture 
 
2. Be hosted on EPA’s CDX and 
NEIEN architecture 
 
3. Be compliant with CROMERR 
 
4. Use web-services supported 
by CDX 
 
5. Use XML for the electronic 
exchange of e-manifest data 
 
 
EPA supported Senate Bill 3871 
that would have given EPA 
share-in-savings type authority.  
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Below is a summary of the bill from THOMAS. 
 
Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest Establishment Act - Amends the Solid Waste Disposal Act 
to require the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish a  
hazardous waste electronic manifest system that may be used by a hazardous waste 
generator or transporter, an owner or operator of a hazardous waste treatment, storage, 
recycling, or disposal facility, or any other entity that is required to use a manifest to comply 
with any federal or state requirement to track the shipment, transportation, and receipt of 
hazardous waste or other material that is shipped from the generation site to an off-site 
facility for treatment, storage, disposal, or recycling. 
 
Authorizes the Administrator to: (1) impose service fees on users to pay for developing, 
operating, maintaining, and upgrading the system; and (2) deposit the fees into the 
Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest System Fund (established by this Act).  
 
Requires the Administrator to: (1) establish the Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest System 
Governing Board; and (2) carry out this Act in each state unless the state program is fully 
authorized to do so. 
 
Hearings were held on the bill on September 28, 2006.  The bill, however, languished in 
the aftermath of the November elections and changes in Senate and House committee 
assignments.   It failed to move beyond the Senate Committee on Environment and 
Public Works.25 
 
 
2.6.3.7 EPA’s Notice of Data Availability (Federal Register February 26, 2008) 
reaffirmed EPA’s intent to seek a public/private partnership via e-
manifest legislation.26 
 
On February 26, 2008, EPA published a Notice of Data Availability in the Federal 
Register.  The notice reaffirmed EPA’s intent to issue an electronic manifest rule and to 
seek federal legislation giving it share-in-savings type authority to support 
implementation of a national e-manifest processing center.  A passage from the notice 
describes EPA’s intent but issues a caution that promulgation of an e-manifest rule is 
contingent on EPA gaining legislative authority for e-manifest user fees. 
 
“We are currently developing the final rule that will authorize the use of electronic 
manifests, and will address scope and other policy issues. However, the promulgation of 
this rule is contingent upon the enactment of legislation providing EPA the authority to 
collect user-fees to fund the development and operation of the system. Nevertheless, we 
continue to move forward with the rulemaking in anticipation of enactment of the 
needed legislation.” 
 
The notice also asked for comment on a refinement to EPA’s implementation plan for its 
e-manifest processing center.  EPA expects e-manifest use will be voluntary and that 
many manifest transactions will continue to be paper based.  However, EPA recognizes 
that a manifest database that holds data on only electronic transactions would be less 
valuable than one that holds both electronic and paper transactions.  EPA has proposed 
for comment a plan to amend its manifest regulations so that the final destination 
facility (and only the destination facility) would mail a copy of the completed manifest 
form to the e-manifest system operator.  The system operator would scan the form and  
enter manifest data from it into the national manifest database.  EPA expects the final 
destination facility would pay the cost of data processing for paper manifests. 
 
This proposal will likely have a huge impact on EPA’s manifest operations center.  E-
manifest use would be purely voluntary. Unless companies moved voluntarily to e-
manifest use, most of the transactions would be paper-based making document 
processing the main focus of the national e-manifest processing center.  EPA expects the 
destination facility would mail a final copy of the manifest to the system operator and 
pay a fee to the system operator for paper manifest processing.  In the February 26th 
notice, EPA estimated that the charge that the system operator might charge TSDFs for  
                                                            
25 For background refer to “BIPARTISAN E-MANIFEST WASTE BILL FACES TIME CRUNCH IN SEEKING PASSAGE” 
http://www.acetransition.net/images/EPA_Release.doc  
 
26EPA Notice of Data Availability, Federal Register,  http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/E8-3615.htm  
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receiving paper manifests and for transferring (i.e., imaging and keypunching) paper 
manifest data to the e-Manifest system, could be between $0.25 to $0.75 per paper 
manifest.  TSDFs would incur additional paperwork burden costs for submitting a copy of 
the final manifest bringing the TSDFs total cost to about $3.20/manifest. 
 
In its comments, the Environmental Technology Council – the trade association 
representing the commercial waste management industry (TSDFs) - questioned EPA's 
cost estimate that it would cost $3.20 per manifest to convert the manifests to electronic 
format. 27 
 
"If the fee per paper manifest is actually in the neighborhood ... of $3.20 per conversion, we 
think that would be acceptable," the council said. However, it noted, EPA has estimated that 
converting a paper-submitted Toxics Release Inventory Form R would cost $50 each, meaning 
the estimate for manifests could be much lower than the real cost.  
 
"If the cost of processing paper manifests approaches this amount, then the [Feb. 26 NODA] 
does not adequately lay out the real options for comment," the council said. The council also 
suggested the fee system could be phased in to serve as an incentive for facilities to switch to 
the e-manifest system.  
 
"If the e-manifest system is well designed and operated, then the number of paper manifests 
that need to be converted will decrease steadily over time," ETC said. 
 
EPA’s preamble discussion on EPA’s proposed changes to the e-manifest process may be 
found in Appendix A.  
 
 
2.6.3.8 Senate Bill 3109, Hazardous Waste Manifest Establishment Act, was 
introduced by Senator John Thune (R-SD) on June 10, 2008 
 
Senator John Thune (R-SD) introduced Senate Bill 3109, the Hazardous Waste 
Establishment Act, on June 10, 2008.  Co-sponsors of the bill are Benjamin Cardin (D-
MD), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), and Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ).  S.B. 3109 is, in essence, a 
repeat of Senate Bill 3871 that was introduced by Senator Thune in September 2006 
(refer to Section 2.6.3.6).    
 
Senate Bill 3109 will amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6921) and will 
require the EPA Administrator to establish a hazardous waste electronic manifest system 
within three years.  S.B. 3109 will give EPA “share-in-savings” type contract authority.  
EPA will be authorized to issue a contract to a private party that would build and operate 
the electronic manifest system.  The party would be allowed to collect a manifest 
processing fee to recoup its investment costs and generate a profit.  On July 31, 2008 
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works ordered Senate Bill 3109 to be 
reported without amendment favorably. 
 
 
2.7 The Alliance for Uniform Hazmat Transportation Procedures was 
established by state agencies to preserve state prerogatives in hazmat 
permitting and registration.  
 
The Alliance for Uniform Hazmat Transportation Procedures (the Alliance) is a 
 
state-based organization that operates in conjunction with the National Conference of 
State Legislatures (NCSL). 28 The Alliance was established in 1990, and supports state  
registration and permitting programs for motor carriers that transport hazardous 
materials and hazardous waste.   
 
The Alliance was established under Section 22 of the Hazardous Materials Transportation 
Uniform Safety Act of 1990 (HMTUSA).  Section 22 mandates that states that elect to  
                                                            
27 Hazardous Waste - Industry Questions Suggested Changes to E-Manifest Proposal, BNA Bulletin May, 5, 2008 
http://subscript.bna.com/SAMPLES/ecb.nsf/85256269004a991e8525611300214487/0311855b6e883f418525743b0071d3a8?OpenD
ocument  
28http://www.hazmatalliance.org/ 
 http://www.ncsl.org/programs/transportation/ALLHAZMAT.htm  
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register and permit motor carriers that transport hazardous materials must do so using 
uniform application forms and uniform procedures.   
 
 
2.7.1 Why was the Alliance established? 
 
In 1990, the states were faced with the prospect that that their permitting and 
registration programs for carriers of hazardous materials would be wiped out - 
preempted by a potentially weaker federal law. At the urging of the trucking industry, 
Congress was on the verge of doing away with state programs and replacing them with 
a one-size-fits-all federal program.  
 
State negotiators led by the NCSL and the National Governors Association agreed to 
convene a working group of state officials that would craft a model program for 
hazardous materials transportation permits and registration using the best practices of 
existing state programs. However, part of the deal was that the new state-developed 
“Uniform Program” would preempt existing state programs. In essence, the states 
agreed to preemption of individual state programs, albeit on state terms, to save an 
existing and important area of state regulation.   
 
States have the option of joining the Alliance and adopting the Alliance’s uniform 
program.  Otherwise, they are subject to federal hazmat registration and permitting 
programs administered by the FMCSA.  Under the terms of Section 22, FMCSA will  
implement the Alliance Uniform Program once 26 states have adopted it.  The Alliance 
has the full support of the FMCSA and is currently funding the centralized aspects of the 
Uniform Program.  Informally, the FMCSA has indicated a willingness to lower the target 
implementation threshold to 18-20 states from the current 26 state target. 
 
The Alliance currently consists of seven member states - Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Oklahoma, Nevada, Ohio, and West Virginia - that have implemented the Uniform 
Program.  Other states, such as Alaska and Missouri, are in the process of joining the 
Alliance.  States have the option of implementing part or all of the Alliance’s Uniform 
Program.  As illustrated in Figure 2.7.a, states may choose to register and permit all 
hazmat shipments (including hazardous waste and radioactive materials) or hazardous 
waste shipments only. 29  
 
 
2.7.2 What is the Uniform Program? 30 
 
Protection of public health and safety is the main objective of the Uniform Program.  The 
two main mechanisms of the Uniform Program are: 1). carrier registration; and 2). 
carrier permitting. 
 
Registration provisions of the Uniform Program are designed to: 
 
• identify persons who transport, ship or cause to be shipped hazardous materials by 
motor carriers, and 
 
• generate revenues for state hazmat programs. 
 
Permitting provisions of the Uniform Program’s permitting are designed to:  
 
• identify "qualified" motor carriers of hazardous materials; and  
 
• ensure states participating in the reciprocal agreement that the base state is 
operating in accordance with Alliance policies and procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
29 Hazardous waste is a subset of the much larger universe of hazardous materials. 
30   NCSL’s website has a on-line overview of the Alliance Uniform Program. 
http://www.ncsl.org/slides/transportation/0605hazmat_jpg_files/frame.htm  
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Figure 2.7.a The Alliance for Uniform Hazmat Transportation Procedures 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7.2.1 The Uniform Program revolves around the “base state” concept. 
 
The Alliance program revolves around the “base” state concept. Instead of registering in 
multiple states, applying for multiple permits, and paying fees to multiple states, carriers 
transact all of their business with the state where they travel the most miles. This is the 
carrier’s base state and it, in effect, become a “one-stop shop” for the carrier, reducing 
the carrier’s administrative overhead and removing duplicative activities across states.  
When a carrier registers in its base state, it gains status as a carrier in all the Alliance 
states.  In addition, permits issued by a carrier’s base state are recognized by all 
Alliance states. 
Under the Alliance Uniform Program, base states have the following responsibilities: 
 
• Process the permitting application for each carrier for which it serves as the base state. 
 
• Collect the permit fee associated with the cost to the state of issuing the permit. 
 
• Conduct any pre-permit investigation or audit. 
 
• Issue indicia to the company that must be carried inside each vehicle transporting hazardous 
materials. 
 
• Determine whether violations of the permitting requirements should result in suspension or 
revocation of the national permit. 
 
• Perform periodic reviews of the motor carrier's operations. 
 
 
2.7.2.2 Under the Uniform Program, hazmat carriers must have acceptable 
safety and operating records. 
Under the Uniform Program, Alliance states exercise authority on one another’s behalf. 
Prior to the formation of the Alliance, each state registered and permitted each carrier 
transporting within its borders.  Each state had the final say on who was allowed to 
transport hazardous materials in the state and on the fees that would be levied on 
carriers traveling though the state. Under the Alliance base state reciprocity agreement,  
 
 “Since May ’93, a group of 
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the registration and permitting is handled by the base state and when the base state 
makes a permitting decision that decision is made on behalf of all Alliance states 
 
Hazmat carriers are required to submit an application to its base state for permission to 
haul hazardous materials.  The base state conducts a review of the motor carrier's 
qualifications to transport hazardous materials and, if appropriate, issues a permit.  
Alliance states have agreed to use common criteria to support denial of a permit 
application by a hazmat carrier.31  Some of those criteria include the following. 
 
• Violations of hazmat regulations that pose imminent hazard to the public or the environment. 
 
• Exhibition of reckless disregard for the public or environment. 
 
• False statements in an application. 
 
• An “unsatisfactory" safety rating. 32 
 
• Failure to maintain a satisfactory security plan. 
 
• Failure to comply with regulations in a manner showing motor carrier is not fit to transport 
hazmat. 
 
• Failure to comply with an out of state order. 
 
• Failure to comply with any other order in a manner showing the carrier is not fit to transport 
hazardous materials. 
 
• Failure to maintain minimum insurance. 
 
• Failure to maintain RSPA registration. 
 
• Loss of operating rights or suspended registration for failure to pay. 
 
 
2.7.2.3 Hazmat fees are allocated using the double apportionment method. 
 
The Uniform Program does not mandate a fee structure.  States can assess fees as they 
see fit as long as the revenue is used for hazardous materials transportation activities 
and do not interfere with interstate commerce. Fees must also meet the fairness test 
under the dormant commerce clause found in Evansville (92 S. Ct. 1349) (1972). This 
test says a fee is fair if it is based on a fair approximation of use of the state facilities, is 
not excessive in relation to benefits conferred, and does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce. "Flat tax" fees assessed per vehicle or per trip per vehicle have 
been preempted because they fail the "internal consistency" test of the commerce clause 
as an undue burden on interstate commerce. Essentially, these fees are not equitable to 
nationwide carriers. 
 
Many hazmat carriers operate in more than one state and have fee obligations to more 
than one jurisdiction.  Under the Alliance program, hazmat carriers register only in their 
base state and the base state is responsible for collecting appropriate fees and allocating 
them to other states. This provides convenient “one-stop shopping” for carriers that 
operate in multiple states, but it also gives the base state the responsibility of collecting 
revenue for other states, similar to the “double apportionment” fee collection and 
allocation methodology underlying the International Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA) and the 
International Registration Plan (IRP).   
 
The Alliance’s “double apportionment” method for fee allocation is based on “hazmat 
mileage” in a state.  For example, assume a carrier’s hazmat trucks travels 10,000 miles 
in West Virginia and 40,000 miles in Ohio.  The carrier pays $25,000 in hazmat fees to 
Ohio, the carrier’s base state.  Ohio will collect $25,000 from the carrier but allocate 
$5,000 (10,000/50,000 * $25,000) to West Virginia to reflect the relative percentage of 
the carrier’s hazmat miles traveled over West Virginia’s roads.   
 
 
2.7.2.4 What data do Alliance states collect from carriers? 
 
Figure 2.7.b lists the data that Alliance states collect from carriers during registration 
and permitting 
                                                            
31 Detailed procedures for registration and permitting of hazmat carriers may be found in the Alliance’s “Administrator’s Manual 
for the Uniform State Hazardous Materials Transportation Motor Carrier Registration and Permit Program”.   
 
32 The FMCSA provides carrier safety information through the FMCSA’s Safety and Fitness Electronic Records (SAFER) System. 
Hazmat fees are collected by 
the base state and allocated to 
other Alliance states using a 
double apportionment method. 
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Figure 2.7.b  Data Collected from Carriers by Alliance States. 
 
 
Part I  Registration Application 
 
 
Applicant name 
 
Employer ID number 
 
DBA name if applicable 
 
Mailing Address for purposes of correspondence 
 
Street Address, if different from mailing address 
 
Does address reflect a change in the last 12 months? 
 
Person to contact concerning the application  
 
Contact title 
 
Contact phone number 
 
Contact fax number 
 
USDOT motor carrier census number 
 
Motor Carrier Docket number 
 
For intrastate carriers, State ID Number, if applicable 
 
USDOT, motor carrier docket #, State ID number(s) displayed  
on vehicles 
 
USDOT HazMat Registration number 
 
Federal EPA transporter identification number, if applicable 
 
Uniform manifest required? 
 
Alliance member states where transportation of hazardous 
waste is expected 
 
States where hazardous was transported in previous 12 
months 
 
Transportation of radioactive waste in Nevada 
 
Phone number at which the carrier can be contacted 
 
Information provided in application covers which 12 month 
period? 
 
Fleet information for carriers with multiple fleets 
 
Average number of power units owned, operated, leased, etc. 
 
IRP allocation percentages by state and other North American 
jurisdictions 
 
Percentage of total activity that involves hazardous materials 
IRP account number 
 
Average number of cargo tanks owned, operated, or leased 
with capacities greater/less than 3,500 water gallons 
 
Classes, divisions and zones of hazardous materials 
transported 
 
Amount of fee(s) enclosed 
 
 
 
Part II – Corporate Structure and Corporate Certifications 
 
Corporate Structure 
Type of Carriage 
Type of Business 
Number of years the applicant has transported general 
freight 
Number of years the applicant has transported hazmat 
Number of years the applicant has transported hazardous 
waste 
 
Permits Withdrawn, Denied, Suspended, or Revoked 
 
USDOT Safety Rating 
 
Most recent USDOT Safety Rating 
  
History of applicants major violations related to hazmat 
Assessed or paid fines over $1000 
Fined or convicted in last 3 years of transporting hazmat 
without permit 
Has subsidiary, etc. been found culpable in legal proceedings 
 
Reportable Hazardous Materials Transportation Incidents -
Incidents required to be reported under 49 CFR 171.15 (a) (1) 
Terminals - Number and address of all terminals owned or 
operated 
   
Inspections - Certification that vehicles have undergone 
required periodic certification  
 
Financial Responsibility 
Certification that the applicant executed Form MCS82 or 
MCS90 
Location of the form 
Insurance Information 
 
Other Certifications 
Current commercial drivers licenses 
Complies with USDOT bulk packaging 
Emergency Response Plan 
State designated routing requirements 
Training requirements for hazardous materials employees 
Retention of shipping papers 
Hours of Service 
Applicant meets motor carrier safety requirements 
Meets federal security requirements for shipments of 
hazardous materials 
 
 
 
Part III  Additional Information Required from Motor 
Carriers of Hazardous Waste 
 
 
Part IV General Application Certifications 
 
 
Incorporation 
 
Facilities Owned and Operated 
 
Identification of Key Management Personnel 
 
Permits Held 
 
Related Business Concerns 
 
Legal Proceedings 
 
        
Acknowledging that Applicant is Subject to Audit 
 
Certification of Accuracy and Completeness 
 
Renewal of Current Registration 
 
Certification of no Key Changes, Listing of Certain Key Changes 
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2.7.3 What requirements does a state have to meet to join the Alliance? 
 
In order to participate states are required to complete the following steps.  
 
1. Complete letter of intent to governing board.  A state must inform the Alliance 
governing board that it requests permission to join both the uniform program and 
base state agreement. Prior to acceptance into the Alliance, the state will be required 
to become an official signatory to the base state agreement.  
 
2. Pass enabling legislation.  Legislation is required for states to enter into the Alliance 
and adopt the policies and procedures of the alliance. The enabling legislation can be 
designed at the state level, but model legislation is available from the Alliance. In 
order to begin the process the legislation may not have to be finalized.  Planning to 
enact the legislation contingent upon joining the Alliance is sufficient.  
 
3. Designate lead agency.  Some states grant jurisdiction for the regulation of hazmat 
and hazardous waste to separate administrative entities. For this reason, the 
governor is required to designate a lead agency which will be responsible for 
compliance. This eliminates the need for other states to keep in contact with multiple 
agencies within a given state.  
 
4. Request an accreditation review by the board.  The accreditation review verifies that 
a state meets all the requirements for joining the alliance. The review itself is a three 
step process. First, the board sets standards for each jurisdiction. Second, using 
those standards each jurisdiction develops an implementation and operating plan. 
Third, jurisdictions are reviews, according to board standards and the jurisdictional 
plan, at application and every three years after that.  
 
The specific standard used by the board may vary by jurisdiction, but they serve to 
require general criteria. They require that each state have: 1). adequate personnel to 
implement the uniform program, 2). ability to store essential information and issue 
credentials in a timely manner, 3). the ability to disseminate essential information to 
motor carriers, 4). adequate training for personnel, and 5). capacity for the accounting 
required under the reciprocal system. In addition to these capacity/ability issues, each 
state must be able to do the following. 
 
• Develop an operating budget and establish an equitable registration fee and a permit application 
review fee structure.  
 
• Develop a plan to ensure full public participation as outlined in the Uniform Program.  
 
• Ensure motor carrier data confidentiality. 
 
• Provide evidence of sufficient audit capacity to fulfill the audit requirements of the Uniform 
Program including personnel time and training. 
 
• Demonstrate that all appropriate enforcement officials recognize the Uniform Program 
credential, regardless of the state of issuance, as adequate for the transport of hazardous 
materials within the jurisdiction. 
 
• Have any necessary enabling legislation and implementing regulations in place when it enters 
the Uniform Program agreement. 
 
• Certify that it will operate the Uniform Program pursuant to the policies and procedures 
developed by the Board. 
 
 
2.7.4 What oversight does the Alliance exercise over member programs? 
 
As a condition of membership in the agreement, all states must agree to participate in a 
peer accreditation review team after their first year of operation in the Uniform Program.  
During a peer review, an accreditation team will examine the following aspects of the 
state’s program.  
 
• Personnel.  The accreditation team will ensure that the program has adequate staff dedicated to 
reviewing applications and conducting any necessary background investigations for Part II or 
Part III permits.  The jurisdiction may contract any portion of the work out to other state offices 
or private contractors.  Any agreement that the program has to contract out any portion of the 
work will also be reviewed.  The team will ensure that the program has adequate personnel to 
receive, process, and disperse funds to other states on a quarterly basis.   
 
States have to meet a number 
of requirements to gain and 
retain Alliance membership. 
 
Alliance states must participate 
in a peer accreditation review 
program. 
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• Automated Data Processing (ADP).  The accreditation team will evaluate the technical resources 
that are available to conduct the Uniform Program.  The state must have the capability to 
transmit data to a central database and conduct searches of the repositories database including 
computer resources with adequate internet capabilities.  The state must be able to store 
elements of the registration electronically and issue credentials to carriers in a timely manner. 
 
• Preparation for Carriers.  The accreditation team will assess the state’s marketing and outreach 
efforts to all covered motor carriers based in the state.  The affected industry should have prior 
knowledge of the Uniform Program implementation date in their base state.  The Board 
recommends that the state conduct at least one full briefing on the Uniform Program for the 
industry that is co-sponsored by the state trucking association.  The state should have a general 
idea of the number of carriers that will be involved in the program.  The new state can also 
survey their carrier population through the state trucking associations to get an idea of the 
number of carriers hauling hazardous materials that are based in the state.   
 
• Training.  The review team will look at training programs and guidance available to all staff 
members involved in the Uniform Program.  Training should result in a general understanding of 
the Uniform Program and a thorough understanding of the employees' responsibilities under the 
program, especially those related to reciprocity among the participating states.  It is anticipated 
that the repository will develop training modules for program managers and other program staff 
covering all aspects of the Uniform Program.  Participation in Alliance sponsored training will be 
viewed as satisfying this requirement.  Agency staff should also have a general knowledge of all 
federal regulations—including employee training regulations—that are referenced in the Uniform 
Program application. 
 
• Program Funding.  The review team will ensure that the registration fee is consistent with 
Uniform Program requirements and will provide the program with sufficient funds to support the 
registration and permit program in the state.  The financial accounting aspects of the state's 
program will be reviewed to ensure compatibility with program guidelines.  The program must 
have full capability (personnel, computer capacity, etc.) to receive, process and disperse funds 
to member states. 
 
• Public Access to Records.  The state must be equipped to register complaints from the public 
and transmit them to the repository.  The public shall have access to information in the 
repository database and the state office in accordance with all federal and other state freedom 
of information laws.  Information on the nature and evidence surrounding complaints shall be 
available to the public.  
 
• Audit Capacity.  Under the base state agreement, the registering state must be able to "conduct 
audits of motor carriers as necessary to ensure that the carrier is accurately reporting its 
hazardous materials transportation activity."  A state that also issues motor carrier permits also 
must "perform periodic review of the motor carrier's operations; and conduct investigations or 
audits of the permit applicants."  The accreditation team will assess the program's 
administrative capacity to audit carriers under the Uniform Program.  This will overlap into 
training criteria, personnel criteria and enforcement capacity. 
 
• Enforcement.  The state must communicate with appropriate state enforcement officials to 
identify carriers that are not properly registered and/or permitted under the base state 
agreement.  In addition, the state is responsible for conducting any necessary training of 
enforcement personnel as to the nature of the base state system and credentials that properly 
registered/permitted carriers will keep in their vehicles.  Each state shall enforce the 
requirements of the Uniform Program but will maintain fines and penalties established by the 
law of the participating state.   
 
• Enabling Legislation and Implementing Regulations.  The state will have enabling legislation and 
implementing regulations in place before the state may participate in the Uniform Program.  
During the accreditation review and subsequent reviews, the review team should be aware of 
any changes that have been made to the Uniform Program and possible changes that may be 
required to state statutes or agency regulations. 
 
• Funding Mechanisms in Place.  The state shall enact a fee program consistent with Alliance 
guidelines.  
 
 
2.7.5 What are the benefits of state membership in the Alliance?  Why is 
membership lagging? 
 
Alliance membership brings a number of benefits to states. 
 
• The Uniform Program is well designed, comprehensive, and has stood the test of 
time.  The Alliance has developed detailed procedures to support state 
implementation of the Uniform Program.  The Alliance procedures have been 
developed and refined by almost two decades of state experience.  The procedures 
have a proven track record work in minimizing administrative burdens of the states 
in implementing their base programs. 
 
• Membership in the Alliance makes it easier for states to implement and defend fee  
 “There is not a governor or 
state legislator who is not 
looking for ways to make state 
government more effective and 
more efficient.  The Uniform 
Program benefits the states by 
distributing the burden of 
regulating the nation’s interstate 
carriers among the states.  This 
allows the base state to conduct 
a more thorough review of the 
operations of a carrier for which 
it has responsibility, rather than 
conducting a less stringent 
review of every carrier that 
enters its jurisdiction.” 
 
Nancy Brown 
State of Kansas 
Alliance Governing Board 
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programs to fund internal programmatic activities.  States need revenue to run their 
programs, and the Alliance program is structured to allow states to capture fees from 
hazmat carriers in a defensible, reasonable manner.  Participation in the Alliance 
program also helps state administrators justify the collection of hazmat fees. 
 
• Carrier compliance is enhanced and highway safety/security is improved.  The 
Alliance reports that carrier compliance with hazmat safety rules is markedly 
improved by implementation of the Alliance program.  The roads are safer and more 
secure. 
 
• Less workload and efficient business processes save states money.  Alliance 
membership helps states share the workload. Instead of registering and reviewing 
every hazmat carrier in their state, states only register and review those carriers that 
identify a given state as their base state. This allows each state to focus their 
attention and resources on a smaller group of carriers without losing confidence that 
other carriers are also being thoroughly checked. Base states are able to improve the 
thoroughness of carrier reviews and inspection and capture cost savings from the 
decreased volume of registration and reviews required. 
 
• Lower regulatory load for interstate hazmat carriers.  Interstate carriers benefit 
from the Alliance program.  Instead of having a regulatory interaction with many 
states, carriers interact with only their base state for permitting and registration.  A 
lighter regulatory load saves carriers money. 
 
In June 2008, the Alliance issued a contract to better articulate and quantify the benefits 
of Alliance membership.  The work is not yet complete but was undertaken in 
recognition that state membership in the Alliance has remained stubbornly low.  
Informally, Alliance board members have identified issues that they believe are 
inhibiting state membership in the Alliance. 
 
• It’s easier for states to “go-along” rather than to work to “get-ahead”.  Joining the 
Alliance takes work and political will to overcome the inertia of the status quo.  
States have to adopt legislation which takes political will on the part of state 
program administrators.  While Alliance programs usually enjoy strong support from 
interstate carriers, intrastate carriers are often resistant (and vocal) in their 
opposition to a hazmat fee program.  To date, the benefits versus the “political 
pain” have not been well articulated by the Alliance. 
 
• The Alliance has not found a mechanism or issue to rally the states to join the 
Alliance, even though there are significant benefits for state membership.  The 
Alliance has not been able to find and exploit a mobilizing catalyst for state 
membership. 
 
 
2.8 How will these regulatory/legislative drivers influence the design and 
operation of the Transportation Security Center? 
 
Figure 2.8.a, summarizes how regulatory/legislative drivers will influence the design and 
operation of the Transportation Security Center.  The yellow-coded portions of the table 
are focused on hazmat truck tracking.  Gold-coded sections focus on hazardous waste 
electronic manifests and green-coded sections are relevant to both hazmat and hazardous 
waste. 
 
Figure 2.8.a Implications of regulatory/legislative drivers on the design and operation of the Transportation Security Center 
 
  
RSPA HM-232 (DOT) – March 25, 2003 
 
2.2.1 
 
Note: HM-232 was supplanted by TSA guidance (June 2008 – see Section 2.4) but the voluntary guidance issued by 
RSPA under HM-232 was largely adopted by TSA and is still relevant to hazmat shippers/carriers. 
 
Starting with HM-232 in 2003, the hazmat carrier industry has been subject to hazmat security 
oversight.  A model regulatory program embracing the current voluntary procedures in place since 2002 
will be familiar to industry, especially carriers of high-risk hazardous materials. 
 
RSPA urges shippers (under HM-232) to set up a communications system with transport vehicles and 
operators, including a crisis communication system with primary and back-up means of communication 
States have to overcome 
programmatic inertia to join 
the Alliance.   The benefits are 
positive, but have not been well 
articulated by the Alliance.  
There is not a mobilizing 
catalyst to drive state 
membership. 
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among the shipper, carrier, and law enforcement and emergency response officials.  The TSC should 
serve as the vehicle to meet the communications needs of the parties under HM-232. 
 
Shippers and carriers must prepare en route security plans under HM-232.  It asks carriers to develop 
preferred and alternate routing for hazmat shipments.  Assume that the model program requires 
submission of electronic route plans to the Transportation Security Center.  The system must be able to 
accept route plans electronically.  The system should also be able to accept multiple route plans from a 
shipper/carrier (preferred and alternate routes) and a mechanism for the shipper/carrier to select a 
route when the carrier accepts shipment custody. 
 
HM-232 applies to hazmat shippers as well as hazmat carriers.  The universe of hazmat shippers is 
much larger than the universe of hazmat carriers.  Given the numbers, hazmat shippers represent an 
attractive service target for the TSC, and the needs of hazmat shippers (subject to HM-232) should be 
fully served by TSC service offerings.   
 
  
Hazmat Commercial Drivers’ Licenses (Patriot Act Background Checks) – January 2005 
 
2.2.2 
 
Since 2005, TSA rules require states to conduct security background checks on drivers before they are 
issued state CDLs to haul hazardous materials.  From a regulatory/systems perspective, TSC systems 
should prevent drivers without a hazmat extension to their CDLs from picking up a hazmat load.   
 
Shippers should be required to verify that a hazmat carrier has a hazmat CDL and is authorized to accept a 
hazmat shipment. 
 
Shippers should be prohibited from using a driver without a Hazmat CDL.   
 
A carrier should be prohibited from allowing a driver without proper CDL hazmat certifications to accept a 
hazmat shipment. 
 
Drivers will need to be linked with companies to prove that an individual driver is authorized to carry 
goods for a permitted entity.  This probably means driver information needs to be collected via 
company registration.  Also, system users need to have the means to edit driver data 24/7 as driver 
lists may change frequently. 
 
An electronic manifest solution could reinforce checks on a drivers hazmat CDL status.  The system 
could prevent a carrier from assigning a driver without proper credentials.  Also, the system could 
prevent a driver without proper credentials from picking up a hazmat shipment by rejecting the driver’s 
digital signature (assumes the hazmat e-manifest will require digital signatures). 
 
An alert /message needs to made in the event an unauthorized driver attempts to pick up a hazmat 
shipment (e.g. no hazmat CDL).  An xml message needs to be crafted for this situation and a response 
workflow needs to be established. 
  
FMCSA Hazmat Safety Permits – January 2005 
 
2.2.3 
 
Note: The list of materials requiring FMCSA hazmat safety permits overlaps with the list of Tier 1 Highway Security 
Sensitive Materials (HSSMs) published by TSA June 2008 (see Section 2.4).  In general, Tier 1 HSSMs will require 
FMCSA hazmat safety permits. 
 
Under the FMCSA hazmat safety permit program, carriers have to have a communications system that 
allows the carrier to stay in contact with its drivers.  The requirements stop short of en route shipment 
tracking but TSA’s program is clearly heading toward requiring shipment tracking for some hazmat 
shipments.  The model program should initially require tracking of security sensitive hazmat shipments 
that are subject to FMCSA safety permits. 
 
From a regulatory/systems perspective, TSC systems should prevent carriers without a FMCSA hazmat 
safety permit from dispatching drivers to pick up materials listed under Section 385.403.   
 
Shippers should be required to verify that a hazmat carrier has a FMCSA hazmat safety permit. 
 
Shippers should be prohibited from using a hazmat carrier without a FMCSA hazmat safety permit.   
 
A carrier without a FMCSA hazmat safety permit should be prohibited from allowing a driver to accept a 
material listed under Section 385.403. 
 
According to FMCSA, maintaining communications records represents almost the total cost of 
compliance with hazmat safety permit requirements.  FMCSA has explicitly recognized the role that fleet 
tracking systems may play in helping carriers meet their communications records requirements.  TSC 
systems should be designed to help carriers meet the communications requirements of Section 
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385.403. 
 
According to the FMCSA, there are about 3,100 hazmat carriers subject to the FMCSA hazmat safety 
permit requirements.  About two-thirds are interstate carriers.   
 
  
DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) – April 9, 2007 
 
2.2.4 
 
The industry voluntary program for chemical plant safety did not work, and DHS was forced to issue its 
CFATS regulations to require chemical facilities to institute hazmat security programs.  This reinforces 
the idea that regulations need to drive “smart truck” technology deployment and data reporting. 
 
The DHS CFATS regulated community largely overlaps with the regulated community (hazmat shippers) 
under HM-232.  But this group will have special hazmat interests in addition to off-site shipment.  Like 
the HM-232 companies, CFATS companies represent an attractive service target for the TSC, and the 
needs of CFATS customers should be addressed by TSC service offerings.   
 
  
TSA Highway Security Sensitive Materials Guidance – June 26, 2008 
 
2.4 
 
TSA described two tiers of Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (HSSM) in its June 2008 guidance.  TSA 
defined Tier 1, the riskiest HSSMs, as HSSMs transported by motor vehicle whose potential 
consequences from an act of terrorism include a highly significant level of adverse effects on human 
life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption.   TSA published 
Security Action Items (SAIs) for Tier 1 HSSMs.  While the SAIs are not mandatory, they clearly define 
establish the structure for future regulatory programs.  Therefore, the model regulatory program should 
focus on Tier 1 HSSMs and the TSA SAIs associated with Tier 1 HSSM shipments, especially SAI 17 – 
SAI 23. 
 
o Shipment routing chosen should result in least public exposure and minimal delay in transit. 
 
o The shipper, carrier and receiver must agree on the shipment’s estimated time of arrival (ETA) before the 
shipment is made. 
 
o During transit, carriers should provide updated ETAs to receivers. 
 
o Receivers should provide shippers notice if a shipment is late or if the full shipment has not been delivered. 
 
o Carriers should establish primary and alternate routes.  Routes should minimize proximity to highly populated 
urban areas or critical infrastructure (bridges, dams, tunnels). 
 
o Alternate routes should steer Tier 1 HSSM shipments away from highly populated urban areas or critical 
infrastructure during Orange or Red alerts. 
 
o Drivers should notify carrier dispatch center when deviating from planned route. 
 
o Except in an emergency, carriers should maintain expected shipment chain of custody.  A load should not be 
shifted to a different truck nor should driver crews be changed. 
 
o Trucks should have in-cab devices that prevent unauthorized drivers from starting the tractor. 
 
o Drivers should have access to a panic button – in-cab and/or remote – that sends an alert to the driver’s dispatch 
center.  
 
SAI 23 of TSA’s HSSM guidance is particularly important from a model regulatory perspective. 
 
o The tractor and the trailer should be tracked from gate out to gate in using “smart truck” technology. 
 
o Reporting (polling) frequency for truck/trailer location should not be more than 15 minutes. 
 
o Shippers/carriers should have the ability to “define and monitor” routes and risk areas.  The monitoring system 
should detect when a truck is off-route or nearing a risk area and send an alert to the dispatch center. 
 
o “Smart truck” technology should be deployed to remotely monitor trailer “connect” and “disconnect” events.  
Location polling frequency for a disconnected trailer should be frequent enough to enable quick trailer recovery. 
 
o Truck tracking vendors need to deploy TSC-compliant technology and report data in a TSC-compliant manner. 
 
TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM compliance requires “smart truck” technology deployment by carriers and the 
systems to manage data from “smart truck” deployments. 
 
1. Truck-mounted GPS receiver and wireless modem (to support vehicle location monitoring). 
  
2. Untethered trailer tracking systems to monitor trailer connect and disconnect events. 
 
3. In-cab and/or remote panic buttons. 
 
4. In-cab device (biometric plus OBC) to prevent unauthorized drivers from driving truck. 
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TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM compliance requires shippers, carriers, and receivers to use the services of truck 
tracking vendors.  Regulations will need to define a “truck tracking vendor” as a regulatory entity and 
establish performance requirements for truck tracking vendors. Note that TSC systems must accept 
data feeds from truck tracking vendors and the data submission requirements will need to be 
developed. 
 
Truck tracking vendors need to modify their “smart truck” technology offerings to meet TSA Tier 1 HSSM 
regulatory requirements. 
 
Truck tracking vendors need to modify their data reporting systems to feed data to the TSC to meet TSA Tier 1 
HSSM regulatory requirements. 
 
Transportation Security Center systems must meet future TSA Tier 1 HSSM regulatory needs. 
 
1. The business processes underlying the TSA Tier 1 HSSM regulatory requirements should be automated with TSC 
systems serving as the messaging mechanism. 
 
2. Users must be able to enter an electronic manifest (load type/quantity; shipper, carrier and receiver 
information; ETA). 
 
3. Users must be able to enter primary and alternate routes (e-route).   
 
4. System should automatically monitor route adherence and send alerts when needed. 
 
5. System should monitor shipment chain of custody. 
 
6. System must be able to accept “gate out” and “gate in” notifications. 
 
7. System should be able to alert en-route carriers/drivers that Orange or Red conditions have been implemented 
by DHS and that alternate routing should be taken. 
 
8. System should be able to accept driver input that the driver is delayed (ETA change) or that the driver is taking 
an alternate route. 
 
   
PL 110-53 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 – August 3, 2007 
 
2.5 
 
PL 110-53 contemplates regulations that will have a base set of requirements for shipments of “security 
sensitive” materials – focusing on those materials subject to TSA (Tier 1) HSSM guidance.  This 
reinforces the conclusion reached in Section 2.4 that the model program regulatory should focus on 
hazmat carriers hauling materials requiring Tier 1 HSSMs. 
 
PL 110-53 contemplates regulations that will require certain hazmat carriers to deploy “smart truck” 
technology that will provide: 
 
o frequent or continuous communications; 
 
o  vehicle position location and tracking capabilities; and 
 
o a feature that allows a driver of such vehicles to broadcast an emergency distress signal. 
 
At a minimum this means that carriers must install a GPS receiver, wireless modem, panic button and 
employ a third party tracking vendor.  The third party vendor must report vehicle location out to a 
government tracking center. 
 
PL 110-53 also contemplates additional regulatory requirements including: 
 
o Sensors to detect device tampering 
 
o Polling frequency 
 
o Vehicle immobilization 
 
o Electronic routes (connotes geo-fence monitoring) 
 
PL 110-53 legitimizes the FMCSA Field Operations Test benefit/cost study as the basis for assessing the 
cost reasonableness of regulations that would be needed to implement the hazmat tracking 
requirements of PL 110-53. 
 
Section 1553 of PL 110-53 will require security-sensitive hazmat carriers to develop and follow route 
plans – possibly electronic route plans.  Model regulations should require development and submission 
of electronic routes to the TSC to enable route monitoring especially since they enable more effective 
geo-fence functionality.   
 
By virtue of its reference to the TSA Hazmat Truck Security Pilot, PL 110-53 explicitly embraces the 
conclusion that the technology/systems that are needed to make a hazmat truck tracking center work 
are feasible and field tested.  Refer to Section 4.5 for an analysis of the implications of the TSA Hazmat 
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Truck Security Pilot program on the design and operation of the Transportation Security Center. 
 
PL 110-53 directs TSA to evaluate the feasibility of vehicle immobilization.  The TSA Hazmat Truck 
Security Pilot did not evaluate vehicle immobilization.  However, a FMCSA study on vehicle 
immobilization systems was completed November 2007. 
 
Section 1553 of PL 110-53 will require security-sensitive hazmat carriers to develop and follow route 
plans – possibly electronic route plans.  The system should be designed to accept an electronic route 
map by the shipper or carrier and should be designed with route monitoring functionality. 
 
  
EPA Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest Initiative 2001 - 2008 
 
2.6 
 
State regulations will need to explicitly allow generators, transporters, and TSDFs to use hazardous 
waste electronic manifests – current regulations allow only paper manifests. 
 
EPA’s “share-in-savings” business model calls for a private company to build and operate an e-manifest 
processing center.  The company will collect a transaction fee for each hazardous waste electronic 
manifest it processes.  EPA’s transaction fee model should be incorporated into the business model for 
the Transportation Security Center. 
 
The savings associated with hazardous waste e-manifests easily justify user-based transaction fees to 
support establishment and operation of an e-manifest processing center. 
 
EPA does not plan to make hazardous waste e-manifest use mandatory.  Two implementation problems 
might arise. 
 
o E-manifest transaction volume may be low and/or slow growing.   
 
o A large volume of paper manifests may result – preventing the parties from capturing full e-manifest cost 
savings. 
 
Hazardous waste e-manifest regulatory fee allocation should reflect the relative e-manifest cost savings 
of the parties.  
 
o Generators will save almost $17/manifest and states will save about $8/manifest.   
 
o Waste firms with captive transport vehicles will save about $50/manifest transaction.   
 
EPA plans to allow an “offeror” (transporter) to sign a manifest on behalf of generator.  Model 
regulations need to factor in the role of offeror, especially in regard to the hazardous waste e-manifest 
business process.   
 
History shows that generators, transporters and TSDFs will not adopt hazardous waste e-manifests 
without a financial or regulatory incentive (refer to Ontario’s experience Section 4.7).  A simple way to 
promote e-manifest use is an e-manifest transaction regulatory fee in which paper manifest 
transactions are assessed a much higher fee than e-manifest transactions. 
 
E-manifest model regulations will require manifests (electronic and paper) to be processed through the 
Transportation Security Center. 
 
Transportation Security Center systems must be EPA CROMERR-compliant and will operate as a node on 
EPA’s Central Data Exchange (CDX).  CDX requirements will drive system interface design between EPA 
and the Transportation Security Center.   
 
5. Services-oriented architecture using web services applications 
 
6. Schemas and stylesheets developed in XML 
 
7. User registration, user authentication, execution of electronic signatures 
 
8. SSL-secured HTTP sessions for conducting business transactions 
 
Even if regulatory fees for hazardous waste paper transactions are set higher than e-manifest 
transactions (to encourage e-manifest use), the need to process potentially large numbers of paper 
manifests will still exist.  A high-speed, non-labor intensive paper manifest system needs to be built.  
 
EPA’s uniform national manifest form simplifies data issues in that states cannot require additional data 
elements on the form.  However, states may have different internal e-manifest business processes that 
may need to be accommodated.  The system will need to be flexible in terms of accommodating 
different state business processes. 
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Two different signature ceremonies need to be accommodated in the hazardous waste e-manifest 
business process. 
 
9. Offeror prepares and signs e-manifest on behalf of waste generator 
 
10. Generator prepares and sign own e-manifest 
 
The hazardous waste e-manifest form needs to be able to accommodate partial form signing.  For 
example, the generator portion of the form needs to be signed and “locked” when the custody of the 
waste shipment shifts from the generator to the transporter. 
 
In the hazardous waste e-manifest business context, a waste management firm is likely to prepare an 
e-manifest in advance.  At the generator’s location, the transporter would verify waste type and add 
quantity information to the manifest. 
 
The hazardous waste e-manifest form needs to be able to be rendered on a mobile computing device to 
support manifest transactions in a field setting.  Ideally, transporters will use on-board (or handheld) 
computers and wireless internet connections to support the generator/transporter e-manifest 
transaction. 
 
EPA’s e-manifest regulatory approach may create a requirement to accommodate a large volume of 
paper manifests.  Efficiency and processing speed will be critical to operational success.  Staffing 
requirements will also change.  Document scanning and data entry – perhaps on a large scale – will be 
required. 
 
Should hazardous waste route tracking be required by transporters/TSDFs?  (This would require 
transporters to install a GPS receiver and wireless modem on their trucks.) 
 
o  Shipment tracking will strengthen chain of custody control of waste shipments. 
 
o Transporters will capture positive ROI from “smart truck” technology deployment (refer to Section 4.1) 
 
EPA’s approach to e-manifest implementation may result in slow growth in transaction volume.  Low e-
manifest transaction volume means lower revenues to the private party operating the e-manifest 
system.  A higher e-manifest transaction processing fee may have to be set to cover fixed costs as 
transaction volume builds.  It is unclear if EPA plans to require States to allow companies to use e-
manifests (ie requirement for program delegation).  If states self-elect, e-manifest transaction volume 
will grow slowly. 
 
  
Alliance for Uniform Hazmat Transportation Procedures, NCSL 
 
2.7 
 
The Alliance has developed an on-line carrier registration system.  Section 2.7.2.4 describes the data 
that Alliance states collect from carriers.  This data will supply much (but not all) the data needed from 
high-risk hazmat carriers to meet TSA Tier 1 HSSM carrier registration.  Assuming that Alliance and TSC 
systems are linked, TSC registration systems could pre-populate on-line forms for Alliance carriers and 
collect only the incremental data needed for TSC purposes. 
 
The TSC’s registration program should query a carrier’s current status in the Alliance and link to Alliance 
databases for carrier information as appropriate.  TSC’s systems should also query the permit status of 
a carrier before each gate-out event to ensure the carrier has permit authority to accept the shipment. 
 
The Alliance program and the ACE Truck E-Manifest program should be brought into alignment.  The 
data requirements for carrier registration/permitting and data requirements for a cross-border e-
manifest should be reconciled.  The ACE data needs are much more expansive than Alliance needs, and 
for the most part the Alliance dataset will be a subset of the ACE dataset.  However, both will need to 
include additional data elements to meet the need to register “smart truck” devices on carrier vehicles. 
 
Joining an existing state program – like the Alliance – should make adoption of new hazmat and 
hazardous waste regulations easier in Kentucky.   
 
 
 
 
46 
 
   
47 
 
 
3.0 Technology Drivers 
 
 
This section examines technology issues that will drive the design and operation of the 
Transportation Security Center. 1  
 
Section 3.1 describes “smart truck” technology and how it may be used to protect the 
nation’s hazmat supply chain.  Section 3.2 examines how truck-based asset tracking 
systems have been substantially enabled by advances in communications technology 
and the implications of better/cheaper technology on the Transportation Security Center.  
Section 3.3 describes how video-sharing software is enabling mobile devices such as cell 
phones to connect field operations with central command centers.   
 
Section 3.4 describes XML messaging standards that have been adopted to support 
hazmat communications and how those standards will be used to build hazmat tracking 
systems.  Sections 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 explore how web-based services are 
transforming the way government and industry interact and the implications of that 
technology on the design and operation of the Transportation Security Center. 
 
Section 3.8 examines how business rules engines can be built into a powerful tool for 
modeling and reacting to real-time threats in the hazmat supply chain.  Section 3.9 
describes systems that have been developed to support operations centers.  Section 
3.10 describes how agile software development techniques reduce development time 
and improve software quality. 
 
 
 
3.1 “Smart Truck” technology, a core technology component of a 
hazmat tracking system, is inexpensive and available from numerous 
vendors.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.1.a, a typical “smart truck” technology deployment connects 
truck-mounted smart truck devices to a commercial fleet tracking data center via a 
wireless modem on the truck.  This set-up allows fleet managers to track the location 
and status of the trucks in their fleets on a real-time basis via an internet connection.  
Fleet managers use GIS tools (mapping, routing, reporting) and in-cab messaging 
systems to monitor and manage fleet activity.   
 
Figure 3.1.a Truck-mounted “smart truck” devices are connected to a commercial fleet 
tracking center by a wireless modem on the truck making the truck a “rolling office”. 
 
 
                                                            
1 This section is not an all inclusive analysis of all the “technologies” that will be used in building the Transportation Security Center.  
It does, however, highlight specific technologies that will serve as core technology components or which have a significant bearing 
on the design or operation of the Transportation Security Center.  
 
Wireless communications systems 
connect “smart truck’ systems with 
interactive data centers using satellite 
&/or cellular networks.     
An interactive data center lets fleet 
managers track vehicles on a real-
time basis, monitor on-board 
sensors, and communicate with 
drivers.  GIS tools support mapping 
and routing. 
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3.1.1 A GPS receiver and wireless modem are core building blocks of a smart 
truck system.  
 
At the heart of every smart truck system are two components – a GPS receiver and a 
wireless modem.  The GPS receiver provides location data on the truck and the wireless 
modem is used to report data to a truck tracking vendor.  Other components can be 
added to provide additional functionality. 2 
 
• Smart Truck Devices— As noted above, a smart truck system will minimally 
involve installation of a GPS satellite receiver and a wireless modem on the truck. 
The GPS receiver is used to pinpoint the exact physical location of the truck using 
signals from GPS satellites. The position of the truck is transmitted to a fleet 
tracking center via the truck’s wireless modem over a wireless communications 
network.  Additional devices increase smart truck functionality. Sensors and 
telemetric devices can monitor a wide variety of truck conditions (brake wear, tire 
pressure, trailer temperature, engine RPM, etc.), and when connected to an on-
board computer (and wireless modem) can supply a continuous stream of live data 
to fleet managers. Other devices and sensors that are typically connected to an on-
board computer include electronic locks, panic buttons, and biometric devices. Like 
the popular OnStar™ service, smart truck devices connected to an on-board 
computer can be monitored and/or activated by a remote command center as long 
as there is a wireless connection to the truck’s on-board computer. 
 
• Wireless Communications (with Global Positioning System) — A smart truck 
interacts with the fleet tracking center via wireless modem and a wireless 
communications network. The truck can use satellite or cellular services for its 
wireless communications network. Satellite communications networks have 
traditionally been the choice of long-haul fleet managers, however, systems based 
on GSM/GPRS cellular wireless networks have experienced tremendous growth. 
GSM/GPRS cellular systems provide extensive national coverage and are less 
expensive than satellite communication systems – especially for the needs of mobile 
service workers. Hybrid satellite/cellular systems that automatically switch between 
satellite and cellular systems based on network coverage are also available. 
 
• Fleet Tracking Center Webservices — Once a truck is connected to the fleet 
operations center, the truck driver and the fleet manager have access to a rich 
selection of webservices. 
 
GIS Mapping Software — The position of a truck is transmitted over a wireless 
network (cellular or satellite) to a server at a fleet tracking center and then on 
through to the client (e.g. fleet manager).  Usually position/location is reported 
once/minute or when a truck changes its route or direction.  Software at the fleet 
tracking center uses truck position/location in conjunction with GIS mapping 
software. The client can view a truck’s location on a map on a real-time basis. Also, 
the software provides the client with the ability to automatically monitor the 
position/location of trucks and receive reports when trucks deviate from routing set 
by the client. GIS tools normally available to the client include geo-fencing, geo-
routing, geo-zoning, and mapping services. 
 
• Geo-fencing of mobile assets to construct a digital, geographic “fence”. The client can set 
“fences” on a map on a truck-specific basis. When the truck “breaks” the fence, the client is 
automatically notified. 
 
• Geo-routing to enforce dangerous route protocols. An electronic buffer is set around a specific 
road or hauling route.  If a truck deviates from its prescribed route, the client is automatically 
notified. 
 
• Geo-zoning a digital geographic boundary of any shape or size around high-risk areas such as 
tunnels or nuclear facilities. If a truck crosses into the landmarked area, the client is 
automatically notified. 
 
• Mapping services allow the fleet manger access to services such as determining the nearest 
vehicle to a specific location, viewing the history of a vehicle and polling for current vehicle 
information. 
                                                            
2 This section provides a general overview of smart truck technology.  For a more extensive review of smart truck technology  refer 
to -  “Homeland Security and the Trucking Industry”, July 2005, University of Minnesota and American Transportation Research 
Institute http://www.atri-online.org/research/results/Homeland%20Security%20Trucking%20Industry%20ATRI%20Final.pdf 
 
A  GPS receiver and a wireless 
modem is the core technology base 
for a truck-based smart truck 
technology system. 
GIS-based tools support 
sophisticated asset tracking 
programs. 
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Intelligent Onboard Computers (OBC) with Wireless Communications — An 
onboard computer (PDA or fixed device) is a data processing unit that receives and 
analyzes information from sensors and other devices on the vehicle and then 
store/present the information in a convenient and easily accessible manner.  The OBC is 
connected to the truck’s wireless modem enabling a wireless internet connection on the 
truck. Various smart truck devices can be connected to the OBC and 
monitored/controlled by the fleet operations center via the wireless connection. 
Devices/services that the OBC/wireless setup enables include the following. 
 
• Mobile worker access to web services and back-office systems. The OBC/wireless 
setup essentially allows the truck to become a rolling office. The mobile worker (driver) can 
use a data terminal or a PDA and the truck’s wireless internet connection to tie to web 
services and corporate back-office systems hosted on servers at the fleet operations 
center. 
 
• Panic buttons. Panic buttons (dashboard or key fob) allow drivers to send emergency 
alert messages to the fleet tracking center &/or fleet dispatchers. If used with an OBC, a 
driver-carried panic button unit can be used to remotely disable the truck. 
 
• Vehicle disablement and e-locks. Connecting the OBC/modem with vehicle operating 
systems allows dispatcher-initiated remote vehicle shutdowns and trailer door 
locking/unlocking. Electronic cargo locks (e-locks) prevent unauthorized cargo access. 
 
• Security alert notification Connecting the OBC/modem with vehicle operating systems 
allows security alerts to be sent to pre-established contacts when onboard sensors, 
including trailer disconnect, tamper, volumetric, door (e-lock), radiation, temperature are 
tripped. 
 
• Biometrics and smartcards— These devices are used to positively identify drivers to 
shippers, consignees, and to their vehicles. Smartcards with predetermined driver-specific 
information can be used with biometric fingerprint scanners to validate drivers’ identities 
and record drop off, pickup, and truck start up events. When used in the truck, the “bio-
login” process sends alerts to dispatchers if an unauthorized person attempts to operate 
the truck. 
 
• Routing, Monitoring & Reporting Software — Software at the fleet operations 
center allows fleet manager to set up efficient routes and to monitor route 
compliance. The software also provides detailed operational reports to the fleet 
manager. 
 
• Enhanced route planning is provided through efficient routing optimization. 
 
• Schedule adherence provides the ability to track how well a vehicle adheres to a planned 
schedule and issue alerts whenever a vehicle deviates from the path. Users can build 
schedules using their in-house planning system and upload to the fleet operations center. 
Notifications such as “behind schedule“, or “stopped too long“ may be sent to the fleet 
manager. 
 
• Forensic software provides a log of location, speed, working hours, idle time, alarms and 
vehicle history. 
 
• Command center/ activity reports automatically access all fleet location and vehicle 
usage data through detailed activity reports and enable the verification and validation of a 
wide range of fleet activity from business mileage reporting to “on-the-job times”. 
 
A typical smart truck hardware setup (GPS, wireless modem, OBC) costs $1,000-
$2,500/per truck. Fleet management services using cellular networks cost about 
$50/truck/month (higher for satellite based systems).   
 
3.1.2 The truck tracking market is well developed and well served.  
  
Many trucking companies have already installed smart truck fleet tracking systems.  
Over the past 15 years, for example, Qualcomm has installed its commercial 
communications and vehicle tracking technology on more than 500,000 commercial 
vehicles.  According to the company, Qualcomm customers include more than 1,500 
trucking companies and 34 of the top 35 truckload fleets.   
 
Qualcomm is far from alone in a crowded marketplace.  Many firms offer fleet tracking 
systems and services and some, such as Safefreight Technology, specialize in hazmat  
fleet tracking/security systems.  In addition, companies such as IBM and Savi/Lockheed 
Martin are integrating smart truck and RFID technology into enterprise supply chain 
systems to protect hazardous materials shipments (refer to Section 3.2). 
 
Commercial “smart truck” systems 
are widely available and 
inexpensive to deploy.  Companies 
are increasingly integrating smart 
truck/RFID technologies into 
enterprise supply chain systems to 
protect hazmat shipments. 
Sensors connected to an on-board 
computer allow fleet managers to 
track a wide variety of conditions on 
a truck using browser-based 
systems. 
Smart truck systems are 
inexpensive to install and operate 
– about $2,500/per truck 
(installation) and $50/month/truck. 
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Figure 3.1.b provides an overview of product/service offering from three truck tracking 
vendors that offer smart truck systems for hazmat shipment tracking.  There are many 
more vendors in the market but this group is representative of smart truck 
product/service offerings by fleet tracking vendors. 
 
Figure 3.1.b Truck tracking vendors offer an impressive list of smart truck products and services. 
 
Truck Tracking 
Vendor 
 
 
Overview of Truck Tracking Vendor  
Product/Service Functionality 
 
Magtec 
Products 
 
Calgary, Alberta 
Willowbrook, IL 
888.624.8320 
 
 
 
FleetControl™ Solution 
• Vehicle control application 
• Mobile communication system 
• M5K™ on-board control system 
 
FleetControl™ is a fleet tracking system that offers satellite/cellular network-based applications.  At the heart of 
FleetControl™ is the MK5™ system which allows access to data from smart truck devices via any fixed or web-
enabled device.  It provides seamless updates to end users on: driver / truck control, asset tracking and 
security, and safety and risk management.  Also enables fuel cost reductions with speed limiters and idle control, 
and other operational cost reductions. 
 
FleetControl™ vehicle security features include the following. 
 
• Drivers must be authorized to operate vehicle 
• Fully configurable event notification system  
• Programmed over-the-air  
• Complete management of assets by group, by company, by type  
• Manage driver information and driver authorization codes  
• Manage maintenance authorization codes, reports, email, SMS notifications on speed thresholds, geo-fence 
crossover, tamper alarms, panic alerts and vehicle shutdowns  
• Breadcrumb tracking of assets includes speed, direction and authenticated driver ID recover mode  
• Remote vehicle shutdown  
 
Geo-Fencing; Boundary around asset, route deviations. 
 
Keyless Driver Authentication requires a driver to enter a valid driver code before a operating a vehicle. 
Driver codes can be deleted or changed remotely as required. 
 
Tamper Protect™ constantly monitors vehicle systems to detect attempts to bypass the security of the M5K.  
If tampering is detected, the vehicle is immediately locked down and alert messages are issued – ensuring 
that a prompt response can occur. 
 
Unattended Idle Protect™ (UIP) automatically engages without driver action allowing operators to fully 
secure the vehicle with the engine running and the key out of the ignition. This allows operators to step away 
from the vehicle, while remaining confident that their vehicle remains fully protected by the M5K. 
 
Timed Maintenance Bypass returns the vehicle to OEM operation for a preset time interval, allowing regular 
maintenance without disclosing the driver authentication code. The vehicle remains in the maintenance setting 
until the time interval expires, or the maintenance exit code is entered in the keypad.   
 
Acceleration Control System™ (ACS) is unique in the marketplace and a key differentiator between 
MAGTEC’s M5K and any other vehicle immobilization technology. ACS allows dispatch to remotely disable a 
vehicle by reducing the vehicles’ speed in preset increments, bringing it to a safe and controlled stop.    
 
Speed and Idle Management™ (SIM) enables the carrier to remotely set, control and geo-fence speed 
maximums and idle times. SIM maximizes fuel efficiencies resulting in calculable savings in fuel and 
operational costs along with improving environmental performance.  
 
Trailer Tethering (Optional); M5K™ identifies the tractor and TT3 identifies the trailer, when tethered, the 
TT3 automatically reports to the M5K™. 
 
Health Check from Vehicle to Host; Relays current vehicle status and current driver authentication 
 
On-Board Event Logging; M5K logs state changes, driver codes and alert triggers 
 
Website - http://www.magtecproducts.com/index.html 
Video: http://www.magtecproducts.com/media/m5k-promo.swf (3:06)  
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Qualcomm 
 
San Diego, CA 
800.348.7227 
 
OmniVisionSM   - The OmniVision Transportation service is a comprehensive mobile computing platform 
designed to enhance the safety, efficiency, and productivity of fleet operations while improving the drivers’ 
in-cab experience.  Seamless interoperability with other Qualcomm platforms including OmniTRACS® mobile 
communications system and Asset Management for Trailers and Containers 
 
OmniTRACS® is a two-way satellite communications and geolocation trailer tracking technology designed 
for the over-the-road transport market.  On-board the vehicle, the OmniTRACS® system sends and receives 
data from a satellite. The satellite relays information to and from the QUALCOMM Network Operations 
Centers (NOCs), which communicates with the customer’s fleet management center. 
 
 
 
Qualcomm’s ViaWeb system allows fleet managers internet access to load status and location information 24 
hours a day/365 days a year. Using data from the OmniTRACS® and OmniExpress solutions, the ViaWeb 
service provides near real-time information for a fleet’s internal and external customers. No additional 
hardware or software is required, and security is ensured via firewalls and passwords. 
. 
QUALCOMM Multiple Access Software System (QMASS) enables automatic data sharing with authorized third 
parties. Fleets may choose to share specific information—such as vehicle positions— with key partner 
organizations or customers through QUALCOMM’s network operations center. 
 
OmniTRACS® also offers a Security Integration Package, Qualcomm’s high-value or high-risk load 
monitoring application.  It allows companies to customize the frequency of vehicle position reports based on 
commodity codes, high-risk areas or out-of-route violations. Companies can receive an exception alert if a 
vehicle has made an unauthorized stop or trailer drop, turns off the truck’s ignition prior to delivery or fails 
to report in to dispatch in keeping with the customer’s set parameters. In addition, customized route alerts 
can be dispatched via pager or e-mail to specified users according to the severity of the exception.    
 
A  Vehicle Immobilization Device (VID) can be connected to the OmniTRACS® mobile communications 
solution.  This enables the authorized operator of the truck to put the vehicle into a “restricted mobility” 
condition. When used with the Wireless Panic Button—a wireless transmitter for use outside the vehicle—the 
VID feature increases the security of a truck’s load and its driver. In addition to working with the VID, the 
Wireless Panic Button allows drivers to send emergency notifications with their current locations. Panic 
message alerts are simultaneously sent to the customer’s dispatch and Qualcomm’s Network Operations 
Center.  
 
Other security -related features of Qualcomm’s systems include the following. 
 
1. Automated arrival and departing 
• Automatic accurate, timely arrival and departure information  
• Documented proof of an-time arrival and departure  
• Measurement of excessive detention  
• Reporting of unplanned stops  
 
2. Untethered asset (trailer/container) management service 
• Position and event reporting throughout the US, Canada, and Mexico  
• Communicates when connected or disconnected from the tractor  
• Over-the-air firmware upgrades  
• Integration with existing dispatch software  
• Optional door and cargo sensors  
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3. Critical event reporting 
• Continuously monitors fleet vehicles for critical events such as hard braking, vehicle yaw and pitch 
motions, and driver-initiated alerts  
• Provides driver/truck ID, time/date, position/location, hours-of-service (HOS) compliance, and on-
board vehicle sensor and device information such as parking brake status, speed, hard braking 
deceleration rate and motion stability for potential jackknife or rollover  
• Provides second-by-second sensor data ranging from five minutes before an event until two minutes 
afterward  
• Sends near real-time alerts to safety and fleet managers when critical events occur  
 
Website: 
http://www.qualcomm.com/products_services/mobile_content_services/enter
prise/assetmanagement/security.html  
 
Video:  
http://www.qualcomm.com/products_services/mobile_content_services/enterprise/assetmanagement/media
/OV-video.htm  
 
Product brochures:  
- OmnitTRACS® System for Transportation  
http://www.qualcomm.com/common/documents/brochures/QUALCOMM-OmniTRACS.pdf  
- OmnitVision™ System 
http://www.qualcomm.com/common/documents/brochures/Qualcomm-OmniVisionTransportation.pdf  
 
 
Safefreight 
Technology 
 
Edmonton, Alberta 
Vancouver, WA. 
 
780.421.9055 
 
 
SmartFleet® Manager - Through the SmartFleet® vehicle tracking system, critical location and operating 
information is gathered through a vehicle-mounted device, communicated wirelessly, and served to 
Safefreight’s customers through Safefreight’s vehicle-to-internet application, SmartFleet® Manager. 
Information can be accessed on-demand from any internet enabled computer or device - any time, from 
anywhere in the world.  Fleet managers can locate and view fleet assets, review historical reports and 
monitor real-time asset location, condition and security status. Fleet managers can also create and modify 
business rules for event and alert monitoring and response, asset reporting intervals, geo controls like geo-
fencing and fleet productivity report generation.   Features include the following. 
? location reporting  
? security alerts  
? security arm/disarm  
? temperature alert  
? diagnostic information  
? remotely managed locking and immobilization  
? trailer security  
? two-way messaging  
? custom reports  
? forensic tool following accidents or thefts. 
 
SecurityGuard™ With the ability to merge cellular and satellite communications with location awareness, 
asset condition monitoring and control, and many diagnostic sensors, SecurityGuard™ is a platform for real-
time tracking, management and security of mobile assets.  Additional enhancements can be added to the 
device, such as sensors (door openings, temperature, seatbelt indicator) and output devices such as sirens, 
strobe lights and keypad for local alarm activation. 
 
EnCompass™ reports the precise location and status of mobile assets at regular intervals in real-time via 
cellular or satellite networks - providing location speed, time, date, direction of travel and ignition on/off. 
 
SafeAlert!™ Fleet emergency response web application delivers information fast, accurately and securely to 
in-house or third party call center for rapid response.   When critical client defined events like unauthorized 
entry (theft), cargo temperature change and smoke endanger your workforce, cargo or mobile assets, an 
alert notification is transmitted to pre-defined key personnel or your call center. An automatic text and 
audible alert notification with asset ID, GPS position, alert details, response procedures and report 
documentation is served to the customer through this application. 
 
Website: http://www.safefreight.com/  
 
 
 
3.2 Truck-based asset tracking systems are key components of 
corporate RFID/supply chain systems. 
 
Smart truck technology deployments save companies money and have the potential to 
improve hazmat transportation security.  Supply chain/RFID technology offers similar 
benefits.   
 
53 
 
As described in Section 3.1, smart truck technology connects truck-mounted sensors, 
GPS receivers, and computers to the internet though wireless modems.  The first 
generation of smart-truck technology relied on satellite networks as the communications 
medium.  Data transfer capacity was limited and expensive, and technology deployment 
was limited to large interstate carriers.  However, since then cellular networks have 
become pervasive allowing for dramatically cheaper operating costs for smart truck 
systems.  Data capacity has been dramatically enhanced enabling the development of a 
wide array of sensors and devices that can be placed on the truck.   
 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) and other automatic identification technologies 
including electronic seals, biometrics, sensors and GPS satellite location systems are 
used to provide real-time information on the location and state of assets in the supply 
chain.  In a typical RFID system, individual objects are equipped with a tag.  The tag 
contains a transponder with a digital memory chip that is given a unique electronic 
identification code.  RFID tags can be read-only (passive) or read-write (active).  They 
can be attached to almost anything including pallets, cases of product, vehicles, 
company assets, high value electronics, and livestock.  Radio-frequency waves transfer 
data between a reader and an RFID tag on a movable item to identify, categorize, and 
track.  The reader initiates tag collection by sending a message to the tag.  The tag 
responds by transmitting its tag ID code to the reader as well as any data collected by 
the tag.  The reader forwards the tag ID/data to a middleware platform that filters and 
aggregates tag data before it is passed on to system servers and consumed in software 
applications. 
 
Readers can be either fixed or mobile. Fixed readers can be installed at any location, 
ideally where the tags frequently pass such as gates or chokepoints, at 
a point of sale, or in a warehouse. Mobile readers are usually small, handheld devices 
with a tethered cable or wireless communication.  RFID data collection is fast, reliable, 
and does not require physical sight or contact between reader/scanner and the tagged 
item.  This non-line of sight advantage means that tags can be read through snow, fog, 
ice, paint, dirt, grime, and other visually and environmentally challenging conditions.  
 
The North American Preclearance and Safety System (NORPASS), pioneered by the 
Kentucky Transportation Center, is an example of an RFID system. NORPASS-
enrolled trucks traveling over the Interstate highway system are equipped with RFID 
tags.  As a truck approaches a truck weigh station, sensors in the pavement weigh the 
truck 3 and its tag (truck identity) is interrogated by roadside RFID readers.  The truck’s 
identity is used by the NORPASS system to look up the corporate safety record of truck’s 
parent company in the NORPASS database.  If the parent company’s safety record is 
acceptable and the truck’s weight is within weight limits, the NORPASS system sends a 
signal back to the truck lighting a green bulb on the dashboard indicating that the truck 
may bypass the weigh station.  A poor safety record or overweight truck causes a red 
bulb to be lit on the dashboard indicating that the trucker must stop at the weigh 
station.  Bypassing weigh stations save truckers time and money.  Almost 60,000 trucks 
are enrolled in NORPASS in twelve states and two Canadian provinces. 
 
RFID and smart truck technologies are enabling tools for corporate supply chain 
management (SCM) systems.  Leading RFID technology firms such as IBM and Savi 
have developed tailored SCM applications to support hazmat distribution by chemical 
and petroleum firms.  For example, Savi/Lockheed’s Chemical Custody Supply Chain 
Solution enables firms to use smart truck/RFID technology to lower costs and enhance 
shipment security. 4   
 
The Chemical Custody Supply Chain Solution is a full-featured web-based SCM/RFID 
application that provides continuous on-line tracking, security monitoring and 
management of hazardous material containers and their contents from point of origin to 
destination.  Savi/Lockheed designed the Chemical Custody Supply Chain Solution 
specifically to enhance hazmat supply chain security.  The Savi/Lockheed Chemical 
Chain of Custody Solution can match the physical location of a container and its contents 
with shipment documents, inventory records, expected routes and destinations, and  
                                                            
3 Trucks are not required to stop or slow down to be weighed.  “Weigh in motion” sensors embedded in the pavement record the 
truck’s weight as it passes over; the truck’s weight/tag ID is instantly transmitted to the NORPASS system. 
 
4 Savi/Lockheed Chemical Chain of Custody Solution;  http://www.savi.com/solutions/so.chem.chain.shtml 
 
 
The North American 
Preclearance and Safety System 
(NORPASS), pioneered by the 
Kentucky Transportation Center, 
is an example of how RFID 
systems improve transportation 
efficiencies. 
 
Radio frequency identification 
(RFID) systems provide real-time 
information on the location and 
state of assets in the supply 
chain. 
 
 
Supply chain/RFID technology 
offers cost savings and improved 
hazmat transportation security. 
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other pertinent information.  Using data gleaned from a variety of automatic 
identification technologies such as RFID, electronic seals, biometrics, sensors, and GPS 
tracking systems, companies can receive a variety of alerts: if a shipment fails to arrive 
at a location as expected, if the shipment goes off route, if the shipment was tampered 
with, if the shipment was handled by someone without proper authority, etc.  Alerts can 
be used to notify security, operational managers, and law enforcement agencies if there 
is a breach in security protocol.   
 
The Chemical Custody Supply Chain Solution is notable for several reasons.   
 
• Marketing message.  To date, RFID/SCM vendors have marketed their products by 
emphasizing the cost savings and service enhancements they offer.  With the 
Chemical Custody Supply Chain Solution, the marketing campaign has emphasized 
hazmat security as an important, if not the chief, benefit of its product.  
Savi/Lockheed’s message reflects the market’s readiness for products and services 
that address the threat of terrorist actions in the hazmat supply chain.  Benefits 
cited include: 
• reduced liability risk; 
• brand protection; 
• increased security; 
• streamlined operational processes; 
• increased asset utilization and return on assets; 
• reduced asset inventory; and 
• reduced capital investment, lease, rental, and demurrage costs. 
 
• Chain of custody as a functional focus.  The Chemical Custody Supply Chain 
Solution was designed to track hazardous materials as custody changed from one 
party to another.  Strict chain of custody maintenance is enabled by the use of 
electronic records (shipping papers), RFID tags, and GPS tracking systems.  
Maintenance of chain of custody for waste shipments is a key regulatory objective of 
EPA’s hazardous waste program.  Hazardous wastes are a subset of the larger 
hazmat universe. 
 
• FMCSA vision relationship/extension.  The Chemical Custody Supply Chain Solution 
is a step toward implementation of the FMCSA’s vision for hazmat security.  It is 
XML-based and data flow to and from a PSRC would be relatively easy to arrange.  
 
 
3.3 IEEE’s 1512 family of XML messaging standards supports 
intelligent transportation systems. 
 
Clearly defined message sets are essential components in the design and operation of 
modern, computer-based intelligent transportation systems (ITS). Specifically, a 
message set provides a series, or set, of individual messages, established in a specific 
format, for exchanging information on a given topic. An agreed-upon message set with 
unambiguous definitions is one of the essential standards required to exchange 
information between ITS systems. 
 
Message sets work in conjunction with data dictionaries that provide the definition and 
syntax of individual data elements (DEs) that make up the specific message content of a 
message. In a simple analogy, message sets are the sentences that contain DEs as the 
individual words. The other standards needed for data exchange provide the actual 
communications protocols that describe how messages are encoded for transmission, 
transmitted and then decoded by the receiver. 
 
The IEEE 1512 family of standards supports the exchange of incident-related data 
between transportation, public safety, and other responding agencies. The IEEE 1512 
family consists of a base (or common) standard and several subject-area standards: 
 
• IEEE Std 1512, Common Incident Management Message Sets for Use by Emergency 
Management Centers is the base standard that defines basic information - such as a 
description of the incident - that is exchanged for any incident.  
 
• IEEE Std 1512.3, Hazardous Material Incident Management Message Sets for Use by 
Emergency Management Centers includes messages needed by responders to 
hazmat spills and other incidents related to commercial vehicles and homeland 
security.  
The Chemical Custody Supply 
Chain Solution is consistent 
with the FMCSA security vision 
for the hazmat supply chain. 
Savi’s sales message reflects the 
market’s readiness for products 
& services that protect hazmat 
shipments from terrorists.   
IEEE Standard 1512.3 is an 
XML messaging standard 
specifically developed for 
hazmat shipments and hazmat 
incidents. 
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The IEEE 1512 family of standards is used to specify the precise format, data element 
order, and transactional order of incident management messages passing between 
agencies that participate in an incident response.  
 
IEEE Standard 1512.3 describes a system of information exchange to be used in a 
situation where hazardous materials have been released on or near a roadway. The 
message sets used in the information exchange are primarily for use among hazmat 
response agencies and between hazmat agencies and any other agencies involved in 
incident management communications networks.  
 
The message sets in the hazmat Standard work in conjunction with the message sets in 
the Base Standard. A center will use the Base Standard message sets to transmit 
information on the type of incident, the location and the center responsible for handling 
the incident. The message sets defined in the hazmat Standard communicate specific 
information about any incident involving hazardous materials. The two standards must 
be used together for useful results.  
 
The following messages, data frames and data elements are part of the IEEE 1512.3 
standard. 
 
1. Messages or sets of messages that describe on-site cues about the cargo and/or 
contents to a remote cargo/contents database, to retrieve more complete data on that 
cargo and/or contents.   
 
2. Messages or sets of messages that describe the cargo and/or contents to a remote 
hazard management database, to retrieve data on how to manage any cargo/content-
related hazards in the course of the management of the incident. The cargo/contents 
information can range from quite cursory, such as the first on-site cues, to quite 
complete, such as the complete information from the shipping papers and even more 
information from the shipper. 
 
3. Messages or sets of messages that contain information available from telematics 
messages broadcast from the vehicle. Those messages may be broadcast automatically 
by the vehicle (triggered by on-board cues indicating an incident, including cues 
indicating leakage), or upon a command action by the driver of the vehicle.  
 
 
3.4 Service-oriented architectures integrate business processes.  
 
A business process is a series of logically related activities or tasks performed together 
to produce a defined set of results.  Business processes are often depicted using 
business process modeling notation (BPMN), a method of illustrating business processes 
in the form of a diagram similar to a flowchart.  
 
BPMN provides a standard, easy-to-read way to define and analyze business processes 
and provides a standard notation that is readily understandable by both business 
analysts and developers.  BPMN can also help to ensure that XML documents designed 
for the execution of diverse business processes can be visualized with a common 
notation. 
 
A diagram in BPMN is assembled from a small set of core elements, making it easy for 
technical and non-technical observers to understand the processes involved.  Elements 
are categorized into three major groups called flow objects, connecting objects, and 
swimlanes.  Flow objects, denoted by geometric figures such as circles, rectangles and 
diamonds, indicate specific events and activities. Flow objects are linked with connecting 
objects, which appear as solid, dashed or dotted lines that may include arrows to 
indicate process direction. Swimlanes, so named because of their geometric resemblance 
to the lane lines on the bottom of a swimming pool, are denoted as solid, straight lines 
running lengthwise within a rectangle called a pool. The swimlanes organize diverse flow 
objects into categories having similar functionality. 
 
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) is a methodology for systems development and 
integration where functionality is grouped around business processes and packaged as 
interoperable services. SOA also describes IT infrastructure which allows different 
applications to exchange data with one another as they participate in business  
The IEEE Standard 1512.3 
includes XML standards for 
alerts and messages from 
smart truck systems. 
 
A business process is a series 
of logically related activities or 
tasks performed together to 
produce a defined set of 
results.   
Service-oriented architecture 
(SOA) is a methodology for 
systems development and 
integration where functionality 
is grouped around business 
processes and packaged as 
interoperable services. 
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processes.  The aim is a loose coupling of services with operating systems, programming 
languages and other technologies which underlie applications.  
 
 SOA separates functions into distinct units, or services, which are made accessible over 
a network in order that they can be combined and reused in the production of business 
applications.  These services communicate with each other by passing data from one 
service to another, or by coordinating an activity between two or more services.   
SOAs build applications out of software services. Services are intrinsically unassociated 
units of functionality, which have no calls to each other embedded in them. Instead of 
services embedding calls to each other in their source code, protocols are defined which 
describe how one or more services can talk to each other. This architecture then relies 
on a business process expert to link and sequence services, in a process known as 
orchestration, to meet a new or existing business system requirement. 
 
In the process of orchestration, relatively large chunks of software functionality 
(services) are associated in a non-hierarchical arrangement (in contrast to a class 
hierarchy) by a software engineer, or process engineer, using a special software tool 
which contains an exhaustive list of all of the services, their characteristics, and a means 
to record the designer's choices which the designer can manage and the software 
system can consume and use at run-time. 
 
Underlying and enabling all of this is metadata which is sufficient to describe not only 
the characteristics of these services, but also the data that drives them. XML has been 
used extensively in SOA to create data which is wrapped in a description container. 
Analogously, the services themselves are typically described by WSDL, and 
communications protocols by SOAP.  
 
SOAP, WSDL, and UDDI are the basic building blocks of web services architecture. 
 
• Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is the XML-based set of rules that govern the 
call-and-response communication between Web Services-enabled applications. 
SOAP ensures reliable delivery of Web services messages, and can be seen as the 
glue that holds Web services together. 
 
• Web Services Description Language (WSDL) is the language that describes the 
design of a Web service so a client can discover how to invoke and properly use it. 
 
• Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI) is the directory standard 
for registering all of the available Web services currently in use. UDDI is like a Web 
services phone book, which allows a client to locate a particular Web service that 
has been published by a provider. 
 
The goal of SOA is to allow fairly large chunks of functionality to be strung together to 
form ad hoc applications which are built almost entirely from existing software services. 
The advantage of SOA is that the marginal cost of creating the n-th application is low, as 
all of the software required already exists to satisfy the requirements of other 
applications. Only orchestration is required to produce a new application. 
 
 
3.5 The E-Sign law of 2000 gave electronic transactions the same 
legal weight as paper-based transactions. 
 
Electronic forms (e-forms) are increasingly replacing inefficient and labor-intensive 
paper forms in government and industry.  The Electronic Signatures in Global and 
National Commerce Act of 2000, also known as the E-Sign law, gave digital signatures 
the same legal weight as those signed on paper.  The E-Sign Law allowed government 
and private organizations to place more of their business processes on-line including 
those that require legally binding signatures.  E-Sign has also supported the 
development of e-forms software to support on-line business transactions. 
 
3.6.1 Electronic (XFML) forms satisfy public and private digital business needs.5  
                                                            
5 This discussion is based on whitepapers published by IBM describing IBM’s Lotus Forms product.  Lotus Forms is an e-forms 
product based on XML/XFDL technology.  It has the functionality that would be needed in an XML e-forms product that would meet 
the business requirements of the hazardous waste e-manifest process.  For an overview of e-forms and Lotus Forms: http://www-
01.ibm.com/software/lotus/products/forms/ For an introduction to document security: 
http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg27006755&aid=1   
 
The Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National Commerce 
Act of 2000 enabled digital 
signatures/electronic forms to 
replace paper-based 
transactions. 
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Forms are vital components of most organizations’ business processes. They are the 
interface point between people and processes, and they supply information to the 
applications that drive the business.  Forms are significant factors in determining how 
efficiently a process works – and in turn, how smoothly an entire business operates.   
 
Companies such as Adobe, Microsoft, and IBM have developed sophisticated e-forms 
software to connect documents, people, and business processes.  Paul Chan, Program 
Director for IBM Lotus Forms, offers the following perspective on the use of e-forms in 
the organization. 
 
“A form is a living, breathing transactional document that interacts with users and 
information and systems across the enterprise.  Today more than 80% of the processes 
in public and private businesses depend on forms. In each case the form is what initiates 
the process, it’s the vehicle that drives the process through its lifecycle and that kicks off 
other related processes, and it’s the surviving record of all approvals and transactions 
once the process is complete.  It follows that to have any appreciable impact on 
operational cost and efficiency, an electronic forms solution has to interact with just 
about every client and every back-end system in the organization.” 
 
An e-form is much more than an on-line alternative to a paper form.  An e-form is a 
rich, intelligent, time- and cost-saving front end to an organization’s on-line business 
processes.  E-forms software allows organizations to develop secure and intelligent 
online forms, deploy them to virtually any client, and integrate them with back-end 
systems and services.   
 
An e-form, often referred to as an XFML e-form, is made up of four XML components – 
1).  Presentation (look & layout); 2). Business logic; 3). Data; and 4). XML attachments.  
E-forms software provides a single envelope for all four XML components, and one of the 
most important features of e-forms is that the XML components of the form are not 
disaggregated as the e-form is processed by the system.  For example, when a user 
applies a digital signature to an e-form, e-form software “locks” the signature to the 
form exactly as it appeared when the user signed it, and stores that signed version of 
the form in the database.  This is particularly important when multiple & sequential  
signatures are applied to a form and the form has regulatory or legal importance (i.e. 
hazardous waste manifest form). 
 
E-forms serve business processes and the workflow associated with business processes.  
Dynamic e-forms can be deployed to match workflow needs.  Security features keep 
transactions safe and ensure that data is not tampered with. Entire e-form records may 
be compressed and stored and data from e-forms flow directly into system databases.   
 
One of the biggest advantages of an online form, compared to a paper form, is the 
ability to build “intelligence” into the online form. XFML forms can provide sophisticated 
error checking as the user fills out the form, preventing possible errors (and wasted time 
as incomplete or erroneous forms are returned to the sender).  
 
E-forms create great value for organizations.  For example, the U.S. Army is in the 
process of a large-scale project to convert its inventory of 100,000 forms used by 1.4 
million people from a paper-based system to an e-forms system using IBM’s Workplace 
Forms™ technology.  Internal Army auditors estimate the Army will save $1.3 billion per 
year when the project is completed.6 
 
3.6.2  Digital signatures ensure document integrity and prevent signature 
repudiation by system users. 
 
In the on-line environment, document security is critical for applications that focus on 
the delivery, routing, storing and viewing of documents (e.g. electronic forms).  
Document security in the on-line environment is a function of a system’s ability to 
maintain document: 1). authentication; 2). authorization; 3). confidentiality; and 4). 
integrity. 
 
                                                            
6 http://www306.ibm.com/software/swnews/swnews.nsf/n/nhan6h9k99?OpenDocument&Site=lotus 
 
 “(An e-form) is a living, 
breathing transactional 
document that interacts with 
users and information and 
systems across the enterprise.”      
Paul Chan, IBM 
In the on-line environment, 
document security is a function 
of:  
• authentication;  
• confidentiality;  
• authorization; and  
• integrity. 
An e-form’s XML components 
are not ‘disaggregated’ as the e-
form is processed through an 
application’s workflow – a major 
advantage of e-forms. 
 
Intelligence can be programmed 
into e-forms to help users avoid 
errors. 
58 
 
Authentication involves verification of the identification of a user. This is typically 
performed at a system level rather than a document level for document access, although 
there are two points at which a user’s identity is critical – when users access documents, 
and when documents containing digital signatures are assessed.  At both points it is 
critical to ensure that the user is positively identified.  System authentication is normally 
 handled by standard web or network-based authentication protocols (i.e., mutual SSL 
authentication or Windows Network authentication). This type of authentication can 
enable a system to make authorization decisions.  Document-level authentication can 
also be useful, when the document format permits. Certain types of e-form documents 
have the capacity to embed decision logic that can detect and respond to an 
authenticated user via a digital signature or information passed into the document from 
server-side processes.   
 
A digital signature is created by using a third-party-issued digital certificate. The digital 
certificate must be provided to the user in such a way as to ensure adequate assurance 
of the user’s actual identity. Many organizations use company-issued cards on which the 
signing certificate is stored or have security policies in place regarding the issuance of 
purely electronic certificates.  Information from either the certificate or server-side 
authentication can be used by logic built into the document to restrict access to parts of 
the document, determine which portions are visible, and block write-access to portions 
as required if a user is not authenticated properly.  Authentication that will be used for 
multiple levels of access should contain information on access level or role. This 
information can be embedded within a user’s digital certificate or stored on a central 
server and linked to the user’s ID. 
 
Authorization is closely linked to authentication, and encompasses the process by 
which a user or user level is permitted access to different levels or parts of an 
application.  The degree of authorization complexity and security will depend on the 
application. Typically, applications that define a hierarchical role structure require more 
complex authorization procedures, in which not only is the user identified, but 
credentials for the current access level are analyzed also. 
 
Authorization can also occur at various places in an application. Most applications will 
require authorization for user login, document access, document submission, data 
queries, and so on. With the exception of user login, most of these authorizations are 
 transparent to the user (single sign-on). Single sign-on systems can be extended to use 
within the context of the document itself. Document formats that support internal logic 
can make decisions regarding which sections of a document are available to the user. 
This is typically accomplished by server-side insertion of session sign-on information into 
the document or by embedding the document in HTML for portal use.  The advantages of 
in-document authorization are mainly in the area of usability and error reduction.  For 
example, sections of a paper form that are to be filled in by someone with manager 
credentials can be made read-only or invisible for someone without those credentials. 
This makes multi-stage documents significantly less error-prone, as well as easier for all 
users.  In-document authorization can also allow for sensitive information to be 
contained in a document but not available to every user of that document.  
 
Confidentiality refers to the ability of the system or document to restrict the access of 
data to authorized users. Data may be in the form of documents or http-based streams 
(or both).  Confidentiality assures that no-one can see or copy the data without the 
knowledge or permission of the system. 
 
Confidentiality is typically provided through encryption of document or data, and is 
employed throughout a system. The majority of applications implement transmission 
confidentiality through the use of secure socket layer (SSL) to encrypt any user-to-
server or web services-based communications.  As an added layer of confidentiality, it is 
possible to implement document encryption using a public/private key methodology to 
ensure that only the owner of the private key can decrypt the document. If the 
document format supports it, it is possible to store the information regarding permitted 
access within the document itself.  
 
Integrity refers to the assurance that the document being viewed is exactly the same 
as the document a user filled out. This is extremely important in documents that are 
legally binding or have regulatory importance.  Document integrity is implemented at 
the document level but can be checked at various points throughout the system. 
 
Confidentiality - Who is allowed 
access to the document? 
 
Integrity - How do you know if 
the document has been 
altered? 
 
Authentication - How do you 
know where the document came 
from?   
 
 
Authorization - What permissions 
does the user have for working 
with the document? 
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Document integrity is typically implemented by use of a digital signature, which is 
generated by a document hash combined with information from the signer’s digital 
certificate – usually a private key.  Biometric information can also be used to generate 
the digital signature.  Many document formats provide only full-document signing 
capabilities; that is, the user can sign the whole document at once, typically when it has 
been completed. This type of document integrity is best for single-user documents, since 
signatures can only be applied to the whole document.  Other document formats support 
multi-stage and overlapping signatures (as well as whole-document signing).  A user 
may fill out part of a form, sign that part, then send the form to another user who can 
fill out and sign another part of it. The second user’s signature can also cover the first 
user’s, which would prevent the first user from subsequently altering anything. This 
flexibility most closely approaches the process that most forms-based processes 
naturally follow. It also provides the capability to ensure step-by-step document 
integrity, rather than simply end-product document integrity.   
 
Digital signatures can be used to ensure the integrity of the document by locking all 
items covered by the signature. Changes to fields or other input items cannot be made 
once a signature has been applied. Other changes (data, positioning, formatting, 
visibility, overlap of other elements, etc.) also cannot be made without invalidating that 
signature on the document. Once the form has been signed by a user, it can also be 
notarized by an automatic process on the server side for increased assurance of 
document integrity.  Digital signatures also prevent an individual who has signed a 
document from denying the signature (non-repudiation). 
 
 
3.6 Internet-based technologies allow the Transportation Security 
Center to be located anywhere. 
 
Web services are information sources and application components whose functionality 
and interfaces are exposed to consumers using emerging web technology standards 
including XML, SOAP, WSDL, and HTTP. In contrast to web sites, web services are 
offered computer-to-computer, via defined formats and protocols and are capable of 
processing large amounts of data across the internet. 
 
Using web services, a service provider can be located anywhere there is a suitable 
internet connection.  In addition, voice over internet protocol (VOIP) systems offer 
location-independent service options that service providers can leverage to complement 
their web-based services. 
 
• VOIP offers integration with other services available over the internet, including 
video conversation, message or data file exchange in parallel with the conversation, 
and audio conferencing.  
 
• VOIP offers advanced telephony features such as call routing, screen pops – all 
useful in a call center environment.  VOIP implementations are easier and cheaper 
to implement and integrate than traditional telephone/PBX systems.  
 
• Conference calling, call forwarding, automatic redial, and caller ID are zero- or near-
zero-cost features that traditional telecommunication companies normally charge 
extra for.  
 
• VOIP offers secure calls using standardized protocols (such as Secure Real-time 
Transport Protocol.) Most of the difficulties of creating a secure phone connection 
over traditional phone lines, like digitizing and digital transmission, are already in 
place with VoIP. It is only necessary to encrypt and authenticate the existing data 
stream.  
 
• VOIP systems are location independent. Only an internet connection is needed to 
get a connection to a VoIP provider. For instance, call center agents using VoIP 
phones can work from anywhere with a sufficiently fast and stable internet 
connection.  
 
 
 
Digital signatures ensure 
document integrity, and 
prevent signature repudiation 
by system users. 
 
Using web services, a service 
provider can be located almost 
anywhere.  In addition, VOIP 
systems offer location-
independent service options. 
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3.7 Business rules engines provide sophisticated analyses of 
market conditions on a dynamic basis. 7 
 
A business rules engine is a software system that executes one or more business rules 
in a runtime production environment. The rules might come from regulation ("hazmat 
carriers without a CDL cannot accept a hazmat shipmet"), company policy ("only carriers 
authorized by the company can accept a hazmat shipment"), or other sources (“carriers 
of a high-hazard material that cross geofence #267 will trigger a system alert”). 
 
Rule engine software is commonly provided as a component of a business rule 
management system which, among other functions, provides the ability to: register, 
define, classify, and manage all the rules, verify consistency of rules definitions (”high 
risk hazmat carriers must report vehicle location every x minutes when it is within y 
miles of a tunnel” and “high risk hazmat carriers must reporting frequency may not 
exceed 15 minutes” ), define the relationships between different rules, and relate some 
of these rules to IT applications that are affected or need to enforce one or more of the 
rules. 
 
In any IT application, business rules change more frequently than the rest of the 
application code. Rules engines (or inference engines) are the pluggable software 
components that execute business rules that have been separated from application code 
as part of a business rules approach. This allows the business users to modify the rules 
frequently without the need of IT intervention and hence allows the applications to be 
more adaptable with the dynamic rules. 
 
Many organizations' rules efforts combine aspects of what is generally considered work-
flow design with traditional rule design. This failure to separate the two approaches can 
lead to problems with the ability to re-use and control both business rules and 
workflows. Design approaches that avoid this quandary separate the role of business 
rules and work flows. 
 
Business rules produce knowledge; work flows perform business work. Concretely, that 
means that a business rule may do things like detect that a business situation has 
occurred and raise a business event (typically carried via a messaging infrastructure) or 
create higher level business knowledge (e.g., evaluating the series of organizational,  
product, and regulatory-based rules). On the other hand, a work flow would respond to 
an event by initiating a series of activities. 
 
This separation is important because the same business judgment or business event can 
be reacted to by many different work flows. Embedding the work done in response to 
rule-driven knowledge creation into the rule itself greatly reduces the ability of business 
rules to be reused across an organization because it makes them work-flow specific. 
To deliver this type of architecture it is essential to establish the integration between a 
BPM (Business Process Management) and BRM (Business Rules Management) platform 
that is based upon processes responding to events or examining business judgments 
that are defined by business rules. There are some products in the marketplace that 
provide this integration natively. In other situations this type of abstraction and 
integration will have to be developed within a particular project or organization. 
 
Most Java-based rules engines provide a technical call-level interface, based on the JSR-
94 application programming interface (API) standard, in order to allow for integration 
with different applications, and many rule engines allow for service-oriented integrations 
through Web-based standards such as WSDL and SOAP. 
 
Most rule engines supply the ability to develop a data abstraction that represents the 
business entities and relationships that rules should be written against. This business 
entity model can typically be populated from a variety of sources including XML, POJOs, 
flat files, etc. There is no standard language for writing the rules themselves. Many 
engines use a Java-like syntax, while some allow the definition of custom business 
friendly languages. 
 
Most rules engines function as a callable library. However, it is becoming more popular 
for them to run as a generic process akin to the way that RDBMSs behave. Most engines 
treat rules as a configuration to be loaded into their process instance, although some are  
                                                            
7  This discussion is adapted from the Wikipedia article, Business Rules Engine  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_engine  
Business rule engines allow 
developers to separate 
business rules from application 
code.  This is important when 
rules change often. 
 
Business rules produce 
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business work. 
 
A business rule will detect that 
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the other hand, a work flow 
would respond to an event by 
initiating a series of activities. 
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actually code generators for the whole rule execution instance and others allow the user 
to choose. 
 
There are two different classes of rule engines, both of which are usually forward 
chaining. The first class processes so-called production/inference rules. These types of 
rules are used to represent behaviors of the type IF condition THEN action. For example,  
such a rule could answer the question: "Should TSA declare a transportation security 
incident?" by executing rules of the form "IF some-condition THEN allow-customer-a-
mortgage". 
 
The other type of rule engine processes so-called reaction/Event Condition Action rules. 
The reactive rule engines detect and react to incoming events and process event 
patterns. For example, a reactive rule engine could be used to alert a watch officer that 
an unusually high number of dangerous hazmat shipments are moving toward an urban 
area. 
 
The biggest difference between these types is that production rule engines execute when 
a user or application invokes them, usually in a stateless manner. A reactive rule engine 
reacts automatically when events occur, usually in a stateful manner. Many (and indeed 
most) popular commercial rule engines have both production and reaction rule 
capabilities, although they might emphasize one class over another. For example, most 
business rules engines are primarily production rules engines, whereas Complex Event 
Processing rules engines emphasize reaction rules. 
 
 
3.8 Web-based crisis information management software supports 
“virtual” operations centers; enhances communication during an 
incident.8 
 
Information is of little value if it is not collected, evaluated and used in a timely matter. 
Crisis Information Management Software (CIMS) allows information to be collected from 
a variety of sources and then be evaluated, shared or viewed by any authorized user.   
Most CIMS applications are web-based placing integrated crisis information management 
within reach of most emergency management agencies. Any authorized user with 
internet access can log into an emergency operations center and gain access to the 
support offered by the center.  This “virtualization” of emergency operations centers 
dramatically extends their reach and functionality in responding to an incident.  The 
latest versions of some of these applications support handheld devices such as the 
BlackBerry, Treo/Palm, and the Windows Mobile systems.  
 
WebEOC™ is one of the leading CIMS packages on the market.  It is a web-based 
information management system that provides a single access point for the collection 
and dissemination of emergency or event-related information. It was designed to aid 
decision making by providing authorized users real-time information in a user-friendly 
format. WebEOC™ can be used during the planning, mitigation, response and recovery 
phases of any emergency. It can also be used by agencies during day-to-day activities 
to manage routine, non-emergency related operations.  
 
Information from WebEOC™ can be viewed on individual PC's or displayed onto any 
number of large screens. It will display text-based lists and reports in conjunction with 
graphics, maps, video, live TV camera, contact lists and other information needed in an 
emergency situation. All windows are scalable and movable; and any number of 
windows can be displayed on any screen, or any window can be displayed across all 
screens.  
 
WebEOC™ integrates data, video, messaging, and many other types of information. It 
distributes that information both to individual terminals and to projection screens. It also 
allows for remote access via the Internet for authorized users. Being able to share real 
time information with other agencies in an area can allow for more rapid deployment of 
the regional resources available to emergency managers.  
 
                                                            
8This section highlights a leading CIMS software package, WebEOC™.  It was developed at the DOE Savannah River complex and is 
used by most DOE installations at their primary emergency management tool.  The emergency management agencies in Louisville 
and Lexington both use WebEOC™.  Website: http://www.esi911.com/home/  
A production rule engine 
executes when an application 
invokes it.  A reactive rule 
engine reacts automatically 
when events occur. 
 
 
 
Crisis information management 
software helps run emergency 
operations centers.   
 “Virtualization” of emergency 
operations center allows 
authorized users in the field to 
gain access to information and 
incident management tools at 
the emergency operations 
center. 
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MapTac™, a companion software product, can interface with other standard mapping 
applications and provides a tactical mapping capability that offers common or agency 
specific mapping views (fire, police, hazmat, etc). WebEOC™ is configurable at the 
administrator level without need of a programmer. The software can accommodate the 
Incident Command System (ICS) and FEMA’s ESF structure. WebEOC™ offers 
chronological and categorical status boards of one or multiple incident/events with user 
configurable screens. Status reports can be directly input by individual responders. It 
also features a Drill Simulator offering the capability to construct exercises that are 
scenario based. Real-time links to 911 CAD systems are also possible through 
WebEOC™.  
 
3.9 Agile software development allows project teams to “develop 
quickly and deliver often”.9 
 
The catch line for Agile software development is “develop quickly, deliver often”.  There 
are a number of agile development methods but all minimize risk by developing software 
in multiple repetitions (or 'iterations') of short time frames (known as 'timeboxes'). 
Software developed during one unit of time is referred to as an iteration, which typically 
lasts from two to four weeks. Each iteration passes through a full software development 
cycle, including planning, requirements analysis, design, writing unit tests, then coding 
until the unit tests pass and a working product is finally demonstrated to stakeholders. 
Documentation is no different from software design and coding. It, too, is produced as 
required by stakeholders. An iteration may not add enough functionality to warrant 
releasing the product to market, but the goal is to have an available release (with 
minimal bugs) at the end of each iteration. At the end of each iteration, stakeholders re-
evaluate project priorities with a view to optimizing their return on investment. 
 
Agile methods emphasize face-to-face communication over written documents. Most 
agile teams are located in a single open office to facilitate such communication with 
project teams of 5-9 persons.  Team composition in an agile project is usually cross-
functional and self-organizing without consideration for any existing corporate hierarchy  
or the corporate roles of team members. No matter what development disciplines are 
required, at a minimum, every agile team will contain a customer representative. This 
person is appointed by stakeholders to act on their behalf and makes a personal 
commitment to being available for developers to answer mid-iteration problem-domain 
questions. This availability is critical to agile project success. 
 
Part of the Agile framework is routine and formal daily face-to-face communication 
among team members. This specifically includes the customer representative and any 
interested stakeholders as observers. Team members report to each other what they did 
yesterday, what they intend to do today, and what their roadblocks are. This formalized 
face-to-face communication prevents problems being hidden, provided that someone 
with corporate influence is always listening.  
 
Agile methods emphasize working software as the primary measure of progress. 
Combined with the preference for face-to-face communication, agile methods usually 
produce less written documentation than other methods. In an agile project, 
documentation, Gantt charts and other project artifacts all rank equally with working 
product. However, when stakeholders are asked to prioritize deliverables for 
demonstration at the end of the current iteration, they generally prefer to see working 
product. Stakeholders are encouraged to prioritize iteration outcomes based exclusively 
on business value perceived at the beginning of the iteration. If documentation 
represents higher business value than working software in any particular iteration then 
stakeholders give it a higher priority than working software. The (cross-functional) 
development team will accordingly produce that documentation instead of lower priority 
software. 
 
Agile means being able to quickly change direction.  In software development, it 
requires strong discipline to code for agility. It includes writing tests for functionality 
before coding. It calls for naming of functionality to exactly match the intent and the 
terminology of the problem domain. It demands cessation of coding when the tests pass. 
The sum total of all the disciplines delivers an ability to change direction quickly. New 
and unexpected functionality required to cope with a sudden change in the business  
                                                            
9 This discussion is adapted from the Wikipedia article, Agile Software Development.  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agile_programming#Principles_behind_agile_methods_.E2.80.94_The_Agile_Manifesto  
The agile software 
development mantra is 
“develop quickly, deliver 
often.” 
Agile methods emphasize 
working software as the 
primary measure of progress.  
Agile allows project teams to 
quickly change direction. 
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landscape can be inserted in existing code using test-driven development and all the 
previous tests will pass or fail to instantly indicate where code needs to be refactored to  
 
stay functional. If functionality is added before it is required then it becomes "dead 
weight" when refactoring is called for. 
 
The agile methods require the whole team to focus on quality throughout each iteration, 
which ensures the system is built on a sound foundation. Testing is no longer a phase in 
the development cycle that begins when development is "frozen." The system under 
development must be kept in a high-quality, working condition at all times. With 
software builds and integration taking place on an hourly basis, there is just no time to 
perform extensive manual tests. To accomplish this goal, the team must commit to 
automating as much of the testing process as possible. This testing must be done at 
various levels of the system underdevelopment. Relying solely on testing the GUI level 
can provide the team with a false sense of security.  
   
Many of the projects using agile methods today are SOA-based projects. Agile methods 
provide the structure for teams to tackle these challenges by keeping them focused on 
short-term wins and ensuring the integration of IT with its business counterpart. By 
tackling the challenges in increments and delivering working functionality more 
frequently to the project stakeholders, the team begins to gain confidence as they see 
the solution emerge.  
   
Producing working functionality in steps within complex integration projects may seem 
impossible. Automation is a critical component in the agile development success. The 
component-orientation of these projects requires testing at the integration level. In a 
sense, SOA is gaining success for its ability to provide "agility" to the business. The very 
nature of SOA is to quickly deliver IT supported change in processes as the business 
needs and priorities change; a goal similar to agile development methodologies. 
Iterative, incremental processes are focused on delivering true value to the business in 
fixed increments of time which creates a culture of success and confidence.  
 
The success of an SOA project also depends on the ability to continuously test the 
system under development. During SOA projects, testing can easily be pushed to the 
end as teams are consumed with simply finding a solution to the complexity. The 
knowledge of how the system actually operates comes too late. The goal of an agile 
development project is to validate at short intervals of the project. By sticking with an 
agile approach, a much stronger, high-quality solution will emerge.  
 
Through the use of short iterations, teams will begin delivering value to the enterprise 
immediately. Quality solutions and adaptable architectures will emerge and be delivered 
with confidence. The working component solutions can be demonstrated to project 
stakeholders. Collaborative testing tools that support this process are proven and 
available from commercial vendors. Tools that support project management, system 
development and customer support are available to suit the needs of various team and 
technology environments. The key value of the tools should be to provide visibility and 
demonstrate system integrity as it emerges.  
 
 
3.10 How will these technology drivers influence the design and 
operation of the Transportation Security Center? 
 
Figure 3.11.a, summarizes how technology drivers will influence the design and 
operation of the Transportation Security Center.  The yellow-coded portions of the table 
are focused on hazmat truck tracking.  Gold-coded sections focus on hazardous waste 
electronic manifests and green is relevant to both hazmat and hazardous waste. 
 
Figure 3.11.a   Implications of technology drivers on the Transportation Security Center. 
 
  
Hazmat Truck Tracking 
 
 
 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.4 
 
The cost of deploying and operating “smart truck” technology systems is low.  Clearly, cost-
effectiveness will be a key consideration in regulatory decision-making in regards to “smart truck” 
technology deployment.  Section 4.1 goes into detail about the cost/benefit of “smart truck” 
technology.  Refer to Section 4.1 for a more complete analysis of the regulatory implications of 
Agile methods force quality 
considerations in each 
iteration. 
 
Agile development is consistent 
with the goals of SOA projects. 
 
64 
 
3.8 
3.9 
 
 
“smart truck” technology. 
 
The market for smart truck technology is well established (Section 3.1.2).  Hazmat carriers use the 
services of commercial truck tracking vendors (TTV).  Truck location data is collected by the TTV and 
the TTV has the ability to report out vehicle location to the carrier and others.  The TTV will become 
a regulatory character in a hazmat truck tracking regulatory program and will need to have certain 
regulatory obligations for technology deployment and data reporting. 
 
Governmental action agencies need to be able to reach drivers in the event of an incident.  The 
Reality Vision™ product allows a driver to use a cell phone to issue a panic alert (with GPS location), 
and allows the operations center to take control of the drivers cell phone to gain in-cab awareness.  
If this capability is needed, regulations need to specify. 
 
Hazmat shippers, carriers and TTVs need to use an XML standard interface to submit data and alerts 
to the TSC.  Regulations need to specify the type, frequency, and form of data reporting. 
 
The field deployment of “smart truck” technology was evaluated in FMCSA’s Field Operations Test 
(see Section 4.1).  TSA’s Hazmat Truck Security Pilot evaluated “smart truck” technology in the 
context of an overall vehicle tracking system.  Refer to Section 4 for information on the system 
design implications of “smart truck” technology. 
 
Use a business rules engine to provide a dynamic risk profile of hazmat shipments.  Separate 
business rules from other applications. 
 
Use of the Reality Vision™ product will change the workflow for hazmat tracking.  It will provide a 
better capability for the TSC to connect with a driver and determine the seriousness of an incident.  
The architecture of the system will also change. 
 
The Reality Vision™ product will also change the way the TSC and government action agencies might 
function during an incident.  For example, first responders with Reality Vision™ enabled smart 
phones can send video information from the field and receive information from the TSC on their 
smart phones. 
 
The interface with shippers, carriers, and TTVs should be built using the IEEE XML standards. 
 
A business rules engine should be used to create a dynamic population at risk score – individual 
shipment and system wide. 
 
The use of a business rules engine to minimize false positive alarms in the hazmat truck tracking 
system is critical to containing costs.  The more false positives, the greater the staffing level needed. 
 
  
Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest 
 
 
3.4 
3.5 
3.6 
 
 
To meet EPA’s Cross Media Environmental Reporting Rule (CROMERR) requirements, hazardous 
waste e-manifest transactions need to meet a high standard for document security.  XFML forms 
help satisfy EPA’s document security needs for authentication, confidentiality, authorization, and 
integrity.  And even though hazmat e-manifest document security needs are not as rigorous, XFML 
forms provide a high level of functionality for hazmat e-manifest transactions.  A key advantage of 
XFML forms is that the forms can be mated to business processes through workflow software to 
efficiently serve complex business processes.  
 
To meet EPA’s e-manifest needs, the TSC will need to serve as a node on EPA’s Central Data 
Exchange. 
 
The hazardous waste business process is made up of a number of sub-processes.  Consider using 
SOA. 
 
Agile development promotes faster development.  TSA and EPA will both benefit if systems are 
deployed quickly. 
 
The TSC will serve as an integrating mechanism for the business processes of hazardous waste and 
hazmat trading partners.  For example, the TSC will tie together the business practices of waste 
generators and waste management firms.  The ability of the TSC to serve these processes will drive 
up transactional volume.  To be most effective, TSC systems should be built on a paradigm of 
efficient XML messaging. 
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Hazmat Truck Tracking and Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6 
3.7 
3.10 
 
Business process management (BPM) software is used to automate an organization’s business 
processes.  The business processes underlying hazmat tracking and e-manifest transactions are 
complicated and, in large part, driven by regulatory requirements.  BPM software allows developers 
to quickly model and build complicated business processes and to build interfaces with government 
and private systems.     
 
Section 3.7 highlighted the point that internet technologies enable a web-based service operation 
anywhere there are suitable internet connections.  Somerset’s Valley Oak Technology Park has an 
excellent communications infrastructure in place and could, for example, serve as the location of the 
TSC. 
 
Agile development promotes faster development.  TSA and EPA will both benefit if systems are 
deployed quickly. 
 
The TSC will serve as an integrating mechanism for the business processes of hazardous waste and 
hazmat trading partners.  For example, the TSC will tie together the business practices of waste 
generators and waste management firms.  The ability of the TSC to serve these processes will drive 
up transactional volume.  To be most effective, TSC systems should be built on a paradigm of 
efficient XML messaging. 
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4.0 Lessons Learned (Experience Drivers) 
 
Section 4.0 examines a number of systems and programs that offer valuable lessons for 
the design and operation of the North American Transportation Security Center.  They 
include the following: 
 
• Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s: Hazmat Safety and Security 
Technology Field Operational Test (Section 4.1);  Vehicle Immobilization Systems 
study (Section 4.2); and Untethered Trailer Tracking Systems study (Section 4.3); 
 
• Singapore’s Hazmat Transport Vehicle Tracking System (Section 4.4);  
 
• TSA’s Hazmat Truck Security Pilot program (Section 4.5);  
 
• U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s ACE truck e-manifest (Section 4.6); 
 
• Ontario Ministry of Environment’s Hazardous Waste Information Network (Section 
4.7); 
 
• Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s vision for a North American waste 
tracking system (Section 4.8); and 
 
• Taiwan Environmental Protection Administration’s Hazardous Waste Shipment 
Tracking system (Section 4.9). 
 
The project team evaluated the implications of each of the above programs from four 
perspectives: 1). the model regulatory program the project team is developing; 2). the 
system design for the Transportation Security Center; 3). the concept of operations plan 
for the Transportation Security Center; and 4). the implementation plan for the 
Transportation Security Center. 
 
4.1 U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration - Hazardous 
Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test 
 
 
In late 2004, the Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration (FMCSA) completed 
the Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test (FOT), a 
study to determine if “smart truck” technology such as GPS tracking, wireless modems, 
panic buttons, and on-board computers could be used to enhance hazardous materials 
shipment security. 1  
 
The primary intent of the FOT was to determine the extent to which existing security 
vulnerabilities in the hazmat supply chain might be reduced by the deployment of “smart 
truck” technology.  The FOT also included a detailed benefit-cost analysis designed to 
measure the benefit of enhanced security in the hazmat supply chain and to determine 
which component technologies or integrated systems offer the best mix of improved 
security balanced against reasonable costs for deployment and operations.  In summary, 
the FOT was designed to answer two questions. 
 
1. Do “smart truck” technologies provide significant macro-level security and safety benefits? 
 
2. If so, are the industry operational efficiency benefits significant enough to drive widespread 
industry deployment of “smart truck” technology, or is government action warranted to facilitate 
wide-scale deployment? 
 
4.1.1  How was smart truck technology deployed in the FOT? 
 
The FOT was focused on four different hazmat truck transportation scenarios 
representing the following industry segments: 
 
• Bulk Petroleum  
• Bulk Chemical  
• Less-than-Truckload (LTL)  
• Truckload Explosives industries  
 
                                                            
1 Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test Executive Summary: http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety-
security/hazmat/fot/eval-rpt-summary-part4.htm 
 
 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration seminal study – “smart
truck” technology and hazmat 
shipment security (November 2004) 
 
Does “smart truck” provide security 
benefits? 
 
Does “smart truck” technology save 
carriers money?  
 
Will carriers voluntarily embrace 
“smart truck” technology? 
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A risk and threat assessment methodology was used to identify the types of materials 
that were of highest concern, as well as the most likely attack scenarios (theft of a 
material, interception/diversion, and legal exploitation). Specific vulnerabilities were also 
identified during this phase of the project, which served as the basis for selecting the 
technologies within each scenario. 
 
As detailed in Figure 4.1.a, a wide variety of existing technologies were tested within 
each scenario. These technologies were integrated based on meeting specific functional 
requirements set by FMCSA. FMCSA also stipulated that these would need to be 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies, such that they could conceivably be 
implemented rapidly by the motor carrier industry in the future.  
 
The technologies were grouped together into several packages within each scenario. The 
grouping assisted in addressing the wide range of vulnerabilities identified in the 
risk/threat assessment, and for testing several different cost tiers reflecting a range of 
carrier deployment options based on market conditions. Based on this premise, the 
various technology components were separated into six technology tiers, ranging from a 
low-end cost of approximately $800 per vehicle to a high-end of approximately $3,500 
per vehicle. 
 
The technologies were matched to testing scenarios, which were developed to address 
the functional requirements and the threats and vulnerabilities identified in the 
Threat/Risk Assessment. With the overall goal of the FOT being to test technologies  
 
Figure 4.1.a FOT “Smart Truck” Technology Deployment 
 
 
Scenario 
 
Load Type 
 
“Smart Truck” Components 
 
 
1 
 
Bulk Fuel Delivery 
 
• Wireless Satellite Communication 
• Global Login 
• In-Dash Panic Button 
• Wireless Panic Button 
• Digital Phone 
• Terrestrial Communication 
• On-Board Computer 
 
 
2 
 
LTL High Hazard 
 
• Wireless Satellite Communication 
• Global Login 
• In-Dash Panic Button 
• Wireless Panic Button 
• Terrestrial Communications 
 
 
3 
 
Bulk Chemicals 
 
 
• Wireless Satellite Communication 
• Biometric Authentication 
• In-Dash Panic Button 
• Wireless Panic Button 
• Electronic Supply Chain Manifest 
 
 
4 
 
Truckload Explosives 
 
• Wireless Satellite Communication 
• Biometric Authentication 
• In-Dash Panic Button 
• Wireless Panic Button 
• Electronic Supply Chain Manifest 
• On-Board Computer 
• Wireless Electronic Cargo Seal 
• Geofencing 
• Untethered Trailer Tracking 
 
 
 
The FOT focused on four 
hazmat/transportation scenarios. 
• Bulk petroleum 
• Bulk chemical 
• Less-than-truckload 
• Explosives 
The FOT evaluated different 
“smart truck” technology suites – 
100 trucks were used in the FOT. 
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installed in 100 vehicles, each scenario tested a total of 25 vehicles, with various 
combinations of technology installed on each vehicle. Figure 4.1.a provides a summary 
of each scenario and the technology components that were tested by scenario. 
 
The cost of deploying “smart truck” technology for each scenario above was calculated 
as well as the benefit of deployment.  Additional information was gathered on such 
topics as the operational effectiveness of the technology, customer satisfaction, and 
institutional challenges. For example, drivers were asked about the ease of use of the 
various technologies, and how adding the technology impacted their daily operations. 
Quantitative data was collected primarily through system-generated archived reports. 
 
The FOT benefit/cost studies focused separately on operational efficiency and 
security.  In the first case, the study team quantified the operational efficiency benefit 
of “smart truck” technology deployment.  Savings from operational efficiency gains will 
be important in industry acceptance of “smart truck” technology deployment.  In the 
second case, the study quantified the societal benefit of an enhanced hazmat supply 
chain through the deployment of “smart truck” technology.   
 
4.1.2 How does “smart truck” technology deployment affect carrier costs? 
 
Some of the technologies tested in the FOT are security-oriented only, and do not 
contribute to operational efficiency cost savings for carriers (i.e., panic buttons, e-seals).  
Two technologies – wireless communications and GPS vehicle tracking – created 
exceptional operational efficiencies for hazmat carriers.  Notably, these two core 
technologies also “enabled” other security technologies.  Without the deployment of 
wireless communications and asset tracking, the study determined that other security 
technologies would not enhance the security of the hazmat supply chain.  
  
Based on the information collected during the FOT, at the micro or carrier-level, benefits 
were gained through closer management of assets and personnel. Better management 
reduced out-of-route miles, enhanced driver productivity by facilitating the monitoring of 
location and driver work status, and through dynamic routing, potentially realized the 
opportunities for additional loads. The core mobile communications and asset tracking 
enabled the motor carriers to monitor their fleet operations both in near real-time and 
through historic record analysis to set tighter performance measures, and to realign 
fixed and variable routing decisions. 
 
Figure 4.1.b displays the operational efficiency cost savings that hazmat haulers can be 
expected to capture from deploying the two core security technologies – wireless 
communications and GPS vehicle tracking.  The operational benefits are estimated to be 
$486/truck/month (bulk fuel), $820/truck/month (LTL-high hazard), $593/truck/month 
(bulk chemicals), $914/truck/month (explosives). 
 
Figure 4.1.b Estimated Monthly Per Truck Operational Benefits by Using Wireless Communications With GPS Vehicle 
Positioning System 
 
Benefits Bulk Fuel LTL – High 
Hazard 
Bulk 
Chemicals 
Truckload 
Explosives 
 
Reduced Call Stops & Check Calls 
a. Reduces telecommunications costs 
b. Increases number of trucks dispatchers 
handle 
c. Increases potential number of loads 
d. Reduces idle time fuel consumption 
e. Reduces idle time engine wear 
  
$296 
 
a. $28 
b. $165 
c. $27 
d. $65 
e. $11 
 
$253 
 
a. $19 
b. $122 
c. $37 
d. $65 
e. $11 
 
 
$491 
 
a. $30 
b. $81 
c. $290 
d. $78 
e. $13 
 
Improved Maintenance Scheduling 
• Reduces maintenance & repair cost 
• Increases revenue miles by reducing 
downtime 
  
$36 
 
$18 
 
$37 
 
Reduce Out-Of-Route Mile 
• Creates savings of line haul variable costs 
  
$180 
 
$123 
 
$116 
 
Improved Vehicle Utilization by 
Reducing Empty Miles 
• Increases potential number of trips 
  
$309 
 
$199 
 
$270 
The FOT team completed 
cost/benefit analyses of “smart 
truck” technology deployment.  
The team evaluated: 
 
1. ROI on technology deployment 
from operational efficiency 
gains; and 
 
2. security benefits of technology 
deployment. 
A basic “smart truck” 
technology package generates 
overwhelmingly positive ROI 
for hazmat carriers due to 
operational efficiency gains. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1.b, GPS 
and wireless communications 
generates $7,116/truck in annual 
operational benefits for bulk 
chemical carriers. 
Wireless communications and GPS 
vehicle tracking is core “smart 
truck” technology – without them 
the other technologies do not 
work. 
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Total Monthly Benefit Per Truck 
 
 
$486 
 
$820 
 
$593 
 
$914 
 
Total Annual Benefit Per Truck 
 
 
$5,832 
 
$9,840 
 
$7,116 
 
$10,968 
 
4.1.3 What is the ROI for “smart truck” technology deployment? 
 
Figure 4.1.c presents the annual cost a hazmat carrier would incur in installing and 
operating the core smart truck technology package (wireless communications with GPS).  
The annual costs per truck include the initial purchase of equipment and installation 
amortized over 3 years plus annual messaging and maintenance service fees.  
 
The choice of terrestrial versus satellite-based systems in Figure 4.1.c is based on 
using the lowest cost service appropriate to the operational characteristics associated 
with the test scenarios. For example terrestrial is more appropriate for the shorter hauls 
in more developed areas with good terrestrial coverage associated with the bulk fuel and 
LTL-Non-Bulk scenarios. The longer hauls in more remote areas characteristic of the 
Bulk Chemical, LTL-High Hazard and Truckload Explosives operations require the 
coverage afforded by satellite service. 
 
Figure 4.1.c  Per Truck-Specific Technology Costs 
(Wireless Communications with GPS Tracking Capabilities)   
 
Item 
 
 
Purchase Cost Per Truck 
Terrestrial / Satellite 
 
 
Annual Cost Per Truck 
Terrestrial / Satellite 
(3-year amortization) 
 
 
Mobile Communications with GPS 
Tracking Units (Hardware Costs) 
 
$1,000 / $2,000 $336 / $672 
 
Installation 
 
$200 $72 
 
Basic Service (per truck)2  
 
 - $600 
 
Maintenance Agreement 
 
 - $180 
 
Total Per Truck Costs 
 
$1,200 / $2,200 $1,188 / $1,524  
 
 
Figure 4.1.d presents the costs, benefits, benefit-cost ratios and payback periods for 
smart truck technology investment (wireless communications with GPS) by hazmat 
haulers.  Note that the benefits varied significantly.  The lower numbers for annual 
benefits were supplied by a trade group representing the trucking industry.  However, 
even considering the lower benefit numbers offered by the trucking industry, the 
payback periods estimated for the high-end satellite-based units are within documented 
ranges for maximum time period that most motor carriers are willing to accept for return 
on investment. 
 
Figure 4.1.d.  Costs, Benefits, Benefit-Cost Ratios, and Payback Periods by Industry Segment 
(Wireless Communications with GPS Tracking Capabilities)  
 
Segment/ Fleet 
Size 
Annual 
Cost/Truck 3 
Annual 
Benefit/Truck 
Benefit-
Cost Ratio 
Payback on 
Purchase 
in Months 
 
Bulk Fuel 
(Terrestrial) 
 
$1,188 $5,832 4.9:1 3 
 
LTL-High Hazard 
(Satellite) 
 
$1,524 2,352 to $9,840 
1.5:1 to 
6.5:1 
3 to 17 
 
                                                            
2 Monthly service fees cover hourly positioning and base number of messages per unit. 
 
3 Costs include purchase and installation costs amortized over 3 years, plus ongoing messaging and maintenance costs. 
“Smart truck” technology is 
inexpensive to deploy and use – 
about $1200 - $1500/year/truck.  
Payback on investment is low and 
acceptable using the investment 
criteria used by hazmat carriers. 
 
“Smart truck” technology benefit-
cost for hazmat carriers. 
• Bulk fuel – 4.9 to 1 
• LTL high hazard – 6.5 to 1 
• Bulk chemicals – 4.7 to 1 
• Explosives – 7.2 to 1 
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Bulk Chemicals 
(Satellite) 
 
$1,524 $1,560 to $7,116 
1.0:1 to 
4.7:1 
5 to 34 
 
Truckload Explosives 
(Satellite) 
 
$1,524 $1,824 to $10,968 
1.2:1 to 
7.2:1 
3 to 25 
 
4.1.4 How big is the market for “smart truck” technology deployment? 
 
Figure 4.1.e presents data on current technology deployment levels by hazmat haulers.  
Almost half of hazmat haulers in the United States have deployed smart truck 
technology.  
 
Figure4.1.e “Smart Truck” Technology Deployment Levels 
 
 
Load Type 
 
New Potential 
Market 
 
Current 
Penetration 
 
% Current 
Penetration 
 
Unrealized 
Market Potential 
 
Bulk Fuel 111,031 Trucks 51,768 Trucks 47% 59,264 Trucks 
LTL-High Hazard 145,184 Trucks 70,779 Trucks 49% 74,405 Trucks 
LTL-Non-Bulk 368,380 Trucks 178,926 Trucks 49% 189,454 Trucks 
Bulk Chemicals 61,168 Trucks 28,963 Trucks 47% 32,204 Trucks 
Truckload Explosives 8,195 Trucks 3,823 Trucks 47% 4,373 Trucks 
 
 
4.1.5 How will “smart truck” technology deployment affect carrier profits? 
 
If the hazmat trucking industry fully deployed smart truck technology, the industry (at 
the high end) would have to invest $543 million and incur annual service fees of $829 
million per year.  If the purchase costs were amortized over 3 years, total annual costs 
(including monthly service fees) would be approximately $457 million. Offsetting these 
costs would be increased profitability, estimated to range from $943 million to $1.7 
billion per year. These estimates are presented in Figure 4.1.f.  
 
Figure 4.1.f.  Full Deployment Investment - Industry Efficiency Benefit and Cost 
Estimates/Investments Over 3 Years - Wireless with GPS (In Millions of Dollars) 
 
Load Type 
Unrealized 
Market 
Potential 
Technology 
Investment 
Investment 
Amortized 
Over 3 Years 
Annual 
Service Fees 
Total Annual 
Costs 
Total Annual 
Benefits 
Bulk Fuel 59,264 Trucks $71 $24 $46 $69 $346 
LTL-High Hazard 74,405 Trucks $164 $55 $57 $112 $175 to $732 
LTL-Non-Bulk 189,454 Trucks $227 $76 $146 $221 $364 
Bulk Chemicals 32,204 Trucks $71 $24 $25 $48 $50 to $229 
Truckload Explosives 4,373 Trucks $10 $3 $3 $7 $8 to $48 
Totals 359,700 Trucks $543 $181 $276 $457 $943 to $1,719 
 
 
4.1.6 What methodology did the FOT project team use to calculate the security 
benefit of smart truck technology deployment? 
 
The primary objective of the FOT was to determine if smart truck technology could 
reduce security vulnerabilities in the hazmat supply chain.   The FOT also focused on 
quantifying the societal benefits of enhanced hazmat security.   
 
The FOT project team faced two challenges, however, in assessing the societal benefits 
of smart truck deployment. 
 
1. The project team could not predict how many terrorist attacks might occur in the 
future. 
 
2. The project team needed to create a methodology to quantify (i.e. monetize) the 
risk reduction effects of smart truck technology deployment. 
The FOT analyzed the financial 
impact of hazmat-based terrorist 
attacks to calculate the security 
benefit of “smart truck” 
technology deployment. 
 
Full deployment of “smart 
truck” technology by hazmat 
carriers will require a one-
time $543 million investment, 
but carrier profitability will 
rise by $1.7 billion/year. 
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The project team used the classic vulnerability assessment equation below in which the 
term, cost, is the financial impact of hazmat-based terrorist attacks. 
  
Cost = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence 
 
By applying this formula both before and after the deployment of technologies, the 
project team determined the likely security impacts of the test technologies and 
expressed these impacts in monetary terms. 
 
To begin the technology benefits assessment, the FOT project team identified the most 
likely terrorist attack profiles for each of the four load types (bulk fuel; less-than-
truckload high hazard; bulk chemicals; and truckload explosives).  The following attack 
profiles were considered. 
 
• Theft is undertaken by means of stealth, deception, or force. Stealth and deception 
are deterred by detection, while force assumes detection and operates within 
parameters defined by the time to communicate and mount an interdiction. Stealth, 
deception, and force also define an escalation path for operational planning 
purposes. 
 
• Diversion is a tactic that results in either theft or interception. The purpose is to 
create a path to a target opportunity or arrive at a location where control of the 
cargo by the terrorists can be achieved. 
 
• Interception is the "instantaneous" version of theft in that the cargo is released 
and/or detonated, and ignited while still in control of the shipper/carrier/consignee. 
Particularly effective when the radius of damage is large, this is potentially the most 
violent of attack profiles in that it likely involves explosives as the mechanism for 
effecting material release. 
 
For example, a possible associated attack profile for a bulk fuel shipment may be 
the use of false manifest to divert the shipment and delivery to a populated area for 
intentional release.   
 
Once operational scenarios and attack profiles were established, a determination was 
made of the extent of the threat, or the probability that a given attack scenario may be 
attempted.  This value is a function of terrorist aims and operating procedures.  Note 
that deployment of smart truck technology may make a given attack scenario less 
desirable relative to others, but the technology would not alter the terrorist overall 
desire to inflict harm. Therefore, threat was held constant throughout the FOT 
assessment.  
 
After establishing threat values, the FOT project team determined weight and rank of 
vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities represent the probability that a given attack 
profile will be successful, given potential weaknesses in the various stages and 
processes involved in transporting hazardous materials from shipper to consignee.  
Three vulnerability factors contribute to the potential success of an attack. 
 
• Chain of Custody - Protection of the Chain of Custody (CoC) is the ability to 
ensure that a shipment is in authenticated hands during the entire transportation 
process. CoC represents the first line of defense allowing positive tracking of the 
material form the point of origin to the point of delivery. Each shipment type infers 
a set of procedures that are followed at points where custody must affirmed or 
transferred. 
 
• Access - If an attacker is unable to gain access by intercepting the CoC, this 
individual may elect to take forcible measures to gain control of the shipment and 
acquire access. Access is the ability to get inside of a critical effects perimeter (CEP) 
on the asset given that it has been identified and intercepted. The CEP is different 
depending on the threat. For detonation in place, this perimeter can be thousands of 
feet; for theft, the perimeter may involve cab entry. Access is measured as the 
probability that the adversary will get inside the CEP for a given shipment type and 
given threat. 
 
• Response Time - Response time is the timeframe that it takes for authorities to 
identify that a shipment has been seized, mobilize response forces, close on the  
 
The FOT evaluated likely attack 
profiles for the four hazmat loads 
and established the probability that 
a given attack profile might be 
successful.  
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asset, and to neutralize the consequence potential. Response time is a function of 
the level of monitoring, the location and alert posture of response forces, and the 
ability to track the asset once it has been commandeered. 
 
Figure 4.1.g illustrates the percent reduction in vulnerability from the deployment of 
smart truck technology by load type.  4 
 
The FOT project team next examined the likely consequence of success for a given 
attack profile and hazmat operational scenario.  As with the threat element of the 
vulnerability assessment formula, the consequence of a successful attack was 
considered to not change as a result of the technology deployment.  The "per event" 
potential consequences of hazmat-based attacks were obtained from a document 
developed by Battelle for FMCSA that explored the potential economic impacts of  
 
Figure 4.1.g.  Percent reduction in overall vulnerability by load type and technology. 
 
Technology Bulk Fuel LTL 
Bulk 
Chemicals 
Truckload 
Explosives 
 
Base (WC + GPS Position) 
 
17% 16% 16% 12% 
 
Base + PSRC 
 
24% 25% 24% 20% 
 
Base + Panic Alert  
 
27% 25% 25% 21% 
 
Base + Vehicle Disabling  
 
26% 27% 26% 19% 
 
Base + Vehicle Disabling + 
Panic Alert 
 
32% 32% 31% 25% 
 
Base + Panic Alert + Driver ID 
+ ESCM 
 
35% 36% 33% 26% 
 
Base + Vehicle Disabling + 
Panic Alert + Driver ID 
 
36% 37% 34% 27% 
 
 intentional and non-intentional releases of hazardous materials. 5  The study examined 
the potential consequences as measured by: 
  
• Fatalities and injuries. 
 
• Property Damage including damage to the truck, to other involved vehicles, and to 
other public and private property. 
 
• Product Loss including quantity and value of the load (hazmat) lost during a spill. 
 
• Environmental damage. 
 
• Evacuation - predominantly short-term relocation of people and business operations. 
 
• Cleanup - stopping the spread of a release and removing spilled materials. 
 
• Traffic Delay - additional travel time experienced by the motoring public due to 
delays caused by the incident. 
 
• Business Disruption - businesses having to reduce or cease operations because the 
facility is inaccessible, supplies cannot be received, or other constraints imposed by 
the incident. 
 
                                                            
4 Battelle, HAZMAT Field Operational Test Task One: Conduct A Risk/Threat Assessment, Draft Report prepared for the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (USDOT), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), October 2002. Also, from Battelle, 
Framework for Assessing Safety & Security Incident Consequences for Highway Shipments of Hazardous Materials, Final Report, 
prepared for the USDOT and FMCSA, December 2003. 
 
5 Framework for Assessing Safety & Security Incident Consequences for Highway Shipments of Hazardous Materials, Final Report, 
Battelle, prepared for the USDOT and FMCSA, December 2003. 
The FOT determined the 
percent reduction in 
vulnerability that “smart 
truck” technology deployment 
would deliver.  
The FOT estimated the economic 
impact of the intentional and non-
intentional release of hazardous 
materials.  
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Figure 4.1.h illustrates reasonable worst-case consequences of attacks using different 
types of hazardous materials. 
 
Figure 4.1.h. Reasonable Worst-Case Per Attack Consequences 
   
 
Hazardous Material Load Type 
 
Reasonable Worst-Case Hazmat Attack 
Consequences 
 
Bulk Fuel 
 
$3.7 Billion 
 
 
Less Than Load High Hazard 
 
$2.1 Billion 
 
 
Bulk Chemicals 
 
$16.3 Billion 
 
 
Truckload Explosives 
 
$13.3 Billion 
 
 
To put these consequence numbers into context, two incidents provide examples of the 
harm that can occur from explosive material delivered in a van or light truck. 
  
• The 1993 New York World Trade Center (WTC) bombing killed six people, injured 
over 1,000, and resulted in over $113 million in loss of life and bodily injury, and 
over $510 million in insured losses (based on figures from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency). Total losses are estimated to be $623 million. 
 
• The Oklahoma City bombing killed 168 people, injured 601, and resulted in $560 
million in loss of life and bodily injury, and over $125 million in insured losses. Total 
losses are estimated to be $685 million. 
 
Vehicles used in the transportation of hazardous materials typically have much larger 
capacities than the vehicles used in these two incidents. If these vehicles were used to 
carry out a terrorist act, the damage would have been far worse. If certain hazardous 
materials were involved and released in a directed attack, it could result in far greater 
numbers of casualties and damage to property over a larger area. 
 
Another example of the impacts of directed attacks in the United States, albeit attack(s) 
using airplanes against buildings as opposed to trucks, is the September 11, 2001 
attack(s) on the WTC.  The Government Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed eight studies 
from seven organizations that examined the financial impacts of the 9-11 attack on the 
World Trade Center.6   The GAO concluded that the study conducted by the New York 
City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce provided the most comprehensive 
estimates: $83 billion in 2001 dollars for direct and indirect costs. 
 
The final activity in the benefits assessment framework was to establish the potential 
number and type of terrorist attacks expected over the time horizon of 3 future years. 
Using these incident occurrence estimates with per incident consequence dollar value 
and the vulnerability reduction estimates, overall reduction in potential impacts 
(benefits) were estimated for each technology countermeasure for each load type. 
 
4.1.7 What is the security benefit of smart truck technology deployment? 
 
In the preceding section, the following equation for the financial impact of hazmat-based 
terrorist attacks was presented. 
  
Cost = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence 
 
Although threat may vary over time and is difficult to predict, in estimating the security 
benefit, threat is held constant at 100 percent, meaning that there is a 100 percent 
chance that an attempt will be made to use a hazmat shipment for a terrorist attack. 
Assuming that threat is a constant, the security benefits of smart truck technology  
                                                            
6 U.S. Government Accounting Office, GAO-02-700R, Impact of Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center, May 29, 2002. The 
reports that were reviewed were prepared by: the New York City Office of the Comptroller; New York Governor and State Division 
of the Budget; New York City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce; Fiscal Policy Institute; New York State Senate Finance 
Committee; Milken Institute; and, New York State Assembly Ways and Means Committee. 
The FMCSA estimates a single 
hazmat attack can create 
economic damages of more 
than $16 Billion. 
The 9/11 attack on the World 
Trade Center resulted in 
$83billion in direct and indirect 
costs. 
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deployment can be calculated as  the overall vulnerability reduction multiplied by the 
consequences of a hazmat-based terrorist attack.   For example, as illustrated in Figure 
4.1.i, the security benefit that will be generated if bulk chemical haulers adopt “smart 
truck” technology (wireless communications, gps, vehicle disabling, panic alert) is 
calculated as follows: 
 
Security Benefit  = Bulk Chemical Consequence X Technology Vulnerability Reduction  
= $16.3 Billion X 31%  
= $5.1 Billion Benefit 
 
Figure 4.1.i.  Estimated Security Benefits (In Millions of Dollars) 
 
Technology Bulk Fuel LTL 
 
Bulk 
Chemicals 
 
 
Truckload 
Explosives 
 
 
Base (WC + GPS Position) 
 
$622 $348 $2,581 $1,657 
 
Base + Panic Alert  
 
$995 $529 $4,058 $2,822 
 
Base + Vehicle Disabling  
 
$970 $573 $4,278 $2,556 
 
Base + PSRC 
 
$908 $525 $3,891 $2,652 
 
Base + Vehicle Disabling 
+ Panic Alert 
 
$1,207 $689 $5,098 $3,355 
 
Base + Panic Alert + Driver 
ID + ESCM 
 
$1,318 $755 $5,319 $3,510 
 
Base + Vehicle Disabling + 
Panic Alert + Driver ID 
 
$1,331 $776 $5,539 $3,547 
 
 
4.1.8 What is the Hazmat Public Sector Reporting Center (PSRC)?  What 
implementation issues are associated with the PSRC? 
 
The FOT examined the potential improvements in public sector response capabilities 
utilizing a Public Sector Reporting Center (PSRC) as the information collection and  
dissemination point. The PSRC coordinated information gathered from smart truck 
technology to create centralized information processing and command and control 
capabilities.  
 
As a “proof-of-concept” system, the PSRC provides a model for enhanced information 
exchange between public and private sector hazmat stakeholders by providing law 
enforcement and emergency response personnel access to accurate, timely, and action-
oriented information. As a solution, the PSRC system holds the potential to enable law 
enforcement and emergency response personnel to respond to intentional and 
unintentional incidents associated with the transportation of hazardous materials. Three 
“requirements” for the PSRC were evaluated in the FOT. 
 
Requirement 1.  Currently, law enforcement typically relies on information provided by 
the subject for identification. The individual may choose to identify himself or herself 
using fraudulent identification credentials. It is difficult to remotely verify an individual’s 
identity and only sketchy information is available without a reliable means to verify 
identification. An officer must depend on visual identification to make a decision as to an 
individual’s identity. In the cases of unauthorized drivers, those individuals might have 
forged identification to pass themselves off as legitimate drivers. 
 
The Biometric Login or Global Login provides much more accurate, truthful information 
on a driver during roadside enforcement actions. With laptop access in remote locations, 
law enforcement can verify driver identity, and with ESCM capabilities, ensure that the 
correct driver is associated with the correct vehicle/cargo. ESCM manifests detail the 
entire supply chain transaction from shipper pickup to consignee delivery. The law 
enforcement officer can determine who should be in control of a shipment at the point of 
the remote vehicle stop.  
 
The security benefit of “smart 
truck” technology deployment is 
substantial – especially for bulk 
chemical shipments.   For 
example, security benefits 
exceeding $5 billion will be 
captured if trucks carrying bulk 
chemicals were equipped with , 
wireless modems, panic alerts, 
GPS, and remote disabling. 
An electronic manifest (ECSM) 
would provide law enforcement 
officials visibility into shipment 
transactions and better 
information on driver identity. 
A Public Sector Reporting Center 
will provide government agencies 
access to actionable information. 
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Requirement 2.  Currently, law enforcement relies on the motor carrier to provide 
details for an “off route” or geofence-violating truck. Law enforcement information is 
only as detailed as what the motor carrier provides. In cases where a carrier has no 
satellite communications, precise vehicle location is impossible with only a rough 
estimate based on travel times would be available. For details on cargo contents, 
without ESCM, law enforcement must contact the motor carrier, who may or may not 
have precise details on what is being hauled. In some cases, the shipper would have to 
be contacted by law enforcement for precise cargo contents to determine what real risk 
is posed by a particular off route or geofence-violating truck, depending on what type of 
material is being hauled.  
 
Geofence alerts contain a precise location of the alert event. Satellite tracking allows 
for continuing monitoring a vehicle once an alert is received at an increased 
positioning rate. The PSRC approach is to provide exception-based off route or 
Geofence alerts to law enforcement or first responders when there is a real defined 
emergency. Geofencing technology allows each route to be configured according to 
each specific shipment type, allowing for a precise risk level to be ascribed to each 
shipment and route. The PSRC allows for law enforcement or first responders to 
select what types of alerts to receive, and contact by a certain method (phone, e-
mail, fax, page, etc.).  
 
ESCM allows for law enforcement to know what cargo is on what truck when 
responding to an off route or Geofence alert to better assess risk. There is no need 
to contact the carrier to obtain load information – the information is contained on 
the manifest when it is electronically accessed.  
 
The PSRC delivers precise, manageable information to law enforcement and first 
responders when dealing with off route or geofence violating trucks 
 
Requirement 3.  Currently, law enforcement does not receive a real-time “panic alert”. 
The best law enforcement can hope for is a cell phone call placed after the fact, to 
describe apparent location and what occurred during the event.  
 
Panic Buttons provide an effective way to transmit emergency event information 
directly to law enforcement through the PSRC. Panic buttons utilize satellite or 
cellular communications to pinpoint exact location and forward that location 
information to the PSRC and ultimately to end users such as law enforcement. There 
is no searching for location information pertaining to an emergency event that 
requires immediate response to a precise location.  
 
As a proof of concept, the FOT demonstrated the PSRC’s ability to fuse and disseminate 
critical hazmat information in a timely manner to enhance enforcement response to 
security events.  On a basic level, the PSRC system successfully demonstrated that as a 
system. The PSRC has the ability to improve:  
 
• the response times for emergency and enforcement personnel to respond to a 
hazmat security or safety incident through the implementation of these technologies 
and the reporting center operational concept; and  
 
• the quality of the information provided to first responders through the 
implementation of these technologies and the reporting center operational concept.  
 
In expanding the PSRC concept to a full deployment scenario, the FOT study concluded 
that significant institutional/ procedural issues will need to be addressed. Among the 
more important of these is the administration of information and the notification 
process, i.e., ensuring that shipment information, alert notification levels (triggers), and 
key persons to be notified are current and complete.  
 
Figure 4.1.j presents the PSRC vision developed in the FMCSA study.  The PSRC 
concept is sound but as Figure 4.1.j shows, the vision as constructed faces significant 
implementation issue. 
 
 
An electronic manifest combined 
with real-time tracking provides 
law enforcement officials with the 
information needed to detect 
when shipments are off route. 
Panic alerts provide precise 
location information to law 
enforcement officials in the event 
of an incident. 
A PSRC will improve emergency 
and enforcement response to a 
hazmat incident. 
   
  
77 
 
Figure4.1.j.  Implementation issues with the Hazmat PSRC   
Hazmat Public Sector Reporting Center 
 
Vision 
 
Implementation Issues 
 
 
• Hazmat transporters will be 
equipped with smart truck 
equipment (GPS devices, 
computing devices & sensors, 
wireless modems) and will employ 
fleet tracking services (voluntary 
deployment) 
 
• Hazmat transporters will 
voluntarily report the following 
information to PSRC: 
 
o truck location 
 
o load information (from e-
manifest?) 
 
o routing information 
 
o alerts (highjack, spill) 
 
• PSRC will be an interactive data 
center.  Data flowing to the PSRC 
will provide government officials 
with accurate, timely, and action-
oriented information that will allow 
them to: 
 
o detect suspicious activity 
(ex. route departure) 
 
o locate stolen vehicles 
 
o develop/enforce high-risk 
hazmat zones 
 
o remotely disable a vehicle 
 
o respond quickly and with 
certainty to an emergency 
(spill/highjacking) 
 
 
• The PSRC is dependent on voluntary, wide-scale deployment of smart truck 
technology by hazmat transporters. 
 
o FMCSA study concluded that despite the clear economic benefit of the 
technology for hazmat transporters, that technology adoption will be too low 
to make the PSRC concept work. 
 
o Ontario’s e-manifest experience buttresses FMCSA conclusion about industry 
behavior. 
 
• The PSRC is dependent on voluntary data (location, load) reporting by hazmat 
transporters. 
 
o Unlikely that industry will be keen to voluntarily report data – same issue as 
voluntary technology deployment 
 
o Note industry resistance to State/Federal legislation requiring location 
reporting 
 
• The PSRC concept will fail without long-term funding but the FMCSA study was 
silent on PSRC funding sources.  The federal government will incur a long-term 
funding obligation unless industry is asked to share the cost.  The PSRC, as 
presented, implies a full-federal, forever-federal funding approach. 
 
• The PSRC concept will fail without a regulatory push to stimulate technology 
deployment and data reporting. 
 
o FMCSA study concluded that government intervention (e.g. regulatory push) 
is needed to promote smart truck technology adoption. 
 
o Note Ontario’s experience and conclusion that a regulatory push is needed.  
Note that Singapore’s hazmat security program required a coordinated 
technology/regulatory approach. 
 
• The FMCSA study was silent on Federal/State implementation roles and 
responsibilities but there is an implied federal-lead role.  A federal, ‘one-size’ 
approach to implementing a PSRC program will not provide authorized States the 
flexibility they need. 
 
o States have delegated responsibility for managing hazardous materials.  
Response actions take place at the state/local level.  The PSRC does not 
establish the critical link with state action agencies. 
 
o Authorized states need flexibility.  What works for California or New Jersey 
may not work for Kentucky or Indiana.   
 
• DOT/DHS may miss the opportunity to coordinate with the CPB ACE Truck E-
Manifest initiative and with the EPA e-manifest initiative. 
 
 
 
4.1.9 What observations did FOT study participants take out of the field experience? 
 
The FOT participants made a number of observations in the field exercise. 
 
• Driver Communications/Asset Visibility.  The participants concluded that frequency 
in driver/dispatch communication and asset location visibility are key determinants 
to shipment security. The participants viewed geofencing and untethered trailer 
tracking favorably from a security perspective.  With user-configured polling 
frequency, these forms of communication types allowed dispatchers to know the 
whereabouts of their drivers and assets, and to be alerted in the event of crisis or 
exceptions to normal operational parameters. 
 
• Average Polling Rates. The polling rates for GPS positioning were considered too 
infrequent to effectively track a vehicle, even at 20-minute average intervals.  Much 
more frequent polling is necessary. 
 
FOT participants concluded that 
real-time shipment tracking and 
driver communication were key 
security capabilities. 
FOT participants viewed panic 
buttons as valuable; an in-dash 
and driver-carried panic button 
should be used. 
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• Panic Alerts. Panic alerts were considered valuable as reflected in the large 
incremental increase in vulnerability reduction, but may be limited in effectiveness 
for more local (within population areas) hauls where the damage could be done 
before intervention by enforcement. It was recommended that a driver-carried Panic 
Button be used in conjunction with in-vehicle Panic Buttons. Dissemination of panic 
notification should be via multiple modes (e-mail, fax, pager, cell phone, etc.). 
 
• Remote Vehicle Disabling. This was also considered a strong vulnerability reduction 
technology, but it was recommended that it should be combined with driver-local 
disabling to be most effective, and not be solely reliant upon dispatcher trigger 
disablement.  
 
• Electronic Seals and Remote Door Locking. These were considered useful for 
detecting tampering or providing a hard lockout until dispatch approves a door 
opening. These devices were not considered appropriate to Bulk Fuel and Bulk 
Chemical operations. Additionally the E-seal concept was not considered as mature 
as some of the other technologies; therefore reliability and potential cost were 
issues. 
 
• The Public Sector Reporting Center. In concept, this item was considered as a 
strong vulnerability reduction system. In terms of identifying crisis and reducing 
response time, concerns exist about the potential frequency of false alarms/alerts 
that would burden public safety agencies, integration with existing systems such as 
computer-aided dispatch (CAD), and the potential cost of deployment. 
 
• Asset Tracking.  The carriers saw GPS tracking as a valuable tool in the recovery of 
stolen tractors and trailers.  A tractor-trailer combination unit is worth more than 
$100,000 and cargo loads potentially worth much more. 
 
• Core Technology Package (wireless communications with GPS).  The carriers saw a 
number of benefits to the core technology package in terms of improved 
management of fleet personnel and assets; reduction in unproductive miles; 
increased driver and dispatcher productivity; and larger loads.  The overall impact 
of the technologies on the motor carriers was that the technologies required the 
basic communications and tracking system, and that the carriers would realize 
additional costs in the concept of enhanced security. In this context, panic alerts 
and remote door locking capabilities were considered very useful with a willingness 
of carriers to possibly invest in them.  
 
 
4.2 The U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration - 
Untethered Trailer Tracking Systems 
 
In late 2004, FMCSA completed the Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Field 
Operational Test.  The FOT included an element to test a basic untethered trailer 
tracking (UTT) system. This system provided trailer position and identification 
information to a dispatcher on a regular basis.  
 
The House of Representatives Report 107-722, Department of Transportation and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, directed the FMCSA to conduct further study into 
UTT systems.  According to the report: 
 
“Truck trailers pose a significant potential security threat since they provide an easy 
means to transport dangerous cargos. In addition, the inability to track freight 
movements causes inefficiencies in the intermodal freight transportation system, 
increasing operating costs and congestion, and decreasing safety, economic 
competitiveness, and air quality. While commercially available technology can track a 
trailer when it is tethered to a cab, commercially available technologies are needed to 
track and control an untethered trailer. Within the funds provided for FMCSA's limitation 
on administrative expenses and high priority initiative program, the Committee has 
provided the funding to leverage existing technology and develop an untethered trailer 
tracking and control system that will provide real-time trailer identification, location, geo-
fencing, unscheduled movement notification, door sensors, and alarms.” 
 
FOT participants believed vehicle 
disabling is an important security 
capability, but worried about 
implementation. Drivers should 
be able to disable a truck. 
FOT participants viewed the 
PSRC concept favorably but 
worried about implementation. 
FOT participants saw the 
operational value of GPS tracking 
and wireless communications. 
FMCSA conducted a 
Congressionally-mandated study 
on untethered trailer tracking 
systems, completing the study 
December 2005. 
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4.2.1 How do UTT systems work? 7 
 
Untethered trailer tracking (UTT) systems are comprised of communications and 
computer technologies for tracking a trailer when it is connected to and disconnected 
from a truck tractor. These systems use satellite-tracking Global Positioning System 
(GPS) technology, supplemented by satellite or cellular communications technologies to 
monitor and track the locations of trailers. Date and time-stamped position reports with 
the longitude and latitude of a tracked trailer can be sent to a carrier on a regular, 
event, or on-demand basis via a website, or they can be downloaded to carrier fleet 
management systems. 
 
Currently available systems allow carriers the flexibility to input asset management 
settings for their own operations, such as assigning identification numbers to tracked 
trailers, determining how alerts are generated, and setting up the time intervals for 
receiving information. For most systems, the location of a single trailer or multiple 
trailers can be viewed in a map format that includes historical locations and the most 
recent location of a trailer in various views, including views of the country, region, city, 
and street where the trailer is located. Also, trailers can be viewed within a specific 
distance from a specified landmark, longitude/latitude, or population center. Tabular 
views of output files can show a carrier's fleet and detailed position history of individual 
vehicles in transit. Using this information, dispatch, logistics, and management 
personnel can locate assets, respond to shipping and delivery demands, and identify 
underutilized trailers. 
 
Some UTT systems may also be configured to establish geo-fence boundaries around 
individual trailers. A geo-fence is an electronic boundary that a user can create to 
monitor trailer location and movement. For example, a user could locate a trailer on a 
map and draw a geo-fence around the trailer position by clicking and dragging a mouse. 
The geo-fence may be assigned to a trailer or to groups of trailers. Geo-fences may also 
be removed or inactivated for trailers or groups of trailers at any time. Once the geo-
fence is set and configured to provide an alert, the system will send a notification to the 
user if the trailer crosses the geo-fence boundary. Typically, the system will send an 
alert when a trailer exits or enters the boundary through an email or pager notification. 
Several systems also provide event-driven exception reporting. Exception-driven 
reporting will allow the system to monitor trailer position and check for geo-fence breaks 
frequently, but only send a message if a geo-fence break is detected. Frequent checking 
for geo-fence breaks without sending frequent messages lowers messaging costs and 
increases battery life. Geo-fencing can also be utilized in conjunction with some systems 
that provide trailer connection and disconnection notification information to the carrier's 
on-site personnel so that they are aware of this tractor trailer information. 
 
Currently available UTT systems may be integrated with sensors that transmit 
information back to fleet managers and dispatchers. Various types of sensors are 
capable of detecting cargo presence, temperature, volume, radiation, gas leaks, motion, 
and door openings and closings. For example, an ultrasonic cargo sensor can detect the 
presence of cargo in the trailer by indicating if the trailer is unloaded or loaded. A cargo 
event is defined as the transition from completely unloaded to partially or completely 
loaded or vice-versa. The systems can be configured to wake up to check the cargo 
status at a predefined frequency. Utilizing event-driven exception reporting, a status 
message is sent only when the cargo status changes. 
 
As another part of the system, a door sensor can monitor an open or closed door event 
on the trailer. A door event is defined as the transition from open to closed or from 
closed to open. The trailer door sensor can work in combination with the cargo sensor, 
so that only those door state changes that might affect cargo are sent to the user. For 
example, it is possible to configure the system to send door open events if there is cargo 
in the trailer and to ignore door open events if the trailer is empty. 
 
Most systems integrated with sensors generate trailer position information with every 
message and status report, which is provided to a fleet manager's or dispatcher's 
computer. Position information can be user-configured to be generated and sent at 
predetermined time intervals, and it can also be generated and sent upon demand from  
                                                            
7 This overview is taken from FMCSA’s description of UTT technology; FMCSA Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety and Security 
Systems Technology – Untethered Trailer Tracking Systems http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/systems-technology/product-
guides/untethered-trailer-tracking.htm 
An untethered trailer tracking 
system is part of an overall 
“smart truck” technology 
package.  It lets carriers know if 
an unauthorized disconnection of  
a trailer has occurred. 
Other features can be built into 
the system including cargo 
monitoring. 
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the dispatcher's computer. The position reporting frequency is configurable, and many 
systems have a store and forward capability, if there is a loss of signal. 
 
In most cases, UTT unit terminals are compact, low-profile, and environmentally rugged 
enclosures, designed to be easily installed on the top of or inside the trailer. UTT 
systems require a power source and power management strategy for long periods of 
inactivity, since trailers maybe stored in terminals for long periods of time. Currently 
available systems can be recharged when the trailer is connected to the tractor via the 
electrical connector (pin 7 on the J560 7-way connector). Some systems can be 
recharged via solar cells. 
 
Possible limitations of UTT systems may include a loss of signal, cellular channel traffic 
overload, or equipment problems, such as limited battery life. 
 
4.2.2 The FMCSA developed functional specifications for UTT systems and 
conducted a field test of commercial trailer tracking systems.8 9 
 
As directed by Congress, FMCSA administered a pilot test for the development of a UTT 
system in 2005. The purpose of this pilot was to test a UTT system that met specific 
functional requirements and could improve the safety and security of trailers and 
shipments at each phase of its movement – pick up, delivery, receipt, and storage.  
 
Eight functional specifications were developed for UTT systems.  The eight specification 
areas are described below.  The functional specifications for each area are listed in 
Appendix D.  
 
1. Near real-time trailer identification.  Trailer identification is established via 
position reports sent from the UTT system terminal on the trailer. The UTT system 
terminal monitors the Global Positioning System (GPS) for its location, checks other 
on-board sensors, and sends this information over the air (OTA). The information 
presented to the user includes the trailer identification number (ID) and trailer type, 
as well as the user Standard Carrier Alpha Code (SCAC). The user can view the host 
software to find the latest trailer location and status on a map. Trailer locations are 
displayed relative to predefined landmarks or street or highway intersections. The 
trailer status refers primarily to three key pieces of information: whether the trailer 
has cargo or is empty, whether the door is open or closed, and whether the trailer is 
connected or disconnected to a tractor. If the latest scheduled report is not 
sufficiently current, the user can request an update from the UTT system terminal. 
The request will be answered immediately if the terminal is awake. Otherwise, the 
request will be queued until the next scheduled wake-up time. 
 
2. Time of trailer connection and disconnection.  The time of trailer connection 
and disconnection refers to the time that a trailer is physically connected or 
disconnected from a tractor. For example, a trailer is typically disconnected from the 
tractor when the tractor-trailer arrives at a destination where the trailer may be 
unloaded while the tractor departs to pick up and move another trailer. 
 
3. Trailer location and mapping.  Trailer positions are established via GPS or other 
locating technology. The UTT system terminal is configurable to wake up to check 
for positions at user-defined intervals. Once the position has been established, the 
coordinates are reported to the user visually at the carrier site through a map 
interface. Although latitude and longitude are provided, the user would normally see 
the trailer’s position on a map with reference to highways, streets, intersections, or 
user-defined landmarks.  
 
4. Geo-fencing.  A geo-fence is an electronic boundary that a user can create to 
monitor trailer location and movement. Geo-fences may be created, viewed, and 
edited visually on an interactive map. For example, a user could locate a trailer on a  
 
                                                            
8Untethered Trailer Tracking and Control System; FMCSA; December 2005 
 http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/research-technology/report/untethered-dec05/untethered-dec05.pdf  
 
9 Untethered Trailer Tracking and Control System Operational Requirements Document; FMCSA; August 2005.   
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/research-technology/report/untethered/untethered-trailer-tracking.pdf  
The FMCSA developed functional 
specifications for untethered 
trailer tracking systems and 
conducted tests of commercial 
systems.  
Geo-fences can be built around a 
trailer or a geographic area. 
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5. map and draw a geo-fence around the trailer position by clicking and dragging a 
mouse. The geo-fence may be assigned to a trailer or to groups of trailers. Once the  
geo-fence is set and configured to provide an alert, the terminal will send a 
notification to the user if the trailer crosses the geo-fence boundary. The geo-fence 
will send an alert when a trailer exits or enters the boundary through an email or 
pager notification. Geo-fences may also be removed or inactivated for trailers or 
groups of trailers at any time.  
 
The UTT system will provide an on-board geo-fence with event-driven exception 
reporting. Exception-driven reporting will allow the UTT system to monitor trailer 
position and check for geo-fence breaks frequently, but send a message only if a 
geo-fence break is detected. Frequent checking for geo-fence breaks without 
sending frequent messages lowers messaging costs and increases battery life.  
 
A geo-fence might be used to ensure that a trailer remained in a general area, such 
as the Los Angeles basin. In this example, the user would create a geo-fence 
around Los Angeles and then assign that geo-fence to a trailer or group of trailers. 
If a trailer was taken from the Los Angeles area, an alert would be generated and 
the user notified. This type of geo-fence might permanently remain in effect if this 
trailer or group of trailers were meant to stay in that area indefinitely. A geo-fence 
could also be created around a particular destination, such as a receiving 
warehouse. When the trailer entered this geo-fence, an alert would be generated so 
that the user would know that the trailer was delivered within a certain timeframe.  
 
Using the UTT system, a user can set a self-centered geo-fence, which provides a 
quick way to set a geo-fence without forcing the user to locate the area on the map. 
A self-centered geo-fence uses the position of the trailer at the time of receiving the 
“set self-centered geo-fence” command to create the geo-fence boundary. The user 
does not have to create the geo-fence on a map or choose settings for that geo-
fence. As with any geo-fence, an alert will notify the user if the trailer breaks the 
geo-fence boundary while the geo-fence is active. 
 
6. Trailer cargo sensing.  As a part of the UTT system, an ultrasonic sensor detects 
the presence of cargo in the trailer by indicating if the trailer is unloaded or loaded. 
A cargo “event” is defined as the transition from completely unloaded to partially or 
completely loaded or vice-versa. The UTT system terminal wakes up to check the 
cargo status at a predefined frequency, and a status message may be sent 
depending on user-chosen settings. For example, an erroneous detection could 
occur if a person walks into the trailer at the moment the sensor is taking a reading 
of cargo status. In this case, assuming the person exits the trailer, a second check 
would show the true unloaded state of the trailer. Validation of cargo events 
decreases the probability of erroneous state detections. 
 
7. Trailer door sensing.  As a part of the UTT system, the trailer door sensor 
monitors for an open or closed door on the trailer. A door event is defined as the 
transition from open to closed or from closed to open. The trailer door sensor can 
work in conjunction with the cargo sensor, so that only those door state changes 
that might affect cargo are sent to the user. For example, it is possible to configure 
the system to send door open events if there is cargo in the trailer and to ignore 
door open events if the trailer is empty.  
 
8. Alerts.  Alerts are generated by the UTT system host software and presented to the 
viewer through an alert icon that is displayed near the trailer ID. Alerts are based 
on a combination of user-preferred settings and events which are generated from 
the mobile terminal. Alerts are used to notify the user of events, such as geo-fence 
violations. Alerts can be configured to be forwarded to email or pager addresses. 
 
9. Software requirements.  Requirements for the software that is visible to the 
system user are included in this section. The UTT system-provider hosts this 
software that may be accessed by users through the Internet. Using the software, 
the user may view information, such as trailer positions and cargo, door, geo-fence, 
or connection events, or configure settings for the system such as landmarks, trailer 
groups, and user accounts. Additional software requirements are listed in sections 
above describing time of trailer connection and disconnection, trailer location and 
mapping, geo-fencing, alerts, and incorporation of fleet management tools. 
 
 
Ultrasonic sensors can be used to 
detect if a trailer is loaded or 
unloaded. 
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4.2.3 What are the benefits/costs of UTT? 10 
 
Untethered trailer tracking can provide an added measure of efficiency and security to 
commercial vehicle operations. In the United States, the trucking industry uses 
approximately three times as many trailers as tractors; therefore, loaded and empty 
trailers can be subject to both theft and terrorism. Trucking companies often buy excess 
trailers in order to have empty ones on hand to ensure that their most expensive assets 
- their tractors - are kept busy, leading to the availability and accessibility of trailers and 
unattended cargo. Due to a lack of manpower and adequate trailer storage facilities, 
these trailer stockpiles may be either inaccurately assessed or unknowingly disbursed at 
various locations, increasing their vulnerability to misuse. When a trailer is removed 
from its dropped location and erroneously moved or parked, a trucking company 
typically conducts lengthy searches to locate it. As a result, both inefficient operations 
and security risks prevail in these situations. To reduce the inefficiencies and 
vulnerabilities relating to the lack of visibility of trailers and their cargo, UTT tracking 
systems can provide the location of trailers along with additional information, such as 
cargo and door status indications, trailer movements, and trailer connections and 
disconnections. 
 
Enhanced operational efficiency and security are major benefits of UTT systems. 
Assuring the location and movement of trailers can improve security and operational 
efficiency by allowing timely recovery of lost or stolen trailers. Trailer yard operational 
performance can become more efficient through improved record keeping with the 
automated processes of these systems, since time is not wasted by manually searching 
for lost trailers. Technology for tracking trailers enables a quick response to find trailers 
and a tracking capability for thefts in progress. Trailer tracking also provides information 
about where a trailer has been and how long it was missing. 
 
Typical operations in trailer yards involve loading cargo in trailers and parking the 
trailers to await a tractor to haul it away. With cargo sitting unattended, the risk of 
cargo pilferage from a parked trailer is high in a trailer yard. Thieves or terrorists may 
steal cargo by entering the yard, accessing parking areas, loading cargo in a waiting 
truck, and removing it from the site. Cargo may also be falsely obtained by personnel 
showing apparently legitimate identification and pickup orders. Furthermore, unattended 
cargo may be damaged or used as a potential hazardous weapon or explosive. By 
providing information on trailer positions with indications of a trailer's location, 
movement, and cargo and door status, UTT systems can be utilized to reduce the 
vulnerabilities relating to the lack of visibility of trailers and their cargo. 
 
The UTT system can also be used to maintain an accurate inventory of cargo and trailers 
in the yard for secure and efficient operations. Yard operations can be better integrated 
with dock operations to efficiently transfer and accurately track the processing of both 
inbound cargo deliveries and outbound shipments, particularly high risk loads. Resulting 
performance benefits of enhanced cargo operations would be improved on-time 
deliveries, a reduction in yard congestion, and better cargo theft detection and recovery. 
 
The installed cost of UTT systems varies depending upon the type of technology and 
various sensors that are included with the system. Most systems are a combination of 
hardware, software, installation, maintenance/service, and recurring monitoring and use 
fees. The cost of an UTT system, including software, hardware, antennas and 
transponders, ranges from approximately $600 to $900 for the system with monthly 
maintenance fees starting at approximately $12 to $70 per month per trailer, depending 
upon the type of plan that is purchased. Some plans include a flat fee, while others are 
based on a flat fee in addition to per-message or air-time usage fees. This price does not 
reflect the price of servers and dispatch systems, which can vary depending on the 
customers. The inclusion of various other sensors to the system incurs additional costs. 
For example, cargo and door sensors cost approximately $50 each. The systems can be 
installed by the manufacturer or experienced technicians utilizing detailed manufacturer 
guidelines. 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 FMCSA Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety and Security Systems Technology – Untethered Trailer Tracking Systems 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/systems-technology/product-guides/untethered-trailer-tracking.htm  
The FMCSA study described the 
benefit of untethered trailer 
tracking systems.  Systems cost 
$600-$900/truck to deploy. 
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4.2.4 Who offers UTT products and services?11 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.2.a, the market for UTT products and services is well served 
by a number of truck tracking vendors.  Note: Figure 4.2.a is not a complete list of UTT 
vendors. 
 
Figure 4.2.a The market for UTT products is served by a number truck tracking vendors. 
  
 
Fleetilla, Inc.  
1745 Fritz Dr. 
Trenton, MI 48183 
Phone: 734-699-6153 
www.fleetilla.com  
 
GE - Trailer Fleet Services 
Phone: 800-333-2030 
www.trailerservices.com  
 
Interlink Logistics, Inc.  
Corporate Headquarters 
6658 W. Robinwood Lane 
Franklin, WI 53132 
Phone: 630-258-3078 
www.cargotracs.com/truckload.asp 
 
PAR Logistics 
Management Systems  
5152 Commercial Drive East 
Yorkville, NY 13495  
Phone: 315-738-0600 
ext:846  
http://www.parlms.com 
 
 
PeopleNet  
1107 Hazeltine Blvd, Suite 
350 
Chaska, Minnesota 55318 
Phone: 888-346-3486 
Fax: 952-368-9320 
www.peoplenetonline.com 
 
QUALCOMM Incorporated  
5775 Morehouse Drive 
San Diego, CA 92121-1714 
Phone: 858-587-1121 
www.qualcomm.com 
 
Safefreight Technology (USA)  
8000 N.E. Parkway Drive 
Suite 200 
Vancouver, Washington 98662 
Phone: 360-256-1280 
Fax: 360-397-0167 
www.safefreight.com 
 
Skybitz  
22455 Davis Drive 
Suite 100 
Sterling, VA 20164 
Phone: 703-478-2364 
Fax: 703-478-3301 
www.skybitz.com 
 
 
 
4.3 U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration – Vehicle 
Immobilization Systems 
 
FMCSA’s Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test 
quantified the security costs and benefits of smart truck technology (see Section 4.1).  
After the FOT, Congress directed FMCSA to undertake the Untethered Trailer Tracking 
and Control Security project (see Section 4.2). These projects used wireless 
communication systems and GPS tracking as base technologies and included the 
wireless transmission of tracking data to law enforcement and emergency responders, in 
addition to the carrier. It was determined that additional technologies, including panic 
buttons, driver identification, and vehicle disabling could be built onto the wireless 
communication system to obtain additional security benefits. In FY 2005, the House of 
Representatives Conference Report 108-792 directed FMCSA to conduct further testing 
of smart truck technologies, including vehicle immobilization. 
 
4.3.1 What is a vehicle immobilization system? 12 
 
There are different types of vehicle immobilization systems. Some utilize on-board 
electronics to immobilize the vehicle's engine or braking system to gradually decelerate 
a vehicle in transit or prevent its initial operation. Others can be engaged remotely using 
a combination of on-board computers integrated with wireless communications; or non-
remotely, utilizing technologies that the driver, operator, or, in some instances, the 
vehicle itself could execute locally. The systems can be activated manually or 
automatically based on pre-programmed security conditions. 
 
Remote vehicle disabling systems typically rely on a wireless communication system to 
provide their basic functionality. They can be integrated with panic buttons and on-board 
computers requiring user identification and/or password log-ins. For non-remote 
systems, a keypad or key-fob may be utilized as a part of these systems for arming, 
disarming, and controlling the security system at the asset itself. Non-remote manual 
systems can also involve the use of in-cab shut-off devices to other vehicle systems, 
such as electronic ignitions and air brakes. 
 
 
                                                            
11 FMCSA Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety and Security Systems Technology – Untethered Trailer Tracking Systems 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/systems-technology/product-guides/untethered-trailer-tracking.htm  
12  The sections is taken from the overview of vehicle disabling systems on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Website; 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/systems-technology/product-guides/vehicle-disabling.htm  
A number of truck tracking 
vendors offer commercial 
untethered trailer tracking 
systems. 
FMCSA conducted a 
Congressionally-mandated study 
on vehicle immobilization 
systems, completing the study 
November 2007. 
Vehicle immobilization systems 
fall into two categories: 1). 
remote disabling systems; and 
2). non-remote disabling 
systems. 
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4.3.1.1  Remote disabling systems enable a control center to prevent a truck 
from being used by an unauthorized driver or to stop a moving truck. 
 
Remote vehicle disabling systems provide authorized users at remote locations such as 
an operations center the ability to prevent an engine from starting, prevent movement 
of a vehicle, and to stop or slow a moving vehicle. Remote disabling allows a dispatcher 
or other authorized personnel to gradually decelerate a vehicle by downshifting, limiting 
the throttle capability, or bleeding air from the braking system from a remote location. 
Some of these systems provide advance notification to the driver that the vehicle 
disabling is about to occur. After stopping a vehicle, some systems will lock the vehicle's 
brakes or will not allow the vehicle's engine to be restarted within a certain timeframe. 
 
Remote disabling systems can also be integrated into a remote panic and emergency 
notification system. In an emergency, a driver can send an emergency alert by pressing 
a panic button on the dashboard, or by using a key-fob panic button if the driver is 
within close proximity of the truck. Then, the carrier or other approved organization can 
be remotely alerted to allow a dispatcher or other authorized personnel to evaluate the 
situation, communicate with the driver, and/or potentially disable the vehicle. 
 
4.3.1.2 Non-remote disabling systems enable authorized drivers to stop a 
moving truck; prevents unauthorized drivers from driving the truck. 
 
Non-remote vehicle disabling systems provide authorized users the ability to restrict or 
prevent vehicle operation in three ways: through the use of wireless technology when 
they are near the vehicle; through on-board actions by the driver/operator; or through a 
combination of both. Non-remote vehicle disabling systems include driver identification 
authentication technologies, tamper detection alerts, brake locks, and emergency 
notification panic buttons for disabling the truck in case of an emergency or other event. 
 
A single sign-on module is utilized for driver authentication in order to initiate the 
operation of a vehicle. The driver uses passwords, pin numbers, or biometrics to start 
the vehicle and to access other on-board wireless communications applications. All 
activities related to the use of the vehicle are associated with the driver signed-in at the 
time. This information can be used for dispatch, driver performance, and driver log 
purposes. 
 
Several different types of technologies can be used to non-remotely disable a vehicle. 
Panic buttons carried by the driver or within reach of the driver inside the vehicle can be 
activated to disable a vehicle or send out an emergency notification. Electronic ignition 
systems allow the driver to automatically activate the system when the key is removed 
from the ignition and reactivate the system when the key is replaced into the ignition. A 
relatively low-cost means of vehicle disabling is the utilization of a brake lock device to 
prevent the movement of the vehicle. A brake lock device shuts down the air line from 
the tractor to the air brakes in the tractor (and if hooked up, to the trailer). Release of 
the brake lock system is the only way to move the vehicle. 
 
4.3.2 The FMCSA evaluated vehicle immobilization systems and developed 
functional requirements. 
 
Important components of vehicle disabling systems are hardware mechanisms that 
restrict vehicle use. Some are on-board computer technologies that identify the driver to 
allow authorized use while preventing unauthorized use. Others utilize mobile 
communication technologies that allow a remote dispatcher or other operator to 
communicate with the driver and/or the vehicle, and if necessary, activate the vehicle 
disabling system. 
 
Driver authentication is a vital part of many vehicle disabling systems. Intelligent on-
board computers can be utilized for driver identification through global login access 
where a driver enters login information into a cab-based interface. Similar to a 
username and password on a computer system, global login is an authentication feature 
of some wireless communications systems. Through the use of a driver login process, 
the login information (user ID and password) entered into the truck-based interface by 
the driver is verified by preset procedures both locally on the vehicle and over the air 
using the wireless communication system. If this verification fails, various configurable 
alerts and resulting actions can be triggered up to and including vehicle disabling with 
the aid of an on-board computer. 
A remote disabling system 
enables a distant control center 
to stop a moving truck. 
A non-remote disabling system 
prevents unauthorized drivers 
from starting a truck and enables 
a driver to stop a hijacked truck. 
The FMCSA evaluated 
commercial vehicle 
immobilization systems and 
developed functional 
requirements. 
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Other authentication technologies utilized in several vehicle disabling systems range 
from PIN number entry to biometric-based systems. The most common biometric-based 
technologies for vehicle disabling utilize driver fingerprints. If the driver's fingerprint 
matches the fingerprint information on a biometric smart card carried by the driver, then 
the driver is verified and able to start the vehicle. If a match is not made, the vehicle 
cannot be started and the fleet dispatcher is typically notified of the failed attempt. 
 
Vehicle disabling systems can be integrated with many on-board wireless 
communications systems that include other features, such as door sensors, cargo 
sensors, temperature sensors, electronic cargo seals, and trailer connection and 
disconnection systems. For example, if an on-board computer system detects a loss of 
signal from the communication network or tampering of electronic cargo seals, a pre-
determined vehicle disabling protocol can be initiated. 
 
Additional monitoring processes using on-board sensors that detect changes in load 
volume, door status, exposure to radiation, or temperature can a generate security alert 
notification that will trigger a vehicle disabling protocol. In vehicles that monitor trailer 
information, a vehicle disabling protocol can be prompted when a trailer has been 
disconnected from its assigned tractor or when a trailer door lock system has been 
violated. 
 
Vehicle disabling protocols can also be activated by critical changes in the status of 
important vehicle systems. Since on-board computers monitor processes such as coolant 
temperature and engine oil pressure, a message can be sent to the driver and 
dispatcher about these conditions alerting them that systems are at unsafe levels. Then, 
a vehicle can be prevented from starting if unsafe system parameters are discovered 
prior to vehicle usage. Carriers with refrigerated units (reefers) are significant users of 
this feature. 
 
Vehicle disabling can be utilized by authorized personnel with a wireless communication 
system's geo-fencing feature. Dispatchers or fleet operators can create a geo-fence or 
defined electronic boundary made up of geo-coded points for particular vehicles or 
routes. If a vehicle enters a restricted geo-fenced area, or exits the defined areas, the 
dispatcher or fleet operator can be alerted to take necessary actions to secure the 
vehicle. Currently, no systems available in the U.S. have the capability of engaging 
automatic vehicle disablement for geo-fence violations.  Singapore’s Hazmat Transport 
Vehicle Tracking System does, however, have the ability to automatically immobilize 
vehicles with geo-fence violations (see Section 4.4).   
 
A study conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the FMCSA sorted vehicle 
immobilization technologies into two categories: 1). Vehicle Disabling Technologies 
(VDTs); and 2). Vehicle Shutdown Technologies (VSTs).  VDTs are immobilization 
technologies that impede restarting a vehicle. They can be activated when the vehicle 
is moving or stationary, but the VDT will only immobilize the vehicle the next time an 
attempt is made to start it. VSTs, on the other hand, are technologies that cause a 
vehicle to lose power while it is moving and will cause it to eventually come to a 
stop, as well as impede the restarting of the vehicle after the technology has been 
triggered. While there are VIT systems that are composed only of a VDT, those that 
have vehicle shutdown capabilities always have vehicle disabling capabilities as well. 13 
 
Figure 4.3.a illustrates the technology components of VSTs and VDTs.   
 
At the core of most vehicle immobilization systems is an electronic vehicle 
immobilization device (eVID), (Item 1 in Figure 4.3.a) mounted somewhere in the 
engine compartment of the equipped vehicle. This device can be activated remotely 
and/or locally to impair the performance of the vehicle via acceleration control, throttle 
reduction, power reduction or engine shutdown. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
13 The remainder of this subsection is taken from Vehicle Immobilization Technologie: Best Practices for Industry and Law 
Enforcement; FMCSA; November 2007 swww.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/research-technology/report/VIT-Best-Practices-Law-
Enforcement-Nov2007.pdf  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory  
conducted a field evaluation of 
commercial immobilization 
systems. 
At the core of a vehicle 
immobilization system is an 
electronic vehicle immobilization 
device (eVID). 
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Figure 4.3.a Technology components of a vehicle immobilization system. 
 
Usually the default mode of the eVID is “active.” That is, vehicles equipped with an eVID 
device cannot be started until the eVID is deactivated. The deactivation of the device 
can be achieved through different means (Item 2 in Figure 4.3.a) which range from 
keypads— the most common, where the driver enters a predefined code—to swipe cards 
and RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) tokens, up to biometric devices.  Usually, the 
eVID is activated automatically when the driver shuts down the engine, but it can also 
be triggered when one of the cabin doors is opened while the engine is running (hijack 
prevention mode).  
 
Outside the cabin, with the engine idling, the eVID can be activated locally (i.e., at a 
short range) by the driver of the vehicle. This is done through a key fob device (Item 3 
in Figure 4.3.a) similar to those used to lock/unlock the doors of passenger cars, but 
usually requiring two buttons to be pressed at the same time to avoid unintentionally 
triggering the device. The eVID can also be activate remotely by the dispatcher (Item 4 
in Figure 4.3.a) or the technology provider (Item 5 in Figure 4.3.a) if the vehicle is 
equipped with a wireless communication system, generally satellite (Item 6 in Figure 
4.3.a) or cellular communications (Item 7 in Figure 4.3.a), or both. This remote 
activation also requires a GPS device (Item 8 in Figure 4.3.a) that provides location 
information for the vehicle.  
 
When activated, the system forwards the vehicle’s location and eVID status to the 
technology provider’s computers (Item 9 in Figure 4.3.a) using the available 
communication links (Items 6 or 7 in Figure 4.3.a). Conversely, from the technology 
provider’s computers and using the same communication links, messages can be sent to 
the eVID, including those that initiate the shutdown of the vehicle while it is moving.  
 
For the case of a local vehicle disablement (for example, when the eVID enters into a 
tampering mode after a given number of authentication attempts have been made and 
failed), the device generally disables the vehicle without waiting to receive a message 
from the central computers (i.e., the decision is made at the device level on the truck). 
However, the device sends a message to the technology provider’s computers indicating 
the problem at hand (in the previous example, conveying that the device has entered 
into a tampering mode). In some cases, this message is immediately forwarded to the 
owner of the vehicle through e-mails or phone messages, so the trucking company can 
take some action (e.g., contacting the driver to determine the nature of the problem). In 
other instances, the vendor’s control center manages the problem directly and, 
subsequently, notifies the owner.  
 
 
1
2
3
45
6 
7
8
9 
10
The eVID can be activated locally 
by the driver of a vehicle by use 
of a key fob. 
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Two different models for vehicle shutdown were described in the study. In the first 
model, the trucking company’s operation center (Item 4 in Figure 4.3.a) has direct 
access to the eVID (Item 1 in Figure 4.3.a) through the technology provider’s computers 
(Item 9 in Figure 4.3.a) and the available communication links (Items 6 and/or 7 in 
Figure 4.3.a). The trucking company can then send a message to the eVID that initiates 
the shutdown (or disablement) process without any other exogenous intervention. The 
second model adds a technology provider’s control center (Item 5 in Figure 4.3.a), which 
is the one that ultimately sends the message to the eVID to start the shutdown process. 
In this model, the technology provider’s control center identifies the location of the 
vehicle in distress (Item 8 in Figure 4.3.a) and contacts the law enforcement 
organization with jurisdiction in that area. The shutdown process is initiated only when 
law enforcement personnel (Item 10 in Figure 4.3.a) are in visual contact with the truck 
and when they determine that is safe to do so. Of course, this involvement of law 
enforcement personnel is also possible in the first model, although it is a cumbersome 
process for the trucking company since it would have to have up-to-date contact 
information for all the law enforcement jurisdictions in the country.  
 
For purposes of the project study, FMCSA identified five functional requirements (FRs) of 
interest for VITs.  
 
• FR1: Vehicle disablement if the vehicle senses an unauthorized driver  
 
• FR2: Vehicle disablement/shutdown in the event of a loss of signal  
 
• FR3: Remote vehicle disablement/shutdown by the driver  
 
• FR4: Remote vehicle shutdown by the dispatcher  
 
• FR5: Remote vehicle shutdown by law enforcement  
 
Functional requirement 1 falls into what has been defined in this document as a VDT, 
while FRs 4 and 5 fall under the VST umbrella.   FRs 2 and 3 would be applicable to both 
VDTs and VSTs, depending on whether the vehicle is stationary or moving.  
 
The five functional requirements are mapped onto Figure 4.3.a.  While all of the FRs 
involve the eVID in this generic VIT system, FR1 is restricted to the truck cabin, the 
driver, and the driver’s interaction with the vehicle immobilization device. Notice that 
this particular FR can also be satisfied by means other than an eVID; that is, there are 
mechanical (e.g., brake locks) and other types of devices that can make the vehicle 
undrivable unless the device is disengaged.  
 
Functional requirement 2 implies the activation of the eVID when one or more of the 
communication links, either GPS or data transfer, become unavailable for a given period 
of time. In general, the VIT systems that satisfy this FR allow the user to define the 
interval of time that needs to elapse before a loss of signal causes a vehicle shutdown. 
Loss of signal can also produce a vehicle disablement if, for example, a communication 
wire (e.g., antenna wire) is physically severed or even if somebody tampers with the 
antenna itself (e.g., covers the antenna with a metal dome) while the truck is idling.  
Remote disablement/shutdown by the driver (FR3) is accomplished, in general, by a key 
fob device that allows that driver to send a short range wireless message to the eVID for 
its activation. This can be achieved while the vehicle is idling (i.e., vehicle disablement) 
or if someone commandeers the vehicle while the driver is away but at a short range 
(i.e., vehicle shutdown), such is the case of a vehicle theft at a truck stop.  
 
While the first three functional requirements involve VIT system components that are on 
the vehicle itself (e.g., in-cabin driver authentication devices for FR1, and antennas and 
communication systems for FR2) or at a very short distance (e.g., key fobs carried by 
drivers for FR3), FRs 4 and 5 involve VIT system components that can be located 
anywhere in the country. A remote vehicle shutdown relies on spatial information 
regarding the location of that vehicle and bi-directional communication links between 
centralized computers and the onboard eVID. Those computers can be accessed by an 
external control center and/or by the trucking company dispatcher. By mapping the 
vehicle’s location information provided by the GPS device, it is possible to determine 
safe places to initiate the shutdown process or to provide information to law 
enforcement at the scene to identify the vehicle that is about to be shutdown. The 
bidirectional communication links with the vehicle serve to receive this spatial 
information and to send a message to the eVID to initiate the shutdown process.  
The FMCSA identified five 
functional requirements for 
vehicle immobilization systems. 
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4.3.3 What are the benefits/costs of vehicle immobilization? 14 
 
Depending on the actual vehicle disabling technologies utilized, fleet operators can have 
additional connectivity and communication with their drivers and vehicles compared with 
fleets not utilizing such technologies. When vehicle disabling systems are integrated with 
on-board communications and tracking systems, fleet managers can actively monitor 
security parameters, vehicle routes, performance, maintenance, and fuel usage—
whether the vehicles are running locally or on a long-haul. These monitoring capabilities 
provide operational efficiency benefits for fleet management optimization by providing 
information about vehicle operation from origin to destination. 
 
Vehicle disabling systems can improve secure operations of carriers who haul high-value 
or high-risk cargo, such as hazardous materials. Access can be limited to authorized 
drivers by dispatchers or fleet managers who can manage driver authentication codes 
and truck identifications, change codes over the air, and disable the vehicle, if 
necessary. To help prevent theft, a valid driver authentication code can be required 
before a vehicle can be started or moved. Also, if there is tampering with any integrated 
security device or fleet management system, the vehicle can be placed in a secure state 
and an alert can be sent over the air to the carrier. Carriers can also change driver 
authentication codes and secure a vehicle if a driver suddenly leaves the company, but 
still has access to the vehicle. The capability to disable the vehicle over the air is also 
available if dispatchers become aware of a stolen or hijacked vehicle. Even if a truck is 
moving, the vehicle's speed can be gradually reduced to allow the vehicle to be brought 
to a safe and controlled stop. 
 
Technologies, such as ignition locks and brake locks can also be used to minimize 
vehicle theft by prohibiting vehicle movement. These security devices are permanently 
installed in the vehicle, and they must be utilized in order to operate the vehicle. 
 
The cost of vehicle disabling systems depends upon the type of system installed (i.e., a 
simple on-board system versus a multi-functional system), the number of systems 
purchased, and the type of installation required. The costs for less complex on-board 
systems (such as an ignition lock or brake lock) range from under $100 to over $300 per 
unit, plus installation costs. Installation for these units could be done by a local 
technician. 
 
The costs for basic, non-wireless driver authentication systems utilizing keypad entry 
range from approximately $500 to $700 per vehicle, plus installation costs. Installation 
for some of these units could be completed by a local technician.  
 
The costs for systems integrated with on-board wireless communications and multi-
functional features range from approximately $2,000 to over $3,000 per vehicle, plus 
installation costs. Installation for some of these systems can be completed by a trained 
technician who is familiar with the technology. However, for technical and/or security 
reasons, some systems require manufacturer installation only.  In addition to installation 
costs, some vehicle disabling systems (especially remote monitoring systems) may also 
require a monthly fee for maintenance and monitoring.  
 
4.3.4 Who offers vehicle immobilization systems? 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.3.b, the market for VIS products and services is well served 
by a number of vendors. 
 
Figure 4.3.b Vehicle immobilization system vendors 
 
AirIQ, Inc. 
Product: OnBoardTM 
1099 Kingston Road, Suite 233 
Pickering, ON, Canada L1V 1B5 
Phone: 905-831-6444 
Toll Free: 888-606-6444 
http://www.airiq.com  
GPS Management Systems 
Product: Asset Tracking 
480 E. Northfield Drive, Suite 500 
Brownsburg, IN 46112 
Phone: 800-914-8247 
Fax: 317-852-0742 
http://www.gpsmanagement.com  
Magtec Products (USA), Inc. 
Product: M5K 
871 Coronado Center Drive, #200 
Henderson, NV 89052 
Phone: 888-624-8320 
E-mail: info@magtecproducts.com 
http://www.magtecproducts.com 
                                                            
14 The sections is taken from the overview of vehicle disabling systems on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Website; 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/systems-technology/product-guides/vehicle-disabling.htm 
The FMCSA study described the 
benefit of vehicle immobilization 
systems. 
The incremental cost of a vehicle 
immobilization system (on top of 
core “smart truck” system) is 
$500 - $700/truck. 
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QUALCOMM Incorporated  
Product: Vehicle Command & Control 
5775 Morehouse Drive 
San Diego, CA 92121-1714 
Phone: 858-587-1121 
http://www.qualcomm.com 
Safefreight Technology (USA), Inc. 
Product: SmartFleetTM 
8000 N.E. Parkway Drive, Suite 200 
Vancouver, WA 98662 
Phone: 360-944-6722 
Fax: 360-253-6424 
http://www.safefreight.com  
Satellite Security Systems, Inc. (S3) 
Product: GlobalGuard 
6779 Mesa Ridge Road, Suite 100 
San Diego, CA 92121 
Phone: 858-638-9700 
http://www.satsecurity.com  
 
The VIT products of three of the vendors are highlighted below. 
 
Safefreight Technology (ST) 
 
The ST vehicle immobilization technology consists of an onboard “box” that can receive 
input from 8-12 sensors (analog or digital signals) and that can also be tied to the 
vehicle’s data bus, a GPS device, and a communications system that can use cell or 
satellite networks (Safefreight Technology, 2007). This is a web-based system that 
requires no software interface. Customers can choose between cell and satellite, or have 
both; in which case, an algorithm selects the one that is most cost-effective, thus 
ensuring almost 100% coverage at a minimum cost.  
 
Customers may choose which types of sensors they want onboard (temperature, light, 
tank fill volume, etc.) that will function in conjunction with their device. ST consults with 
their customers to create response protocols that meet their customer’s needs and that 
can be modified at a later time, if necessary. When the Response Center receives the 
“real-time” notification of a sensor violation, ST security specialists immediately 
implement the associated response protocol, which includes contacting key personnel 
and/or the authorities as identified by the client, in the order specified by the client. 
These protocols and systems are predetermined so that key personnel can be reached at 
their office, at home or on the road, or through a 24/7/365 call center. In addition to 
events triggered from onboard sensors, ST also provides geo-fencing and landmark 
mapping capabilities. ST has the ability to provide remote ignition lockout and driver 
authentication.  
 
Other ST technologies include a version of their device that can function in a battery 
mode on an untethered trailer, and can be configured to get power from the tractor 
when mated. A portable version of the onboard “box,” which operates on rechargeable 
batteries, has no external wires or antennas and does not require “line-of-sight” for GPS 
fixes. It can interface with wireless sensors onboard the tractor-trailer and has the 
ability to link to an electronic cargo manifest.  
 
ST has over 1,000 units deployed in the United States and 1,500 in Canada. The vast 
majority of the units sold to date have been installed by the customer; ST provides 
installation instructions, a manual, and customer support. The cost of a base unit is 
$625-$700, plus $35 to $40/month/vehicle for reporting at a 2-minute interval. The cost 
of the dual reporting system adds $350 for a modem plus a “Sim card,” and requires an 
additional service contract. 
 
MAGTEC Products, Inc.  
 
The MAGTEC® VIT technology provides various features and capabilities, including a 
driver authentication system, vehicle protection logic, hijack code, maintenance code, 
and an acceleration control system, among other features (MAGTEC, 2005). The 
MAGTEC Authentication System includes a keypad used by the driver to enter a pre-
assigned PIN or a driver authentication code; without a correct code, the onboard eVID 
would not allow the truck to be started. The Protection Logic component is an automated 
vehicle disabling technology that allows the driver to leave the truck idling and will 
prevent any unauthorized person from driving that truck. The system also offers a hijack 
code or under-duress code, which once entered and after some predefined period of 
time, will send a distress message to the dispatcher. However, regardless of any 
communication system, the hijack feature will always work and disable/shutdown the 
vehicle; that is, once the hijack feature is activated by the driver, the vehicle will 
shutdown. The maintenance code feature allows the dispatcher to generate a one-time 
maintenance access code that can be used for a preset period of time (up to 99 hrs). If 
the truck is in maintenance mode and someone attempts to steal the vehicle, the truck 
will enter into a shutdown sequence after the maintenance period has expired.  
 
MAGTEC offers an integrated 
security package that includes a 
number of features including 
driver authentication and vehicle 
immobilization. 
Commercial vehicle 
immobilization systems are 
offered by a number of truck 
tracking vendors.  Safefreight 
offers VIS as an add-on to its 
basic “smart truck” technology 
package.  Cost $700. 
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The Acceleration Control System™
 
(ACS) is the core of the MAGTEC VIT system. It is an 
eVID that restricts the acceleration capability of the vehicle, diminishing the maximum 
speed achievable by the vehicle by constant intervals triggered at predefined periods of 
time (see the Qualcomm section for more details about MAGTEC’s ACS). These 
parameters, which define the shutdown process, are configurable over the air. This is a 
very important feature, particularly for FR5, which would allow the vehicle to be shut 
down quickly if so required (for example, in less than a mile, instead of shutting down 
gently over several miles). MAGTEC’s remote deceleration technology has not, as of yet, 
been used in a real situation, but their idle protection technology (which ultimately uses 
the same VIT) has been used many times.  
 
MAGTEC indicated that a customer could get a system that includes only the driver 
authentication portion of the technology without the disabling/shutdown technology. 
However, the VIT functionality portion of the technology is inherently part of the system 
and would be wired but not active. The VIT functionality could, in theory, be activated (if 
the vehicle has communication capabilities) even if the customer has not chosen to use 
that technology.  
 
Other features include geo-fencing capabilities (for those vehicles equipped with GPS 
and communication systems), back office software and communication technologies for 
customers that do not want to go with complete packages (such as the one offered by 
Qualcomm), and, shortly, the availability of technology that will protect the trailer/cargo 
(at the present time, only the tractor is protected).  
 
GlenHugh Enterprise (GHE) 
 
GHE provides a modular platform consisting of different modules that cover different 
FRs.  Specifically, the GHE platform consists of four separate modules that provide 
different levels of protection and can be configured to any communications carrier.  
 
Module 1 (573): The 573 PPI (Passive Proximity Immobilizer), with driver 
authentication, is the primary immobilization system that ensures that a truck cannot be 
started and driven by an unauthorized operator. Disabling up to three vital circuits of the 
vehicle, the 583 system will not allow an unauthorized driver to start and drive the 
vehicle. GHE makes available authentication codes for lost codes via toll-free and fleet 
identification. The 573 PPI is an Underwriters Laboratory of Canada certified device.  
 
Module 2 (898): The 898 Safe-Stop Immobilizer, with driver authentication, allows the 
truck to idle with the key removed. If a thief attempts to steal the vehicle while it is 
idling, As soon as the brakes are disengaged, any change in the engine revolutions 
triggers an engine shutdown. This device is being used by many trucking companies and 
public service fleets.  
 
Module 3 (211): For FRs 1, 3, and 4, GHE’s anti-hijack technology is adaptive and can 
be customized to any specific fleet requirement triggered by various initiating events 
such as pressing a button or opening the driver’s door, the latter being a main feature 
for the company’s anti-hijack technology. The primary goal is focused on safely bringing 
the vehicle to a stationary position and to distance the driver from the hijacker as 
quickly as possible. The hijacker has to gain access to the truck cab and when the door 
or brake valve is opened, the shutdown sequence is automatically initiated. The driver 
then has the option to allow the vehicle to shutdown, cancel shutdown, or offer the 
hijacker access to an override button that will immediately send an alert signal to the 
dispatcher, indicating that an unauthorized driver has taken control of the vehicle. Once 
this is done, the dispatcher has the option to shutdown the vehicle. The shutdown 
sequence consists of slowly opening and closing the fuel line while the truck retains 
power. The truck comes to a slow, albeit jerky, stop as the vehicle runs out of fuel. The 
relay timing increases so that the moving vehicle’s engine slows down until it stops. 
During this shutdown sequence, the truck lights are also flashing and the horn or siren is 
sounding loudly.  
 
Module 4 (1r2): The 1r2 provides the dispatcher with the ability to prevent a vehicle 
equipped with this device from starting. This is achieved remotely via a message sent 
wirelessly to the vehicle. Once the message has been sent and the device is activated, 
the vehicle will not start and an alarm (buzzing sound) will be heard, indicating that the 
vehicle has been immobilized. 
 
GlenHugh Enterprise products 
allows carriers to select the level 
of protection they want for their 
vehicles. 
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4.4 Singapore HazMat Transport Vehicle Tracking System 
 
 In July 2005, Singapore began operating its HazMat Transport Vehicle Tracking System 
(HTVTS), the world’s first hazmat transportation security system. The HazMat Transport 
Vehicle Tracking System is operated by the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF), 
the government agency responsible for protecting the country from terrorist attacks. 
 
Singapore’s HTVTS provides the SCDF real-time tracking of hazmat trucks carrying high-
hazard materials over Singapore’s road system.  Alerts from trucks straying out of 
authorized routes or traveling during unauthorized hours are immediately sent to SCDF 
enforcement personnel by the HTVTS.  Beginning October 2007, hazmat trucks are 
automatically immobilized by the HTVTS if the trucks violate route requirements. 
 
 
4.4.1  Why did Singapore build the HTVTS? 
 
Singapore is one of the largest petrochemical hubs in the world.  Over $21 billion has 
been invested in Singapore’s petrochemical facilities at Ayer Merbau, and the economic 
output from these facilities accounts for 4%-5% of Singapore’s GDP.   
 
The events of 9/11 were the catalyst for development of the HTVTS.  Singapore has a 
landmass of only 300 square miles and a population of 4 million (dense urban 
development across the island).  Disruptions in Singapore’s hazmat supply chain due to 
terrorist action could be disastrous – both to the safety of Singaporeans and to 
Singapore’s economy. 
 
The CNN International© video (control/click on link below) provides an overview of 
Singapore’s HTVTS. 
http://www.astratagroup.com/external/astrata_on_cnn.wmv 
 
 
4.4.2  Regulations drive technology deployment. 
 
The Singapore Civil Defence Force established hazmat transportation regulations in 
conjunction with Singapore’s National Environmental Agency (NEA).  In Singapore, like 
the United States, hazardous waste is a subset of the larger hazardous materials 
universe and waste transportation is co-regulated by the SCDF and Singapore’s 
environmental agency.  
 
The FMCSA FOT study suggests that government action will be necessary to ensure 
timely and wide-scale smart truck technology deployment but was silent as to the nature 
of government action needed.  In Singapore, the government is using its regulatory 
authority as the forcing mechanism for technology adoption – SCDF regulations require 
hazmat transporters to adopt “smart truck” technology. Without this regulatory “push”, 
a comprehensive hazmat security program would not be possible. 
 
Singapore’s regulations require hazmat carriers to deploy “smart truck” technology and 
to report shipment information on a real-time basis.  The HTVTS is the implementing 
tool for anti-terrorism regulations issued by SCDF that require: 15  
 
1. fleet operators to obtain a transport license for trucks that haul hazardous 
materials; 
 
2. hazmat drivers to obtain a Hazmat Transport Driver Permit; 
 
3. fleet operators to install a GPS tracking device and special license plates on trucks 
hauling (or having the capacity to haul): 
 
                                                            
15 URL - Singapore Civil Defence Force - Requirements on Road Transportation of Petroleum and Flammable Materials 
http://www.scdf.gov.sg/downloads/FS_Licensing/Circular_on_Requirements_of_Road_Transportation_of_Petrol
eum_&_Flammable_Materials.pdf 
 
 
 
 
July 2005 – Singapore 
became the first 
country in the world to 
implement a hazmat 
tracking system to 
deter terrorist attacks.   
 
Regulations are the 
key driver for 
Singapore’s hazmat 
tracking program. 
The HTVTS is the 
implementing tool for 
Singapore’s hazmat 
security regulations. 
 
 
 
Video of Singapore’s 
HazMat Transport Vehicle 
Tracking System. 
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a. more than 3 tons of petroleum or flammable 
materials, 
 
b. more than 1 ton of liquefied ammonia, chlorine, 
hydrogen chloride, hydrogen fluoride and methyl 
chloride, 
 
c. hydrogen in long tubes (tube trailers), 
 
d. any amount of arsine, phosphine and phosgene gases; and  
 
4. trucks hauling regulated hazmat loads to follow approved hazmat transportation 
routes during approved transportation hours. 
 
All vehicles monitored under the HTVTS are deemed as always transporting materials in 
amounts above the regulatory triggers of 3 tons and 1 ton. These vehicles must adhere 
to approved routes and hours of transportation at all times. Failure to do so will result in 
a violation registered by the HTVTS.  
 
In the event of any violation detected by the HTVTS, the SCDF duty officer will contact 
the company concerned (via the contact number given in the application for transport 
license). The company is required to immediately contact the driver on the road to take 
corrective actions and report back to the SCDF. In this regard, the company must 
ensure that they are able to remain in communications with the driver at any time that 
the vehicle is on the road.  
 
If there is a geofence violation, the vehicle’s horns and blinkers are automatically 
activated. The driver must then stop the vehicle safely by the side of the road, and 
contact the SCDF.  If the vehicle does not stop, or the company confirms that they have 
lost control of the vehicle or is unable to contact the driver within 2 minutes, the incident 
is treated as a security violation.  
 
In the event that the driver is detained by SPF or if the vehicle is found without the 
driver, SCDF will contact the driver’s company, which must ensure that they drive or tow 
away the vehicle within 1 hour. The company also has to provide SCDF with information 
(name, NRIC, and vehicle number) on the company personnel who will take the vehicle. 
Both the licensee and the driver are subject to enforcement actions and penalties for 
violations. 
 
 
4.4.3  What is the technology behind the HTVTS? 
 
A small, but sophisticated, computer/GPS tracking device installed on a hazmat truck 
allows officials at the SCDF headquarters control room to monitor the truck’s location 
and movement in real-time. Hazmat trucks are restricted to certain routes and are only 
allowed to travel on the roads during certain times.   
 
The system will trigger an alert in the event of the following: 
 
• tampering with the tracking device; 
• unauthorized diversion from approved routes; 
• unauthorized transportation during prohibited hours; 
• unauthorized entry into restricted areas; or 
• unauthorized disengagement of trailers. 
 
The HTVTS also monitors vehicle speeds 
 
About 500 domestic trucks and 150 foreign hazmat haulers are currently monitored by 
the HTVTS. The technology underlying the HTVTS is highly scalable – any size fleet can 
be tracked and monitored, over any size road system. 
 
The HTVTS relies heavily on GIS functionality.  The HTVTS system developer, Astrata 
Group Limited, used MapInfo™ as the GIS platform to build the HTVTS.16  A case study 
published by MapInfo may be found in Appendix E.  Astrata also provided the on-board 
tracking devices used by the SCDF. 
 
                                                            
16   Astrata Group Ltd. Website:  http://www.astratagroup.com/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1  
Hazmat trucks entering 
exclusionary zones (e.g. 
geo-zones) in Singapore 
are automatically 
disabled by the HazMat 
Transport Vehicle 
Tracking System. 
 
The computer/GPS 
device used by the  
HTVTS is half the size of 
a cell phone. 
 
The HTVTS can 
automatically 
immolbilize an off-
route truck. 
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In October 2007, the SCDF activated immobilization functionality into the HTVTS.  
Vehicle immobilization is enabled by an add-on module to Astrata’s tracking device.  If a 
truck is off-route, the on-board device controls the truck’s fuel injectors to prevent 
acceleration and limit throttle response. This will slow a vehicle progressively without 
interfering with its power steering and braking system. The vehicle is slowed safely to a  
low speed of 10km/hr to enable the driver to maneuver it to the side of the road before 
it comes to a full stop.  For road safety considerations, the vehicle’s horn and hazard 
warning lights will be activated before the immobilizer is triggered.   
 
The SCDF phased in truck immobilization to give itself time to work through a number of issues.  
Examples of a few issues resolved by the SCDF include the following. 
 
• What happens to a transponder when a truck is decommissioned? 
• Does installation of a device void a truck’s warranty? 
• How can a truck be stopped without creating a road hazard? 
• For old trucks using mechanical systems, how to install immobilization devices? 
 
Figure 4.4.a illustrates how the HTVTS immobilization system works. 
 
 
Figure 4.4.a  Hazmat Transport Vehicles Truck Security Immobilization System 
 
4.4.4 How does the SCDF factor risk assessment into its hazmat tracking 
program? 
 
The SCDF established hazmat routes and hazmat restriction zones using a modified 
version of the U.S. Department of Transportation’s hazmat routing criteria. DOT’s 
hazmat routing criteria include: (1) cost (time, distance); (2) safety (accident 
prevention); (3) exposure – size of the population at risk; (4) emergency response 
capabilities; (5) burden on commerce; (6) congestion and transportation delays; and (7) 
property risk. In general, use of DOT hazmat routing criteria results in hazmat routes 
that avoid highly populated areas and areas of high commercial value. The SCDF 
supplemented DOT’s hazmat routing criteria with criteria designed to enhance hazmat 
shipment security. Supplemental SCDF hazmat routing criteria include: 
 
• socio-economic impact – potential cost of damage (direct and indirect); 
• risk of hijack – factors/areas that make hijacking easier; and 
• emergency response – rescue efficiency and police/military presence as a terrorist 
deterrent. 
 
Singapore uses 
sophisticated GIS tools 
to establish hazmat 
routes & exclusion zones 
to maximize hazmat 
security. 
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Current hazmat routes in Singapore are illustrated in Figure 4.4.b.  In general, the 
SCDF designed hazmat routes to prevent shipments from entering Singapore’s Central 
Business District.  The SCDF is continuing to refine hazmat routing and hazmat 
restriction zones using sophisticated geographic information system (GIS) tools to 
optimize hazmat route/restriction zone security. 17 
4.4.5 How does the HTVTS fit into Singapore’s overall hazmat management 
program? 
The project team also met with Mr. Jackson J.K. Lim of Singapore’s Ministry of Home 
Affairs.  Mr. Lim formerly served as a senior executive in the SCDF.18  The points below 
summarize some of the lessons learned by the SCDF in building and operating the 
HTVTS. 
 
• Voluntary doesn’t work – regulations have to drive technology deployment.
The SCDF considered a voluntary call for installation of “smart truck” technology but
concluded that it would be futile - a few good corporate citizens would deploy
tracking systems and submit tracking data to the SCDF but that most companies
would not.  The SCDF also knew that incomplete or inconsistent deployment would
defeat its hazmat security program.  The SCDF decided that it had to use its
regulatory authority to require companies to install tracking/immobilization devices
and to report data.
• The first and most important decision is what to regulate.  The decision on
types of materials to regulate (and at what quantities) was the SCDF’s most
important decision when it designed its hazmat tracking program.  This early-on
decision determines how many companies will be regulated, the size and scope of
the tracking program, etc.
• Regulations and technology have to be in alignment.  A regulatory program
that outreaches what is possible from a technology perspective will fail.  The SCDF
17 Presentation Transportation Research Board conference 2004 - The National University of Singapore “Incorporating Security in
HAZMAT Route Planning using GIS and AHP “ provides an overview of Singapore’s approach to using GIS to optimize hazmat 
security planning.        http://projects.battelle.org/trbhazmat/Presentations/TRB2004-BH.ppt#270,14,Assignment of Weights (AHP) 
18 Michael Barclay (Coldstream Digital) and Dr. Sam Varnado (National Institute for Hometown Security) met with Mr. Lim in Boston
on 3/31/20008.  Mr. Lim is the Director of the Strategic Planning & Development Division of Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs on 
3/31/2008 in Boston.  Singapore’s SCDF is located in the Ministry of Home Affairs.  Before assuming his current duties, Mr. Lim was 
a senior executive in the SCDF.  He has detailed insight into the HTVTS and its development.
SCDF hazmat routing 
criteria are designed to 
prevent/mitigate use of 
hazmat shipments as 
weapons of mass 
destruction. 
Organizational roles and 
responsibilities have to 
be clear. 
Security cannot be too 
burdensome on industry. 
A regulatory program 
will break down without 
a focused compliance & 
enforcement effort. 
   
  
95 
 
 
• carefully tailored “smart truck” technology to its regulatory needs for real-time 
vehicle tracking and vehicle immobilization. 
 
• Understand organizational roles and responsibilities – capture a clear 
mandate.  The SCDF was careful in crafting its regulatory and compliance 
programs to ensure that there was clarity in government roles and responsibilities.  
Also, the SCDF was careful to capture a clear and compelling mandate from 
Singapore’s legislative body to proceed. 
 
• Enhanced security cannot be too burdensome on industry.  The SCDF’s job is 
to protect Singapore from terrorists.  But, the SCDF is also sensitive to the impact 
of enhanced security on Singaporean companies’ competitive position.  The SCDF 
believes industry has to share in the cost of enhanced security but that the cost 
should be reasonable.   
 
• Carriers prefer not to be regulated, and will go to substantial lengths to 
avoid regulation (beat the system).  Some companies will resist regulation 
and/or will look for regulatory loopholes to escape being regulated.  For example, 
shortly after the SCDF set a regulatory trigger of 3 tons of petroleum products, 
many carriers began using trucks with a fuel capacity lower than 3 tons.  The SCDF 
is considering lowering the trigger to 2 tons.  The SCDF has a robust compliance 
program to ensure high compliance by hazmat carriers.  According to the SCDF, a 
weak compliance program will be quickly exploited. 
 
• An effective security program must include vehicle immobilization.  The 
SCDF believes that vehicle immobilization is a critical component of a hazmat truck 
security program.  Just knowing where a truck is may not be enough.  For example, 
even if the system detects a hijacking in progress, a terrorist can take the shipment 
into a vulnerable area and use it as a WMD unless there is a way to immobilize the 
truck.   
 
• Back-office systems are critical – require suitable investment.  The systems 
that ensure the smooth functioning of the administrative aspects of a truck tracking 
program are essential to success.  Administrative systems include financial 
management (fee processing), registration, help desk, and user rights/access 
management. 
 
• People have to be involved in decision-making – the system cannot do it 
all.  It is possible to automate most of the decision-making in a truck tracking 
system.  However, the system cannot manage every situation especially those 
where communications with regulated parties or response agencies is important. 
 
• Things will go “haywire” – build in contingencies.  Even the best designed 
systems will go “haywire”.  It is important to invest in contingencies to minimize the 
impact of problems. 
 
• Driver identification is important.  The SCDF did not require biometric devices 
on trucks to prevent unauthorized drivers from gaining access to a hazmat 
shipment.  The SCDF decided that biometric devices cost too much and would be 
disruptive given that trucks often have multiple drivers.  The SCDF believes, 
however, that there needs to be an administrative/regulatory framework to screen 
out people that should not be handling hazmat shipments. 
 
• Public outreach is critical.  It is important to have a good public communications 
plan – especially a plan to work with industry as new requirements are put into 
place.  Building a good system is important, but it’s also important to build public  
 
The SCDF believes 
vehicle immobilization 
is a critical component 
of a hazmat security 
program. 
 
 
 
 
Investment in backend 
administrative systems 
is critical. 
 
 
 
 
Automate business 
processes to the extent 
possible, but recognize 
the need for human 
involvement. 
 
 
 
 
Things will go “haywire”.  
Invest in contingencies. 
 
 
 
The SCDF does not 
believe biometrics are 
feasible but believes it is 
important to prevent 
“bad” drivers from 
accepting hazmat loads. 
 
 
 
 
Public outreach is critical 
to making the program 
work. 
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outreach and pilot programs that help companies come into compliance with 
regulatory requirements. 
 
 
4.5 U.S. Transportation Security Administration -  Hazmat Truck 
Security Pilot 
 
After the FMCSA finished its Hazmat Safety and Security Technology Field Operational 
Test in November 2004, Congress directed the U.S. Transportation Security 
Administration’s (TSA) to undertake the TSA Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP) 
project. The purpose of the pilot project was to demonstrate that a hazmat truck 
tracking center was feasible from a technology and systems perspective and to 
determine if existing commercial truck tracking systems can interface with government 
intelligence centers and first responders.  
 
The contract for the Hazmat Truck Security Pilot program was awarded to General 
Dynamics Advanced Information Systems (GDAIS) of Buffalo, NY in October 2005.  Work 
under the contract was completed April 2008.  The contract had three tasks. 
 
1. Develop and demonstrate a prototype for a centralized truck tracking center that 
could be used to continually track truck locations and load types.   The truck 
tracking center would also be used to coordinate incident response with a 
government intelligence operations center, state, local, and Federal law 
enforcement agencies and first responders. 
 
2. Develop and demonstrate a non-proprietary universal interface or set of 
communication protocols that would allow alerts and tracking information to be 
transmitted from all commercially available tracking systems to a prototype truck 
tracking center. 
 
3. Analyze the feasibility and benefits of applying a risk-based approach to identifying 
and managing hazmat security risks and incidents involving trucks on U.S. 
highways; demonstrate the capability of using the Hazmat Truck Security System 
(HTSS), with a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) rules-based risk assessment tool; 
and conduct a public showcase demonstration of the entire HTSS. 
 
The Hazmat Truck Security Pilot (HTSP) program demonstrated that a truck tracking 
system is feasible from a technology and systems perspective. 
 
 
4.5.1 What are the building blocks of a hazmat truck tracking center? 
 
Figure 4.5.a presents a general schematic of a hazmat truck tracking center.  As 
indicated in Figure 4.5.a, four basic functional components – or building blocks - are 
needed to build a hazmat truck tracking system. 
 
1. An XML-based interface with shippers, carriers, and truck tracking vendors feeds 
data to a hazmat truck tracking center. 
 
2. A hazmat truck tracking operations center merges data flowing into it to create 
actionable information for government agencies. 
 
3. A risk engine provides dynamic risk profiling of hazmat shipments between gate-
out and gate-in to identify shipments that present true risk. 
 
4. A communications infrastructure supports efficient interaction/consultation with 
government action agencies. 
 
 
4.5.2 Shippers, carriers, and truck tracking vendors have to deploy “smart 
truck” technology and submit data to enable a truck tracking center. 
 
A hazmat truck tracking center is dependent on data flow from shippers, carriers and 
truck tracking vendors.  Data is the raw product that a truck tracking center converts 
into actionable intelligence.  Efficient and timely processing of data gives the center the  
 
Congress directed TSA to 
undertake the Hazmat Truck 
Security Pilot project.  TSA 
demonstrated that a truck 
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Figure 4.5.a  Building blocks of a hazmat truck tracking center. 
 
 
ability to answer the questions presented in Figure 4.5.a and allows it to effectively 
support government action agencies when a transportation security incident is declared. 
 
However, a truck tracking center will fail unless smart truck technology is widely 
deployed and shippers, carriers and truck tracking vendors submit data to the truck 
tracking center.  Currently, there is no regulatory requirement that hazmat shippers 
deploy smart truck technology or submit data to a truck tracking center. 19  
 
Industry groups have advocated voluntary measures for hazmat technology deployment 
and data reporting.  However, voluntary industry measures – while conceptually 
appealing – rarely work.  The FMCSA FOT study (refer to Section 4.1) acknowledged the 
problem of industry-led voluntary programs by suggesting that “government 
intervention” (e.g. regulations) will be needed to stimulate smart truck technology 
deployment and data reporting.  This argument for “government intervention” is 
buttressed by DHS’s recent experience in its efforts to beef up security at chemical 
production plants in urban areas.  In that case, an industry-led voluntary initiative to 
upgrade chemical plant security resulted in such a tepid industry response that DHS had 
to take the program back and issue regulations to require chemical companies to 
institute security programs (refer to Section 2.2.4). 
 
 
4.5.3 The HTSP prototype design reflected assumptions about technology 
deployment and data reporting.  
 
Figure 4.5.b shows the timeline of events surrounding the HTSP project.  The HTSP 
project began in October 2005 and ended April 2008.  The FMCSA’s seminal Field 
Operations Test was completed a year before the HTPS project began.  While the FOT 
project report suggested that regulations should drive 
 
                                                            
19 The exceptions are munitions and radioactive material shipments.  However, these shipments 
represent only a small fraction of the total number of high-risk hazmat shipments in the U.S.  Refer 
to Section 2.4.2.   
 
The building blocks of a hazmat 
truck tracking center are: 
 
1. an XML –based 
communications interface; 
 
2. an operations center that 
processes data into 
actionable intelligence; 
 
3. a business rules engine for 
dynamic risk profiling of 
hazmat shipments; and 
 
4. a communications 
infrastructure for 
collaboration with action 
agencies. 
To succeed, a hazmat truck 
tracking center needs data. 
Hazmat carriers have to deploy 
smart truck technology, and 
shippers, carriers, and truck 
tracking vendors must submit 
It is unlikely that hazmat trading 
partners will voluntarily submit 
data to a truck tracking center. 
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Figure 4.5.b  The HTSP project began October 2005 and ended April 2008. 
 
 
technology deployment and data reporting – especially in light of positive ROI generated 
by smart truck technology – the time was not right in late 2005 for a regulatory push by 
federal agencies (refer to Section 4.1).  The responsibility for regulation of hazmat 
shipments was in transition from DOT to DHS, and a number of thorny technical and 
regulatory uncertainties existed.  The results of the FMCSA field tests on vehicle 
immobilization systems (see Section 4.3) and untethered trailer tracking systems (see 
Section 4.2) were not yet available, and the concept of operations for a hazmat truck 
tracking center had been only mildly developed in the FOT.  Moreover, there was a great 
deal of uncertainty about the role that regulations would play in securing the nation’s 
hazmat supply chain. 
 
Even though the HTSP prototype’s functionality was limited by industry participation, the 
HTSP pilot was highly successful.  It proved that a hazmat truck tracking center is 
technically feasible and that smart truck technology can be crafted into an effective and 
efficient system for tracking hazmat shipments.  However, the pilot fell far short of 
advancing a regulatory and implementation framework that would allow TSA to move 
forward with its hazmat truck tracking program.  This is not a criticism of the HTSP pilot 
or the work done on it – development of a framework for implementing TSA’s hazmat 
truck tracking program was not part of the mission of the project team. 
 
 
 
 
 
The HTSP project was hugely 
successful in that it proved that a 
hazmat truck tracking center is 
feasible from a technology 
perspective. 
In late 2005 when the HTSP 
began, there was uncertainty 
about technology and regulatory 
issues. 
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4.6 U.S. Customs and Border Protection – ACE Truck E-Manifest  
 
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, is responsible for protecting the nation’s borders and for promoting 
the free flow of legitimate goods into the country.  In early 2001, CBP began a large, 
multi-year effort to rebuild and modernize its information systems.  CBP’s Automated 
Commercial Environment (ACE) – CBP’s new information system - will arm CBP 
personnel with the tools and information they need to decide which incoming shipments 
should be targeted for inspection at the border.  ACE will also automate time-consuming 
and labor-intensive transactions so that legitimate shipments can move through ports 
and border crossing quickly and efficiently.  
 
In 2002, Section 343(a) of the Trade Act of 2002 (PL 107-210) required CPB to: 
 
 “promulgate regulations providing for the transmission to the Customs Service, 
through an electronic data interchange system, of information pertaining to cargo 
destined for importation into the United States or exportation from the United 
States, prior to such importation or exportation.” 
 
CBP issued regulations under 19 CFR Section 123.92 that requires all trucks crossing 
customs from Canada destined to the U.S.A. with freight on board to submit an 
electronic truck manifest to CBP before arriving at the border.20  If a truck arrives at 
customs without submitting a Manifest electronically, it will be refused access into the 
United States. A truck returning to the United States empty or entering Canada from the 
United States is not required to submit an E-Manifest. 
 
The ACE truck e-manifest will help create a secure and streamlined environment for 
processing and releasing cargo at the land borders.  It was launched in conjunction with 
the deployment of the CPB’s ACE Secure Data Portal, which will bring enhanced security 
and commercial account capabilities to all land border ports across the nation.  Carriers 
can use the ACE Secure Data Portal or commercial Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
systems to create an e-manifest and submit it along with mandatory advance cargo 
information to CBP in advance of a shipment.  This allows CPB to pre-screen the crew, 
conveyance, equipment, and shipment information before the truck arrives at the 
border.  E-manifests allow CBP officers focus their efforts and inspections on high-risk 
commerce, minimizing unnecessary delays for legitimate, low-risk commerce.  
 
 
4.6.1 E-manifests and RFID systems speed trucks past CBP inspection 
stations. 
 
The ACE e-manifest capability consolidates previously separate cargo release systems 
into a single, integrated computer interface for CBP officers and allows truck carriers to 
prepare and submit electronic truck manifests prior to arrival at a land border port of 
entry. With advance access to truck cargo information, CBP officers are able to pre-
screen trucks and shipments, and dedicate more time to inspecting suspicious cargo 
without delaying the border crossings of legitimate carriers. E-manifests are also more 
efficient with an average processing time that is 33 percent faster than a traditional 
paper manifest. 
 
Since November 2007 when ports in Alaska went on-line, e-manifest use has been 
mandatory at all 99 U.S. land border ports. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.6.a, when a truck approaches the border crossing, the e-
Manifest is automatically retrieved along with the matching pre-filed entries, in-bond 
requests, and other release declarations for the CBP Officer to view and process. The e-
manifest must be transmitted at least one hour prior to the carrier’s arrival at the  
                                                            
20 Truck e-manifest Federal Register notices are listed below. 
 
• Modification to data elements required for participation in the truck e-manifest program - 70 FR 13514, March 21, 2005 
 
• Ability of truck carriers to use third parties to submit manifest information in the ACE test - 71 FR 15756, March 29, 2006 
 
• Ability of third parties to submit manifest information on behalf of truck carriers via the ACE secure data portal – 72 FR 50, March 
15, 2007 
 
The ACE truck e-manifest 
system uses electronic manifests 
and RFID to speed truckers 
through border inspection posts. 
 
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s 
Automated Commercial Environment 
(ACE) enhances border security and 
speeds the flow of commercial traffic into 
the U.S.  
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border.  The CBP Officer can either release the truck, or hold the truck for further 
processing.  
     
 Figure 4.6.a.  ACE Truck E-Manifest. 
 
 
Receiving the electronic manifest information early allows CBP and other border security 
agencies to pre-screen the manifest through multiple checks before the truck arrives at 
the port. The receipt of e-Manifests enables CBP Officers to focus their efforts and 
inspections on high-risk commerce, thereby minimizing unnecessary delays for 
legitimate, low-risk commerce. 
 
From the Carrier’s perspective, a huge benefit of ACE is that Carriers no longer have to 
pay import duties and fees on a transaction-by-transaction basis.  Beginning June 2004, 
Carriers are issued a monthly statement by CBP and can make one monthly payment for 
all transactions.  This changes a business practice begun by Customs in 1789 in which 
customs duties and fees were processed one entry at a time.   
 
The ACE truck e-manifest system offers highway carriers the ability to move goods 
across the border faster and more efficiently.  In addition to expedited trade flows, 
Figure 4.6.b lists benefits that ACE truck e-manifest offers the government and the 
trade community. 
 
Figure 4.6.b. ACE Truck E-Manifest Benefits 
 
Enhanced border protection  
 
• Availability of pre-arrival information 
 
• Cargo tracking; access to more accurate and timely 
transaction information 
 
• Multi-agency enforcement collaboration 
 
 
Enhanced efficiency and 
lower costs 
 
• Promote information sharing among federal, state, and local 
governments 
 
• Accelerate border clearance 
 
• Eliminate paper systems 
 
 
Trade facilitation 
 
• Single-window transaction filing for the trade community 
 
• Harmonization of government data requirements 
 
• Online access to data 
 
• Improved visibility of conveyance and cargo status 
 
 
The ACE truck e-manifest 
system saves carriers money and 
expedites the flow of trade across 
the border. 
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4.6.2 Carriers can use CBP’s portal to submit a truck e-manifest; CBP’s e-
manifest has 70 data elements.  
 
The ACE truck e-manifest creates a secure and streamlined environment for 
processing and releasing cargo at the land borders. 
 
Carriers are able to file an e-Manifest through the ACE Secure Data Portal or by utilizing 
the services of a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) tested solution provider. 
Carriers may opt to use another party to file the trucking e-Manifest on their behalf, 
such as Customs brokers, border processing centers, or other carriers. Truck carriers 
without an ACE portal account may use a third party with an ACE portal account to 
electronically transmit truck manifest information via the ACE portal on their behalf. 
 
A step-by-step guide for creating and submitting an electronic manifest has been 
prepared by CBP. 
 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/automated/modernization/carrier_info/electronic_tru
ck_manifest_info/  
 
There are two ways an e-manifest can be submitted to CBP. 
 
1. The ACE Secure Data Portal provides a web-based method to submit data to CBP. 
The portal is readily accessible on the Internet and is free to all users. Portal users 
key data in manually and then submit information directly to CBP.   
 
2. Electronic data interchange (EDI) is an electronic transmission of data directly from 
one computer system to another. Information sent to ACE via EDI will be validated 
and processed.  E-manifests can be sent to ACE either by the carrier or by a third 
party service bureau.  Carriers have three options for using CBP-tested EDI 
software. 
 
• Self-developed EDI interface – A carrier develops in-house software that is 
tested by CBP and interfaces with ACE.    
 
•  Software application provided by a software vendor – A carrier utilizes software 
provided by a vendor that has been tested by CBP.  Often, these software 
applications enable carriers to pull the data required to populate the eManifest 
from the software they use in their daily business practices.   
 
• Service provider – A carrier employs a third party to enter and/or transmit 
manifest data on his or her behalf.  This third party is using software that has 
been tested by CBP.     
 
In the ACE Secure Data Portal, truck carrier accounts are organized by Standard Carrier 
Alpha Codes (SCACs).  There are five sets of master data that can be stored in the truck 
carrier’s ACE account. Storing these items will reduce the time it takes to create a 
manifest. This information may be stored in an account for future retrieval, or they can 
be entered each time a manifest is prepared. These sets of master data are as follows:  
 
1. Drivers/Crew 
 
2. Conveyance (power units)  
 
3. Equipment (trailers, containers, chassis etc.)  
 
4. Shipper (names and addresses)  
 
5. Consignee (names and addresses) 
 
CBP lists the following benefits of preparing and submitting e-manifests via its secure 
portal. 
 
• Easy-to-use, simple screens, including a unique auto-complete feature on forms, allows anyone 
to step in and complete a manifest quickly and efficiently;  
 
• Straightforward dashboard screen, updated in real-time, giving an at-a-glance view of all 
shipments and their status;  
 
• Powerful search and filter features, to quickly and easily locate a manifest;  
 
• Easy-to-read data entry screens for shipment information;  
The ACE truck e-manifest has 
70 data elements. 
 
Carriers can prepare and submit 
e-manifests on CBP secure portal 
or let others submit e-manifests 
on their behalf. 
Carriers with accounts on CBP’s 
portal can keep their shipping 
data on file to make e-manifest 
preparation fast and easy. 
   
  
102 
 
• Automatic shipment status notifications sent via e-mail to trade chain partners;  
 
• Create and print all the forms and reports to clear Customs, including the ACE cover sheet;  
 
• Complete submission history of all shipment and reporting activity for tracking and compliance 
auditing. 
 
Another advantage of ACE is that ACE participants do not have to pay duties and other 
fees on a transaction-by-transaction basis. Through the Periodic Monthly Statement, 
they can make a consolidated payment to Customs on a monthly basis, streamlining 
accounting and report processing.  
 
The truck e-manifest has 70 data elements.  Data elements (1) – (12) listed below are 
the core data elements for the truck e-manifest.  Data elements (13) – (70) are included 
on the e-manifest as applicable.  Those that are relevant to hazmat shipments are also 
listed below. 
  
(1) Conveyance number, and (if applicable) equipment number (the  number of the conveyance is its 
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) or  its license plate number and State of issuance; the equipment 
number,  if applicable, refers to the identification number of any trailing  equipment or container 
attached to the power unit. For purposes of this test, both the VIN and the license plate number are 
required); 
    
 (2) Carrier identification (i.e., the truck carrier identification SCAC code (the unique Standard Carrier 
Alpha Code) assigned for each carrier by the National Motor Freight Traffic Association); 
     
(3) Trip number and, if applicable, the transportation reference number for each shipment (The 
transportation reference number is the freight bill number, or Pro Number, if such a number has 
been generated by the carrier.); 
     
(4) Container number(s) (for any containerized shipment, if different from the equipment number), 
and the seal numbers for all seals affixed to the equipment or container(s); 
     
(5) The foreign location where the truck carrier takes possession of the cargo destined for the U.S.; 
 
(6) The scheduled date and time of arrival of the truck at the first port of entry in the U.S.; 
 
(7) The numbers and quantities for the cargo laden aboard the truck  as contained in the bill(s) of 
lading (this means the quantity of the  lowest external packaging unit); 
 
(8) The weight of the cargo, or, for a sealed container, the shipper's declared weight of the cargo; 
 
(9) A precise description of the cargo and/or the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) numbers to the 
6-digit level under which the cargo will be classified.  
 
(10) Internationally recognized hazardous material code when such cargo is being shipped by truck; 
 
(11) The shipper's complete name and address, or identification number.  
     
(12) The complete name and address of the consignee, or identification number.  
 
(13) DOT number; 
 
(14) Person on arriving conveyance who is in charge; 
 
(15) Names of all crew members; 
 
(16) Date of birth of each crew member; 
 
(17) Commercial driver's license (CDL)/drivers license number for each crew member; 
 
(18) CDL/driver's license State/province of issuance for each crew 
member; 
 
(31) Hazmat endorsement for each crew member; 
 
(42) Conveyance insurance company name; 
 
(43) Conveyance insurance policy number; 
 
(44) Year of issuance; 
 
(45) Insurance amount. 
 
CBP requires the submission of a 
extensive data on each in-coming 
shipment of goods. 
Some of CBP’s e-manifest data 
elements are specific to hazmat 
shipments (see yellow highlighted 
items). 
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(65) Hazmat contact; 
 
 
4.7 Ontario Ministry of the Environment – Hazardous Waste 
Information Network 
 
On January 1, 2002, the Ontario Ministry of the Environment (MOE) issued new 
regulations for its hazardous waste program.  The central feature of MOE’s regulations 
was a requirement that hazardous waste generators would be obligated to pay a new set 
of fees.  Ontario’s fee objective was to capture about $10 million/year in new regulatory 
fees.   
 
The Hazardous Waste Information Network (HWIN) was the web-based system MOE 
built to support generator, hauler, and receiver registrations and to collect regulatory 
fees.  HWIN had more to offer, however.  It was also North America’s first hazardous 
waste electronic manifest system.  HWIN performed exceptionally well as a registration 
and fee collection system.  However, only a small percentage of manifest transactions 
shifted from paper to electronic. 
 
This section reviews MOE’s experience and explores the reasons for low e-manifest 
adoption in Ontario.  
 
 
4.7.1  What is Ontario’s Regulation 347?  Why was it enacted? 
 
The Ontario Ministry of the Environment (MOE) is responsible for overseeing the 
hazardous waste program in the province.  Regulation 347, Ontario’s hazardous waste 
rule, is almost a mirror image of EPA’s hazardous waste rule.  Like EPA’s rule, Regulation 
347 includes a comprehensive manifest system to track hazardous wastes from the point 
of generation to final disposal.  Regulation 347 differs from EPA rules in one major 
respect.  It allows waste generators, transporters, and receivers to use e-manifests in 
lieu of paper manifests provided that they process their e-manifest transactions through 
the Hazardous Waste Information Network (HWIN), an on-line system managed by MOE.  
Ontario companies have had the option of using e-manifests in lieu of paper manifests 
since 2002. 
 
There are about 8,000 hazardous waste generators and 200,000 hazardous waste 
shipments/year in Ontario.  Since January 1, 2002, Regulation 347 has required 
hazardous wastes generators to visit the HWIN on-line registry once per year to update 
their corporate profiles and to pay an annual registration fee. The registration 
requirement applies to generators of hazardous waste in Ontario as well as out-of-
province generators – including many U.S. companies – that ship waste to Ontario for 
treatment or disposal. In addition to the annual registration fee of Cad$50, hazardous 
waste generators are also required to pay the following regulatory fees for waste 
shipments that originate or end in Ontario: 1). Cad$5 for each manifest used to ship 
waste off-site; and 2). Cad$10/ton of hazardous waste generated.   
 
Ontario’s regulatory fee provisions are not unusual.  Many states in the U.S. – including 
Kentucky - have regulatory fee requirements on the books especially related to their 
hazardous waste programs.  However, Ontario’s requirements are notable in terms of 
the amount of revenue they generate. By design, MOE’s Regulation 347 hazardous 
waste fees create a revenue stream of almost Cad$9 million/year for the province.  By 
the end of 2008, Ontario will have collected over Cad$60 million under Regulation 347’s 
hazardous waste regulatory fee program. 
 
Even with MOE’s hefty fee schedule, e-manifest usage has the potential to generate 
benefits of ~1.5x the cost of MOE’s regulatory fees due to the inherent cost savings 
associated with e-manifests. 21   
 
                                                            
21 B/C= US$15milion/CAD$9million = US$15million/US$10= 1.5 
 
B = 200,000 x $75 = $15 million potential annual e-manifest cost savings  
(~200,000 manifest transactions/year in Ontario; EPA e-manifest unit cost savings = US$75/manifest) 
 
C = MOE regulatory fees of ~Cad$9 million/year ~US$10million. 
 
Ontario designed Regulation 347 
to generate Cad$10 million per 
year in revenue for the 
province.  MOE has collected over 
Cad$60 million in revenue from 
hazardous waste regulatory fees 
since 2002. 
 
Ontario’s regulations are similar to 
EPA’s regulations.  Ontario has, 
however, allowed companies to 
use electronic manifests since 
2002. 
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4.7.2  What is the Hazardous Waste Information Network?  How does it 
support Regulation 347? 22 
 
The Hazardous Waste Information Network (HWIN) is a web-based system that allows 
hazardous waste generators, transporters, and receivers to register their activities with 
MOE on-line, and to make payments for fees associated with Regulation 347.  HWIN also 
enables users to create and process electronic manifests over the web making HWIN the 
first e-manifest system for hazardous wastes in North America.  
 
HWIN was designed specifically to serve as the implementing tool for Regulation 347, 
allowing for the efficient integration of Regulation 347’s fee collection requirements with 
the business processes associated with the manifesting of hazardous waste.  The 
primary users of the HWIN system are hazardous waste generators, carriers, and 
receivers in Ontario.  Generators, carriers and receivers outside Ontario with manifest 
transactions that originate or terminate in Ontario are also able to use HWIN.  
 
 
4.7.3 Who are the system users?  How do they use HWIN? 
 
HWIN was built around the regulatory needs of waste generators that ship waste into or 
out of Ontario.  There are, however, other system users.  Other hazardous waste trading 
partners – waste haulers (transporters) and waste receivers (waste management firms) 
– also use HWIN.  Within MOE, HWIN also meets a number of administrative and 
enforcement needs.  
 
 
4.7.3.1.1 HWIN was built around the regulatory needs of waste generators. 
 
Generators use HWIN to complete registration activities, including payment of annual 
registration fees, and to prepare and process electronic manifests.  Generators also use 
HWIN to pay fees associated with manifest transactions. In addition, every generator 
has access to real-time data on their manifest transactions, and may use HWIN as an 
electronic repository for their manifest data.  Carriers and receivers are not subject to 
fee requirements of Regulation 347 but may use HWIN to engage in electronic manifest 
transactions with waste generators and to gain access to their manifest transaction data.   
 
Figure 4.7.a illustrates a screen shot of a typical “My HWIN” page owned by a fictional 
Ontario waste generator - Max Phillips of the Canadian Industrial Waste Company of 
Wama, Ontario  
 
The list of wastes generated at Wama – including information on waste characteristics – 
may be found by clicking the ‘registered wastes’ tab.  Max may add or delete wastes to 
the list any time.  Before HWIN was implemented, companies had to file requests for 
waste list changes by paper with MOE.  It took, on average, about three months for MOE 
to respond.  Until the company had MOE’s approval, it could not make the process 
change at the facility that would create the new waste product. 
 
The ‘open manifests’ tab lists manifests that have been initiated at the Wama facility but 
that have not completed the complete manifest business cycle as well as information 
about those manifests (e.g. signed by generator/transporter, in transit, load diversion,  
load discrepancy, etc.).  The ‘closed manifest’ tab lists manifests that have completed 
the full business cycle and detailed transactional data about those shipments.   
 
HWIN allows users to manage all financial transactions associated with Regulation 347 
(adding funds to an on-line account; regulatory fee payments).  Note that HWIN 
computes and assesses fees (waste tonnage, manifest) for each transaction as it occurs.  
The ‘account status’ tab provides detailed information on financial transactions 
(payments made, dates, amounts, etc.).   
 
Max can click on any manifest listed in column one, ‘manifest number’, and view a copy 
of the completed manifest (PDF for paper manifests or e-manifest w/digital signatures).   
 
                                                            
22 Hazardous Waste Information Network  http://www.hwin.ca/hwin/index.jsp  
 
 
 
HWIN is the only hazardous waste 
e-manifest system in North 
America; serves as the 
implementing tool for Ontario’s 
hazardous waste regulations.  
 
 
HWIN was built around the 
regulatory needs of waste 
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Figure 4.7.a.  My HWIN Page 
 
 
 
 
   
  
106 
 
HWIN Capabilities and Features 
 
• Registration forms are pre-filled with data from MOE data sources to make the 
registration process faster and to validate MOE-held data.  On-screen e-manifest 
wizards include data checks and validations to prevent generators from making errors 
as they prepare e-manifests 
 
• User rights are established and managed by company administrators (i.e. Max has 
administrator status for his company).  User rights are established at the individual 
level.  Each user manages his/her secret PIN/passwords to the HWIN system. 
 
• As parties to the e-manifest transaction sign the e-manifest, their portion of the form 
is “locked” so that other parties cannot change the form later.  As each e-manifest 
transaction takes place (ie waste shipment chain-of-custody change), a ‘snapshot’ of 
the e-manifest form is taken and stored in the HWIN database.  E-manifest 
forms/transactions are programmed to follow the business process workflow.    For 
example, a load rejection by a receiving facility initiates a set of business processes 
that change the routing of the e-manifest form.  Workflow events trigger notifications 
and on-line approvals and help connect generator, transporter and receiver waste 
manifest business processes.  E-mail is the communication mechanism for alerts. 
 
• A generator may only use transporters/receiving facilities that MOE has authorized 
(permitted) to transport or manage the generator’s specific waste type.  HWIN 
business rules are applied as the generator prepares the e-manifest to prevent a 
transporter/receiver mismatch with a generator’s waste stream. 
 
• HWIN allows a generator to search for vendors (transporter, receiver) that may 
manage the type of waste the generator produces and to build/maintain a list of 
preferred vendors.   
 
• HWIN replaces record retention requirements for generators, transporters and 
receivers (for e-manifest transactions only).  HWIN provides system users 24/7 access 
to account and transactional data.  Users manage their corporate data – profiles, user 
rights, company information, etc. – directly in HWIN providing MOE with high quality, 
up to date data about system users. 
 
• HWIN allows generators, transporters and receivers to sign e-manifests by telephone.  
Using their PIN/passwords, the parties can interact with the HWIN database to apply 
an electronic signature to a manifest.  HWIN allows MOE inspectors - using a cell/PDA 
- to type in a waste transporter’s license plate number to retrieve the hauler’s e-
manifest(s).   
 
 
4.7.3.2 Waste transporters and waste management firms also use HWIN. 
 
Waste transporters and waste firms are parties to the e-manifest process.  Like waste 
generators, they have a page similar to the generator’s My HWIN page that allows them 
to complete manifest transactions and to view open and closed manifest transactions. 
 
 
4.7.3.3 MOE uses HWIN to support a variety of administrative and operational 
functions. 
 
MOE’s field operations offices use HWIN to support inspections and compliance reviews.  
MOE compliance office’s can, for example, use the telephonic features of HWIN to type 
in a license plate number of a waste hauler on a cellular phone to obtain information on 
the shipment (type and quantity of waste) and the carrier.  Administrative functionality 
was built into HWIN to support MOE’s financial needs.  Payments collected by the HWIN 
system (via credit charge payments) are swept into a provincial treasury account every 
evening.  Help desk functionality was also built into HWIN to support the need for 
password management, payment refunds and adjustments, and other administrative 
functions.   
 
 
 
 
 
The My HWIN page lets a 
generator view and change waste 
profiles, make payments, view 
open and closed manifest 
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4.7.4 What service/operational problems did MOE experience during HWIN 
implementation? 
 
One of the objectives that MOE had was that HWIN would replace an older legacy 
system.  MOE used the legacy system to monitor chain of custody status of waste 
shipments.  For each manifest transaction, MOE received the generator’s and the 
receiver’s copy of the manifest.  MOE scanned each copy and entered data from each 
into its system.  The system compared the waste/quantity information to identify 
discrepancies in shipments.  The idea was to ensure that shipments authorized by a 
generator reached the receiver in full as intended.   
 
Unfortunately, when MOE developed the specifications for HWIN, it made an assumption 
that all waste trading partners would shift fully to e-manifests on day one.  It also 
assumed that the older legacy system could be immediately phased out.  Both 
assumptions were wrong.  The second assumption that the older legacy system could be 
discontinued created a serious problem for MOE in implementing Regulation 347.  
Without data that a manifest transaction had occurred and without data on the quantity 
of waste shipped offsite, HWIN could not calculate fees owed by waste generators.  And 
since almost all the transactions were paper-based, HWIN had no access to transaction 
data.   
 
An interface between HWIN and the older legacy system had to be rushed into 
production.  Figure 4.7.b illustrates the business processes associated with the 
interface.  Scanned images of completed manifests and manifest transaction data had to 
be ported over to HWIN from the legacy system daily so that HWIN could process the 
data, calculate fees, and present the data in HWIN.   
 
 
MOE also did not appreciate the need for a help desk in implementing Regulation 347 via 
HWIN.  About 8,000 waste generators needed to go onto the system, complete 
registration process and make payments in early 2002.  MOE had to rush a help desk 
into operation to answer questions and address user issues.  Many of the users needed 
help with password management and payment issues (refunds, credits). 
 
 
4.7.5 Waste generators and waste firms did not make a move to e-manifests. 
 
Since it was placed into operation by MOE in 2002, HWIN has performed exceptionally 
well as a registration and fee collection system.  But, e-manifest use remains low at less 
than 5% of Ontario’s manifest transactions.   
 
Low e-manifest use means that neither the Ministry of Environment or Ontario’s industry 
are capturing available e-manifest cost benefits.  In fact, by the end of 2006, Ontario’s 
Ministry of Environment will have lost out on almost Cad$11million in e-manifest cost 
savings and Ontario industry will have lost out on almost Cad$90million in cost 
savings.23   
 
Figure 4.7.c examines root causes of low e-manifest use in Ontario and describes e-
manifest lessons learned in Ontario that should be applied in the United States.   
 
In light of the FMCSA hazmat security study, the deployment of on-board computers and 
wireless modem deployment by waste transporters deserves special attention.  In 
planning for its HWIN system, Ontario officials worked under the assumption that 
computing capability and internet connections would be available to waste generators 
and waste transporters to serve the critical generator/transporter e-manifest 
transaction.  In fact, the e-manifest process failed at the generator/transporter interface 
in Ontario because of the lack of internet access and computing capability at this crucial 
business interface. We concluded that transporters have to “bring” the computing 
capability and internet connection to the generator to ensure that the e-manifest 
process can go forward.  
 
                                                            
23 Based on U.S. EPA e-manifest cost/benefit analyses.  Lost industry cost savings 2002 – 2008 = 7 years x 200,000 manifests/year 
x US$66.62 savings/manifest x Cad$1.0/$U.S. x 0.95 = Cad$89million.  Lost provincial cost savings 2002-2008 = 7 years x 
200,000 manifests/year x US$8.20 savings/manifest x Cad$1.0/$U.S. x 0.95 = Cad$10.9million. 
 
MOE made a number of 
assumptions that created service 
or operational problems during 
implementation of Regulation 347. 
HWIN has performed 
exceptionally well as a 
registration/fee collection 
system.   But, only a small 
percentage of manifest 
transactions are electronic.   
MOE officials wrongly assumed 
that computing capability and 
internet connectivity would be 
available to support the critical 
generator/transporter e-
manifest transaction. 
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Figure 4.7.b MOE’s paper manifest processing business process.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.7.c Reasons for Low E-Manifest Use in Ontario 
 
 
Ontario E-Manifest Implementation 
Lessons Learned 
 
Implementation Lessons for U.S. E-Manifest 
Systems 
 
 
The e-manifest process failed at the 
generator/transporter interface in Ontario 
because many generators do not have 
internet access and computing capability at 
the loading dock. Transporters have to 
“bring” the computing capability and internet 
connection to the generator to ensure the e-
manifest process can go forward.  
 
 
E-manifest regulations should require waste 
transporters to be equipped with mobile 
computers and wireless modems.  Rationale… 
 
• Most large waste firms have captive 
transport fleets. 
 
• Waste firms capture a large percentage of 
the e-manifest cost savings (approaching 
US$50 per e-manifest). 
 
• Adding GPS with fleet tracking to mobile 
computing/wireless modem setup will 
generate net cost savings for waste firms 
(FMCSA study).  Will enhance chain-of-
custody control over waste shipments. 
 
 
 
Waste transporters need to 
“bring” the internet to the 
generator - should be equipped 
with mobile computers and 
 
Despite favorable economics, 
industry won’t “go electronic” 
without a regulatory push.  
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Industry – especially the waste industry - 
will not adopt e-manifests on a wide-scale 
operational basis without regulatory &/or 
financial pressure to do so.  MOE did not 
require mandatory e-manifest use or higher 
fees for paper manifest transactions. 
 
 
Agencies should use a regulatory “push” to 
promote e-manifest use.  Should consider higher 
manifest processing fee for paper manifests 
(applied to waste firms) 
 
 
The benefits of e-manifests are substantial 
– for both industry and government – but 
only if companies shift to e-manifests.  
 
Cost savings for all parties, including states, 
cannot be captured without wide-spread e-
manifest adoption by industry – arguing for goal 
of near 100% e-manifest use. 
 
 
Regulation 347 demonstrated that 
hazardous waste regulatory fees offer a 
significant revenue opportunity for 
government agencies.  E-manifests create 
cost savings that can be >> than regulatory 
fees. 24 
 
 
With state budget shortfalls, states will be 
interested in hazardous waste regulatory fee 
programs like Ontario’s - especially since states 
can structure fee programs so that e-manifest 
cost savings are >> regulatory fees.   
 
 
E-manifests are part of a broader set of 
industry & government business processes.  
If an e-manifest system like HWIN fails to 
link users’ systems & processes, users will 
find it inefficient and difficult to adopt.   
 
 
E-manifest processing systems should be XML-
based, and designed to serve as the integrating 
link between the business processes of 
generators, transporters, waste firms, and 
government agencies. 
 
 
 
The FMCSA hazmat security study showed that a basic “smart truck” technology package 
consisting of an on-board computer, GPS receiver, and wireless modem provides 
exceptional homeland security benefits for hazmat shipments.  Notably, this 
technology package will also fully meet the field deployment needs of a 
hazardous waste e-manifest program.  Generators and transporters can use the 
transporter’s on-board computer and truck-based internet systems to prepare and 
process e-manifest transactions through an e-manifest processing center.   
 
From an economics perspective, use of truck-based systems to support the hazardous 
waste e-manifest system will be efficient and cost-effective.  The FMCSA hazmat security 
study demonstrated that hazmat fleets will capture positive ROI from “smart truck” 
technology deployment (see Section 1.2).  And, deployment of “smart truck” technology 
by hazardous waste transporters will enable generators and transporters to complete e-
manifest transactions and unlock e-manifest cost savings.  Since the larger waste 
management firms in the U.S. and Canada operate captive transport fleets, waste 
management firms will capture the lion’s share of e-manifest cost savings - about $50 
per manifest transaction.  On top of positive ROI from “smart truck” technology  
deployment, e-manifest savings will generate huge cost savings for waste management 
firms.   
 
 
4.8 The Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NAFTA 
Environmental Commission) envisions a North American waste 
tracking system. 25 
 
The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was 
established under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to promote 
harmonization of environmental programs between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.  The  
                                                            
24 Total potential benefit of e-manifests in Ontario is about Cad$15million/year (200,000 manifests x US$75 savings/manifest x 1.0 
Cad$/U.S.$).  Regulatory fees are Cad$9million/year.  Benefits > regulatory fees by Cad$6million/year.  B/C = 15/9=1.7.  
 
25  Home page – Commission for Environmental Cooperation:  http://www.cec.org/home/index.cfm?varlan=english  
 
The basic “smart truck” 
technology package the FMCSA 
study advocates for hazmat 
security fully meets the field 
needs of a hazardous waste e-
manifest program. 
“Smart truck” technology 
deployment by the waste 
management industry will 
unlock huge cost savings for 
the waste management 
industry. 
 
 
Near 100% e-manifest 
adoption rate should the 
objective of an e-manifest 
program.  
 
 
E-manifest regulatory fees are 
viable: e-manifest cost savings 
can be >> industry regulatory 
fees. 
 
 
E-manifests should be XML-
based and should tie manifest 
business processes together. 
 
 
The CEC is the NAFTA 
environmental commission – the 
United States, Canada, and 
Mexico support the CEC. 
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CEC, located in Montreal, does not have any regulatory authority within the U.S., 
Canada, or Mexico but serves to promote the effective enforcement of environmental 
law, prevent trade difficulties due to environmental conflicts, and to advise the countries 
in managing regional/cross-border environmental issues.   
 
U.S., Canadian, and Mexican hazardous waste regulations are similar and all three 
countries require hazardous waste manifests.  A significant volume of hazardous waste 
moves between the United States and Canada with Canada being a net hazardous waste 
importer.  Hazardous waste also moves from Mexico to the United States.  Mexico lacks 
the commercial waste management infrastructure to manage waste, and U.S. 
manufacturers operating in Mexico under the Maquiladora program are required to ship 
the hazardous waste they generate back to the U.S. 26 
 
In 2003, the CEC published a study examining the cross-border movement of hazardous 
waste in North America.27  The study concluded that the cradle-to-grave tracking of 
cross-border waste shipments is not possible because environmental and customs 
agencies do not communicate in real time; and no country has an integrated system to 
electronically share data from the shipment approval process with the border inspection 
process.  
 
The study also concluded that current cross-border waste tracking approaches are 
ineffective, inefficient, and costly. The lack of the capability to effectively track cross-
border waste shipments is problematic because it creates a “hole” in North America’s 
cradle-to-grave regulatory system that can be exploited to hide illegal waste disposal.  
The study advanced a vision for a North American waste tracking approach – including 
use of electronic hazardous waste manifest systems – that would overcome current 
problems.   
 
“…Tracking transboundary hazardous waste shipments within North America will be based on a timely 
electronic exchange of information which will result in improved compliance, enhanced border 
security, and which will minimize the administrative burden and costs to government agencies and 
the private sector.” 
 
4.9 Taiwan Environmental Protection Administration – Hazardous 
Waste and Hazmat Shipment Tracking 28 
 
Taiwan’s Environmental Protection Administration (TEPA) faced a significant problem of 
illegal waste disposal in the late 1990’s.  Taiwan’s hazardous waste regulations are 
similar to U.S. regulations.  For examples, waste generators must use a manifest for 
hazardous waste shipments.   
 
In 2000, TEPA established the Industrial Waste Control Center (IWCC) to exercise 
tighter control over hazardous waste disposal – especially chain of custody control of off-
site waste shipments.  TEPA established and online reporting system for waste 
generators and in 2001 began tracking waste transporters using a GPS monitoring 
system.   
 
Since then, TEPA has built the Industrial Waste Control Center into a more sophisticated 
operation as illustrated in Figure 4.9.a.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
26  The Maquiladora program was established as part of a treaty agreement between the U.S. and Mexico.  Under the program, U.S. 
firms can build manufacturing plants in Mexico, ship raw products to the plants, and return finished goods to the U.S. paying only 
value added taxes.  The program allows U.S. firms to take advantage of lower labor costs in Mexico.  A provision of the treaty 
agreement requires the U.S. manufacturers to repatriate hazardous waste generated at Maquiladora locations in Mexico.  A World 
Bank study estimates, however, that only about a quarter of the hazardous waste generated at Maquiladora plants is returned to 
U.S. 
 
27 “Crossing the Border -  Opportunities to Improve Tracking of Transboundary Hazardous Waste Shipments in North America”  
(November 2003 - CEC) http://www.cec.org/news/details/?varlan=english&ID=2590   
 
28 Taiwan’s Waste Import/Export Control Measures, Taiwan Environmental Protection Administration, October 2005.  
http://wm.epa.gov.tw/web/english/basel2005en.pdf  
CEC study - cradle-to-grave 
tracking of cross-border 
hazardous waste shipments is 
not currently possible. 
 
CEC study – e-manifest systems 
will enhance communication 
between customs and 
environmental agencies and 
enable cross-border waste 
tracking. 
Taiwan’s environmental agency 
tracks the movement of waste 
transporters using a GPS 
monitoring system.   
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Figure 4.9.a Taiwan’s Industrial Waste Control Center 
 
 
By 2005, over 15,000 firms were using the online reporting system. Over twelve million 
tonnes of wastes were reported through the system, accounting for 96% of all industrial 
wastes in Taiwan. Each day an average of over 10,000 firms submitted manifests online, 
and an average of over 800,000 manifests were received per month. 
 
Recent revisions to Taiwan’s Toxic Chemical Substance Transport Management 
Regulations by TEPA and the Ministry of Transportation and Communications will require 
GPS monitoring of toxic chemicals (hazmat) shipments.  Class I toxic chemical tankers 
are required to install GPS tracking equipment by August 2008.  Class II and Class III 
carriers are required to install GPS equipment at a later date. 
 
According to TEPA, the objective of its monitoring program is to improve the safety of 
toxic chemical shipments in Taiwan and to improve response actions in the case of a spill 
or accident. In addition to GPS monitoring, the system will support electronic submission 
of manifest forms and transport routes.   
 
 
4.10  How will these regulatory/legislative drivers influence the 
design and operation of the Transportation Security Center? 
 
Figure 4.10.a, summarizes how regulatory/legislative drivers will influence the design 
and operation of the Transportation Security Center.  The yellow-coded portions of the 
table are focused on hazmat truck tracking.  Gold-coded sections focus on hazardous 
waste electronic manifests and green-coded sections are relevant to both hazmat and 
hazardous waste. 
 
 
 
 
Taiwan will begin tracking 
hazmat shipments August 
2008.  
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Figure 4.10.a Implications of regulatory/legislative drivers for the Transportation Security Center 
 
  
U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration - Hazardous Materials Safety and Security 
Technology Field Operational Test 
 
 
4.1 
 
The success of the PSRC implementation approach described in the FMCSA study is dependent on 
voluntary technology deployment and data reporting by hazmat transporters.  However, the FOT 
acknowledged that hazmat carriers would not likely respond to a voluntary call for technology 
deployment even with positive ROI.   
 
“… Even with attractive return-on-investment (ROI) and low payback periods, capital constraints and 
institutional inertia (comfort with doing business in fixed ways) are likely to make penetration of this market a 
long-term enterprise, especially in the smaller fleet categories.” 
 
The FMCSA study acknowledged the problem of industry-led voluntary programs by suggesting that 
“government intervention” (e.g. regulations) might be needed.  The argument for “government 
intervention” is buttressed by DHS’s recent experience in its efforts to beef up security at chemical 
production plants in urban areas.  In that case, an industry-led voluntary initiative to upgrade chemical 
plant security resulted in such a tepid industry response that DHS is now considering regulatory action 
to require chemical companies to institute security programs. 
 
Regulations have to supply the market “push” needed to support technology deployment and 
data reporting – both critical to a functioning PSRC. 
 
Almost any combination of smart truck technology can be easily and reasonably justified from a B/C 
perspective. 
 
o The cost of technology deployment/operation is low ~$1500/truck/year (§4.1.4). 
  
o Wireless communications plus GPS generates overwhelmingly positive ROI due to operational efficiency gains - 
$6,000-$10,000/truck/year depending on load type (§4.1.3). 
 
o FOT citation - If all the hazmat carriers in the country fully deployed “smart truck” technology it would require a 
one-time investment of $543 million.  But, carrier profitability would rise by $1.7 billion/year. 
 
Operational benefits and security benefits argue for a technology package that includes:  (§4.1.8) 
 
o Wireless communications and GPS receiver 
o Panic alert 
o Vehicle disabling 
o Electronic manifest 29 
 
Security benefits are huge arguing for wide-spread deployment of “smart truck” technology by hazmat 
carriers.  For example, security benefits exceeding $5 billion will be captured if trucks carrying bulk 
chemicals were equipped with GPS, wireless modems, panic alerts and remote disabling (§4.1.8).   
 
Estimated security benefits argue for regulations that require smart truck technology deployment by 1).  
bulk fuel carriers; 2). bulk chemical carriers; and 3). truckload explosive carriers (§4.1.8).  LTL high-
hazard carriers are also a possibility. 
 
The Public Sector Reporting Center (PSRC) was seen as a desirable mechanism for the capture and 
processing of data (load, location, alerts) from hazmat carriers (§4.1.9).  However, the FOT study 
acknowledged that it is unlikely that hazmat carriers will voluntarily report data to a PSRC.  Data 
reporting must be uniform and widespread or the security paradigm envisioned by the FOT will collapse.  
 
Regulations must drive data reporting requirements. 
 
The FOT participants saw value in geo-fencing as a mechanism to detect off-route shipments, and the 
PSRC as the point where off-route shipments would be detected. There has to be a regulatory 
requirement for shippers and/or carriers to submit a route report to the PSRC and a regulatory or 
operational mechanism for establishing geo-fences for individual shipments. 
 
A PSRC must be able to efficiently integrate the following data on a shipment-specific basis: 
1.  Load and quantity data 
2.  Truck location 
3.  Transaction markers and alerts 
                                                            
29 The electronic supply chain manifest (ESCM) was not evaluated as part of this technology configuration in the FOT.  However, we 
envision the ECSM as the mechanism for capturing load/quantity data and driver identity information.  Routing data might also be 
included as a feature of the electronic manifest. 
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4.  Route information 
 
System users will need access to web services to submit electronic shipping papers, route plans and 
shipment transactional data.   Some data may flow from carriers’ fleet tracking vendors, but some of 
the data must flow directly into a PSRC-managed system from the carriers’ smart truck systems or from 
carrier corporate systems. 
 
Geo-fencing requires establishment of routes for carriers within the system.  If the shipper/carrier 
establishes the route, the system has to be configured to allow access.  Who sets geo-fences in the 
system?  What constitutes off-route? 
 
Panic alerts and/or a poorly implemented geo-fence program have a significant potential for creating a 
high level of false positives.  The system should be designed to minimize false panic alarms and/or to 
deal with them quickly. 
 
Access to data on companies, personnel, and equipment will be required to make a truck tracking 
system work.  Some of the data may exist in existing government databases.  Other data may need to 
be collected through system registration or other mechanisms. 
 
If regulatory fees are established, systems will be needed to process payments from companies and to 
remit payments to government agencies. 
 
PSRC help desk systems are needed to support registration, regulatory assistance (?), fee payment, 
etc.  A VOIP/CRM support system for use by help desk operators might be necessary especially if 
system users are interacting with the system using telephony services. 
 
The systems that manage/support the interface between the PSRC and government action personnel 
are critical. For each type of incident, what are the possible support needs of the government 
personnel?  What is the systems infrastructure that is needed to support the necessary communications 
between the PSRC and government agencies?  Can COTS systems (like WebEOC) be integrated into 
system design to support the interface requirements? 
 
To meet the needs of hazardous waste electronic manifest program, waste carriers could deploy an on-
board computer and wireless communications to support e-manifest transactions – especially digital 
signature processing via XML webforms.  The same approach might be extended to electronic 
processing of hazmat shipping papers and/or transaction processing.  Do the commercial fleet tracking 
vendors currently have the hardware/software capabilities to support deployment of e-manifest 
solutions in the OBC-truck context? 
 
Assume that the PSRC processes and passes incident information on to government agencies for action.  
Does the PSRC hold the system capabilities to fully support government incident response – for 
example, air dispersion modeling, hazmat medical information, etc.  How would the PSRC work with 
government agencies in the event of an incident?  Would the agencies use PSRC incident response tools 
to manage the incident? 
 
There is a limit to PSRC decision support systems.  Some incidents need human intervention especially 
to sort out low-level alerts and/or false positive alerts.  The PSRC needs to be staffed by professionals 
that can make operational judgments about incidents as they occur. 
 
The PSRC must operate and be staffed on a 24/7 basis.  Less human intervention at the PSRC means 
lower staffing levels and lower PSRC costs. 
 
Who disables a vehicle?  What are the decision criteria (workflow) that have to be followed to support 
disabling a vehicle?  FOT participants expressed a desire for a driver to be able to disable his/her 
vehicle. 
 
A variable polling frequency on vehicle location (via fleet tracking vendor) needs to be triggered by 
different events?  For example, if a truck is found to be off-route, the system should automatically ask 
the tracking vendor to report the vehicle’s location more frequently. 
 
The FMCSA study was silent on Federal/State implementation roles and responsibilities but there is an 
implied federal-lead role.  A federal, ‘one-size’ approach to implementing a PSRC program may not 
provide authorized States the flexibility they want to regulate hazmat shipments on their roads. 
 
The PSRC concept will fail without long-term funding.  The FMCSA study was silent on PSRC funding 
sources – but the implication is that the federal government will provide long-term funding.  The PSRC 
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concept will also fail without a regulatory push to stimulate technology deployment and data reporting. 
 
A truck tracking center will lessen but will not eliminate risk in the hazmat supply chain.  Layers of 
protection need to be built into the system and its operation.  For example, the ESCM will help shippers 
detect drivers that are not authorized to accept hazmat shipments. 
 
Should the hazmat ECSM and the hazardous waste e-manifest use the same technology toolset (e.g. 
internet XFML forms)?  Should ESCM data be conveyed to the PSRC directly from the shipper/carrier or 
via the carrier’s fleet tracking vendor? 
 
Should transaction events be conveyed directly to the PSRC or conveyed via the carrier’s fleet tracking 
vendor? (ex. shipment acceptance, gate out, etc)  Should all alerts be conveyed directly to the PSRC, or 
should some or all be conveyed through the carrier’s fleet tracking vendor? 
 
The hazardous waste e-manifest process breaks at the generator/transporter interface because of a lack 
of computing capability and internet connectivity.  Does a typical hazmat “smart truck” setup (OBC and 
wireless modem) solve this problem?  Can it be used to process hazmat and hazardous waste e-
manifest transactions in the field? 
 
  
The U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration - Untethered Trailer Tracking Systems 
 
 
4.2 
 
The FMCSA UTT study demonstrates that UTT technology is commercially available and inexpensive to 
deploy.  The study further demonstrated that the technology is effective.  There is no technology, cost, 
or operational barrier to a regulation that would require carriers to deploy UTT systems. 
 
The communications interface will need to be modified to manage alerts and messaging associated with 
UTT systems.   
 
  
U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration – Vehicle Immobilization Systems 
 
 
4.3 
 
The FMCSA VIS demonstrates that VIS technology is commercially available and inexpensive to deploy.  
The study further demonstrates that the technology is effective.  The study evaluated security scenarios 
in which a vehicle would be disabled, and developed functional requirements for vehicle immobilization 
systems.  There is no technology, cost, or operational barrier to a regulation that would require carriers 
to deploy vehicle immobilization systems. 
 
The communications interface will need to be modified to manage alerts and messaging associated with 
vehicle immobilization systems.  Also, the communications interface and other systems will need to be 
refined to work with a concept of operations plan involving vehicle immobilization roles and 
responsibilities. 
 
  
Singapore Civil Defence Force - Hazmat Transport Vehicle Tracking System 
 
4.4 
 
Singapore’s experience reinforces the thinking that regulations need to drive “smart truck” technology 
deployment.  A voluntary call for technology deployment will not work.   
 
The SCDF views vehicle immobilization as a critical component of a hazmat security program.  Given 
that the marginal cost of vehicle immobilization is low (FMCSA FOT) and that the SCDF experience 
demonstrates feasibility, vehicle immobilization should be given strong consideration in the model 
regulatory program.   
 
The SCDF’s compliance experience demonstrates the need to include regulatory provisions with 
compliance “teeth” to ensure high compliance rates. 
 
The SCDF believes vehicle immobilization is an important component of a hazmat security program and 
designed hardware and a software interface to accommodate vehicle immobilization.  The “trigger 
point” is an important design consideration.  Does a geofence violation (encoded on the truck mounted 
device?) trigger vehicle immobilization?   
 
System should integrate OTS GIS software – chosen for cost, ease of integration and additional 
functionality that allows for development of web-based response tools (incident management, plume 
modeling, etc.) 
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Singapore’s experience shows that investment in outreach initiatives – such as pilot programs – are 
critical to program success. 
 
  
U.S. Transportation Security Administration -  Hazmat Truck Security Pilot 
 
 
4.5 
 
Congress directed TSA to undertake the HTSP project to prove that a hazmat truck tracking center was 
feasible and to work out the details of how a tracking center would operate.  While the HTSP project 
was on-going, a number of important developments occurred.  The FMCSA completed field testing of 
vehicle immobilization and untethered trailer tracking systems and the President signed into law a 
requirement that TSA implement a truck tracking program.  DOT and DHS signed a memorandum of 
understanding formally shifting the responsibility for hazmat shipment security to DHS/TSA and DHS 
began publishing hazmat-related regulations beginning with its chemical facilities anti-terrorism 
standards.  TSA more fully asserted its role as overseer of hazmat transportation security when it 
published guidance on shippers and carriers of highway security-sensitive materials on June 26, 2008.  
Also, DHS’s Customs and Border Protection fully implemented its ACE Truck E-Manifest program that 
requires mandatory submission of electronic manifests for incoming truck shipments to the U.S. 
 
The HTSP project was primarily a technology initiative.  The HTSP project team was not tasked with 
sorting through different implementation options for a hazmat truck tracking center or for evaluating 
regulatory options for a hazmat truck tracking program.  Instead, when the HTSP project team began 
its work in late 2005 it had to make assumptions about the regulatory/implementation environment in 
which a truck tracking system would operate.  In the absence of a clear TSA regulatory plan, the 
project team had to assume that smart truck technology deployment and data reporting would be 
voluntary on the part of industry and that future TSA rules would be narrow in scope.  Also, the project 
team assumed that states would play a passive role in protecting the hazmat supply chain – that they 
would react to incidents declared by TSA but would not have a hands-on role in tracking and 
monitoring hazmat shipments. 
 
These assumptions – especially the assumption that technology deployment and data reporting would 
be voluntary - had a significant effect on the design of the HTSP prototype.  The project team built 
limited functionality into its XML interface to the prototype because it could count on only limited data 
reporting by hazmat carriers and truck tracking vendors during the pilot.  The business rules engine 
was also hobbled by a lack of data to feed it and the prototype’s geo-fence functions were limited 
because carriers had no obligation to submit route plans.  And, cargo data was limited and hard to 
obtain because an electronic manifest function was not built into the prototype and a number of truck 
tracking vendors refused to pass on shipment data to the XML interface.   
 
A hazmat truck tracking center is dependent on data flow from shippers, carriers and truck tracking 
vendors.  Data is the raw product that a truck tracking center converts into actionable intelligence.  
Efficient and timely processing of data gives the center the ability to function and allows it to effectively 
support government action agencies when a transportation security incident is declared.  However, a 
truck tracking center will fail unless smart truck technology is widely deployed and shippers, carriers 
and truck tracking vendors submit data to the truck tracking center.  Currently, there is no regulatory 
requirement that hazmat shippers deploy smart truck technology or submit data to a truck tracking 
center. In the HTSP, carriers and truck tracking vendors were unwilling to voluntarily submit the full set 
of data needed to make a truck tracking center work.  And, many felt that the program should be 
voluntary only – not unlike the chemical industry’s reaction to DHS’s chemical plant security initiative.  
The HTSP contractor expended a great deal of effort doing “work arounds” because the data it received 
from carriers and truck tracing vendors was inconsistent and incomplete.  In fact, the HTSP contractor 
was able to implement only a small part of the functionality that a truck tracking center needs to deliver 
because of the paucity of the data it was able to get from carriers and truck tracking vendors.  A 
national truck tracking program will fail if this is not remedied.  Regulations need to require technology 
deployment and data reporting.  The regulations need to be specific about technology standards and 
data reporting standards.   
 
The HTSP program proved that a hazmat truck tracking center is technically feasible and that smart 
truck technology can be crafted into an effective and efficient system for tracking hazmat shipments.  
The design of the truck tracking prototype in the HTSP is sound and integrates most of the building 
blocks of a truck tracking center (see Section 4.5.1).  However, the prototype lacks the full functionality 
needed in a truck tracking center – especially considering regulatory and programmatic developments 
that occurred after the HTSP program began in October 2004. 
 
The concept of operations (ConOps) plan developed by the HTSP project team did not have a role for 
state action agencies, failing to reflect the possibility of a stronger implementation role for states in 
protecting the hazmat supply chain. 
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The ConOps plan developed by the HTSP project team did not reflect the regulatory approach that will 
likely be implemented by TSA and the states.   
 
The ConOps plan developed by the HTSP project team also did not reflect the full set of responsibilities 
that will face shippers, carriers and truck tracking vendors when a truck tracking center with full 
functionality is implemented.  For example, the pilot did not factor in vehicle immobilization, 
untethered trailer tracking, electronic routes or electronic manifests.  The ConOps plan will need to 
change to reflect a more sophisticated mix of tracking center functionality. 
 
The HTSP report acknowledged the need for better interaction between the truck tracking center and 
TSA.  Beyond this, the truck tracking center needs to coordinate events and information flow with state 
fusion centers and local governments.  COTS web-based crisis information management software 
(CIMS) would probably be the most efficient and effective approach to meeting this need.  An added 
benefit of most CIMS is that it supports management and operations of a command center (e.g. truck 
tracking center).  Section 3.9 describes CIMS by highlighting a market leading product – WebEOC™. 
 
   
U.S. Customs & Border Protection – ACE Truck E-Manifest 
 
 
4.6 
 
The ACE Truck E-Manifest program is a huge regulatory precedent. 
 
o It covers all carrier-based shipments from Canada and Mexico in the U.S. (including hazmat and hazardous waste). 
 
o At the heart of the ACE program is the electronic manifest.  ACE uses an electronic manifest to capture information 
on trading partners, trucks/equipment, and load (type and quantity).  The Transportation Security Center will also 
use an e-manifest to capture information. 
 
o Regulations make participation mandatory.  CBP regulations require trucks entering the U.S. to submit an electronic 
manifest.  They also require carriers to install on-board equipment. 
 
o The Truck E-Manifest program and the Transportation Security Center overlap on some shipments (hazmat and 
hazardous waste). 
 
o CBP and TSA are both DHS agencies.   
 
CBP’s Truck E-Manifest program is a clear precedent for requiring technology deployment and data 
reporting from the transportation industry. 
 
Regulatory integration between the CBP’s Truck E-Manifest program and TSA’s hazmat truck tracking 
program should be a goal between CBP and TSA.   
 
Section 4.6.2 lists the data elements that the CBP’s Truck E-Manifest captures for every shipment.  The 
TSA e-manifest will need some of the CBP’s data elements and others in addition.  CBP and TSA should 
develop a list of common/additional data elements and coordinate e-manifest processing.  For example, 
an e-manifest for a shipment of hazardous materials filed through CBP’s portal should flow directly into 
the Transportation Security Center and should have all the data elements needed to meet TSA truck 
tracking requirements. 
 
CBP uses web services to accept electronic manifests.  The Transportation Security Center will also use 
web services to accept electronic manifests.  However, the hazmat truck tracking center may be taking 
in more data (vehicle location, e-manifest, e-route) from more sources (shippers, carriers, truck 
tracking vendors).  The approach is similar but the technical challenge for hazmat truck tracking is 
greater.   
 
CBP’s Truck E-Manifest program uses a business rules engine to evaluate shipments before they reach 
the border.  The hazmat truck tracking system will also use a business rules engine as a dynamic risk 
profiling tool.  Some of the rules for evaluating companies and drivers may be similar between the 
programs. 
 
 
 
 
  
Ontario Hazardous Waste Information Network 
 
4.7 
 
Near 100% hazardous waste e-manifest use should be the objective of an e-manifest program – 
otherwise, industry and government miss out on cost savings. 
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Industry will not make a wide-scale shift to hazardous waste e-manifests without regulatory and/or 
financial pressure.  Without a regulatory push to overcome market inertia, most companies will stay 
with paper manifests. 
 
Hazardous waste e-manifest regulatory fees are viable, especially since states can deliver e-manifest 
costs savings to industry that are far greater than industry-paid regulatory fees. 
 
The hazardous waste e-manifest process will fail at the generator/transporter interface unless there is 
internet connectivity and computing capabilities available to the parties.  Waste transporters should 
be equipped with an on-board computer and wireless modem to ‘bring’ the internet and computing 
power to the critical generator- transporter hazardous waste e-manifest transaction. 
 
A hazardous waste e-manifest system links the business processes of waste generators, waste 
haulers, and waste firms.  It has to allow user data to flow efficiently though the system to support 
external business processes as well as meeting its own internal e-manifest business processes.  There 
should be defined XML interfaces created that allow system users to efficiently link to the e-manifest 
system. 
 
Based on the experiences in Ontario in implementing its hazardous waste e-manifest system, help desk 
systems need to be established that support system user needs fully and efficiently. 
 
  
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NAFTA Environmental Commission) 
 
 
4.8 
 
Hazmat and waste tracking systems will need to be built to serve the tri-lingual needs of North 
American customers.   
 
The NAFTA environmental commission has backed establishment of a North American waste tracking 
system.  The commission has no regulatory authority but does speak for the common interests of the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico. 
 
  
Taiwan Environmental Protection Administration - Hazardous Waste and Hazmat Shipment 
Tracking 
 
 
4.9 
 
Taiwan EPA requires hazardous waste transporters to install GPS monitoring equipment on their trucks.  
The purpose is to strengthen chain of custody control over hazardous waste shipment and to prevent 
illegal waste disposal.  Should the model regulation also require tracking of hazardous waste shipments 
to strengthen chain of custody control in the U.S.? 
 
Taiwan requires submission of electronic manifests for hazardous waste shipments to its Industrial 
Waste Control Center.  Unlike Ontario, where e-manifest use is voluntary and e-manifest usage is low, 
almost all of Taiwan’s transactions are electronic. 
 
Taiwan is about to begin tracking hazmat shipments.  Notably, Taiwan requires submission of e-
manifests (type, quantity of load) and electronic route information and GPS monitoring of hazmat 
carriers (location).  Taiwan had combined the interests of two agencies with different regulatory focus – 
environment and transportation – to build an efficient regulatory program that meets multiple interests. 
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5.0 Business Drivers 
 
 
Business drivers are external or internal influences that significantly impact or set direction for programs.  Sections 
2-4 examined in detail the wide array of events in the market that will influence the establishment and operation of 
the Transportation Security Center.  Section 5 begins to tie together the analyses conducted in Sections 2-4 by 
listing business drivers that will likely impact or set the direction for a hazmat truck tracking and hazardous waste 
e-manifest processing. 
 
5.1 Hazmat shipment tracking – the top five business drivers 
 
 
5.1.1 The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 
(PL 110-53/H.R. 1) requires TSA to 
take action on hazmat truck 
tracking.   
 
As discussed in Section 2.5, PL 110-53 requires TSA to: 
 
…develop a program to facilitate the tracking of motor carrier shipments of security-
sensitive materials and to equip vehicles used in such shipments with technology that 
provides-- 
 
(A) frequent or continuous communications; 
 
(B) vehicle position location and tracking capabilities; and 
 
(C) a feature that allows a driver of such vehicles to broadcast an emergency distress 
signal. 
 
A legislative mandate is a powerful incentive for a federal agency. 
TSA’s objective should be to open an operational hazmat truck 
tracking center as soon as possible – especially since earlier studies 
and initiatives have proven that a truck tracking center is 
technically feasible.  In its June 26, 2008 guidance, TSA signaled its 
interest in applying stringent security measures for TSA-designated 
Tier 1 highway security-sensitive materials (HSSMs).  This focuses 
tracking scrutiny down to a small percentage of the universe of 
hazmat shipments. 
 
 
5.1.2 There is public demand for a 
secure hazmat supply chain. 
 
 
 
 
 
There have been attacks using truck-based hazmat shipments 
around the world and the U.S. public fears that hazmat shipments 
could be used as weapons of mass destruction here in the United 
States.  In Kentucky, for example, the former Director of the 
Kentucky Office of Homeland Security reported that hazmat truck 
security was raised as a pressing issue by Kentucky citizens in every 
public forum she attended.  The public recognizes hazmat supply 
chain security as a national issue and wants TSA to act as soon as 
possible – and certainly before an actual incident occurs. 
 
 
5.1.3 Security is driving technology 
innovation in the hazmat truck 
security market; the market 
anticipates a government regulatory 
program.  
    
Section 2.2 explained how hazmat security issues are driving the 
regulatory agenda for government agencies with a transportation 
mandate.  Section 3.1 described “smart truck” technology and 
included a review of the commercial “smart truck” products 
available in the market.  Section 4.2-4.3 reviewed additional 
“smart truck” technology devices.   
 
The market anticipates that government regulation will eventually 
dictate the deployment of “smart truck” technology in segments of 
the hazmat transportation market.  Product development by “smart 
truck” technology vendors has increasingly focused on developing 
product security features, and product marketing has increasingly 
emphasized hazmat shipment security.   
 
Two examples highlight the market’s recognition of hazmat 
security as a market. 
 
• Section 3.2 described the Chemical Custody Supply Chain 
Solution, an application that provides continuous on-line tracking, 
security monitoring and management of hazardous material 
containers and their contents from point of origin to destination.  It 
is offered by Savi/Lockheed (Savi).  Savi was one of the first 
technology vendors to emphasize hazmat security as an important, 
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if not the chief, benefit of its product.  Savi’s message reflects the 
market’s readiness for products and services that address the 
threat of terrorist actions in the hazmat supply chain.  Benefits 
cited by Savi include: 
 
• reduced liability risk; 
 
• increased security; 
 
• streamlined operational processes; 
 
• reduced asset inventory; and 
 
• reduced capital investment, lease, rental, and demurrage costs. 
 
• Sections 3.1 described the product offerings of Safefreight 
Technology.  Safefreight is notable in that it has aligned its “smart 
truck” products around hazmat transportation security.  A visit to 
Safefreight’s webpage demonstrates the company’s recognition 
that the hazmat transportation security market is fast arriving. 
 
http://www.safefreight.com/security-by-technology/hazmat-security-
technologies/ 
 
 
5.1.4 “Smart truck” technology 
deployment saves hazmat carriers 
money; generates huge benefits 
for the public.   
 
Section 4.1 examines the cost/benefit of hazmat truck tracking 
programs.  It is overwhelmingly evident that there is a clear cost 
argument for requiring hazmat carriers – especially high-risk 
hazmat carriers - to deploy “smart truck” technology.  
  
o The cost of technology deployment/operation is low 
~$1500/truck/year (§4.1.4). 
  
o Wireless communications plus GPS generates overwhelmingly 
positive ROI due to operational efficiency gains - $6,000-
$10,000/truck/year depending on load type (§4.1.3). 
 
o If all the hazmat carriers in the country fully deployed “smart 
truck” technology it would require a one-time investment of $543 
million but carrier profitability would rise by $1.7 billion/year. 
 
There is also a clear benefits argument as well.  The FOT report 
concluded that security benefits exceeding $5 billion will be 
captured if trucks carrying bulk chemicals were equipped with 
GPS, wireless modems, panic alerts and remote disabling 
(§4.1.8).   
 
The cost savings/benefits of “smart truck” technology deployment 
will create a great deal of flexibility for federal and state 
regulatory agencies.  The overwhelmingly positive ROI on “smart 
truck” investment should mute concerns by hazmat carriers that 
regulatory requirements for technology deployment and data 
reporting are burdensome.  Also, the social benefits are so great 
that concerns over regulatory burden elsewhere in the hazmat 
supply chain can be easily mitigated. 
 
 
5.1.5 Technology is not an inhibiting 
factor for a truck tracking center; 
developing an effective 
regulatory/implementation 
framework is the challenge.   
 
TSA’s Hazmat Transportation Security Pilot program proved that a 
hazmat truck tracking center is technically feasible and that smart 
truck technology can be crafted into an effective and efficient 
system for tracking hazmat shipments.  And, it is clear that 
technology vendors have the capability to refine their products to 
meet the government’s needs for a national truck tracking 
system.   
 
Technology will not be an inhibiting factor for a truck tracking 
center.  The challenge in establishing a truck tracking center will 
be in developing the regulatory and implementation paradigm in 
which it will operate.  And those that do will be in the lead position 
to place a truck tracking center into operation. 
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5.2 Hazardous waste e-manifests – the top five business drivers. 
 
 
5.2.1 EPA wants hazardous waste trading 
partners to use e-manifests.   
 
Section 2.6 describes EPA’s multi-year effort to try to implement 
an e-manifest program.  Despite its inability to date to implement 
an e-manifest program, EPA remains firmly committed – even to 
the point of supporting legislation that would allow it to move 
forward on a privatization plan to implement a national e-manifest 
processing center.  And, EPA’s support and leadership is critical.  
Until EPA allows companies and states to use e-manifests, they 
remain bound to the current costly and inefficient paper-based 
system. 
 
 
5.2.2 E-manifests will unlock cost 
savings for government and 
industry.   
 
With about 4 million hazardous waste shipments in the U.S. each 
year, EPA estimates electronic manifests have the potential to 
generate savings of more than $300 million per year.  This 
translates into cost savings of about $75/manifest transaction.  
Waste transporters and waste management firms together capture 
about two-thirds of available e-manifest cost savings – about 
$50/manifest transaction.  Waste generators and state agencies 
capture the remainder.  The waste management industry operates 
under thin margins, and will welcome e-manifest cost savings.  
Many states and waste generating companies likewise face serious 
economic pressures and will happily embrace cost savings from e-
manifests.  
 
 
5.2.3 E-manifest cost savings provide 
revenue opportunity for state 
agencies.   
Cash strapped states are increasingly looking for revenue 
opportunities.  Kentucky, like many other states, currently has 
regulations in place that require waste generators to pay fees 
based on waste generation.  Section 4.7 described how the 
Province of Ontario crafted a regulatory fee program to generate 
CAD$10 million/year in revenue.  With the inherent cost savings 
associated with e-manifests (e.g. $75/transaction), there is plenty 
of room for a state to collect regulatory fees and still deliver a 
benefit to regulated companies.  For example, Section 4.7 
examined Ontario’s fee program.  Even with Ontario’s extremely 
hefty regulatory fee structure, e-manifests offer a healthy 
benefit/cost value proposition. 
 
With about 200,000 manifest transactions/year, the use of e-manifests 
instead of paper manifests has the potential of generating US$15 
million in annual cost savings (200,000 x $75) in Ontario.  Ontario 
collects about CAD$9 million/year (US$10.2 million) in regulatory fees 
from waste generators.  Assuming full e-manifest use, the benefit/cost 
ratio for an e-manifest program in Ontario is ~1.5 (B=$15million; 
C=$10.2 million).  This is an impressive B/C ratio considering the heavy 
regulatory fee burden Ontario places on waste generators. 
 
 
5.2.4 Hazardous waste management is a 
state-delegated program.   
 
The states - not EPA - oversee hazardous waste management 
programs in the U.S.  The states are the regulatory point of 
contact for companies and the states are responsible for 
compliance/enforcement actions.  States have been traditionally 
forceful about maintaining their role in managing their hazardous 
waste programs.  For example, the Alliance for Uniform Hazmat 
Transportation Procedures, sponsored by the National Conference 
of State Legislatures, has established model programs for 
hazardous waste transportation.  The states are a key partner 
with EPA and will significantly influence the implementation of 
hazardous waste e-manifest programs.  Given the revenue 
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potential associated with e-manifest implementation, the states 
will likely have an especially keen interest in how the program is 
structured. 
 
5.2.5 Technology is not an inhibiting 
factor for a hazardous waste e-
manifest processing center; 
developing an effective business, 
regulatory, and implementation 
framework is the challenge.   
 
Like the truck tracking center, technology is not an inhibitor to the 
establishment of a hazardous waste e-manifest processing center.  
In fact, technology can substantially expand shipment chain-of-
custody control far beyond EPA’s current objective for its e-
manifest program.  Section 3 reviewed technology that will 
support an e-manifest system and Section 4.7 reviewed Ontario’s 
Hazardous Waste Information Network, the only hazardous waste 
e-manifest system in North America.   
 
Technology will not be an inhibiting factor for a hazardous waste 
e-manifest processing center.  As EPA has discovered over the 
years, the challenge in establishing an e-manifest processing 
center will be in developing the business, regulatory and 
implementation paradigm in which it will operate.  And those that 
do will be in the lead position to place an e-manifest processing 
center into operation. 
 
 
5.3 Business drivers common to both hazmat shipment tracking and hazardous waste e-
manifests. 
 
5.3.1 The transportation of hazardous 
materials and hazardous waste is a 
highly regulated business.   
 
Regulation is a clear business driver for the transportation 
industry.  Regulations from EPA and DOT cover hazardous waste 
transportation safety and place strict requirements on hazardous 
waste trading partners (generators, transporters, waste firms).  
Regulations from DOT and TSA cover hazmat transportation  
safety and security and place strict requirements on hazmat 
trading partners (shippers, carriers, receivers).  As noted in two 
previous sections, regulation will inevitably drive the adoption of 
“smart truck” technology by hazmat carriers and the use of e-
manifests by hazardous waste trading partners.  The nature and 
type of regulations that are ultimately adopted will shape the 
market for hazmat shipment tracking and hazardous waste e-
manifests. 
 
 
5.3.2 EPA’s proposed transaction revenue 
model supports establishment of a 
for-profit business for hazmat 
shipment tracking and hazardous 
waste e-manifest processing.   
 
EPA’s “share-in-savings” business model calls for a private 
company to build and operate an e-manifest processing center.  
The company will collect a transaction fee for each hazardous 
waste electronic manifest it processes.  A business model based 
on transaction fee revenues will work equally well for hazmat 
shipments, and can be extended to a for-profit approach for 
establishing a hazmat truck tracking center.  In the hazmat case, 
the transaction would begin at “gate out” and would end at “gate 
in”.  The fee paid would be for tracking services from “gate out” to 
“gate in”. 
 
 
5.3.3 Government agencies are interested 
in privatization – especially when 
intramural funding is limited. 
 
 
The Congressional Research Service defines “privatization” as the 
use of the private sector in the provision of  a good or service, the 
components of which include financing, operations (supplying, 
production, delivery), and quality control. 1  Government agencies 
are most interested in privatization when the performing 
organization: 1). can do the work less expensively than the 
government; 2). will deliver high service quality; and 3). advances 
a business model that lessens an agency’s downstream financial 
obligations.  EPA’s interest in the GSA “share-in-savings” contract 
mechanism is an excellent example of government privatization 
                                                            
1 Privatization and the Federal Government: An Introduction; Congressional Research Service; December 28, 2006. 
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(refer to Section 2.6.3).   
 
 
5.3.4 Financial considerations and 
programmatic/technology overlaps 
argue for co-location of TSA’s 
hazmat truck tracking center and 
EPA’s hazardous waste e-manifest 
processing center.   
 
As explained in Section 2.1,  there are programmatic overlaps 
between hazardous materials and hazardous waste.  Hazardous 
waste is a subset of the much larger universe of hazardous 
materials, and EPA and DOT co-regulate the hazardous waste 
transportation (EPA does not, however, regulate the 
transportation of hazardous materials other than hazardous 
waste).  The systems infrastructure needs for a hazmat truck 
tracking system and a hazardous waste e-manifest processing 
center are similar, and significant economies of scale can be 
achieved if TSA’s hazmat truck tracking center and EPA’s 
hazardous waste e-manifest processing center are co-located. 
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6.0  Regulatory Program Plan 
 
 
This section contains recommendations for two model regulatory programs for 
consideration by Kentucky cabinet agencies.  The first is a model program to support 
implementation of TSA’s hazmat truck tracking program.  The second is a model 
program to support implementation of EPA’s hazardous waste e-manifest program.   
 
Section 6.1 begins by providing an analysis of terrorist threats to Kentucky’s hazmat 
supply chain including shipments of hazardous materials by truck.  Section 6.2 contains 
project team recommendations for Kentucky’s membership in the Alliance for Uniform 
Hazmat Transportation Procedures.  Section 6.3 describes the regulatory strategy that 
would drive the model programs, and Section 6.4 presents critical regulatory elements 
of the model programs.  Section 6.5 presents recommendations for refinements to 
Kentucky’s existing hazmat and hazardous waste regulatory programs. 
 
 
6.1 Kentucky’s hazmat supply chain is an attractive target for 
terrorists. 
 
Appendix F, Kentucky Hazmat Supply Chain Threat Analysis, contains a report that 
describes terrorist threats to Kentucky’s hazmat supply chain including shipments of 
hazardous materials by truck.   
 
Kentucky is located in the middle of one of the nation’s busiest transportation corridors.  
Major interstate highways including I-64, I-65, and I-75 cut through the state carrying 
over 70,000 semi-tractor trailer trucks daily.  In fact, only six states have more truck 
tonnage over their roads than Kentucky.   
 
The study advanced the idea that Kentucky might serve as a “magnet” for out-of-state 
terrorists seeking the significant stores of hazardous materials at petrochemical 
complexes in Louisville, and in eastern and western Kentucky or seeking to divert a 
hazmat shipment in-route on Kentucky’s roads.  The materials could be transported out 
of state for use elsewhere or used as weapons of mass destruction at large, high-profile 
sporting venues like the Kentucky Derby. 
 
The report concluded that Kentucky’s hazmat supply chain – including carrier-based 
transportation – was an attractive target for terrorists. 
 
 
6.2 Kentucky should seek membership in the Alliance for Uniform 
Hazmat Transportation Procedures 
 
Responsibility for hazmat and hazardous waste programs has been delegated to 
Kentucky by EPA and DOT.  Kentucky’s hazmat program incorporates DOT regulations 
by reference while its hazardous waste program has been enhanced beyond EPA-
minimum requirements to include items such as regulatory fees for waste generators.  
See Section 6.5 for additional detail. 
 
Section 2.7 described the Alliance for Uniform Hazmat Transportation Procedures (the 
Alliance), a state-based organization that operates in conjunction with the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).  The Alliance has developed model hazmat and 
hazardous waste registration/permitting programs that its member states use as guides 
for in developing their own regulatory programs.  Kentucky is bordered by three Alliance 
states – West Virginia, Ohio, and Illinois.   
 
Membership is open to all states but candidate states must satisfy membership 
requirements to join the Alliance (See Section 2.7.3).  Section 2.7.5 listed benefits of 
state membership in the Alliance. 
 
• The Uniform Program is well designed, comprehensive, and has stood the test of 
time.  The Alliance has developed detailed procedures to support state 
implementation of the Uniform Program.  The Alliance procedures have been  
Kentucky’s hazmat supply chain 
is an attractive target for 
terrorists. 
The Alliance for Uniform Hazmat 
Transportation Procedures is a 
state-based organization that 
operates in conjunction with the 
National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL).   
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developed and refined by almost two decades of state experience.  The procedures have 
a proven track record work in minimizing administrative burdens of the states in 
implementing their base programs. 
 
• Membership in the Alliance makes it easier for states to implement and defend fee 
programs to fund internal programmatic activities.  States need revenue to run their 
programs, and the Alliance program is structured to allow states to capture fees from 
hazmat carriers in a defensible, reasonable manner.  Participation in the Alliance 
program also helps state administrators justify the collection of hazmat fees. 
 
• Carrier compliance is enhanced and highway safety/security is improved.  The Alliance 
reports that carrier compliance with hazmat safety rules is markedly improved by 
implementation of the Alliance program.   
 
• Less workload and efficient business processes save states money.  Alliance membership 
helps states share the workload. Instead of registering and reviewing every hazmat 
carrier in their state, states only register and review those carriers that identify a given 
state as their base state. This allows each state to focus their attention and resources on 
a smaller group of carriers without losing confidence that other carriers are also being 
thoroughly checked. Base states are able to improve the thoroughness of carrier reviews 
and inspection and capture cost savings from the decreased volume of registration and 
reviews required. 
 
• Lower regulatory load for interstate hazmat carriers.  Interstate carriers benefit from the 
Alliance program.  Instead of having a regulatory interaction with many states, carriers 
interact with only their base state for permitting and registration.  A lighter regulatory 
load lowers carrier costs. 
 
In June 2008, the Alliance issued a contract to better quantify the benefits of Alliance 
membership.  The work is not yet complete but will provide states with additional 
information to evaluate the benefits of Alliance membership. 
 
The project team recommends that Kentucky seek membership in the Alliance 
for Uniform Hazmat Transportation Procedures.  Membership in the Alliance places 
Kentucky in position to host the North American Transportation Security Center.  The 
Alliance base program is consistent with the statutory/regulatory refinements Kentucky 
needs to make to implement its model hazmat truck tracking program and its model 
hazardous waste e-manifest program.  The Alliance program also lets Kentucky cabinet 
agencies collect regulatory fees to cover internal programmatic costs.  The 
administrative burden on the Cabinet agencies in adopting Alliance programs will be low 
and the benefit to Kentucky carriers, especially interstate carriers, will be high.   
 
The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet should serve as the lead agency in Kentucky, and 
Kentucky should opt to register/permit all hazmat carriers including hazardous waste 
carriers.  
 
 
6.3 Recommended regulatory strategy 
 
This project is being conducted as part of an overall plan to bring two federal initiatives 
to Kentucky: TSA’s hazmat truck tracking center and EPA’s hazardous waste e-manifest 
processing center.  Bringing these programs to Kentucky will create well-paying 
technology jobs and provide a welcome economic boost to Kentucky’s 5th Congressional 
district.   
 
The North American Transportation Security Center will be the implementing tool for a 
model regulatory program that will require: 
 
• high-risk hazmat transporters to install “smart truck” technology on their vehicles; 
 
• carriers to process hazmat e-manifests through the Transportation Security Center; 
 
• carriers to report vehicle location to the Transportation Security Center (real-time 
XML data feed); and 
 
• companies to pay hazmat regulatory fees. 
 
 
Kentucky should seek 
membership in the Alliance for 
Uniform Hazmat Transportation 
Procedures  
The North American 
Transportation Security Center 
will be the implementing tool for 
a model regulatory program. 
Membership in the Alliance for 
Uniform Hazmat Transportation 
Procedures will deliver 
substantial benefits to a state. 
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The Transportation Security Center will also serve as the implementing tool for a model 
hazardous waste electronic manifest regulatory program.   
 
The project team adopted the following strategy as it crafted its regulatory 
recommendations for consideration by Kentucky’s cabinet agencies. 
 
 
6.3.1 Kentucky’s model program will 
support implementation of PL 
110-53 (Tier 1 HSSM tracking).   
The model regulatory program will focus on tracking TSA-
designated Tier 1 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (HSSM).  
Tier 1 HSSM shipments represent less than 1% of all hazmat 
shipments.  The Transportation Security Center will operate a 
hazmat truck tracking center for Tier 1 HSSMs that will fully satisfy 
the implementation needs of PL 110-53 and that will serve as the 
implementing tool for a model hazmat shipment tracking program.  
The hazmat shipment tracking program recommended for Kentucky 
will serve as a model program for states and/or a model for future 
TSA regulations. 
 
6.3.2 Kentucky’s model program will 
support implementation of EPA’s 
hazardous waste e-manifest 
program.   
 
The model regulatory program will be developed consistent with 
EPA’s hazardous waste e-manifest program.   The Transportation 
Security Center will operate a hazardous waste e-manifest 
processing center that will be CROMERR-compliant and that will 
serve as a node on EPA’s Central Data Exchange.  The hazardous 
waste e-manifest program recommended for Kentucky will serve as 
a model program for states and/or a model for future EPA 
regulations. 
 
6.3.3 Kentucky’s model program will 
position Kentucky to host the 
Transportation Security Center 
and establish the Transportation 
Security Center as a for-profit 
business.   
By being in the regulatory/business forefront, Kentucky will position 
itself to serve as host of the Transportation Security Center.  Model 
regulations will be developed with the idea that the Transportation 
Security Center will serve as the implementing tool for the 
regulations.  The Transportation Security Center will process 
hazmat and hazardous waste transactions from states and 
provinces throughout North America. 
 
6.3.4 Kentucky’s model program will 
support Kentucky’s entry into the 
Alliance for Uniform Hazmat 
Transportation Procedures.   
Section 2.7 described the procedures and policies that underlie the 
Alliance for Uniform Hazmat Transportation Procedures.  The base 
program is comprehensive and compatible with the technical and 
programmatic goals of the North American Transportation Security 
Center.  Section 6.2 included a recommendation that Kentucky join 
the Alliance.  The model program developed in Kentucky will 
incorporate Alliance registration/permitting provisions.    
 
 
6.4 Critical elements of the model regulatory programs. 
 
Sections 2, 3, and 4 analyzed “drivers” that will influence the design and operation of the 
Transportation Security Center.  Section 2.8 summarized the implications of 
regulatory/legislative drivers on the design and operation of the Transportation Security 
Center.  Section 3.11 summarized technology drivers and Section 4.10 summarized 
experience drivers.   
 
These “drivers” also have a profound effect on the design of regulatory programs related 
to hazmat truck tracking and hazardous waste electronic manifests.  One issue that arose 
frequently during the course of this project was that voluntary industry compliance 
programs do not work.  For example, DHS’s industry voluntary program for chemical 
plant safety met with such tepid response by industry that DHS was forced to issue its 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards regulations to require chemical facilities to 
institute hazmat security programs.  In order for hazmat truck tracking and hazardous 
waste e-manifest programs to work, they need a high level of industry participation.  The 
model programs recommended by the project team will apply regulatory and financial 
incentives to promote technology deployment, data reporting, and e-manifest use by 
industry. 
 
Regulations need to drive 
technology deployment, data 
reporting and electronic manifest 
use. 
The strategy behind the model 
regulatory program has to 
reflect state and federal needs 
as well as the business needs of 
the Transportation Security 
Center. 
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This section describes critical elements of the model regulatory programs that would be 
implemented in conjunction with the Transportation Security Center. 
 
 
6.4.1 Tier 1 HSSM shipment tracking 
 
A hazmat truck tracking center is dependent on data flow from shippers, carriers and 
truck tracking vendors.  Data is the raw product that a truck tracking center converts 
into actionable intelligence.  Efficient and timely processing of data gives the center the 
ability to function and allows it to effectively support government action agencies when a 
transportation security incident is declared.  However, a truck tracking center will fail 
unless “smart truck” technology is widely deployed and shippers, carriers and truck 
tracking vendors submit data to the truck tracking center.  Currently, there is no 
regulatory requirement that hazmat shippers deploy “smart truck” technology or submit 
data to a truck tracking center. In TSA’s Hazmat Truck Security Pilot, carriers and truck 
tracking vendors were unwilling to voluntarily submit the full set of data needed to make 
a truck tracking center work.  And, many felt that the program should be voluntary only 
– not unlike the chemical industry’s reaction to DHS’s chemical plant security initiative.  
The HTSP contractor expended a great deal of effort doing “work arounds” because the 
data it received from carriers and truck tracing vendors was inconsistent and 
incomplete.  In fact, the HTSP contractor was able to implement only a small part of the 
functionality that a truck tracking center needs to deliver because of the paucity of the 
data it was able to get from carriers and truck tracking vendors.  A national truck 
tracking program will fail unless regulations drive technology deployment and data 
reporting.  Moreover, regulations need to drive technology standards and data reporting 
standards.   
The HTSP program proved that a hazmat truck tracking center is technically feasible and 
that smart truck technology can be crafted into an effective and efficient system for 
tracking hazmat shipments (see Section 4.5.1).  However, the HTSP study stopped well 
short of describing a regulatory program that would promote the successful 
establishment of a hazmat truck tracking program. 
 
PL 110-53 and TSA’s June 2008 guidance for Highway Security-Sensitive Materials do, 
however, establish the framework for a regulatory program that would promote 
technology deployment and data reporting. The regulatory elements listed below are 
designed to support implementation of PL 110-53 and field implementation of TSA’s 
HSSM guidance.  They focus regulatory scrutiny on Tier 1 HSSMs, and promote “smart 
truck” technology deployment and data reporting by Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers. 
 
6.4.1.1 Shipments of TSA-designated Tier 
1 highway security-sensitive 
shipments (HSSMs) are 
“regulated shipments”.  
 
There are 800,000 hazmat shipments per day in the United States 
– over 290 million shipments annually.  Not all materials 
represent the same risk during transit, especially from a security 
perspective.  In its June 26, 2008 guidance, TSA recognized two 
tiers of highway security-sensitive materials. 
 
1. Tier 1 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 1 
HSSM) – HSSM transported by motor vehicle whose potential 
consequences from an act of terrorism include a highly 
significant level of adverse effects on human life, 
environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or 
economic disruption.  
 
2. Tier 2 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 2 
HSSM) - HSSM transported by motor vehicle whose potential 
consequences from an act of terrorism include moderately 
significant level of adverse effects on human life or health, 
environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or 
economic disruption.  A full list of Tier 2 HSSM may be found 
in Appendix B.    
 
As discussed in Section 2.4, TSA also published voluntary Security 
A hazmat truck tracking center 
will fail unless carriers deploy 
“smart truck” technology and 
submit data.     
PL 110-53 and TSA’s HSSM 
guidance establish the 
framework for a regulatory 
framework for technology 
deployment and data reporting.   
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Action Items (SAIs) for Tier 1 and Tier 2 HSSMs.  They include the 
following SAIs for en-route security. 
 
10. Establish Communications Plan. 
11. Establish Appropriate Vehicle Security Program. 
12. Establish Appropriate Cargo Security Program. 
13. Implement a Seal/Lock Control Program. 
14. High Alert Level Protocols. 
15. Establish Security Inspection Policy and Procedures. 
16. Establish Reporting Policy and Procedures. 
17. Shipment Pre-Planning, Advance Notice of Arrival, and 
Receipt of Confirmation Procedures. 
18. Preplanning Routes. 
19. Security for Trips Exceeding Driver Hours of Service. 
20. Dedicated Truck. 
21. Tractor Activation Capability. 
22. Panic Button Capability. 
23. Tractor and Trailer Tracking Systems 
 
SAIs 17-23 are recommended by TSA for Tier 1 HSSM shipments. 
 
Figure 6.4.a lists Tier 1 HSSMs and the number of annual 
shipments of each HSSM.  At less than 2 million shipments per 
year, Tier 1 HSSM shipments represent well less than 1% of all 
hazmat shipments in the U.S. This is a reasonable number of 
shipments to track, and focuses government attention on the 
riskiest shipments from a security perspective.  
 
The model regulation requires shippers/carriers of Tier 1 HSSMs 
to implement a truck tracking program.  For purposes of this 
paper, Tier 1 HSSM shipments are referred to as “regulated 
shipments”.   
 
Figure 6.4.a TSA Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Materials 
 
DOT Hazard Class Hazmat 
Placard 
Threshold Quantity Number of Annual U.S. 
Shipments 1 
 
Division 1.1 
Division 1.2 
Division 1.3 
Explosives 
 
 
 
 
Any quantity 
 
 
Domestic - 11,868 
NAFTA – 524 
 
 
Division 2.2 
Non-Flammable Gas (also 
meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation) 
 
 
 
 
 
Anhydrous ammonia (UN1005) in single bulk 
packaging >300 L or 3000 kg 
 
 
Domestic - 563,771 2 
NAFTA - 6,767 
 
 
Division 2.3 
Toxic (Poison) Gas 
 
 
 
 
 
Hazard zone A & B >5lbs. in a single package 
 
Hazard zone C & D in single bulk packaging 
>3000L or 3000kg 
 
Domestic - 960,871 
NAFTA - 8,233 
 
Class 3 Flammable Liquids (also 
meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation) 
 
 
 
PG I in single bulk packaging > 3000 L or 3000 
kg 
 
Domestic - 62,015,889 3 
NAFTA - 119,816 
 
                                                            
1 Data on the number of Tier 1 HSSM shipments was provided by David Cooper, Program Manager, Highway & Motor Carrier 
Division, U.S. Transportation Security Administration.  Data represents 2005 projections for US domestic and NAFTA truck traffic for 
select hazmat commodities. 
 
2 This figure includes shipments of Tier 2 Division 2.2 Non-Flammable Gases (subsidiary hazard Oxidizer Division 5.1). 
 
3 This figure includes shipments of : 1). Class 3 Flammable Liquids (PGI and II in single bulk packaging > 300L or 3000 kg; and 2). 
Class 3 Flammable Liquids (any quantity desensitized explosives) – both of which are Tier 2 HSSM. 
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Division 6.1 Poisonous Materials 
(also meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation) 
 
 
 
Hazard zone A & B > 5 lbs. in a single package 
 
Domestic - 307,244 
NAFTA - 18,213 
 
 
Division 6.1 Poisonous Materials 
(also meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation) 
 
 
 
Hazard zone C & D in single bulk packaging > 
3000 l or 3000 kg 
 
Class 7 Radioactive Materials 
 
 
 
IAEA Code of Conduct Category 1 and 2 
materials including Highway Route Controlled 
quantities as defined in 49 CFR 173.403 or 
known as radionuclides in forms as RAM-QC by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
 
Domestic - 7,777 
NAFTA - 7,265 
 
 
Class 8 Corrosive Materials (also 
meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation) 
 
 
 
Packing group I and II in single bulk packaging 
> 3000 L or 3000 kg 
 
Domestic - 4,548,595 4 
NAFTA - 95,703 
 
 
  
Other Materials 
  
Any quantity of chemicals listed by the 
Chemical Weapons Convention on Schedules. 
 
 
unknown 
   Domestic – 1,287.760 5 
 
 
6.4.1.2 Tier 1 HSSM shipments traveling 
over Kentucky’s roads must meet 
Kentucky’s hazmat shipment 
security requirements. 
Regulated shipments that travel over Kentucky’s roads are subject 
to Kentucky’s hazmat security regulatory requirements.  The 
requirements are spelled out below.   
 
 
 
6.4.1.3 Carriers of Tier 1 HSSM shipments 
must install “smart truck” devices 
that are Transportation Security 
Center compliant. 
 
Compliance with Tier 1 HSSM requirements requires “smart truck” 
technology deployment by Tier 1 HSSM carriers.  In its June 26, 
2008 guidance, TSA published 23 Security Action Items (SAIs) for 
Tier 1 HSSMs.   SAIs 17 – 23 cover en-route requirements for Tier 
1 HSSMs.  SAIs 21, 22, and 23 specifically address the 
deployment of “smart truck” technology on vehicles carrying Tier 
1 HSSMs.   
 
• Security Action Item #21. Tractor Activation Capability – 
Employers should implement security measures that require driver 
identification by login and password or biometric data to drive the 
tractor. Companies should provide written policies and instructions to 
drivers explaining the activation process.  
 
• Security Action Item #22. Panic Button Capability – Employers 
should implement means for a driver to transmit an emergency alert 
notification to dispatch. “Panic Button” technology enables a driver to 
remotely send an emergency alert notification message either via 
Satellite or Terrestrial Communications, and/or utilize the remote Panic 
Button to disable the vehicle.  
 
• Security Action Item #23. Tractor and Trailer Tracking Systems – 
Employers should have the ability of implementing methods of tracking 
the tractor and trailer throughout the intended route with satellite and/or 
land-based wireless GPS communications systems. Tracking methods for 
the tractor and trailer should provide current position by latitude and 
longitude. Geo-fencing and route monitoring capabilities allow authorized 
users to define and monitor routes and risk areas. If the tractor and/or 
trailer deviates from a specified route or enters a risk area, an alert 
notification should be sent to the dispatch center. An employer or an 
authorized representative should have the ability to remotely monitor 
                                                            
4 This figure includes shipments of Class 8 Corrosive Materials (Packing group I in single bulk packaging > 3000L or 3000kg) which 
is a Tier 2 HSSM. 
 
5 This figure does not include Tier 1 Division 2.2 Non-Flammable Gas (also meeting the definition of a material poisonous by 
inhalation) or Tier 1 Class 3 Flammable Liquids (also meeting the definition of a material poisonous by inhalation) or Class 8 
Corrosive Materials (also meeting the definition of a material poisonous by inhalation).  Data is unavailable on the number of these 
shipments. 
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trailer “connect” and “disconnect” events. Employers or an authorized 
representative should have the ability to poll the tractor and trailer 
tracking units to request a current location and status report. Tractor 
position reporting frequency should be configured at not more than 15-
minute intervals. Trailer position reporting frequency should be 
configured to provide a position report periodically when the trailer has 
been subject to an unauthorized disconnect from the tractor. The 
reporting frequency should be at an interval that assists the employer in 
locating and recovering the trailer in a timely manner. The tractor and 
trailer tracking system should be tested periodically and the results of the 
test should be recorded 
 
In addition to the SAIs published by TSA, PL 110-53 sets up 
technology considerations TSA needs to factor into its hazmat 
truck tracking program.  Congress directed TSA to factor in the 
results of the FMCSA’s Hazardous Materials Safety and Security 
Technology Field Operational Test (refer to Section 4.1) and TSA’s 
Hazmat Truck Security Pilot program (refer to Section 4.5).  PL 
110-53 includes language related to the desired capability of 
“smart truck” technology that Tier 1 HSSM carriers should deploy.  
“Smart truck” technology devices should: 
 
• have the ability to resist tampering and disabling;  
 
• the capability to collect, display, and store information regarding the 
movement of shipments of security-sensitive materials by commercial 
motor vehicles; and 
 
•  allow the installation by a motor carrier of concealed electronic devices 
on commercial motor vehicles that can be activated by law enforcement 
authorities to disable the vehicle or alert emergency response resources 
to locate and recover security-sensitive materials in the event of loss or 
theft of such materials. 
 
To satisfy TSA Tier 1 HSSM and PL 110-53 requirements, the 
following “smart truck” devices must be deployed by Tier 1 HSSM 
carriers. 
 
• GPS receiver 
 
• Wireless modem (cellular or satellite connection) 
 
• On-board (or handheld) computer (with wireless connection) 
 
• Vehicle immobilization devices (with driver authentication 
capabilities) 
 
• Untethered trailer tracking devices 
 
• Driver panic button 
 
“Smart truck” devices deployed by Tier 1 HSSM carriers must 
meet Transportation Security Center performance specifications.  
Most Tier 1 HSSM carriers will purchase a product/service package 
from Truck Tracking Vendors such as Qualcomm or Safefreight in 
which the truck tracking vendor will supply the “smart truck” 
hardware that carriers will install on their vehicles.  In addition, 
the truck tracking vendor will provide fleet monitoring services to 
the carrier.  Tier 1 HSSM carriers will need to purchase “smart 
truck” products/services from truck tracking vendors that are 
Transportation Security Center certified.   
 
Section 4.1 described the results of the FMCSA’s Hazardous 
Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test.  
Lessons learned from the FMCSA study point out that regulations 
– needed to promote technology deployment – will actually 
generate positive ROI for hazmat carriers and will generate a huge 
public benefit. 
 
• Regulations have to supply the market “push” needed to support 
technology deployment and data reporting – both critical to a functioning 
PSRC. 
 
• Almost any combination of smart truck technology can be easily and 
reasonably justified from a B/C perspective. 
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o The cost of technology deployment/operation is low 
~$1500/truck/year (§4.1.4). 
  
o Wireless communications plus GPS generates overwhelmingly 
positive ROI due to operational efficiency gains - $6,000-
$10,000/truck/year depending on load type (§4.1.3). 
 
o FOT citation - If all the hazmat carriers in the country fully deployed 
“smart truck” technology it would require a one-time investment of 
$543 million.  But, carrier profitability would rise by $1.7 
billion/year. 
 
• Security benefits are huge arguing for wide-spread deployment of “smart 
truck” technology by hazmat carriers.  For example, security benefits 
exceeding $5 billion will be captured if trucks carrying bulk chemicals 
were equipped with GPS, wireless modems, panic alerts and remote 
disabling (§4.1.8).   
 
• Estimated security benefits argue for regulations that require smart truck 
technology deployment by 1).  bulk fuel carriers; 2). bulk chemical 
carriers; and 3). truckload explosive carriers (§4.1.8).  LTL high-hazard 
carriers are also a possibility. 
 
 
6.4.1.4 Shippers, carriers and consignees 
of Tier 1 HSSM shipments must 
register with the Transportation 
Security Center. 
 
As noted in the introduction to this section, data is the raw 
product of a truck tracking center.  Without it, a truck tracking 
center cannot function.  A truck tracking center needs access to 
current corporate data from hazmat shippers, carriers and 
consignees.  For shippers, a truck tracking center needs data on 
shipping locations, persons authorized to act on behalf of the 
shipper, and the types of materials that will be shipped offsite.  
For carriers, a truck tracking center needs data on drivers, 
vehicles, permits, “smart truck” technology deployments, and 
relationships with shippers and truck tracking vendors.  For 
consignees, a truck tracking center needs information on receiving 
facilities and facility contacts. 
 
A registration process is the most efficient means to gather and 
organize this data for access by a truck tracking center and by 
shippers/carriers as they carry out hazmat shipment transactions.   
 
The regulations will require Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers to 
complete registration with the Transportation Security Center.  
  
 
6.4.1.5 The shipper or carrier of a Tier 1 
HSSM shipment must file an 
electronic manifest with the 
Transportation Security Center 
before the regulated shipment 
may leave a shipper’s facility. 
 
An electronic manifest includes data critical to the functioning of a 
truck tracking center.  It lists the materials (type, quantity) that 
are in the shipment as well as information on the shipper, the 
carrier, and the consignee.  The electronic manifest initiates the 
shipment business process.  The electronic manifest has to be 
completed before custody of the shipment can shift from the 
shipper to the carrier, and before the shipment may leave the 
shipper’s facility. 
 
Electronic manifest transaction events – such as application of 
digital signatures – are events that a truck tracking center will 
receive and process to signal the initiation of a new hazmat 
shipment.  An electronic manifest has to be submitted prior to 
“gate out” in order for the truck tracking center to have visibility 
for that shipment.  Without submission of an electronic manifest, 
the tracking center will not have the basic information on shipper, 
carrier, and load even though the vehicle is traveling over the 
roads. 
 
 
6.4.1.6 The shipper or carrier of a Tier 1 
HSSM shipment must file an 
electronic route plan with the 
Transportation Security Center 
before a regulated shipment may 
Section 1553 of PL 110-53 will require security-sensitive hazmat 
carriers to develop and follow route plans.  In addition TSA SAI 
#23 advises that Tier 1 HSSM shippers and carriers should have 
the ability to “define and monitor” routes and risk areas.  The 
monitoring system should detect when a truck is off-route or 
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leave a shipper’s facility. nearing a risk area and send an alert to the dispatch center. 
 
Electronic route plans are critical to a truck tracking program.  
Without an electronic route plan, a truck tracking system cannot 
track carrier route adherence and geo-fence and risk management 
capabilities of the system will be substantially degraded. 
 
Like the electronic manifest, the electronic route plan must be 
submitted prior to “gate out” so that the truck tracking center can 
match the vehicle’s location with its planned route.    
 
Filing an electronic manifest with the Transportation Security 
Center should also trigger messaging that meets the requirements 
of SAI #17 – i.e. an email notice to the consignee from the 
consignor that a shipment is en-route and the estimated time of 
arrival.  Upon delivery, a digital signature on the electronic 
manifest will trigger an email back to the consignor that the 
shipment was received and that the shipment was delivered in 
full. 
 
 
6.4.1.7 Carriers of Tier 1 HSSM 
shipments must use the services 
of a fleet tracking vendor that 
has Transportation Security 
Center compliant systems and 
service offerings. 
 
Section 3.1 explained that “smart truck” technology, a core 
technology component of a hazmat tracking system, is 
inexpensive and available from numerous truck tracking vendors.  
Section 3.1 highlighted products/services available from several 
truck tracking vendors.   
 
Truck tracking vendors will be required to modify their “smart 
truck” product offerings to meet TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM requirements 
and the Transportation Security Center’s need for a complete set 
of data that it needs to operate a fully functioning truck tracking 
system.  In addition, truck tracking vendors will be required to 
modify their data reporting systems to feed data to the TSC (on 
behalf of Tier 1 HSSM carriers) in a format that supports its 
needs. 
 
 
6.4.1.8 A carrier’s fleet tracking vendor 
must report the location of a 
carrier’s vehicle hauling a Tier 1 
HSSM shipment to the 
Transportation Security Center in a 
manner and at a polling frequency 
specified by the Transportation 
Security Center.   
Section 3.1 described how carriers use the services of truck 
tracking vendors to manage their truck fleets. A GPS receiver on a 
carrier’s truck is used to pinpoint the exact physical location of the 
truck using signals from GPS satellites. The position of the truck is 
transmitted to a truck tracking vendor via the truck’s wireless 
modem over a wireless communications network.  The truck 
tracking vendor will report the vehicle’s location to the 
Transportation Security Center on a real-time basis. 
 
SAI #23 specifies that tractor position reporting frequency should 
not exceed 15 minutes.   The regulations will establish 15 minutes 
as a maximum reporting frequency for carriers hauling Tier 1 
HSSMs.  Location reporting must take place between “gate out” 
and “gate in”.  The Transportation Security Center may require 
carriers to report position more frequently for a vehicle if that 
vehicle’s risk score warrants closer tracking. 
 
 
6.4.1.9 The truck tracking vendor must 
report certain alerts and messages 
from installed smart truck devices 
on the carrier’s vehicle to the 
Transportation Security Center in a 
manner specified by the 
Transportation Security Center. 
 
Truck tracking vendors will receive data and messages from 
“smart truck” devices on carriers’ vehicles.  Truck tracking 
vendors are required to directly relay that information to the 
Transportation Security Center.  This includes the following: 
 
• vehicle location (tractor); 
 
• driver panic alerts; 
 
• unexpected trailer disconnect; 
 
• unexpected trailer unloading; 
 
• equipment tampering; and 
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• trailer location (after unexpected disconnect). 
 
The truck tracking vendor must build to an XML interface 
published by the Transportation Security Center, and submit data 
in a form approved by the Transportation Security Center.   
 
 
6.4.1.10 Shippers and carriers of Tier 1 
HSSM shipments must respond to 
inquiries and alerts issued by the 
Transportation Security Center. 
 
The Transportation Security Center will make inquiries when it 
receives alerts or information that raise concerns about a 
shipment.  For example, a Security Specialist from the 
Transportation Security Center will call the carrier’s hazmat 
contact if a carrier’s truck is traveling off-route to determine if 
there is a “problem” with the off-route shipment.  The carrier will 
have an obligation to act to resolve the issue and to report back to 
the Transportation Security Center.   
 
SAI #14 describes special requirements HSSM carriers need to 
meet when DHS issues an alert that DHS Threat Conditions are 
red. 
 
• Security Action Item #14.  High Alert Level Protocols (Tier 1 
HSSM, Tier 2 HSSM) – Employers should establish policies governing 
operations during periods of increased threat conditions under the 
Homeland Security Advisory System (for example when the DHS Threat 
Condition is raised from Orange to Red).  These protocols should be 
capable of being implemented when deemed appropriate by an employer 
or appropriate law enforcement or homeland security officials.   
 
Under certain circumstances, TSA will declare a transportation 
security incident.  This may then lead to a decision by TSA and/or 
state action agencies that a moving truck needs to be 
immobilized.  This decision will be relayed to the truck tracking 
vendor, and the truck tracking vendor will be required to send a 
signal to the carrier’s on-board immobilization systems to initiate 
immobilization. 
 
 
6.4.1.11 A carrier and the Transportation 
Security Center must have the 
ability to communicate with a 
driver hauling a Tier 1 HSSM 
shipment.   
 
SAI #10 requires Tier 1 and Tier 2 HSSM carriers to implement a 
communications plan that provides for communications between 
the carrier’s hazmat contact and the driver. 
 
• Security Action Item #10. Establish Communications Plan (Tier 1 
HSSM, Tier 2 HSSM) - A communication plan should be established to 
include standard operating procedures (SOP) for communications 
between drivers, appropriate company personnel, and emergency 
services agencies.  This plan should include the appropriate two-way 
communication technologies required to implement the communication 
plan, such as terrestrial or satellite-based systems.  This is not intended 
to preclude the use of personal cell phones.  Employers should encourage 
and employees should follow the proper use of cell phones including 
observing state and local cell phone laws. 
 
 
6.4.1.12 A carrier must provide drivers of 
Tier 1 HSSM shipments the 
ability to send a panic alert both 
in and out of the cab. 
SAI #22 requires the use of driver panic buttons. 
 
• Security Action Item #22. Panic Button Capability – Employers 
should implement means for a driver to transmit an emergency alert 
notification to dispatch. “Panic Button” technology enables a driver to 
remotely send an emergency alert notification message either via 
Satellite or Terrestrial Communications, and/or utilize the remote Panic 
Button to disable the vehicle.  
 
 
6.4.1.13 A shipper may not release a Tier 
1 HSSM shipment to a driver 
that does not have a CDL with a 
hazmat extension or to a carrier 
that does not possess a FMCSA 
(or state-issued) hazmat safety 
To meet the requirements of SAIs #5 and #17, Tier 1 HSSM 
shippers are prohibited from releasing a Tier 1 HSSM to a carrier 
that does not have a FMCSA hazmat safety permit or to a driver 
that does not have a commercial driver’s license with a hazmat 
extension. 
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permit. 
 
• Security Action Item #17. The shipper (consignor), motor carrier and 
receiver (consignee) should conduct shipment pre-planning to ensure 
shipments are not released to the motor carrier until they can be 
transported to destination with the least public exposure and minimal 
delay in transit. Shipment pre-planning should include establishing the 
estimated time of arrival (ETA) agreeable to consignor, motor carrier, 
and consignee; load specifics (shipping paper information), and driver 
identification. 
 
• Security Action Item #5. Possession of a Valid Commercial 
Drivers License-Hazardous Materials Endorsement (Tier 1 HSSM, 
Tier 2 HSSM) – TSA is aware that motor carriers are required by Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulations in 49 CFR Part 
383 to verify that a person employed to drive a vehicle containing 
hazardous materials (which includes TIER 1 HSSM and TIER 2 HSSM) has 
a valid commercial drivers license (CDL) with a hazardous materials 
endorsement (HME).  A driver with a valid CDL with an HME will have 
undergone a Security Threat Assessment conducted by the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) under 49 CFR Part 1572. 
TSA is not recommending that drivers with HMEs undergo additional 
background checks under these voluntary action items. 
 
 
6.4.1.14 Shippers must pay a homeland 
security fee for each Tier 1 HSSM 
shipment as well as other 
regulatory fees established by 
the state. 
 
The Transportation Security Center will be a for-profit entity.  It 
will generate revenue from shipment tracking transaction fees.  
The Transportation Security Center will track Tier 1 HSSM 
shipments from “gate out” to “gate in” in exchange for a 
homeland security fee paid by the HSSM shipper.  This revenue 
model is based on the transaction fee model developed by EPA for 
hazardous waste e-manifest processing transactions. 
 
 
6.4.2 Hazardous waste electronic manifest 
 
Section 2.6 describes EPA’s attempt to establish a hazardous waste e-manifest program.  
Beginning in 2005, EPA began to issue a series of rules to pave the way for a national 
hazardous waste e-manifest program.  On March 4, 2005 EPA published a rule in the 
Federal Register that established a uniform national manifest form.  Under the old rule, 
States were allowed to add additional data fields to the standard manifest form.  EPA’s 
rule eliminates that option for states.  Since September 4, 2006, all jurisdictions use the 
exact same form. 
 
On October 13, 2005 EPA published the Cross Media Environmental Reporting Rule 
(CROMERR 40 CFR Part 3) in the Federal Register.  CROMERR provides a uniform, 
technology-neutral framework for electronic reporting across all EPA programs; allows 
EPA programs to offer electronic reporting as they become ready (without any additional 
rule-making beyond CROMERR); provides states with a streamlined process – together 
with a uniform set of criteria – for approval of their electronic reporting implementations 
for all their EPA-authorized programs; and ensures that electronic reporting under EPA 
and EPA-authorized state programs does not compromise the enforceability of 
environmental programs.  Specifically, CROMERR establishes the following electronic 
reporting (ER) provisions: 
 
• modified existing requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) to remove any 
obstacles to ER and allow regulated entities to submit any report electronically, but only after 
EPA announces that ER is available for the specific report; 
 
• required submission of electronic reports to EPA's Central Data Exchange (CDX) or to another 
designated EPA system; 
 
• required validation of electronic signatures on reports submitted to EPA through CDX (or 
another designated EPA system) and ensured that valid electronic signatures have the same 
legal force as their "wet-ink" counterparts; and 
 
• set forth requirements that EPA-authorized programs must satisfy when implementing ER, and 
provided a streamlined process for these programs to get EPA approval of their ER 
implementations. 
 
CROMERR is an EPA agency-wide rule that establishes electronic reporting standards for 
all EPA programs including standards for digital signatures, data integrity, and identity  
EPA’s Cross Media 
Environmental Reporting Rule 
defines the systems 
infrastructure for e-manifest 
reporting systems.   
EPA requires states to use the 
same hazardous waste manifest 
form. 
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authentication.  EPA’s future hazardous waste e-manifest rule will incorporate the 
requirements of CROMERR by reference.   
 
As an Agency-wide rule, CROMERR is important because: 1). it sets the design/operating 
standards that a hazardous waste e-manifest system must meet; 2). it establishes e-
manifest requirements for state authorized programs; and 3). it establishes the 
foundation for EPA’s upcoming hazardous waste e-manifest rule.  CROMERR establishes 
the infrastructure for EPA’s hazardous waste e-manifest program.   
 
In 2004, EPA began to explore models for building a centralized hazardous waste e-
manifest processing center using a public/private development approach.  EPA entered  
into discussions with the General Services Administration (GSA), which managed the E-
Gov Act Share-in-Savings program, on a possible procurement action that might have 
enabled the centralized e-manifest system to be developed and operated for EPA by an 
information technology (IT) vendor under a “Share-in-Savings'' (SiS) type contract. 
 
The SiS IT contracting mechanism was authorized under the E-Gov Act of 2002 on a 
provisional basis as an innovative tool for Federal agencies to develop new IT systems 
with little direct Federal investment. The premise of the SiS contracting approach was 
that the IT vendor awarded an SiS contract would build the IT system at the vendor's 
initial expense, and then recover its costs and profit from the cost savings or enhanced 
revenue that results to the sponsoring agency from the new IT system. With this 
approach, for example, the successful e-manifest IT contractor would have incurred the 
initial financial risk and outlay to build the centralized e-manifest system to meet EPA's 
performance objectives, and then would have recovered its costs and earned its agreed 
profit from the revenue stream generated by the service fees (e-manifest transaction 
fees) paid by the users. 
 
The GSA SiS contract program was not reauthorized by Congress leaving EPA without a 
path forward for implementing its e-manifest program.   
 
On April 18, 2006 EPA issued a Federal Register notice stating the Agency’s intent to 
move forward with its e-manifest rule and its interest in building a national hazardous 
waste e-manifest processing center.  EPA explained that it was considering a model in 
which a private developer would build and operate the e-manifest system.  The system 
would be connected to EPA’s Centralized Data Exchange (CDX) and would be built to 
meet EPA CROMERR requirements.  Data would flow into CDX as e-manifest transactions 
take place.  The private developer running the national processing center would collect 
e-manifest transaction fees in exchange for incurring the cost of building and operating 
the national e-manifest system.  EPA’s Public Notice set the stage for a push to obtain 
GSA share-in-savings type authority via legislation. 
 
In 2006 EPA sought legislative authority to enter into a SiS-type contract with a private 
party.  EPA’s legislative initiative was unsuccessful.  However, EPA launched a new 
legislative initiative in 2008 to receive Congressional authority for SiS-type contract 
authority. 
 
Eventually, EPA will likely issue a simple rule to implement its hazardous waste e-
manifest program.  It will allow states and hazardous waste trading partners to use e-
manifests instead of paper manifests provided that they process their manifests though 
EPA’s national hazardous waste e-manifest processing center.  The processing center will 
be built to be CROMERR-compliant and will be connected as a node to EPA’s Central 
Data Exchange. 
 
The regulatory elements listed below are designed to support implementation of EPA’s 
hazardous waste electronic manifest program and to support establishment of a national 
hazardous waste e-manifest processing center. 
 
 
6.4.2.1 Waste generators, transporters, 
and TSDFs may use electronic 
manifests instead of paper 
manifests. 
Regulations will permit waste generators, transporters, and 
owner/operators of hazardous waste TSDFs (treatment, storage, 
disposal facilities) to use electronic manifests instead of paper 
manifests.   
 
 
 
EPA tried to use GSA’s Share-
In-Savings contract mechanism 
to enter into a contract with a 
private company to build and 
operate its e-manifest system.   
 
In 2006, EPA reaffirmed its intent 
to build a national e-manifest 
processing center and published 
its vision for the system. 
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6.4.2.2 Hazardous waste shipments 
originating or ending in Kentucky 
are subject to Kentucky’s 
hazardous waste electronic 
manifest regulations. 
Hazardous waste shipments involve three parties: 1). waste 
generators; 2). waste transporters; and 3). waste management 
firms (TSDFs).  Shipments from generators located in Kentucky 
will be subject to Kentucky’s hazardous waste e-manifest 
regulations.   This will be the case even if the shipments are to 
waste management facilities located out of the state.  Also, 
shipments from out-of-state waste generators to waste 
management facilities located in Kentucky will also be subject to 
Kentucky’s regulations.  Ontario’s Regulation 347 applied a similar 
regulatory construct (refer to Section 4.7). 
 
 
6.4.2.3 Waste generators, transporters, 
and TSDFs must register with 
the Transportation Security 
Center. 
A registration process is necessary to populate the system with 
the raw data it needs to support an electronic manifest program.  
Regulations will require generators, transporters, and waste 
management facilities to provide the date needed via an on-line 
registration process.  Again, Ontario’s regulatory program and its 
Hazardous Waste Information Network (HWIN) provide the 
example of how  the registration program would work (refer to 
Section 4.7). 
 
 
6.4.2.4 A waste generator may not 
release a hazardous waste 
shipment to a driver that does 
not have a CDL with a hazmat 
extension. 
 
Section 2.1 explained that hazardous wastes are, in fact, a small 
subset of the much larger universe of hazardous materials 
(hazmat).  TSA regulations require each hazmat driver to obtain a 
commercial driver’s licenses with a hazmat extension (refer to 
Section 2.2.2).  A waste generator will be required to verify that 
the driver has the appropriate credentials (CDL with hazmat 
extension) before releasing custody of the waste shipment to the 
driver. 
 
 
6.4.2.5 Hazardous waste electronic 
manifest transactions must be 
processed through the 
Transportation Security Center.  
The manifest must be processed 
before “gate out”. 
Regulations will require hazardous waste electronic manifests to 
be processed through the Transportation Security Center.  The 
Transportation Security Center will have national service scope 
and will process e-manifests from any state. 
 
An electronic manifest includes data critical to the functioning of 
an e-manifest processing center.  It lists the wastes (type, 
quantity) that are in the shipment as well as information on the 
shipper, the transporter, and the waste management facility.  The 
electronic manifest initiates the e-manifest business process.  The 
electronic manifest has to be completed before custody of the 
waste shipment can shift from the generator to the transporter, 
and before the transporter may leave the shipper’s facility. 
 
Electronic manifest transaction events – such as application of 
digital signatures – are events that the e-manifest processing 
center will receive and process to signal the initiation of a new 
hazardous waste shipment.  An electronic manifest has to be 
submitted prior to “gate out” in order for the e-manifest 
processing center to have visibility for that shipment.  Without 
submission of an electronic manifest, the tracking center will not 
have the basic information on shipper, carrier, and load even 
though the vehicle is traveling over the roads.  And without this 
visibility, there will be no chain-of-custody control over the waste 
shipment. 
 
 
6.4.2.6 Waste generators and TSDFs 
must pay regulatory fees 
established by EPA or the state. 
 
The regulations will require waste generators and waste 
management firms to pay regulatory fees.   Many states currently 
require payment of regulatory fees related to their hazardous 
waste programs.  Kentucky, for example, collects a variety of fees 
from hazardous waste generators (refer to Section 6.5.1.2).   
 
Ontario’s Regulation 347 established regulatory fees for hazardous 
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waste generators: 1). CAD$50 base fee payable annually; 2). 
CAD$5 for each manifest used to ship waste off-site; and 3). 
CAD$10/tonne of hazardous waste generated.  Ontario generates 
about CAD$9 million/year in regulatory fees. 
 
At a minimum, regulations will establish a manifest transaction 
fee.  EPA estimates that each e-manifest transaction will save 
about $75.  Waste transporters and waste management firms 
together capture about two-thirds of available e-manifest cost 
savings – about $50/manifest transaction.  Many waste 
transporters are captive transporters – ie. they are owned by 
waste management firms and haul exclusively for their parent 
companies.  When viewed in this light, the waste management 
firms will be the largest beneficiaries of EPA’s e-manifest program.   
 
 
 
Unit Cost 
Savings 
% Distribution 
 
Unit Cost 
Savings 
$ Distribution 
Waste Generators 22% $16.67 
Waste Management 
Firms 
47% $34.96 
Waste Transporters 20% $14.99 
State Agencies 11% $8.20 
EPA 0% $0.00 
Total 100% $74.82 
 
E-manifest regulatory fees will be shared by generators and waste 
management firms given that both parties benefit. 
 
E-manifest regulatory fees will be established that are much lower 
than the cost savings estimated by EPA. 
 
 
6.4.2.7 Use of electronic manifests is 
voluntary however parties to the 
manifest transaction will pay 
higher regulatory fees for paper 
manifest processing. 
The regulations will not require mandatory use of electronic 
manifests.  However, the regulatory goal will be near 100% e-
manifest use by the waste trading partners.   
 
The e-manifest experience in Ontario demonstrated that waste 
trading partners will not transition to e-manifests without a 
regulatory/financial incentive.  This was true even though e-
manifests deliver cost savings of about $75/manifest transaction 
(refer to Section 2.6).   
 
As noted in the previous section, regulations will establish a fee 
program for manifest processing.  The fee for processing a paper 
manifest will be set higher than the fee for an e-manifest to 
encourage e-manifest use.  The e-manifest transaction processing 
fee will be shared by waste generators and waste management 
firms, the major beneficiaries of an e-manifest program.  
However, hazardous waste e-manifest regulatory fee allocation 
will reflect the relative e-manifest cost savings of the parties. The 
waste management firms – the primary financial beneficiary of an 
e-manifest program – will likely assume the larger portion of the 
incremental cost of using paper manifests.   
 
 
6.4.2.8 A waste transporter may serve 
as an “offeror” and sign a 
manifest on behalf of the waste 
generator. 
 
On September 4, 2006 EPA published a rule that established a 
fundamental shift in the relationship between waste generators 
and waste transporters.  The rule discusses the new role of 
“offeror” in the EPA hazardous waste manifest process.  The 
status of an offeror is well developed under DOT’s hazardous 
materials regulations.   Under DOT rules, an offeror is any person 
involved with performing certain ``pre-transportation'' functions 
that occur before hazardous materials are transported in 
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commerce.  An offeror may prepare shipping papers on behalf of 
hazmat shippers and sign the shipper’s certification on the DOT 
shipping papers.  EPA has adopted DOT’s concept of offeror, and 
will allow offerors to sign hazardous waste manifests on behalf of 
the waste generator.    
 
The model regulation will recognize the role of an offeror and 
systems underlying the Transportation Security Center will 
accommodate the offeror’s role in the e-manifest business 
process. 
 
 
6.4.2.9 A waste transporter is not required 
to install “smart truck” devices or 
use a fleet tracking vendor but it is 
strongly encouraged (optional 
regulatory element) 
 
Unlike Tier 1 HSSM carriers, waste transporters will not be 
required to install “smart truck” devices or use a truck tracking 
vendor.  However, some states may want to require shipment 
tracking to strengthen chain-of-custody control over hazardous 
waste shipments.  It should be noted that an on-board computer 
and wireless modem – basic building blocks of a truck tracking 
program – will directly serve the needs of a hazardous waste 
electronic manifest program.  By deploying these devices, the 
waste transporter will bring computing capability and internet 
connectivity to the critical generator/transporter manifest 
transaction.  The experience in Ontario shows that this will 
address a major implementation flaw in an e-manifest program.  
Refer to Section 4.7 for additional information. 
 
 
6.5 Kentucky statutes and regulations 
 
This section describes Kentucky’s hazardous waste and hazmat statutes/regulations that 
are currently on the books.  Implementing a model regulatory program will require 
refinements to the current set of statutes and regulations.  Section 6.5.1 provides an 
overview of the statutes and regulations that are currently in force in Kentucky.  Section 
6.5.2 describes refinements that Kentucky cabinet agencies would need to seek to 
implement the model regulatory program. 
 
 
6.5.1 Current statutes and regulations 
 
Section 6.5.1.1 describes Kentucky’s hazardous materials program.  Section 6.5.1.2 
describes Kentucky’s hazardous waste program. 
 
 
6.5.1.1 Kentucky’s hazardous materials program6 
 
Kentucky has adopted statutes and regulations for its hazmat program.  Chapter 174 of 
the Kentucky revised statutes describes the legislative intent of Kentucky’s hazmat 
regulations.  
 
174.400 Legislative intent. 
Due to the central geographical location of the Commonwealth with respect to the 
hazardous materials industry, and since most predictions indicate that the amount 
of hazardous material in transport should substantially increase in the future, it is 
the intent of KRS 174.405 to 174.425 to provide for the public health and safety of 
the citizens and to protect the environment of the Commonwealth when any 
hazardous material is being transported within, or, in the case of radioactive 
materials, within or through this state. 
 
Effective: July 15, 1994 
History: Amended 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 99, sec. 2, effective July 15, 1994. – 
Created 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 384, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1980. 
 
                                                            
6 Kentucky Revised Statutes - http://www.lrc.ky.gov/krs/titles.htm 
Kentucky Administrative Regulations - http://www.lrc.ky.gov/kar/601/001/025.htm  
 
Kentucky’s current hazmat 
program incorporated federal 
rules by reference.  
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Kentucky’s hazmat statute directs the Transportation Secretary to “adopt by reference 
or in entirety, the Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Regulations, 49 C.F.R. 
(1978), as amended, to effectively carry out the intent of KRS 174.400 to 174.425.”  
This means that Kentucky’s hazmat regulatory program is a virtual mirror image of the 
federal regulatory program.   
 
Extracts from Kentucky revised statutes dealing with hazardous materials may be found 
in Appendix H.  Notable features of Kentucky’s hazardous materials statute: 
 
• The Transportation Secretary is responsible for controlling and regulating the movement 
of all radioactive materials and the intrastate transport of other hazardous materials 
transported by all carrier modes within the Commonwealth. (174.410(1) administrative 
regulations and agreements with other cabinets) 
 
• The Transportation Cabinet and the Justice Cabinet shall cooperate with and assist the 
Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet in implementing and enforcing the 
transportation provisions of any state hazardous waste regulations promulgated 
pursuant to KRS Chapter 224. The specific nature and details of the assistance effort 
shall be established by a formal cooperative agreement acceptable to the cabinets, and 
all activities shall occur in accordance with the terms of the agreement. (174.410(3) 
administrative regulations and agreements with other cabinets) 
 
 
6.5.1.2 Kentucky’s hazardous waste program7 
 
Kentucky has adopted statutes and regulations for its hazardous waste program.  
Chapter 224 of the Kentucky revised statutes describes the authority of the 
Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet (EPPC) and describes the regulatory 
structure of the state’s hazardous waste program. (Chapter 224 Subchapter 46). 
 
Extracts from Kentucky revised statutes dealing with hazardous waste may be found in 
Appendix G.  Notable features of Kentucky’s hazardous waste statutes: 
 
• Kentucky requires hazardous waste generators to pay annual registration fees 
(224.46-012 Registration fee for generator of hazardous waste). 
 
• Kentucky requires hazardous waste generators to pay waste generation fees 
(224.46-580(7) hazardous waste assessment). 
 
• The cabinet shall promulgate regulations establishing standards applicable to 
transporters of hazardous waste regarding record keeping, notification and 
compliance with the manifest system. The Transportation Cabinet and the Justice 
Cabinet shall cooperate with and assist the cabinet in implementing and enforcing the 
transportation provisions of any state hazardous waste regulations promulgated 
pursuant to this chapter. The specific nature and details of the assistance effort shall 
be established by a formal cooperative agreement acceptable to the cabinets. 
(224.46-560 Standards relating to transporters -- Agency cooperation) 
 
• The Cabinet is authorized to deposit fees into the hazardous waste management 
fund.  The fund balance will not exceed $6 million or fall below $3 million.  (224.46-
580(13) Hazardous waste management fund) 
 
224.46-580(15) Upon request of the secretary, moneys accumulated in the 
hazardous waste management fund shall be released in amounts necessary to 
accomplish the performance of the duties imposed by subsection (3) of this section.  
 
• The cabinet shall require the use of a manifest system for the orderly tracking of 
hazardous wastes from the generation site to the site of treatment, storage, and 
disposal except for coal mining wastes pursuant to KRS 224.50-760(1)(c). The 
system shall, at a minimum, require the designation of the generator, each 
transporter, the disposal facility, and the type and quantity of waste involved. The  
                                                            
7 Kentucky Revised Statutes - http://www.lrc.ky.gov/krs/titles.htm 
Kentucky Administrative Regulations – Title 401 http://www.lrc.ky.gov/kar/TITLE401.HTM  
 
Kentucky’s hazardous waste 
program includes a set of 
regulatory fees on waste 
generators.  Fees flow into the 
hazardous waste management 
fund. 
EPA has delegated authority for 
the hazardous waste program to 
Kentucky.  The Environmental 
and Public Protection Cabinet 
has responsibility for the 
program. 
DOT has delegated responsibility 
for the hazmat program to 
Kentucky.  The Transportation 
Cabinet and the Justice and 
Public Safety Cabinet are 
responsible for the program. 
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cabinet may establish additional criteria to accommodate the manifest system 
to internal record keeping and to facilitate the monitoring of hazardous waste 
activity within the Commonwealth. (224.46-570 Manifest system) 
 
Kentucky is authorized by EPA to operate the hazardous waste program in Kentucky in 
lieu of EPA.  State authorization is a rulemaking process through which EPA delegates 
the primary responsibility of implementing the RCRA hazardous waste program to 
individual states in lieu of EPA. This process ensures national consistency and minimum 
standards while providing flexibility to states in implementing rules.  
 
State RCRA programs must always be at least as stringent as the federal requirements, 
but states can adopt more stringent requirements as well.  Refer to EPA URL on state 
authorization of hazardous waste programs.  
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/state/index.htm  
 
From time to time, EPA will revise its regulations.  As states must have 
statutes/regulations at least as stringent as EPA’s, there is a constant modification of 
state statutes and state regulatory provisions.  For example, in 2005, EPA promulgated 
a major rule that will establish a uniform national manifest for hazardous waste 
shipments.  As part of that rule, EPA published guidance for authorized states to advise 
them how they would need to revise their regulations/statutes to ensure consistency 
with the EPA uniform manifest rule.   
 
 
6.5.2 Recommended statutory refinements – Tier 1 HSSM tracking 
 
Section 6.4.1 described the regulatory elements that should underlie a Tier 1 
HSSM truck tracking program.  They are listed below. 
 
• Shipments of TSA-designated Tier 1 highway security-sensitive shipments (HSSMs) are “regulated 
shipments”.  
 
• Tier 1 HSSM shipments traveling over Kentucky’s roads must meet Kentucky’s hazmat shipment 
security requirements. 
 
• Carriers of Tier 1 HSSM shipments must install smart truck devices that are Transportation 
Security Center compliant. 
 
• Shippers and carriers of Tier 1 HSSM must register with the Transportation Security Center. 
 
• The shipper or carrier of a Tier 1 HSSM shipment must file an electronic manifest with the 
Transportation Security Center before the regulated shipment may leave a shipper’s facility. 
 
• The shipper or carrier of a Tier 1 HSSM shipment must file an electronic route plan with the 
Transportation Security Center before a regulated shipment may leave a shipper’s facility. 
 
• Carriers of Tier 1 HSSM shipments must use the services of a fleet tracking vendor that has 
Transportation Security Center compliant systems and service offerings. 
 
• A carrier’s fleet tracking vendor must report the location of a carrier’s vehicle hauling a regulated 
shipment to the Transportation Security Center in a manner and at a polling frequency specified by 
the Transportation Security Center.   
 
• The truck tracking vendor must report certain alerts and messages from installed smart truck 
devices on the carrier’s vehicle to the Transportation Security Center in a manner specified by the 
Transportation Security Center. 
 
• Shippers and carriers of Tier 1 HSSM shipments must respond to inquiries and alerts issued by the 
Transportation Security Center. 
 
• A carrier and the Transportation Security Center must have the ability to verbally communicate 
with a driver hauling a regulated shipment.   
 
• A carrier must provide drivers of Tier 1 HSSM shipments the ability to send a panic alert both in 
and out of the cab. 
 
• A Tier 1 HSSM shipper may not release a regulated shipment to a driver that does not have a CDL 
with a hazmat extension or a FMCSA or state-issued hazmat safety permit. 
 
Regulations will be a key driver 
for establishment of a Tier 1 
HSSM truck tracking program. 
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• Shippers must pay a homeland security fee for each Tier 1 HSSM shipment as well as other 
regulatory fees established by the state. 
 
Kentucky’s statutory program would need to be refined to support implementation of a 
program incorporating these regulatory elements.  Specifically, the following refinements 
would be needed. 
 
1. Broaden Section 174.400 which describes the legislative intent of Kentucky’s 
hazmat program slightly to add public security to public health and safety as the 
driving forces behind Kentucky’s hazmat program. 
 
2. Revise Sections 174.410  and 174.415 to reflect the role of the Kentucky Office of 
Homeland Security in hazmat supply chain security issues and to reinforce the 
primary role of the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet in hazmat regulatory and 
enforcement matters. 
 
3. Add a new section to provide the Secretary of the Transportation Cabinet the 
authority to commit the Commonwealth to membership in the Alliance for Uniform 
Hazmat Transportation Procedures if the Secretary determines that membership is 
advantageous to the Commonwealth. 
 
4. Add a new section that allows the Secretary of the Transportation Cabinet to 
implement regulations to institute regulatory fees on hazmat carriers consistent  
with membership in the Alliance for Uniform Hazmat Transportation Procedures and 
the cost of hazmat services provided by Commonwealth agencies.  Add a provision 
that allows the Secretary of the Transportation Cabinet to implement a homeland 
security fee for high-risk hazmat shipments on Kentucky’s roads. 
 
5. Add a new section authorizing the Secretary of the Transportation Cabinet to depart 
from Kentucky’s current regulatory approach of incorporating by reference federal 
hazmat regulations.  Authorize the Secretary to implement regulations that enhance 
security of high-risk hazmat shipments on Kentucky’s roads. 
 
 
6.5.3 Recommended statutory refinements - hazardous waste electronic 
manifest 
 
Section 6.4.2 described the regulatory elements that should underlie a 
hazardous waste e-manifest program.  They are listed below. 
 
• Waste generators, transporters, and TSDFs may use electronic manifests instead of paper 
manifests. 
 
• Hazardous waste shipments originating or ending in Kentucky are subject to Kentucky’s hazardous 
waste electronic manifest regulations. 
 
• Waste generators, transporters, and TSDFs must register with the Transportation Security Center. 
 
• A waste generator may not release a hazardous waste shipment to a driver that does not have a 
CDL with a hazmat extension. 
 
• Hazardous waste electronic manifest transactions must be processed through the Transportation 
Security Center. 
 
• Use of electronic manifests is voluntary however parties to the manifest transaction will pay higher 
regulatory fees for paper manifest processing. 
 
• A waste transporter may serve as an “offeror” and sign a manifest on behalf of the waste 
generator. 
 
• Waste generators and TSDFs must pay regulatory fees established by EPA or the state. 
 
• A waste transporter is not required to install smart truck devices or use a fleet tracking vendor but 
it is strongly encouraged (optional regulatory element). 
 
Kentucky’s statutes need 
refinement to pave the way for 
implementing regulations that 
will drive a Tier 1 HSSM truck 
tracking program. 
Regulations will be a key driver 
for establishment of a hazardous 
waste electronic manifest 
program. 
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Kentucky’s statutory program would need to be refined to support implementation of a 
program incorporating these regulatory elements.  Specifically, the following refinements 
would be needed. 
 
1. Revise Section 224.46 to refine regulatory fee schedule. 
 
2. Revise Section 224.46 – 570 to authorize the use of hazardous waste 
electronic manifests for hazardous waste shipments originating or 
terminating in Kentucky.   (Note: may only require a regulatory 
amendment.) 
 
3. Revise 224.46 – 580 to authorize the Secretary of the Environmental and 
Public Protection Cabinet to use the hazardous waste management fund to 
collect regulatory fees and to disburse funds to support implementation of 
a hazardous waste electronic manifest program.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kentucky’s statutes need 
refinement to pave the way for 
implementing regulations that 
will drive a hazardous waste e-
manifest program. 
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7.0  The North American Transportation 
Security Center 
 
 
The North American Transportation Security Center will serve as the implementing tool 
for regulations that will require: 
 
• Tier 1 HSSM carriers to install “smart truck” technology on their vehicles; 
 
• shippers and carriers to send electronic manifests and electronic route plans to the 
Transportation Security Center; 
 
• carriers to report vehicle location and alerts to the Transportation Security Center 
(real-time XML data feed); and 
 
• companies to pay hazmat regulatory fees. 
 
The Transportation Security Center will also serve as the implementing tool for a model 
hazardous waste electronic manifest regulatory program. 
 
Figure 7.a illustrates the hazmat tracking features of the Transportation Security 
Center.  The Transportation Security Center will use the basic building blocks described 
in Section 4.5.2.  A “smart truck” equipped with an on-board computer, GPS receiver, 
and a wireless modem will use an internet connection (satellite or cellular) to interact 
with the Transportation Security Center and a commercial fleet tracking data center.  E-
manifest transactions between the carrier and the Transportation Security Center will 
provide the Transportation Security Center with information on the types and quantities 
of materials the transporter is hauling as well as shipment status (i.e. awaiting pickup, 
in transit, etc.). Data from the carrier’s fleet tracking data center will provide the 
Transportation Security Center the carrier’s exact location at all times.  The shipper 
and/or carrier will also submit route plans. Alerts from the shipper or carrier will be 
generated when different events occur. The Transportation Security Center will merge e-
manifest, vehicle location, route and alert data to provide government officials real-time 
visibility into the security status of hazmat shipments.  In the event of a security 
incident, the Transportation Security Center will interact with State and Federal 
operations centers Kentucky’s Intelligence Fusion Center is the state action agency in 
the Commonwealth. 
Figure 7.a Hazmat tracking at the North American Transportation Security Center. 
 
  
  The building blocks of a hazmat 
truck tracking center are: 
1. an XML –based 
communications interface; 
 
2. an operations center that 
processes data into 
actionable intelligence; 
 
3. a business rules engine for 
dynamic risk profiling of 
hazmat shipments; and 
 
4. a communications 
infrastructure for 
collaboration with action 
agencies. 
 
 
The North American 
Transportation Security Center 
will be the implementing tool for 
hazmat shipment tracking 
regulations.  
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7.1 The North American 
Transportation Security Center 
will operate as a for-profit 
business; will use the EPA-
inspired transaction fee revenue 
model.   
EPA’s “share-in-savings” business model calls for a private 
company to build and operate an e-manifest processing center.  
The company will collect a transaction fee for each hazardous 
waste electronic manifest it processes.  A business model based 
on transaction fee revenues will work equally well for hazmat 
shipments, and can be extended to a for-profit model for a 
hazmat truck tracking center.  In the hazmat case, the 
transaction would begin at “gate out” and would end at “gate in”.  
The fee paid would be for tracking services from “gate out” to 
“gate in”. 
 
 
7.2 The North American 
Transportation Security Center 
will serve as TSA’s hazmat truck 
tracking center.    
PL 110-53 requires TSA to develop a HSSM truck tracking 
program.  The North American Transportation Security Center will 
meet TSA’s need for a truck tracking center. 
 
 
7.3 The North American 
Transportation Security Center 
will serve as EPA’s hazardous 
waste electronic manifest 
processing center.    
EPA is committed to the establishment of a hazardous waste 
electronic manifest processing center.  The North American 
Transportation Security Center will meet EPA’s need for an e-
manifest processing center. 
 
 
7.4 The hazmat truck tracking 
services offered by the North 
American Transportation 
Security Center will operate 
under the FedTrak.com™ brand 
name. 
The hazmat truck tracking services offered by the Transportation 
Security Center will operate under the brand name, 
FedTrak.com™.  FedTrak.com™ will serve the needs of hazmat 
shippers and carriers.  In addition, FedTrak.com™ will interface 
with state and federal action agencies to serve their needs for 
high-risk hazmat shipment tracking. 
 
 
7.5 FedTrak.com™ will provide truck 
tracking services for shipments 
of TSA-designated Tier 1 
Highway Security-Sensitive 
Materials. 
FedTrak.com™ will provide truck tracking services for Tier 1 
HSSMs.  Refer to Section  6.4.1.1 for a discussion of the rationale 
for tracking Tier 1 HSSMs.  TSA defines the following hazardous 
materials as Tier 1 HSSMs. 
 
• Division 1.1, Division 1.2, Division 1.3 - Explosives 
 
• Division 2.2 - Non-Flammable Gas (also meeting the definition of a 
material poisonous by inhalation) 
 
• Division 2.3 - Toxic (Poison) Gas 
 
• Class 3 Flammable Liquids (also meeting the definition of a material 
poisonous by inhalation) 
 
• Division 6.1 Poisonous Materials (also meeting the definition of a material 
poisonous by inhalation) 
 
• Class 7 Radioactive Materials 
 
• Class 8 Corrosive Materials (also meeting the definition of a material 
poisonous by inhalation) 
 
• Any quantity of chemicals listed by the Chemical Weapons Convention on 
Schedules. 
 
There are less than 2 million Tier 1 HSSM shipments per year in 
the U.S.  This represents well less than 1% of all hazmat 
shipments. 
 
 
7.6  Tier 1 HSSM carriers must use 
the services of a FedTrak.com™ 
certified hazmat truck tracking 
vendor. 
 
As illustrated in the figure in the left column, a typical “smart truck” 
technology deployment connects truck-mounted smart truck devices 
to a truck tracking vendor’s fleet tracking data center via a wireless 
modem on the truck.  This set-up allows carrier fleet managers to 
track the location and status of the trucks in their fleets on a real-
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time basis via an internet connection.  Fleet managers use GIS tools 
(mapping, routing, reporting) and in-cab messaging systems to 
monitor and manage fleet activity.   
 
The cost of deploying and operating “smart truck” technology 
systems is low and the market for smart truck technology is well 
established (Section 3.1.2).  Hazmat carriers use the services of 
commercial truck tracking vendors such as Qualcomm and 
Safefreight Technology (see Figure 3.1.b).  
 
Many trucking companies have already installed smart truck fleet 
tracking systems.  Over the past 15 years, for example, Qualcomm 
has installed its commercial communications and vehicle tracking 
technology on more than 500,000 commercial vehicles.  According 
to the company, Qualcomm customers include more than 1,500 
trucking companies and 34 of the top 35 truckload fleets.   
 
The North American Transportation Security Center will not create 
“smart truck” technology.  Instead, it will leverage the technology 
offered by existing commercial truck tracking vendors.  The FMCSA 
study (Section 4.1) and the TSA Hazmat Truck Security Pilot 
program (Section 4.5) demonstrated the value of leveraging the 
product/service offerings of commercial truck tracking vendors. 
Truck tracking vendors have the ability to forward on vehicle 
location and other alerts to a hazmat truck tracking center using a 
real-time XML data feed. 
 
Commercial truck tracking vendors anticipate that government 
regulation will dictate the deployment of “smart truck” technology in 
segments of the hazmat transportation market (see Section 5.1). 
Product development by “smart truck” technology vendors has 
increasingly focused on developing product security features, and 
product marketing has increasingly emphasized hazmat shipment 
security.   
 
Truck tracking vendors will be required to fine-tune their “smart 
truck” product offerings to meet TSA’s Tier 1 HSSM requirements 
and the Transportation Security Center’s need for a complete set of 
data that it needs to operate a fully functioning truck tracking 
system (see Section 6.4.1.7).  However, these modifications should 
be relatively minor.  In addition, truck tracking vendors will be 
required to modify their data reporting systems to feed data to the 
Transportation Security Center (on behalf of Tier 1 HSSM carriers) 
in a format that supports the Transportation Security Center’s 
needs. 
 
Under this regulatory/implementation approach, truck tracking 
vendors will serve as a new ‘regulatory character’ working in 
concert with hazmat carriers and the North American 
Transportation Security Center. 
 
 
7.7 Tier 1 HSSM carriers must install 
FedTrak.com™ compliant “smart 
truck” technology devices on 
their vehicles. 
Tier 1 HSSM carriers will be required to install the following “smart 
truck” devices on their vehicles. 
 
• GPS receiver 
 
• Wireless modem (cellular or satellite connection) 
 
• On-board (or handheld) computer (with wireless connection) 
 
• Vehicle immobilization devices (with driver authentication 
capabilities) 
 
• Untethered trailer tracking devices 
 
• Driver panic button 
 
Section 6.4.1.3 discussed the regulatory rationale for the inclusion 
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of these devices as part of the “smart truck” technology suite for 
Tier 1 HSSM vehicles.   
 
“Smart truck” devices deployed by Tier 1 HSSM carriers must 
meet Transportation Security Center performance specifications.  
Most Tier 1 HSSM carriers will purchase a product/service package 
from truck tracking vendors such as Qualcomm or Safefreight in 
which the truck tracking vendor will supply the “smart truck” 
hardware that carriers will install on their vehicles.  Refer to 
Sections 3.1, 4.2, and 4.3 for information on commercial offerings 
by “smart truck” technology vendors. 
 
 
7.8 Incident management will follow 
a defined workflow. 
Figure 7.8 illustrates the workflow that CTU Security Specialists 
will follow when a driver panic alert is received by FedTrak.com™.  
The Security Specialist will contact the carrier first to determine if 
the alert is a “false alarm”.  If so, the case is closed.  However, if 
it is determined that the alarm is genuine, the Security Specialist 
will bridge a TSA Watch Officer and the state operations center 
into a conference call.  The TSA Watch Officer has the option of 
declaring the shipment of “security interest” or declaring a 
“transportation security incident”.1       
 
 
7.9 Shippers of Tier 1 HSSMs will 
pay a homeland security fee for 
each “gate out” to “gate-in” 
transaction. 
 
EPA’s “share-in-savings” business model calls for a private 
company to build and operate an e-manifest processing center.  
The company will collect a transaction fee for each hazardous 
waste electronic manifest it processes.  A revenue model based on 
transaction fees will work equally well for hazmat shipments.  
Refer to Section 5.3.2 and Section 6.4.1.14. 
 
FedTrak.com™ will generate revenue from shipment tracking 
transaction fees.  FedTrak.com™ will track Tier 1 HSSM shipments 
from “gate out” to “gate in”.  Tier 1 HSSM shippers will pay a 
homeland security (transaction) fee for shipment tracking.   
 
 
7.10 The hazardous waste electronic 
manifest services offered by the 
North American Transportation 
Security Center will operate 
under the FedWaste.com™ brand 
name. 
 
The hazardous waste e-manifest services offered by the 
Transportation Security Center will operate under the brand name, 
FedWaste.com™.  FedWaste.com™ will serve the needs of 
hazardous waste generators, transporters, and owner/operators of 
waste management facilities.  In addition, FedWaste.com™ will 
interface with state and federal action agencies to serve their 
needs for hazardous waste e-manifest processing. 
 
 
7.11 FedWaste.com™ will be EPA 
CROMERR-compliant and will 
serve as a node on EPA’s Central 
Data Exchange (CDX) system. 
Section 2.6.3.3 described EPA’s Cross Media Environmental 
Reporting Rule (CROMERR).  CROMERR is an EPA agency-wide 
rule that establishes electronic reporting standards for all EPA 
programs including standards for digital signatures, data integrity, 
and identity authentication.  EPA’s future hazardous waste e-
manifest rule will incorporate the requirements of CROMERR by 
reference.   
 
As an Agency-wide rule, CROMERR is important to a hazardous 
waste e-manifest program because: 1). it sets the 
design/operating standards that a hazardous waste e-manifest 
system must meet; 2). it establishes e-manifest requirements for 
state authorized programs; and 3). it establishes the foundation 
for EPA’s upcoming hazardous waste e-manifest rule.   
 
On April 18, 2006 EPA issued a Federal Register notice stating the 
Agency’s intent to move forward with its e-manifest rule and its 
                                                            
1 A transportation security incident (TSI) is defined by TSA as a security incident resulting in significant loss of life, environmental 
damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area (46 USC 701). 
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Figure 7.8 FedTrak.com™ incident management workflow. 
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 interest in building a national hazardous waste e-manifest 
processing center.  EPA explained that it was considering a model 
in which a private developer would build and operate the e-
manifest system.  The system would be connected to EPA’s 
Centralized Data Exchange (CDX) and would be built to meet EPA 
CROMERR requirements.  Data would flow into CDX as e-manifest 
transactions take place.  The private developer running the 
national processing center would collect e-manifest transaction 
fees in exchange for incurring the cost of building and operating 
the national e-manifest system. See Section 2.6.3.5. 
 
FedWaste.com™ will be EPA CROMERR-compliant and will serve as 
a node on EPA’s Central Data Exchange (CDX) system.  See 
Section 2.6.3.5. 
 
 
7.12 FedWaste.com™ will integrate 
the business processes of waste 
generators, transporters, waste 
firms, and regulatory agencies. 
 
 
 
 
FedWaste.com™ will link the business processes of waste 
generators, waste haulers, waste firms and regulatory agencies.  
It will allow user data to flow efficiently though FedWaste.com™ to 
support external business processes as well as meeting internal 
FedWaste.com™ e-manifest business processes.  Published XML 
interfaces will allow system users to efficiently link to the e-
manifest system. 
 
 
7.13 FedWaste.com™ will collect a 
transaction fee for processing an 
e-manifest on behalf of EPA or a 
state agency. 
 
EPA’s “share-in-savings” business model calls for a private 
company to build and operate an e-manifest processing center.  
The private company will collect a transaction fee for each 
hazardous waste electronic manifest it processes.   
 
On April 18, 2006 EPA issued a Federal Register notice stating the 
Agency’s intent to move forward with its e-manifest rule and its 
interest in building a national hazardous waste e-manifest 
processing center.  EPA explained that it was considering a model 
in which a private developer would build and operate the e-
manifest system.  The system would be connected to EPA’s 
Centralized Data Exchange (CDX) and would be built to meet EPA 
CROMERR requirements.  Data would flow into CDX as e-manifest 
transactions take place.  The private developer running the 
national processing center would collect e-manifest transaction 
fees in exchange for incurring the cost of building and operating 
the national e-manifest system.  
 
On February 26, 2008, EPA published a Notice of Data 
Availability in the Federal Register that reaffirmed EPA’s intent to 
issue an electronic manifest rule and to seek federal legislation 
giving it share-in-savings type authority to support 
implementation of a national e-manifest processing center.   
 
FedWaste.com™ will generate revenue from hazardous waste 
manifest processing transaction fees.  Hazardous waste 
generators and owner/operators of treatment, storage and 
disposal facilities (TSDFs) will pay a fee for each manifest 
processed by FedWaste.com™.   
 
FedWaste.com™ will provide manifest processing service on behalf 
of EPA if EPA implements a national e-manifest regulatory 
program or on behalf of states if states are given the option of 
choosing to implement e-manifest programs. 
 
 
7.14 FedWaste.com™ will provide the 
states a mechanism to 
implement regulatory fee 
programs and to efficiently 
FedWaste.com™ will process regulatory fee payments by 
hazardous waste generators and TSDF owner/operators.  
FedWaste.com™ will serve as a regulatory fee payment portal for 
generators and TSDFs.  Regulatory fee payments systems in 
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collect payments. 
 
Ontario’s HWIN system are illustrative of fee payment 
functionality that will be built into FedWaste.com™ (see Section 
4.7 and Figure 4.7.a). 
 
 
7.15 E-manifest regulatory fees will 
be paid by waste generators and 
waste firms; can be a significant 
revenue source for states. 
 
EPA estimates that an e-manifest will save $75/manifest 
transaction.  As shown in the table below, waste transporters and 
waste management firms together capture about two-thirds of 
available e-manifest cost savings – about $50/manifest 
transaction.  Waste generators and state agencies capture the 
remainder.  With about 4 million hazardous waste shipments in 
the U.S. each year, electronic manifests have the potential to 
generate savings of more than $300 million per year.   
 
 
 
Unit Cost 
Savings 
% Distribution 
 
Unit Cost 
Savings 
$ Distribution 
Waste Generators 22% $16.67 
Waste Management 
Firms 
47% $34.96 
Waste Transporters 20% $14.99 
State Agencies 11% $8.20 
EPA 0% $0.00 
Total 100% $74.82 
 
Cash-strapped states are increasingly looking for revenue 
opportunities.  Kentucky, like many other states, currently has 
regulations in place that require waste generators to pay fees 
based on waste generation.   
 
Section 4.7 described how the Province of Ontario crafted a 
regulatory fee program to generate CAD$10 million/year in 
revenue including a fee for each manifest transaction.  With the 
inherent cost savings associated with e-manifests (e.g. 
$75/transaction), there is plenty of room for a state to collect 
regulatory fees and still deliver a benefit to regulated companies 
by implementing an e-manifest program.  Ontario’s hazardous 
waste program is a good example (see Section 4.7). Even with an 
extremely hefty regulatory fee structure, e-manifests offer Ontario 
waste generators a healthy benefit/cost value proposition. 
 
With about 200,000 manifest transactions/year, the use of e-manifests 
instead of paper manifests has the potential of generating US$15 
million in annual cost savings (200,000 x $75) in Ontario.  Ontario 
collects about CAD$9 million/year (US$10.2 million) in regulatory fees 
from waste generators.  Assuming full e-manifest use, the benefit/cost 
ratio for an e-manifest program in Ontario is ~1.5 (B=$15million; 
C=$10.2 million).  This is an impressive B/C ratio considering the 
heavy regulatory fee burden Ontario places on waste generators. 
  
 
7.16 FedWaste.com™ will operate a 
paper manifest processing center 
in conjunction with 
FedWaste.com™. 
 
On February 26, 2008, EPA published a Notice of Data Availability 
in the Federal Register.  The notice asked for comment on a 
refinement to EPA’s implementation plan for its e-manifest 
processing center.  EPA expects e-manifest use will be voluntary 
and that many manifest transactions will continue to be paper 
based.  However, EPA recognizes that a manifest database that 
holds data on only electronic transactions would be less valuable 
than one that holds both electronic and paper transactions.  EPA 
has proposed for comment a plan to amend its manifest 
regulations so that the final destination facility (and only the 
destination facility) would mail a copy of the completed manifest 
form to the e-manifest system operator.  The system operator 
would scan the form and enter manifest data from it into the 
national manifest database.  EPA expects the final destination 
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facility would pay the cost of data processing for paper manifests. 
 
This proposal will likely have a huge impact on EPA’s manifest 
operations center.  E-manifest use would be purely voluntary. 
Unless companies moved voluntarily to e-manifest use, most of 
the transactions would be paper-based making document 
processing the main focus of the national e-manifest processing 
center.  EPA expects the destination facility would mail a final 
copy of the manifest to the system operator and pay a fee to the 
system operator for paper manifest processing.   
 
FedWaste.com™ will operate a paper manifest processing center 
in conjunction with FedWaste.com™.  The emphasis will be on 
high-speed forms processing.  Completed forms would be posted 
on My FedWaste.com™.  This is similar to the approach taken by 
Ontario in its HWIN system.  Figure 4.7.b illustrates the process 
followed in Ontario.  After paper manifest forms are scanned and 
the data from the forms entered into an interim database, the 
data and the scanned form are ported over to HWIN.  The data as 
well as the scanned image is available to generators, transporters, 
and TSDFs via their MyHWIN pages. 
 
FedWaste.com™ will use a double blind keying process to process 
paper manifest forms.  Two different data entry operators will 
process each form.  The results will be compared to make sure 
that the information corresponds. The objective is 99.9% 
accuracy. 
 
 
7.17 Higher transaction fees for paper 
manifests will promote e-
manifest use. 
 
As discussed in Section 6.4.2.7, regulations will not require 
mandatory use of electronic manifests.  However, the regulatory 
goal will be near 100% e-manifest use by the waste trading 
partners.   
 
The e-manifest experience in Ontario demonstrated that waste 
trading partners will not transition to e-manifests without a 
regulatory/financial incentive.  This was true even though e-
manifests deliver cost savings of about $75/manifest transaction. 
 
As noted in the Section 6.4.2.6, regulations will establish a fee 
program for manifest processing.  The fee for processing a paper 
manifest will be set higher than the fee for an e-manifest to 
encourage e-manifest use.  The e-manifest transaction processing 
fee will be shared by waste generators and waste management 
firms, the major beneficiaries of an e-manifest program.  
However, hazardous waste e-manifest regulatory fee allocation 
will reflect the relative e-manifest cost savings of the parties. The 
waste management firms – the primary financial beneficiary of an 
e-manifest program – will likely assume the larger portion of the 
incremental cost of using paper manifests.   
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Section 3.2000 Cross Media Environmental Reporting Rule 
October 13, 2005 
 
Sec. 3.2000 What are the requirements authorized state, tribe, and local programs' reporting systems must meet? 
 
(a) Authorized programs that receive electronic documents in lieu of paper to satisfy requirements under such programs 
must: 
 
(1) Use an acceptable electronic document receiving system as specified under paragraphs (b) and (c) of this 
section; and 
 
(2) Require that any electronic document must bear the valid electronic signature of a signatory if that signatory 
would be required under the authorized program to sign the paper document for which the electronic document 
substitutes. 
 
(b) An electronic document receiving system that receives electronic documents submitted in lieu of paper documents to 
satisfy requirements under an authorized program must be able to generate data with respect to any such electronic 
document, as needed and in a timely manner, including a copy of record for the electronic document, sufficient to prove, in 
private litigation, civil enforcement proceedings, and criminal proceedings, that 
 
(1) The electronic document was not altered without detection during transmission or at any time after receipt; 
 
(2) Any alterations to the electronic document during transmission or after receipt are fully documented; 
 
(3) The electronic document was submitted knowingly and not by accident; 
 
(4) Any individual identified in the electronic document submission as a submitter or signatory had the 
opportunity to review the copy of record in a human-readable format that clearly and accurately associates all the 
information provided in the electronic document with descriptions or labeling of the information and had the 
opportunity to repudiate the electronic document based on this review; and 
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(5) In the case of an electronic document that must bear electronic signatures of individuals as provided under 
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, that: 
 
(i) Each electronic signature was a valid electronic signature at the time of signing; 
 
(ii) The electronic document cannot be altered without detection at any time after being signed; 
 
(iii) Each signatory had the opportunity to review in a human-readable format the content of the 
electronic document that he or she was certifying to, attesting to or agreeing to by signing; 
 
(iv) Each signatory had the opportunity, at the time of signing, to review the content or meaning of the 
required certification statement, including any applicable provisions that false certification carries 
criminal penalties; 
 
(v) Each signatory has signed either an electronic signature agreement or a subscriber agreement with 
respect to the electronic signature device used to create his or her electronic signature on the electronic 
document; 
 
(vi) The electronic document receiving system has automatically responded to the receipt of the 
electronic document with an acknowledgment that identifies the electronic document received, including 
the signatory and the date and time of receipt, and is sent to at least one address that does not share 
the same access controls as the account used to make the electronic submission; and 
 
(vii) For each electronic signature device used to create an electronic signature on the document, the 
identity of the individual uniquely entitled to use the device and his or her relation to any entity for 
which he or she will sign electronic documents has been determined with legal certainty by the issuing 
state, tribe, or local government. In the case of priority reports identified in the table in Appendix 1 of 
Part 3, this determination has been made before the electronic document is received, by means of: 
 
 (A) Identifiers or attributes that are verified (and that may be re-verified at any time) by 
attestation of disinterested individuals to be uniquely true of (or attributable to) the individual 
in whose name the application is submitted, based on information or objects of independent 
origin, at least one item of which is not subject to change without governmental action or 
authorization; or 
 
(B) A method of determining identity no less stringent than would be permitted under 
paragraph (b)(5)(vii)(A) of this section; or 
 
(C) Collection of either a subscriber agreement or a certification from a local registration 
authority that such an agreement has been received and securely stored. 
 
(c) An authorized program that receives electronic documents in lieu of paper documents must ensure that: 
 
(1) A person is subject to any appropriate civil, criminal penalties or other remedies under state, tribe, or local 
law for failure to comply with a reporting requirement if the person fails to comply with the applicable provisions 
for electronic reporting. 
 
(2) Where an electronic document submitted to satisfy a state, tribe, or local reporting requirement bears an 
electronic signature, the electronic signature legally binds or obligates the signatory, or makes the signatory 
responsible, to the same extent as the signatory's handwritten signature on a paper document submitted to 
satisfy the same reporting requirement. 
 
(3) Proof that a particular electronic signature device was used to create an electronic signature that is included 
in or logically associated with an electronic document submitted to satisfy a state, tribe, or local reporting 
requirement will suffice to establish that the individual uniquely entitled to use the device at the time of 
signature did so with the intent to sign the electronic document and give it effect  
 
(4) Nothing in the authorized program limits the use of electronic documents. 
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http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-WASTE/2005/March/Day-04/f1966.htm 
Federal Register March 4, 2005 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
40 CFR Parts 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, and 271 
[FRL-7867-4] 
RIN 2050-AE21 
  
Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous  
Waste Manifest System 
 
AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency. 
ACTION: Final rule. 
Pages 10792-10794 
 
4. Offerors and the Preparation of Hazardous Waste Shipments and Manifests. The proposed rule would have added 
a new definition of ``preparer'' to the definitions in 40 CFR 260.10. While this new definition was proposed in the 
context of those using an electronic manifest, the purpose of the definition was to extend to the electronic manifest 
sufficient flexibility to enable the person performing the steps necessary to prepare a waste shipment for 
transportation to also prepare and sign the electronic manifest on behalf of the generator.  
 
The discussion in the NPRM of the proposed ``preparer'' definition referred to the instructions for Item 16 of the 
current manifest paper form as a precedent for this flexibility in the paper context, since the Item 16 instruction 
allows signatures on the generator certification statement to be made ``on behalf of'' the generator. Thus, this 
aspect of the proposed rule raised an issue dealing with the activities of shipment preparers, their authority to 
initiate and sign the manifest for the generator, and their resulting responsibilities.  
 
Similarly, in the context of TSDFs rejecting waste shipments and preparing manifests to forward rejected waste to 
alternate facilities (or return the shipment to the generator), the NPRM raised the issue of the responsibility and 
liability of the rejecting TSDF when it initiates a new manifest and signs the generator's certification statement. For 
the latter issue, we proposed that the TSDF in such cases was signing the manifest in the capacity of an “offeror'' 
of the shipment, but we asked for comment whether the TSDF forwarding a rejected waste under a new manifest 
should be viewed instead as signing the manifest as the agent of the generator. Today's final rule affirms that the 
TSDF rejecting waste and completing a new manifest to track the rejected waste to an alternate facility (or the 
generator site) signs the manifest in the capacity as offeror of the shipment, and not as an agent of the generator. 
Nor would the TSDF be functioning as a generator by initiating such a manifest, although the NPRM would have had 
the facility sign the Generator's Certification statement. The specific issue of TSDFs rejecting wastes and their 
offeror responsibilities when they complete and sign new manifests is addressed in detail in section IV.B.3. of this 
preamble. However, because the offeror concept carries broader implications for hazardous waste shipments and 
waste handlers, and overlaps with the “preparer'' concept that we proposed in the May, 2001 NPRM, we are 
including additional discussion here of the offeror status and how it impacts more generally those who prepare 
hazardous waste shipments and manifests for transportation. 
 
    The term ``offeror'' refers to a status that is well understood under the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs) 
of the Department of Transportation (DOT). The HMRs apply to persons who transport hazardous materials in 
commerce, as well as to persons who offer hazardous materials for transportation. Since hazardous wastes are also 
hazardous materials within the scope of the HMRs, and since our RCRA statute requires us to regulate hazardous 
waste transportation-related activities consistent with DOT regulations, the requirements and policies adopted in 
the HMRs with respect to those who offer hazardous materials for transportation (“offerors'') apply to hazardous 
waste shipments and those who offer hazardous wastes in transportation. DOT consistently has interpreted the 
“offeror'' status as connoting those persons involved with performing certain ``pre-transportation'' functions that 
must occur before hazardous materials are transported in commerce. Over the years, DOT has described the pre-
transportation functions that may be performed by an ``offeror'' as including activities such as determining a 
material's hazard class, selecting a packaging, making and labeling a package, filling a hazardous materials 
package, preparing a hazardous materials shipping paper (including the hazardous waste manifest), providing 
emergency response information, and certifying that a hazardous material is in proper condition for transportation 
in conformance with the HMRs. The latter certification is in fact made when one signs the shipper's certification on 
a hazardous materials shipping paper, which occurs with respect to the hazardous waste manifest when one signs 
the Generator's Certification statement. DOT has issued interpretive letters and policy statements respecting 
offerors and their responsibilities when they perform the types of pre-transportation activities described above. 
However, these activities and responsibilities were further clarified by DOT when the Department codified these 
policies in a recent final regulation dealing with the applicability of the HMRs to loading, unloading, and storage. 
See 68 FR 61906 (October 30, 2003). In this rule, DOT codified a new regulatory definition of ``pre-transportation 
function,'' and listed the above-described activities and others as examples of theses functions that are specified in 
the HMR and ``required to assure the safe transportation of a hazardous material in commerce.'' See 49 CFR  
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171.8. 
     
In the preamble discussion of the ``pre-transportation functions,'' DOT explains that a pre-transportation function 
is performed to prepare a hazardous material and its accompanying shipping documentation for transportation and 
is required to assure its safe transportation in commerce. 68 FR 61906 at 61909. The rule further explains that it 
does not matter if the pre-transportation function is performed by the shipper's (generator's) personnel or by the 
carrier's (transporter's) personnel. The HMR requirements apply to any person who performs or is responsible for 
performing the pre-transportation functions, and that person must perform the functions in accordance with the 
HMRs. See 68 FR at 61909-61911. Moreover, as to when compliance or non-compliance must be demonstrated, 
DOT has stated that it would generally expect an offeror to be able to demonstrate compliance with all applicable 
pre-transportation requirements at the time the hazardous material is staged for loading and the shipping paper is 
signed, as this is the offeror's certification that the material has been prepared properly for transportation in 
accordance with the HMRs. Id. at 61911-61912. At the same time, however, DOT has clarified that 
``intermediaries'' who certify as the offeror assume responsibility only ``for all aspects of that shipment about 
which he knew or should have known.'' 
    
 EPA is today clarifying that the issues concerning the activities of shipment ``preparers'' and the corresponding 
issues tied with the authority of a generator or other preparer to complete and sign the Generator's Certification 
statement on the manifest are governed by the same considerations discussed by DOT with respect to ``offerors'' 
and the performance of the pre-transportation functions described in 49 CFR  
171.8. Since hazardous waste shipments and waste handlers are subject to the HMRs, and DOT recently has 
finalized a rulemaking under the HMRs which provides more clarity on these issues, EPA is deferring to these DOT 
requirements, rather than adopting its own definitions or differing interpretations based on the ``on behalf of'' 
language in the manifest instructions or on ``preparer'' signatures, etc. 
    
 Therefore, this final rule resolves the issues pending in this rulemaking relating to preparers signing manifests and 
TSDFs initiating new rejected waste manifests consistent with the DOT requirements in the HMRs pertaining to 
offerors and pre-transportation functions. Moreover, we have amended the Generator's Certification statement on 
the manifest form so that it will be described on the revised form as the Generator's/Offeror's Certification. This 
change more accurately represents the fact that the person signing the certification statement may in some 
instances be an offeror involved with the preparation of the waste shipment (or of the manifest) for transportation, 
rather than the waste generator. 
     
While the proposed rule discussed the offeror status while dealing with the issue of TSDFs rejecting and re-shipping 
wastes, we wish to emphasize that the offeror concept is broad enough to cover many waste shipment scenarios. 
Indeed, the offeror status and signature would be encountered most commonly in connection with the waste pick-
up and transportation arrangements made between generators and waste transporters when the transporters 
service the generators' sites. Since the transporter's personnel frequently will aid generators in preparing their 
waste shipments for transportation (e.g., selecting packages, labeling containers, filling and closing containers, 
selecting and affixing placards, completing the manifest or reviewing it for compliance with the HMRs and RCRA), 
the transporter performing such pre-transportation functions may be an offeror with respect to the shipment. While 
a generator may certainly sign the generator certification statement in its capacity as the generator, today's rule is 
intended to clarify that another person, such as a transporter making a waste pick-up and helping with the pre-
transportation functions, may sign the certification statement on the manifest in their capacity as an offeror. This 
person may sign as an offeror if they have performed pre-transportation functions, and can certify that the 
shipment has been properly described, classified, packed, marked, and labeled, and is in all respects in proper 
condition for transportation under the applicable international or national regulations. The person preparing the 
shipment and making the certification is responsible for the proper discharge of the offeror functions they perform 
and the truth of the certification statement. The offeror is liable in its independent offeror capacity for discharging 
their offeror responsibilities, regardless of whether or not they may also be viewed as performing these activities 
``on behalf of'' or the agent of the generator, as the generator's independent service contractor, or pursuant to a 
course of dealing with the generator. 
 
    Because we believe that the “offeror'' approach and the new regulatory requirements in the HMRs concerning 
pre-transportation functions deal effectively with the issues we raised in the NPRM with respect to shipment 
preparers and manifest signatures, we are not finalizing the definition of ``preparer'' we proposed for inclusion in 
Sec.  260.10. Nor are we expanding or otherwise modifying the meaning of the language in the Item 16 manifest 
form instruction enabling one to include the words ``on behalf of'' in connection with a signature, although it will 
now apply both to generator and offeror signatures. A preparer who assists with pre-transportation functions under 
the HMRs, and who can certify to the ``shipper's certification'' statements in the Generator's/Offeror's 
Certification, may sign this certification and initiate the manifest as an offeror. The ``on behalf of'' language is 
retained in the instruction to the signature item in order to effectuate the limited purpose for which this language 
was added in  
1986, that is, to connote that generator (and now offeror) organizations typically act through their employees or 
agents, and that the employee/agent signatures bind the organizations they represent. 
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The term “offeror'' thus connotes a status in hazardous materials management distinct from that of a shipper or 
generator. The offeror's responsibilities are limited to the proper discharge of the pre-transportation functions they 
perform or certify to being properly performed. While it is true that a generator may often elect to perform the pre-
transportation functions, these represent only a subset of the full generator responsibilities set out in 40 CFR part 
262. Likewise, when an entity other than a generator (e.g., transporter or TSDF) performs pre-transportation 
functions as an offeror, it does not thereby assume full generator responsibilities. Rather, it assumes only the more 
limited responsibilities (for the pre-transportation functions) and the distinct liability that attaches to the offeror 
status. Therefore, a TSDF that only is offering hazardous waste in transportation after rejecting and staging the 
waste temporarily at its facility would be subject to the offeror responsibilities for the new movement of the waste, 
but it would not be subject to the full range of generator requirements. This issue is explained further in section 
IV.B.3. of this preamble. 
 
http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-WASTE/2008/February/Day-26/f3615.htm  
Federal Register 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
40 CFR Parts 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, and 271 
[EPA-HQ-RCRA-2001-0032; FRL-8534-1] 
RIN 2050-AG20 
 
Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous 
Waste Manifest System 
 
AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
ACTION: Notice of data availability and request for comment. 
February 26, 2008 
EPA agrees with waste management industry and state government commenters' concern that it would not be 
efficient to have an electronic manifest system collecting data only from electronic manifests, while another paper-
based system addresses the data only from paper manifests. Therefore, we believe that the system being designed 
should be a unified system for processing and distributing data from all manifests, including data from paper 
manifests. We considered several options aimed at simplifying the process for collecting paper forms and at 
ensuring that the data collected from both electronic manifests and paper forms could be efficiently processed so 
that a comprehensive set of manifest data would be available to users and regulators. We have identified a 
preferred approach that we believe provides the most efficient solution to the dual paper/electronic systems 
problem. 
 
Under our preferred approach, the final destination facility (i.e., designated final TSDF), for each hazardous waste 
shipment involving a paper manifest, would be required to submit the top copy (i.e., Page 1 of the 6-page set) of 
the paper manifest form to the e-Manifest system operator within 30 days of receipt of the waste shipment. While 
the e-Manifest system is not yet designed, we envision that the designated facility could mail a copy to the e-
Manifest system operator or could transmit an image file to the EPA system so that the e-Manifest system operator 
could key in the data from the paper copies or image files to the data system. Alternatively, the designated facility 
could submit both the image file and a file presenting the manifest data to the system in image file and data file 
formats acceptable to the e-Manifest system operator and supported by the Central Data Exchange (CDX). For 
paper copies mailed to the system by designated facilities, the e-Manifest system operator would create or obtain 
an image file of each such manifest, and store it on the system for retrieval by state or federal regulators. The e-
Manifest system operator also would key in, electronically scan using an optical character recognition (OCR) device, 
or otherwise transfer the federal- and state-regulated waste data from these paper copies to the e-Manifest 
system. By having all manifest data in electronic form, EPA could extract any data regarding RCRA hazardous 
wastes for inclusion in its data systems, while the states could pull off data from the system concerning both 
federally regulated RCRA and state-regulated wastes for processing in the states' own tracking systems. 
 
    We envision that designated facilities would be required to pay a fee to the system operator for processing the 
data from these final copies of the paper forms, and the fee would presumably vary with the type of submission 
(mailed copy, image file, or image plus data file), as these submission types would likely present a different level of 
effort insofar as the processing steps required to enter the form data into the system. It is likely that the fee paid 
by the designated facility would be passed on to the generator (i.e., the designated facility's customer). We 
estimate that the paperwork burden cost to TSDFs for submitting a copy of the final manifest could be $1.95 per 
paper manifest, for an incremental (i.e., over current baseline) annual cost to TSDFs of between $1.6 million and 
$6.5 million per year. In addition, we estimate the possible fee that EPA's e-Manifest system operator (or other 
EPA-designated e-Manifest affiliate) might charge TSDFs for receiving paper manifests and for transferring (i.e., 
imaging and keypunching) paper manifest data to the e-Manifest system, could be between $0.25 to $0.75 per 
paper manifest, for an incremental (i.e., over current baseline) annual cost to TSDFs of between $0.2 million and 
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$2.9 million. On a combined basis, we estimate these two components of paper manifest processing incremental 
costs to TSDFs could total between $1.8 million and $9.4 million annually, representing an average incremental 
cost to TSDFs of $2.20 to $2.70 per paper manifest. We invite public comment on our approach and the cost 
estimates. 
 
    We believe such an approach simplifies manifest copy submissions for the regulated TSDFs, who in the future 
would only need to provide designated facility copies to one location--the national centralized e-Manifest system--
rather than supply copies to the numerous state agencies that now collect a copy of the final manifest. Further, it 
focuses the federal collection effort on a copy of the final paper manifest forms from the designated facilities, which 
provide the best accounting of the quantities and types of hazardous wastes that were actually received for 
management. We believe that providing a means to collect a complete set of hazardous waste receipts data from 
RCRA TSDFs (the merged set of paper and electronic manifest data), also may in the future provide EPA with the 
means to replace biennial reporting by TSDFs of waste receipts data with a much simpler approach that relies upon 
the designated facility data reported to the e-Manifest system. 
 
    We also believe that there are a number of benefits of this approach to state programs. As states are connected 
to the e-Manifest system through EPA's National Environmental Information Exchange Network, they would be able 
to pull off the image files and the data keyed from paper manifests from this central processing service, just as 
they would be able to obtain the data and presentations of electronic manifests from the eXtensible Markup 
Language (XML) schemas and stylesheets transmitted on the e-Manifest system. This national data system also 
presents a much more efficient approach that can eliminate the need for discrete state systems designed to 
capture manifest data. 
 
    In addition, as the e-Manifest system operator would be able to assess appropriate fees for the paper processing 
and data entry activities necessary to process the data from paper forms and enter them into the e-Manifest 
system, the actual costs of providing these services would be recovered by the system operator from the 
designated facility. Since we expect that electronic manifests will be much more efficient to process than paper 
forms, the differential fees that are established for paper and electronic manifest processing likely would operate as 
an additional incentive for the transition to electronic manifests. 
 
    While we intend to clarify in the final rule that the use of the electronic manifest format would be optional for 
members of the regulated community, our preferred approach to collect a copy of the final paper manifest forms 
from designated facilities and to process the data from these paper forms centrally means that these designated 
facilities will be required to interact with the e-Manifest system (i.e., submitting data either electronically or by mail 
and paying established fees). Thus, this NODA confirms our intention to have a single national hazardous waste 
database. 
 
    Facilities that elect to use the electronic manifest format would submit their manifest information electronically 
as a natural consequence of participating in the e-Manifest system. The e-Manifest system would be designed for 
the purpose of distributing electronic manifest data among the users and regulatory agencies, while the electronic 
manifest information is being obtained, processed, and transmitted electronically via the e-Manifest system. On the 
other hand, those facilities and hazardous waste handlers that choose to use the paper manifest forms or are 
presented with paper forms rather than electronic manifest formats, would need to process the paper manifest 
forms physically in the conventional manner that has been the norm since the uniform hazardous waste manifest 
form was introduced in 1984. However, in place of sending a copy of the final manifest directly to the destination 
state, the final rule would require the designated facility to send Copy 1 of the paper manifest form to EPA's e-
Manifest system operator. Thus, the designated facilities would be required to submit a copy of the final manifest 
to the e-Manifest system, either in the supported electronic format or as a paper copy, and pay a fee for this 
service. In other words, the use of the electronic manifest format would be voluntary under the final rule, although 
the submission of either a completed paper or electronic manifest to the EPA system operator and payment of an 
associated fee in every case would be required of designated facilities. Once this requirement is effective, and all 
copies of the final manifest (electronic or paper) from designated facilities are being submitted directly to EPA's e-
Manifest system operator, the states would be able to obtain their copies of the final manifest and data from the e-
Manifest system through their computer systems on the National Environmental Information Exchange Network. It 
is EPA's intent that the submission of the final paper manifest copy to the e-Manifest system would replace the 
requirement to supply paper manifests directly to the states. Since the states would have nodes in place on the 
Exchange Network for receiving manifest copies from the system, it would no longer be necessary for the states to 
require the direct submission of paper copies to the states. Thus, the paper copy submission requirement could 
replace the requirement for facilities to submit copies of the final manifest to the states. Note that the facilities that 
receive paper manifests will still need to retain a paper manifest copy among their own facility records for the 3-
year record retention period in accordance with current requirements. We request comment on our 
recommendation to collect a copy of the final electronic and paper manifest forms from designated facilities and to 
process the data from these forms centrally. 
 
U.S. Departmeut d Homelaud Security 
601 South 12'* Strret 
Arllagtoo. VA 22202 
@ pw&ty',tion 
Administration 
Dear Highway and Motor Carrier Stakeholders: 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is providing security action items for the 
highway transportation of specific hazardous material substances as listed in appendices A and B 
of this document. Adoption of these measures is voluntary. 
Movement of certain quantities of Tier 1 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (HSSM) or 
Tier 2 HSSM by highway motor vehicle warrants special cmsideration and attention. These 
materials have the potential to cause significant fatalities and injuries or significant economic 
damage when released or detonated during a transportation security incident. The voluntary 
security practices contained in Appendix A have been developed by the TSA Office of 
Transportation Sector Network Management, Highway and Motor Carrier Division, in 
conjunction with stakeholders including representatives of the chemical manufacturing industry, 
chemical carriers and transportation industry, as well as appropriate Federal agencies. 
Appendix B provides a listing of Tier I and Tier 2 HSSM. TSA remains sole1 y responsible for 
the contents of these documents. The list of substances in Appendix B is not intended to meet 
the requirement for the development of Security-Sensitive Materials under the ImpZementing 
Recommendatio~is of the 9/I 1 Commission Act oj'2007. 
The efficient operation of our critical interstate and intrastate highway system requires a 
uniform nationwide approach to highway motor carrier security. In addition to collaboration 
with the chemical manu factwing industry and chemical carriers, TSA also gathered security 
information during its Corporate Security Review, which, among other areas, identified commnn 
security practices within the hazardous material motor carrier industry. These security action 
items have been developed by TSA in consultation with the Pipeline and Hazardous Material 
Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA). and build upon existing PHMSA and FMCSA hazardous materials regulations. In 
particular the PHMSA regulations in title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, sections 172.704 and 
1 72.800 require each transporter of hazardous materials to develop and impl anent security plans 
and to train appropriate employees in security measures. TSA is providing these voluntary 
security practices as measures that should be considered for implementation by motor carriers 
transporting Tier 1 HSSM and Tier 2 HSSM. If the motor carrier adopts these security practices, 
TSA recommends that the practices be included in security plans when they are developed, 
implemented, and revised. ale security practices are voluntary to allow highway motor carriers 
to adopt measures best suited to their particular circumstances provided the measures are 
co~lsistent with existing regulations, jaws, or directives. 
The security action items have been divided into four categories I )  general security; 
2 )  personnel security; 3) unauthorized access; and 4) en route security. General security 
measures pertain to security h e a t  assessments, security planning, protecting critical 
information, and awareness of industry security practices. Personnel security and unauthorized 
access refer to practices affecting the security of the motor carrier's employees, contracted 
employees, and its property. En route security refers to the actual movement and handling of 
motor vehicles containing HSSM. 
TSA recognizes that no one solution fits all motor carriers and circumstances. These security 
action items allow for flexibility in implcrnentation based upon the assessed vulnerability of a 
particular process or operation. Where appropriate, implementation of these action items to their 
fullest extent practicable should be the goal of the affected owner and operator. 
TSA plans to monitor the use and effectiveness of these security action items and to revise 
them as circumstances warrant. TSA encowages members of the affected industry and Federal 
agencies to provide feedback to TSA Highway and Motor Carrier Division. Questions and 
comments may be provided at highwaysecurity@dhs.aov 
Questions may be directed to Mr. William Arrington, General Manager, Highway and Motor 
Carrier Division, Transportation Security Administration, TSA-28,601 South 12' Street, 
Arlington, VA 22202. 
Sincerely yours, 
John P. Sammon 
Assistant Administrator 
Transportation Sector Network Management 
Appendix A - Description of Voluntary Security Action Items for Tier 1 Highway Security- 
Sensitive Materials (Tier 1 HSSM) and Tier 2 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 2 
HSSM) Transported by Motor Carrier 
Attachment 1 to Appendix A - TSA Highway and Motor Carrier Division Guidance for 
Background Checks for Motor Vehicle Hazmat Employees other than Motor Vehicle Drivers 
Appendix B - List of Tier 1 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 1 HSSM) and 
Tier 2 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 2 HSSM) with Corresponding Security 
Action Items 
Appendix A 
Description of Voluntary Security Action Items for 
Tier 1 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 1 HSSM) and  
Tier 2 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 2 HSSM)  
  
 
 
This document contains a description of the voluntary security practices (referred to as 
Security Action Items or SAIs) that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 
recommending to increase the security of certain highway security-sensitive materials 
transported by motor vehicle.  TSA intends that this document be used along with the 
listing of Tier 1 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 1 HSSM) or Tier 2 Highway 
Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 2 HSSM) (Appendix B) and the Security Assessment 
conducted to satisfy Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
requirements under 49 CFR 172.802 to determine the appropriate voluntary security 
practices to be implemented for the indicated substances when transported in the volumes 
noted in Appendix B.  The listing of Tier 1 and Tier 2 HSSM provided in Appendix B is 
not intended to meet the requirements to develop a list of security sensitive materials as 
defined in section 1501 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007.    
 
The voluntary security practices have been developed by TSA Office of Transportation 
Sector Network Management, Highway and Motor Carrier Division after consultation 
with individual stakeholders including chemical manufacturers, chemical carriers and 
transportation industry representatives, as well as appropriate Federal agencies.  TSA will 
consider revisions to the SAIs based on experience in the implementation of the SAIs and 
the suggestions of stakeholders and Federal agencies.   
 
The recommendations in this document are not intended to conflict with or supersede any 
existing regulatory or statutory requirements.  In the case of conflicts, TSA encourages 
stakeholders to implement non-conflicting recommended security actions. 
 
The following definitions are applicable to this document: 
 
Critical Infrastructure – Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a 
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters.  For purposes of these SAIs, Critical 
Infrastructure refers to those portions of all Federal, State, and local highway systems 
that, as a result of a terrorist activity, could reasonably be expected to be time consuming, 
disruptive to the regional economy and costly to replace.  This may include publicly and 
privately owned infrastructure that is deemed critical by Federal, State, local or tribal 
governments.  
   
Hazardous Materials – means “hazardous material” as defined by the U. S. Department 
of Transportation in 49 CFR 171.8. 
 
Hazmat – means a hazardous material. 
 
Highway Transportation Sector Hazmat Employee (employee) – means:  
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(1) A person who is employed on a full time, part time, or temporary basis by a 
highway transportation sector hazmat employer and who in the course of employment 
directly affects transportation security of HSSM;   
(2) A person who is self-employed (including an owner-operator of a motor 
vehicle) transporting hazardous materials in commerce who in the course of such self-
employment directly affects transportation security of HSSM;     
(3) This term includes an individual, including a self-employed individual, 
employed by a motor vehicle hazmat employer who, during the course of employment: 
(i) Loads, unloads, or handles HSSM; 
(ii)  Prepares HSSM for transportation; 
(iii) Is responsible for the security of transporting HSSM; or 
(iv) Operates a vehicle used to transport HSSM. 
 
Highway Transportation Sector Hazmat Employer (employer) – means: 
(1) A person who employs or uses at least one hazmat employee on a full time, 
part time, or temporary basis; and who: 
(i) transports HSSM in commerce; or 
(ii) Causes HSSM to be transported in commerce; 
(2) A person who is self-employed (including an owner-operator of a motor 
vehicle) transporting HSSM in commerce and in the course of such self-employment 
directly affects the transportation security of HSSM.   
 
Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (HSSM) – a material identified by TSA as 
posing a significant risk to national security while being transported in commerce due to 
the potential use of the material in an act of terrorism.  A HSSM may, at a minimum, 
include the following material as defined in 49 CFR 171.8: 
(A) Class 7 radioactive materials. 
(B) Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives. 
(C) Materials poisonous or toxic by inhalation, including Division 2.3 gases and 
Division 6.1 materials 
 
Tier 1 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 1 HSSM) – HSSM transported by 
motor vehicle whose potential consequences from an act of terrorism include a highly 
significant level of adverse effects on human life, environmental damage, transportation 
system disruption, or economic disruption.  Attachment B contains a listing of categories 
of substances considered to be a TIER 1 HSSM. 
 
Tier 2 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 2 HSSM) - HSSM transported by 
motor vehicle whose potential consequences from an act of terrorism include moderately 
significant level of adverse effects on human life or health, environmental damage, 
transportation system disruption, or economic disruption.  Attachment B contains a 
listing of categories of substances considered to be a TIER 2 HSSM. 
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The listing of Tier 1 and Tier 2 HSSM provided in Appendix B is not intended to meet 
the requirements to develop a list of security sensitive materials as defined in section 
1501 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.   
 
General Security: 
 
1) Security Assessment and Security Plan Requirements (TIER 1 HSSM, 
TIER 2 HSSM)  – Motor carriers are required by PHMSA regulations in 49 
CFR Part 172, Subpart I to develop and implement security plans to address 
security risks related to the transportation of hazardous materials.  TSA 
recommends that employers review their security assessment and determine 
the security action items which may be appropriate to address their assessed 
risks.  To obtain further guidance on the security planning process, 
employers should review the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA) Guide to Developing an Effective Security Plan and the PHMSA 
document Risk Management Self-Evaluation Framework (RMSEF).  
These guidance materials can be found on the FMCSA website at 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/ and the PHMSA website at 
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/.  
 
2) Awareness of Industry Security Practices (TIER 1 HSSM, TIER 2 
HSSM) – Employers should become familiar with security practices 
recommended by industry groups and trade associations to further enhance 
transportation security.  Examples include the American Chemistry 
Council’s (ACC) Responsible Care Program, the Chlorine Institute’s 
Security Management Plan, the International Cargo Security Council and 
other entities offering similar security guidance.  Employers should review 
these security practices and consider their use in mitigating the assessed 
risks. 
 
3) Inventory Control Process (TIER 1 HSSM, TIER 2 HSSM) – Employers 
should implement procedures to maintain accountability for their containers, 
cylinders, and vehicles at all times while in transport throughout the supply 
chain.  Inventory control information should include:  pertinent shipping 
information; material location; tracking processes; and verification 
procedures.  
 
4) Business and Security Critical Information (TIER 1 HSSM, TIER 2 
HSSM) – Employers should implement policies to protect security critical 
information.  This policy should address current methods of communication 
between shippers, carriers, third-party logistic companies, and receivers.  
Information flow should be reduced to that which is essential to accomplish 
the task of transporting the hazardous material shipments.  Communications 
and information systems should be protected from unauthorized access.  
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This includes telecommunications, computer systems, printed materials, 
verbal communications and all networks on which they operate.  
 
Personnel Security: 
 
5) Possession of a Valid Commercial Drivers License-Hazardous Materials 
Endorsement (TIER 1 HSSM, TIER 2 HSSM) – TSA is aware that motor 
carriers are required by Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA) regulations in 49 CFR Part 383 to verify that a person employed 
to drive a vehicle containing hazardous materials (which includes TIER 1 
HSSM and TIER 2 HSSM) has a valid commercial drivers license (CDL) 
with a hazardous materials endorsement (HME).  A driver with a valid CDL 
with an HME will have undergone a Security Threat Assessment conducted 
by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) under 49 CFR Part 
1572. TSA is not recommending that drivers with HMEs undergo additional 
background checks under these voluntary action items. 
 
6) Background checks for highway transportation sector employees other 
than motor vehicle drivers with a valid CDL with hazardous materials 
endorsement (TIER 1 HSSM, TIER 2 HSSM) – During the hiring 
process, an employer in the highway-related hazmat supply chain should 
conduct a background check for employees and contractors with unescorted 
access to motor vehicles (in transport), the motor carrier facility, or 
information critical to the hazmat transportation.  Attachment A-1 provides 
guidance on the recommended scope and procedures for these voluntary 
background checks to include a criminal background check, verification of 
social security number, and verification of immigration status.  An employer 
should also establish a method of redress as described in Attachment A-1.   
This SAI may also be satisfied by the CDL HME background check 
requirement or background checks mandated by other Government agencies, 
such as the ATF’s Employee Possessor Questionnaire, provided that the 
background check meets or exceeds the guidance in Attachment A-1. 
 
7) Security Awareness Training for Employees (TIER 1 HSSM, TIER 2 
HSSM) – In support of the PHMSA security training requirements in 49 
CFR 172.704, employers should have employees complete TSA-sponsored 
domain awareness training, the TSA Hazmat Motor Carrier Security Self-
Assessment Training Program or other equivalent security training 
programs.  For more information see 
www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/tsnm/highways.shtm   Employers may wish to 
establish security awareness training programs that at a minimum address 
methods to:  restrict access to sensitive information on HSSM such as 
shipping papers, dates of shipment and arrival, destination and routing 
information; recognize suspicious activities of potential terrorists; assess 
 4  
Source: TSA_TSNM_Highway & Motor Carrier Program                                                                     rev: 06-25-08 
Appendix A 
Description of Voluntary Security Action Items for 
Tier 1 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 1 HSSM) and  
Tier 2 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 2 HSSM)  
  
 
vulnerabilities and apply security measures; and notify the appropriate 
authorities of unusual activities. 
 
Unauthorized Access: 
 
8) Access Control System for Drivers (in addition to CDL) (TIER 1 
HSSM, TIER 2 HSSM) – Employers should implement an access control 
system that includes issuing company photo IDs or other visible forms of 
company identification to all drivers.  These company IDs should be used by 
drivers to gain access to company designated restricted areas (such as 
vehicle key control room, loading or unloading processes) as appropriate, 
and also for shippers, consignees and others to verify the drivers’ current 
employment status. 
 
9) Access Control System for Facilities Incidental to Transport (TIER 1 
HSSM, TIER 2 HSSM) – Employers should implement an access control 
system that includes issuing company photo IDs or other visible forms of 
employee identification to all employees, vendors, contractors, and visitors 
who require unescorted access to restricted areas on a permanent or 
temporary basis, as appropriate.  This system should control access to 
restricted areas including plants, data centers and IT systems, loading and 
unloading facilities, storage facilities, and other critical areas as designated 
by company management.  Company-issued ID cards and other forms of 
employee identification should be required to be displayed by the holder at 
all times while on company property.  Employers should also establish a 
method of challenging individuals who do not display the appropriate 
identification.  It is expected that such a system will be unnecessary at 
businesses with fewer that 10 employees.   
 
En-route Security: 
 
10) Establish Communications Plan (TIER 1 HSSM, TIER 2 HSSM) - A 
communication plan should be established to include standard operating 
procedures (SOP) for communications between drivers, appropriate 
company personnel, and emergency services agencies.  This plan should 
include the appropriate two-way communication technologies required to 
implement the communication plan, such as terrestrial or satellite-based 
systems.  This is not intended to preclude the use of personal cell phones.  
Employers should encourage and employees should follow the proper use of 
cell phones including observing state and local cell phone laws. 
  
11)  Establish Appropriate Vehicle Security Program (TIER 1 HSSM, TIER 
2 HSSM) – Employers should ensure that all company vehicles (power 
units including but not limited to tractors, straight trucks, pickups, and 
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service units) are secured when unattended through use of a primary and 
secondary securement systems.  Primary methods should include the 
following: 
 a) Ensuring that all company vehicles have the capability to be locked.  
 b) Adopt a written security policy that includes: 
  i) procedures such as a key control program when a vehicle is not in active 
use, and 
  ii) ensuring the vehicle engine is turned off, remove keys from vehicle, 
closing windows, and locking doors when the vehicle is in active use but 
unattended. 
 Secondary securement methods should include the following:  
a)  Steering wheel locking system,  
b)  Air brake locking system,   
c)  Wheel locks, or 
d)  Other appropriate lockout control process. 
 
12) Establish Appropriate Cargo Security Program to Prevent Theft or 
Sabotage of Cargo Containers (TIER 1 HSSM, TIER 2 HSSM) –
Employers should ensure that all cargo containers (including but not limited 
to trailers, tankers, straight trucks, security cages, and flatbeds) are secured 
when in use but unattended through use of  a primary and secondary 
securement system.  The primary methods should include the following: 
a) Ensuring that all cargo containers have the capability to be locked. 
b) Adopt a written security policy that includes: 
i)  a key control program (if appropriate), and 
ii) ensuring a container is provided with a mechanical or electrical method 
of locking.  
Secondary securement method should include the following:  
a)  Glad hand locks,  
b)  King pin locks,   
c)  Wheel locks, or 
d)  Other appropriate lockout control process 
 
13) Implement a Seal/Lock Control Program to Prevent Theft or Sabotage 
of Cargo (TIER 1 HSSM, TIER 2 HSSM) –Employers should implement 
a seal/lock program to prevent theft or sabotage of the contents of cargo 
containers and cylinders when in transport, when unattended by company 
personnel, or when at facilities incidental to transport.  The following is 
recommended: 
Tier 1 HSSM – High security locks or electronic seals 
Tier 2 HSSM – Tamper evident (indicative) seals. 
 
When establishing a seal/lock control program employers should review the 
“User’s Guide on Security Seals for Domestic Cargo” (January 2007) 
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developed jointly by the Department of Homeland Security and Department 
of Defense.  A copy of this document may be requested by sending 
electronic mail to highwaysecurity@dhs.gov. 
 
14) High Alert Level Protocols (TIER 1 HSSM, TIER 2 HSSM) –  
Employers should establish policies governing operations during periods of 
increased threat conditions under the Homeland Security Advisory System 
(for example when the DHS Threat Condition is raised from Orange to 
Red).  These protocols should be capable of being implemented when 
deemed appropriate by an employer or appropriate law enforcement or 
homeland security officials.  Alternatives to continued routine operations 
include: 
a) Identifying secure locations to seek refuge,   
b) For shipments exceeding 200 miles, identify private sector or law 
enforcement escorts to provide increased vehicle security, surveillance, 
and communications between local law enforcement officials and the 
motor vehicle while en route for shipments exceeding 200 miles or   
c) Other appropriate security measures identified by the employer.   
 
Examples of planning for secure locations include mutual agreements with 
industry partners and stakeholders or utilizing state weigh stations and 
inspection facilities that can provide law enforcement protection. 
 
15) Establish Security Inspection Policy and Procedures (TIER 1 HSSM, 
TIER 2 HSSM) – Employers should establish a security inspection policy 
and procedures for drivers to conduct security inspections.  Security 
inspections should be performed in conjunction with required safety 
inspections conducted under 49 CFR Part 392 before operation of the 
vehicle.  These security inspections should occur initially at the beginning of 
the driver’s shift or trip (pre-departure) and after any stop en-route in which 
the vehicle is left unattended.  The security inspection should consist of all 
areas where a suspicious item could be placed, training to recognize 
suspicious items, and reporting and response procedures to follow if a 
suspicious item or package is found. 
 
16) Establish Reporting Policy and Procedures (TIER 1 HSSM, TIER 2 
HSSM) – Employers should implement reporting procedures for drivers and 
non-driver employees to follow when reporting suspicious incidents, threats, 
or concerns regarding transportation facilities (terminal, distribution center, 
etc.) or company vehicles.  These procedures should include at a minimum; 
appropriate company points of contact, appropriate law enforcement 
agencies, and the appropriate emergency response telephone number 
required in 49 CFR 172.604 and 172.606. 
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17) Shipment Pre-Planning, Advance Notice of Arrival and Receipt 
Confirmation Procedures with Receiving Facility (TIER 1 HSSM only) 
– The shipper (consignor), motor carrier and receiver (consignee) should 
conduct shipment pre-planning to ensure shipments are not released to the 
motor carrier until they can be transported to destination with the least 
public exposure and minimal delay in transit.  Shipment pre-planning should 
include establishing the estimated time of arrival (ETA) agreeable to 
consignor, motor carrier, and consignee; load specifics (shipping paper 
information), and driver identification.  When shipments are in transit, the 
motor carrier should coordinate with consignee to confirm the pre-
established ETA will be met, or agree on a new ETA.  Upon receipt of the 
shipment consignees should notify the shipper that the shipment has arrived 
on schedule and materials are accounted for.  Methods for advance notice 
and confirmation of receipt of shipments include electronic mail and voice 
communications.  When practical, consignees should immediately alert the 
appropriate shipper or motor carrier if the shipment fails to arrive on 
schedule or if a material shortage is discovered.  Methods for immediate 
alert notifications should be made by voice communications only.  Where 
immediate notification is not practical (for example at unmanned facilities), 
the consignor, the motor carrier, and consignee should agree on alternate 
confirmation (method and time) of delivery and receipt.  Consignees should 
make every effort possible to accept a shipment that arrives during non-
business hours due to unforeseen circumstances.  
 
18) Preplanning Routes (TIER 1 HSSM only) – Employers should ensure 
preplanning of primary and alternate routes.  This preplanning should seek 
to avoid or minimize proximity to highly populated urban areas or critical 
infrastructure such as bridges, dams, and tunnels.  Policies governing 
operations during periods of Orange or Red alert levels under the Homeland 
Security Advisory System should plan for alternate routing for TIER 1 
HSSM shipments away from highly populated urban areas and critical 
infrastructure.  The motor carrier or law enforcement officials may 
determine when to implement alternate routing.  Drivers should be 
encouraged to notify the company’s dispatch center when substantial or 
non-routine deviation from the route is necessary. 
 
19) Security for Trips Exceeding Driving Time under the Hours of Service 
of Drivers Regulation (49 CFR Part 395)  - (TIER 1 HSSM only) –
Employers should examine security in light of hours of service available and 
take steps to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with extended rest stops 
for driver relief.  Examples include methods such as constant vehicle 
attendance or visual observation with the vehicle, driver teams, or vetted 
companions.  Other examples include arranging secure locations along the 
route through mutual agreement with industry partners and stakeholders, or 
 8  
Source: TSA_TSNM_Highway & Motor Carrier Program                                                                     rev: 06-25-08 
Appendix A 
Description of Voluntary Security Action Items for 
Tier 1 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 1 HSSM) and  
Tier 2 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 2 HSSM)  
  
 
State weigh stations and inspection facilities that provide law enforcement 
protection.   
 
20) Dedicated Truck (TIER 1 HSSM only) –Employers should implement 
policies to ensure that, except under emergency circumstances, contracted 
shipments remain with the primary carrier and are not subcontracted, 
driver/team substitutions are not made, and transloading does not occur 
unless the subcontractor has been confirmed to comply with applicable 
Federal safety and security guidance and regulations and company security 
policies. 
 
21) Tractor Activation Capability (TIER 1 HSSM only) –Employers should 
implement security measures that require driver identification by login and 
password or biometric data to drive the tractor.  Companies should provide 
written policies and instructions to drivers explaining the activation process. 
 
22) Panic Button Capability (TIER 1 HSSM only) –Employers should 
implement means for a driver to transmit an emergency alert notification to 
dispatch.  “Panic Button” technology enables a driver to remotely send an 
emergency alert notification message either via Satellite or Terrestrial 
Communications, and/or utilize the remote Panic Button to disable the 
vehicle. 
 
23) Tractor and Trailer Tracking Systems (TIER 1 HSSM only) – 
Employers should have the ability of implementing methods of tracking the 
tractor and trailer throughout the intended route with satellite and/or land-
based wireless GPS communications systems.  Tracking methods for the 
tractor and trailer should provide current position by latitude and longitude. 
Geofencing and route monitoring capabilities allow authorized users to 
define and monitor routes and risk areas. If the tractor and/or trailer deviates 
from a specified route or enters a risk area, an alert notification should be 
sent to the dispatch center.  An employer or an authorized representative 
should have the ability to remotely monitor trailer “connect” and 
“disconnect” events.  Employers or an authorized representative should have 
the ability to poll the tractor and trailer tracking units to request a current 
location and status report.  Tractor position reporting frequency should be 
configured at not more than 15-minute intervals.   
  
Trailer position reporting frequency should be configured to provide a 
position report periodically when the trailer has been subject to an 
unauthorized disconnect from the tractor.  The reporting frequency should 
be at an interval that assists the employer in locating and recovering the 
trailer in a timely manner.  The tractor and trailer tracking system should be 
tested periodically and the results of the test should be recorded.
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The Transportation Security Administration is concerned about the risk posed by the 
transportation by motor carrier over the nation’s highways of Tier 1 Highway Security-
Sensitive Materials (Tier 1) and Tier 2 Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (Tier 2) as 
defined in this guidance.  While individuals with a commercial driver’s license with a 
hazardous materials endorsement are the subject of mandatory background checks, other 
employees involved in the transportation of certain hazardous materials by motor vehicle 
are not subject to background checks.  This document provides guidance on voluntarily 
conducting  background checks for motor vehicle hazmat employees other than motor 
vehicle drivers holding a valid commercial driver’s license with a hazardous materials 
endorsement.  This guidance is not intended to supersede or conflict with Federal or 
State.   
 
Criminal History Checks 
Many highway transportation sector hazmat employers may use criminal background 
checks to assess the suitability of their employees for positions.  To the extent that a 
highway transportation sector hazmat employer chooses to do so for employees with 
unmonitored access to company-designated critical infrastructure, they should consider 
using the federally established list (attached) of disqualifying crimes applicable to hazmat 
drivers and transportation workers at ports (see 49 CFR 1572.103).1
 
Verification of Social Security Number 
In addition, the highway transportation sector hazmat employer should consider using the 
Social Security Number Verification System (SSNVS) that the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) makes available to all employers.  Employers can verify that 
current employee names and social security numbers match the SSA’s records.  This 
reduces the likelihood that an individual who has adopted a false identity.   
 
Verification of Immigration Status 
The highway transportation sector hazmat employer should also consider using the 
Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) database to determine a non-
citizen’s immigration status.  SAVE is an intergovernmental information-sharing service 
for agencies and employers to use to ensure that an applicant has lawful presence in the 
United States.  SAVE is nationally accessible and contains selected immigration status 
information on approximately 50 million individual non-citizens.2
 
1 See 72 FR 3492 (January 25, 2007), as corrected by 72 FR 5632 (February 7, 2007) 
2 For information on accessing SAVE, contact:  Director, SAVE Program, USCIS SAVE Program, 
Douglas Development Building, 2nd Floor, 20 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC  20529. 
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Redress Procedures 
A highway transportation sector hazmat employer should consider establishing an 
internal redress process for adversely affected applicants and personnel, including an 
appeal and waiver process similar to the system established for holders of a commercial 
drivers license and transportation workers at ports (see 49 CFR Part 1515). 
An appeal process could be designed to provide an applicant or personnel with the 
opportunity to show that he or she does not have a disqualifying conviction by correcting 
outdated underlying court records or proving mistaken identity. 
A waiver process could be designed to provide an applicant or personnel with the 
opportunity to be hired or continue employment by demonstrating rehabilitation or facts 
surrounding a conviction that mitigate security concerns.  The highway transportation 
sector hazmat employer should consider permitting an applicant or personnel to submit 
information pertaining to any of the following:  
1. Circumstances of the disqualifying offense;  
2. Restitution made; 
3. Letters of reference from clergy, employers, probation/parole officers; and  
4. Other factors the individual believes bear on his or her good character. 
The highway transportation sector hazmat employer may elect to incorporate the redress 
process into the disciplinary procedures already in use as part of its management or labor 
relations procedures.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Document:  S:\TSASharedFolders\TSNM\HighWay\Programs\HAZSUBS & 
Chemicals\HSHM_SSHM_SAIs\Final_Hazmat_ SAI_Documents_3-25-08\TSA-080429-001_D1 
Appendix A-1_HSSM_SAI_#6_rev4_final_04-29-08.doc 
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49 CFR Part 1572 Subpart B – Standards, Appeals, and Waivers for Security 
Threat Assessments (Source: 72 FR 3492, Jan. 25, 2007; 72 FR 5633, Feb. 7, 2007)  
 
Sec. 1572.103 Disqualifying Criminal Offenses.  
(a) Permanent disqualifying criminal offenses. An applicant has a permanent 
disqualifying offense if convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in a civilian 
or military jurisdiction of any of the following felonies:  
(1) Espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage.  
(2) Sedition, or conspiracy to commit sedition.  
(3) Treason, or conspiracy to commit treason.  
(4) A federal crime of terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g), or comparable State 
law, or conspiracy to commit such crime.  
(5) A crime involving a transportation security incident. A transportation security 
incident is a security incident resulting in a significant loss of life, environmental 
damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area, as 
defined in 46 U.S.C. 70101. The term “economic disruption” does not include a work 
stoppage or other employee-related action not related to terrorism and resulting from an 
employer-employee dispute.  
(6) Improper transportation of a hazardous material under 49 U.S.C. 5124, or a State law 
that is comparable.  
(7) Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, manufacture, purchase, receipt, transfer, 
shipping, transporting, import, export, storage of, or dealing in an explosive or explosive 
device. An explosive or explosive device includes, but is not limited to, an explosive or 
explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. 232(5), 841(c) through 841(f), and 844(j); and 
a destructive device, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(4) and 26 U.S.C. 5845(f).  
(8) Murder.  
(9) Making any threat, or maliciously conveying false information knowing the same to 
be false, concerning the deliverance, placement, or detonation of an explosive or other 
lethal device in or against a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public 
transportations system, or an infrastructure facility.  
(10) Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt  
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, et seq, or a comparable State law that is comparable, 
where one of the predicate acts found by a jury or admitted by the defendant, consists of 
one of the crimes listed in paragraph (a) of this section.  
(11) Attempt to commit the crimes in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4).  
(12) Conspiracy or attempt to commit the crimes in paragraphs (a)(5) through (a)(10).  
(b) Interim disqualifying criminal offenses. (1) The felonies listed in paragraphs (b)(2) of 
this section are disqualifying, if either:  
(i) the applicant was convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, of the crime in a 
civilian or military jurisdiction, within seven years of the date of the application; or  
(ii) the applicant was incarcerated for that crime and released from incarceration within 
five years of the date of the TWIC application.  
(2) The interim disqualifying felonies are:  
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(i) Unlawful possession, use, sale, manufacture, purchase, distribution, receipt, transfer, 
shipping, transporting, delivery, import, export of, or dealing in a firearm or other 
weapon. A firearm or other weapon includes, but is not limited to, firearms as defined in 
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3) or 26 U.S.C. 5 845(a), or items contained on the U.S. Munitions 
Import List at 27 CFR 447.21.  
(ii) Extortion.  
(iii) Dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation, including identity fraud and money 
laundering where the money laundering is related to a crime described in paragraphs (a) 
or (b) of this section. Welfare fraud and passing bad checks do not constitute dishonesty, 
fraud, or misrepresentation for purposes of this paragraph.  
(iv) Bribery.  
(v) Smuggling.  
(vi) Immigration violations.  
(vii) Distribution of, possession with intent to distribute, or importation of a controlled 
substance.  
(viii) Arson.  
(ix) Kidnapping or hostage taking.  
(x) Rape or aggravated sexual abuse.  
(xi) Assault with intent to kill.  
(xii) Robbery.  
(xiii) Fraudulent entry into a seaport as described in 18 U.S.C. 1036, or a comparable 
State law.  
(xiv) Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 
1961, et seq., or a comparable State law, other than the violations listed in paragraph 
(a)(10) of this section.  
(xv) Conspiracy or attempt to commit the crimes in this paragraph (b).  
(c) Under want, warrant, or indictment. An applicant who is wanted, or under indictment 
in any civilian or military jurisdiction for a felony listed in this section, is disqualified 
until the want or warrant is released or the indictment is dismissed.  
(d) Determination of arrest status. (1) When a fingerprint-based check discloses an arrest 
for a disqualifying crime listed in this section without indicating a disposition, TSA will 
so notify the applicant and provide instructions on how the applicant must clear the 
disposition, in accordance with paragraph (d)(2) of this section.  
(2) The applicant must provide TSA with written proof that the arrest did not result in 
conviction for the disqualifying criminal offense, within 60 days after the service date of 
the notification in paragraph (d)(1) of this section. If TSA does not receive proof in that  
time, TSA will notify the applicant that he or she is disqualified. In the case of an HME, 
TSA will notify the State that the applicant is disqualified, and in the case of a mariner 
applying for TWIC, TSA will notify the Coast Guard that the applicant is disqualified. 
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Appendix D 
FMCSA Functional Specifications for 
Untethered Trailer Tracking Systems 1 
 
4.2.1.1 Near real-time trailer identification 
 
Trailer identification is established via position reports sent from the UTT system terminal on the trailer. The UTT 
system terminal monitors the Global Positioning System (GPS) for its location, checks other on-board sensors, and 
sends this information over the air (OTA). The information presented to the user includes the trailer identification 
number (ID) and trailer type, as well as the user Standard Carrier Alpha Code (SCAC). The user can view the host 
software to find the latest trailer location and status on a map. Trailer locations are displayed relative to predefined 
landmarks or street or highway intersections. The trailer status refers primarily to three key pieces of information: 
whether the trailer has cargo or is empty, whether the door is open or closed, and whether the trailer is connected 
or disconnected to a tractor. If the latest scheduled report is not sufficiently current, the user can request an 
update from the UTT system terminal. The request will be answered immediately if the terminal is awake. 
Otherwise, the request will be queued until the next scheduled wake-up time. 
 
• The UTT system allows a user to request and obtain the current trailer status information from the 
terminal, which includes at minimum the trailer position, cargo status, door status, and status of any 
other sensors, if installed.  
 
• The UTT terminal shall wake up to listen for status requests at user-configurable intervals, which will 
include at minimum: never; once per 30 minutes; and once per 1, 2, 6, 8, and 12 hours.  
 
• The UTT terminal shall default to wake up and listen for requests for status once per 6 hours.  
 
4.2.1.2 Time of trailer connection and disconnection 
 
The time of trailer connection and disconnection refers to the time that a trailer is physically connected or 
disconnected from a tractor. For example, a trailer is typically disconnected from the tractor when the tractor-
trailer arrives at a destination where the trailer may be unloaded while the tractor departs to pick up and move 
another trailer. 
 
• The UTT system shall detect and record time of trailer connections and disconnections.  
 
• The connection and disconnection times recorded by the UTT system shall be accurate within 15 minutes of the 
actual connection and disconnection times.  
 
• The UTT system connection and disconnection events shall be sent immediately upon validation by default.  
 
4.2.1.3 Trailer location and mapping 
 
Trailer positions are established via GPS or other locating technology. The UTT system terminal is configurable to 
wake up to check for positions at user-defined intervals. Once the position has been established, the coordinates 
are reported to the user visually at the carrier site through a map interface. Although latitude and longitude are 
provided, the user would normally see the trailer’s position on a map with reference to highways, streets, 
intersections, or user-defined landmarks.  
 
• UTT system position reporting intervals shall be user-configurable OTA.  
 
• UTT system position reporting intervals shall be configurable at a minimum to: never; 15 minutes; 1, 6, 8, 12, 
24 hours; and then once per day until the 30th day. (Reporting intervals that are more frequent than 15 
minutes may be utilized in certain instances, such as trying to locate a stolen trailer.)  
 
• UTT system position reporting intervals of less than 60 minutes shall be configurable by the system 
administrators only, unless system administrators have given a user the capability to change the position 
reporting interval to less than 60 minutes. (The purpose of this requirement is to prevent excessive messaging 
and battery drain, especially for users who may not clearly understand the constraints of the system.)  
 
•  The UTT system shall provide a daily interval for position reports by default.  
 
                                                            
1 These functional specifications were published in the FMCSA report, Untethered Trailer Tracking and Control System Operational 
Requirements Document; August 2005.   http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/research-
technology/report/untethered/untethered-trailer-tracking.pdf  
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• The UTT system shall provide the configurable capability to suppress scheduled position reports when power is 
detected on Pin 7 of the SAE J560 connector. (The SAE J560 is the standard connector used to connect the 
electrical system of a trailer to a tractor, and power on Pin 7 may indicate that a tractor is attached to the 
trailer. If there is a mobile communications system on a tractor tethered to a trailer, position reports may be 
more cost effectively sent from the tractor system versus the UTT system. When the tractor mobile 
communications system is non-operational or more frequent trailer positioning updates are required, the UTT 
system can be effectively utilized to provide this information.)  
 
• The UTT system shall support a mapping module including street-level maps for the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico.  
 
• The UTT system shall provide visibility to active geo-fences, cargo event locations, door event locations, 
connection and disconnection locations, and historical positions on maps. (For the UTT system tested in the 
pilot test, geo-fences will be visible on maps as polygons or circles overlaid on the map, and geo-fence 
violations will be visible as icons appearing in a line item for a trailer.)  
 
• The UTT system shall allow users to view one or more selected trailers with proximity from pre-defined 
landmarks on a map display. (For the UTT system tested in the pilot test, there is no maximum limit to the 
number of trailers that may be displayed on maps, although in an area densely populated with trailers, viewing 
can be difficult. A pop-up list of ‘hidden’ trailers provides visibility to the trailers that may be overlapped on the 
display.)  
 
• The UTT system shall provide the ability for users to view the position history of a trailer on a map display for 
a user selected period of time or a default setting to the prior week.  
 
• The UTT system software shall support the creation, modification, and deletion of custom landmarks by 
authorized users.  
 
• The UTT system software shall support the display of trailer positions with proximity to the nearest custom 
landmark, if configured as such under user’s preferences. This allows the user to display all position reports in 
terms of the trailer’s proximity to a landmark.  
 
• The UTT system software shall support the query for trailers near a specified landmark within a specified 
distance, which allows the user to query for any trailer within a certain distance from a landmark.  
 
 
4.2.1.4 Geo-fencing 
 
A geo-fence is an electronic boundary that a user can create to monitor trailer location and movement. Geo-fences 
may be created, viewed, and edited visually on an interactive map. For example, a user could locate a trailer on a 
map and draw a geo-fence around the trailer position by clicking and dragging a mouse. The geo-fence may be 
assigned to a trailer or to groups of trailers. Once the geo-fence is set and configured to provide an alert, the 
terminal will send a notification to the user if the trailer crosses the geo-fence boundary. The geo-fence will send 
an alert when a trailer exits or enters the boundary through an email or pager notification. Geo-fences may also be 
removed or inactivated for trailers or groups of trailers at any time.  
The UTT system will provide an on-board geo-fence with event-driven exception reporting. Exception-driven 
reporting will allow the UTT system to monitor trailer position and check for geo-fence breaks frequently, but send 
a message only if a geo-fence break is detected. Frequent checking for geo-fence breaks without sending frequent 
messages lowers messaging costs and increases battery life.  
A geo-fence might be used to ensure that a trailer remained in a general area, such as the Los Angeles basin. In 
this example, the user would create a geo-fence around Los Angeles and then assign that geo-fence to a trailer or 
group of trailers. If a trailer was taken from the Los Angeles area, an alert would be generated and the user 
notified. This type of geo-fence might permanently remain in effect if this trailer or group of trailers were meant to 
stay in that area indefinitely. A geo-fence could also be created around a particular destination, such as a receiving 
warehouse. When the trailer entered this geo-fence, an alert would be generated so that the user would know that 
the trailer was delivered within a certain timeframe.  
Using the UTT system, a user can set a self-centered geo-fence, which provides a quick way to set a geo-fence 
without forcing the user to locate the area on the map. A self-centered geo-fence uses the position of the trailer at 
the time of receiving the “set self-centered geo-fence” command to create the geo-fence boundary. The user does 
not have to create the geo-fence on a map or choose settings for that geo-fence. As with any geo-fence, an alert 
will notify the user if the trailer breaks the geo-fence boundary while the geo-fence is active. 
 
All UTT system generated geo-fences shall have configurable start and end dates.  
 
• The UTT system shall support a single geo-fence per trailer, which may be reset OTA.  
 
• The UTT system terminal shall monitor the geo-fence at configurable intervals of 15 minutes; 1, 6, 8, 12, 
or 24 hours.  
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• The UTT system geo-fence monitoring interval shall default to once per hour.  
 
• The UTT system geo-fence alert shall be configurable to be sent immediately upon validation, saved and 
sent with the next planned status message, or disabled.  
 
• The UTT system geo-fences shall be configurable to generate an alert on exit, entry, or both.  
 
• The UTT system software shall support the assignment and deletion of geo-fences to individual trailers.  
 
• The UTT system software shall support the display of geo-fence summary data containing the trailer 
ID/SCAC; last known position; geo-fence status; last geo-fence alert message with location, door, cargo, 
and connect events; timestamps; and alert acknowledgement status.  
 
• All UTT system geo-fence sizes shall be configurable.  
 
• The UTT system shall support a self-centered geo-fence that is centered at the terminal location at time of 
receipt of the geo-fence command.  
 
• The UTT system self-centered geo-fence default size shall be a square of 0.5 miles x 0.5 miles. (Note: 0.5 
x 0.5 miles has been a useful setting in practice, but this setting and all other self-centered geo-fence 
default settings may be configurable by users. The UTT system in the pilot test allows the setting of a geo-
fence as follows: East/West length from 500 to 40,000,000 meters and North/South Length from 500 to 
20,000,000 meters.)  
 
• The self-centered geo-fence default configuration shall be activated upon receipt by the UTT system 
terminal.  
 
• The UTT system self-centered geo-fence default configuration shall remain active until deactivated by the 
user.  
 
• The UTT system self-centered geo-fence default configuration shall be to send an alert when a trailer exits 
the geo-fence boundary.  
 
• The UTT system self-centered geo-fence default configuration shall be to send alerts immediately, as 
opposed to saving alerts and sending them along with the next scheduled status message.  
 
• The UTT system self-centered geo-fence default configuration settings shall be editable by system 
administrators.  
 
4.2.1.5 Trailer cargo sensing 
 
As a part of the UTT system, an ultrasonic sensor detects the presence of cargo in the trailer by indicating if the 
trailer is unloaded or loaded. A cargo “event” is defined as the transition from completely unloaded to partially or 
completely loaded or vice-versa. The UTT system terminal wakes up to check the cargo status at a predefined 
frequency, and a status message may be sent depending on user-chosen settings. For example, an erroneous 
detection could occur if a person walks into the trailer at the moment the sensor is taking a reading of cargo 
status. In this case, assuming the person exits the trailer, a second check would show the true unloaded state of 
the trailer. Validation of cargo events decreases the probability of erroneous state detections. 
 
• The cargo sensor shall be configurable to monitor at four or more different frequencies, including once 
every 10, 30, 60, or 120 minutes.  
 
• The cargo sensor shall be monitored at least once every 30 minutes by default.  
 
• The cargo event message shall be configurable to be sent immediately upon validation, saved and sent 
with the next planned status message, or disabled.  
 
• The cargo event message shall be sent immediately upon validation by default.  
 
• The cargo sensor validation shall be configurable as follows: If a cargo state change is detected, the cargo 
sensor shall wait an interval of X minutes prior to rechecking, and shall recheck Y times, where X may be 
5, 10, 30, or 120 minutes and Y may be 0, 1, 2, or 3.  
 
• The cargo sensor default validation setting shall be to recheck one time (Y=1) after five minutes (X=5). 
 
• The cargo event message shall include trailer position, if available. If the position is not available, the 
message shall provide the last known position with a timestamp or “position unknown”.  
 
• The cargo event status message shall include the last known cargo state (loaded or not loaded) and time 
of the last known cargo state.  
 
• All of the above configurable parameters of the cargo sensor shall be OTA configurable by the user.  
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4.2.1.6 Trailer door sensing 
 
As a part of the UTT system, the trailer door sensor monitors for an open or closed door on the trailer. A door 
event is defined as the transition from open to closed or from closed to open. The trailer door sensor can work in 
conjunction with the cargo sensor, so that only those door state changes that might affect cargo are sent to the 
user. For example, it is possible to configure the system to send door open events if there is cargo in the trailer 
and to ignore door open events if the trailer is empty.  
 
For the pilot test, only trailers with a single set of doors will be monitored, and a door opening alert will only be 
sent when the trailer is loaded. 
 
 
• The door sensor shall be configurable to trigger an event if the door goes from closed to open and remains 
open for a configurable amount of time, where the time may be 5, 10, or 30 seconds; or 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 30, 
or 60 minutes. 4 
 
• The door sensor shall be configurable to trigger an event if the door goes from open to closed and remains 
closed for a configurable amount of time, where the time may be 30 seconds; 1, 10, 20, 30, or 60 minutes.  
 
• The default configuration shall be not to send door closed events.  
 
• The default configuration shall be to send an alert for door open events when the cargo sensor senses a loaded 
trailer.  
 
• Door events shall be configurable to be sent immediately upon validation, saved and sent with the next 
planned status message, or disabled.  
 
• Door event messages shall be sent immediately upon validation by default.  
 
• The door event message shall include position, if available.  
 
• The UTT system terminal shall automatically detect when a door sensor is installed. 
 
• All of the above configurable parameters of the door sensor shall be OTA configurable by the user.  
 
4.2.1.7 Alerts 
 
Alerts are generated by the UTT system host software and presented to the viewer through an alert icon that is 
displayed near the trailer ID. Alerts are based on a combination of user-preferred settings and events which are 
generated from the mobile terminal. Alerts are used to notify the user of events, such as geo-fence violations. 
Alerts can be configured to be forwarded to email or pager addresses. 
 
• UTT system alerts shall meet the requirements for the cargo sensor, trailer door sensor, and geo-fence as 
specified in each respective section above.  
 
• UTT system alerts shall be configurable to be sent to a minimum of one email/pager address. (There is no 
requirement for a maximum number of addresses to which an alert may be forwarded.)  
 
• The UTT system software shall allow a user to acknowledge alert messages and then the UTT system shall log 
the corresponding user ID.  
 
• The UTT system software shall provide an optional alert for a trailer that has failed to send a scheduled status 
report for a period of X days, where X is configurable at any time.   
 
• The UTT system software shall provide an optional alert for a trailer that has moved independently of its 
assigned tractor.  
 
• The UTT system software shall provide an optional alert for a trailer that has been disconnected outside of a 
specified distance from any one of a list of user-specified drop points.  
 
• The UTT system software shall provide an optional alert for a tractor that has sent a “load call” without being 
connected to a trailer. (A load call is a message sent from the tractor to a dispatcher indicating that it has 
connected to a trailer and is ready to depart.)  
 
• The UTT system software shall provide an optional alert for a trailer that reports a door open event while the 
trailer is not empty.  
 
• The UTT system software shall provide a way for the user to create and save an alert monitoring plan that may 
be assigned to trailers. (The purpose of this requirement is to help users specify alert settings quickly and 
easily for any trailer. Without a monitoring plan, the user would have to set each alert option  
 
4.4.4.8 Software requirements 
 
Requirements for the software that is visible to the system user are included in this section. The UTT system-
provider hosts this software that may be accessed by users through the Internet. Using the software, the user may 
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view information, such as trailer positions and cargo, door, geo-fence, or connection events, or configure settings 
for the system such as landmarks, trailer groups, and user accounts. Additional software requirements are listed in 
sections above describing time of trailer connection and disconnection, trailer location and mapping, geo-fencing, 
alerts, and incorporation of fleet management tools. 
 
Messaging  
 
• The UTT system software shall store in the database and display all incoming messages including trailer 
connect/disconnect, door open/closed, cargo empty/not empty, battery events, and status reports.  
 
• The UTT system software shall support the configuration of terminal parameters by authorized users.  
 
• The UTT system software shall support the ability for an authorized user to request an updated status report 
from the UTT system terminal.  
 
Accounts  
 
• The UTT system software shall support the administration of user accounts, including creation, modification, 
and deletion of accounts.  
 
• The UTT system software shall allow authorized users from a user account to only access to their user account 
data.  
 
User Interface 
  
• The UTT system shall provide access to the data from an Internet browser.  
 
• The UTT system shall support a password-protected secure log-in access to the user’s account for authorized 
users.  
 
• The UTT system software shall include a monitoring screen for the user to view all trailers, which will display 
the trailer ID, trailer type, terminal type, SCAC, date/time of last message, door status, connect status, cargo 
status, and last-known trailer location with proximity to city/town/landmark.  
 
• The UTT system software shall allow authorized users to modify the labels of the sensors, such as the door 
sensor and cargo sensor.  
 
• Using the UTT system software, authorized users shall be able to view and edit trailer details, including trailer 
ID, SCAC, trailer type, and description.  
 
• Using the UTT system software, authorized users shall be able to view the event details and event history for a 
trailer including positions, cargo events, door events, and connect events for a user-selected time period 
(default to the prior week).  
 
• Using the UTT system software, authorized users shall be able to view all messages including status reports, 
events, and positions for a given trailer in a time-sequential order for a user selected time period (default to 
the prior week).  
 
• Using the UTT system software, authorized users shall be able to create and delete trailers and their history 
and to rename trailers (retaining history).  
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APPENDIX F 
 
Kentucky Hazmat Supply Chain Threat Analysis1 
 
 
What is the terrorist threat to the nation’s hazmat supply chain? 
 
The hazmat supply chain presents an attractive target for terrorists.  In the United 
States, there are hundreds of thousands of shipments daily through a complicated 
supply chain with multiple points of vulnerability.  Because of their nature, many hazmat 
shipments could become dangerous and ready-made weapon the in the hands of a 
terrorist. And because of the large number of shipments, the exposure to these 
vulnerabilities is very broad. 
 
Most hazmat shipments in the United States are by motor carriers, however hazardous 
materials are also shipped by rail and barge.  Vulnerable points in the supply chain 
include manufacturing facilities, shippers, hazmat carriers, and receiving facilities.   
 
A FMCSA study identified three terrorist attack profiles for hazmat shipments.2 
 
1. Theft is undertaken by means of stealth, deception, or force. Stealth and deception 
are deterred by detection, while force assumes detection and operates within 
parameters defined by the time to communicate and mount an interdiction. Stealth, 
deception, and force also define an escalation path for operational planning 
purposes. 
 
2. Diversion is a tactic that results in either theft or interception. The purpose is to 
create a path to a target opportunity or arrive at a location where control of the 
cargo by the terrorists can be achieved. 
 
3. Interception is the "instantaneous" version of theft in that the cargo is released 
and/or detonated, and ignited while still in control of the shipper/carrier/consignee. 
Particularly effective when the radius of damage is large, this is potentially the most 
violent of attack profiles in that it likely involves explosives as the mechanism for 
effecting material release. 
 
For example, for a bulk chemical shipment, a terrorist might use a false manifest to 
divert the chemical shipment for delivery to a populated area for intentional release. 
 
Numerous international and domestic incidents have occurred over the past several 
years that demonstrate the threat posed to the hazmat supply chain by terrorists. For 
example, according to the FMCSA study the following events all occurred in a 2-month 
period in 2002: 
 
• March 31, 2002: A 29-year-old driver for a propane distributor drove away with a 
3,000-gallon bobtail. He made a telephone threat stating that he wanted to kill 
President George W. Bush and that he would use the bobtail as a "3,000-lb bomb".  
 
• April 11, 2002: A terrorist driving a truck carrying liquefied natural gas ignited his 
cargo in front of a synagogue on the Tunisian Island of Djerba, killing 17 people, 
mainly German and French tourists. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the blast.  
 
• May 16, 2002: A tractor-trailer carrying 10 tons of deadly cyanide in 96 drums was 
stolen after three armed men held up the vehicle north of Mexico City. Six drums 
were never found.  
 
                                                            
1 This analysis was prepared by Brandon Montgomery and Matthew Tackett – May 2008 – under the direction 
of Michael Barclay, Coldstream Digital LLC.  Messrs. Montgomery and Tackett completed requirements for the 
Master of Public Administration degree from Morehead State University during the course of this project.   
 
2 Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test Volume II: Evaluation Final Report 
Synthesis. 2004 pgs 51-52. 
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• May 2002: A fully loaded tanker truck pulled into Israel's largest fuel depot and 
suddenly caught fire due to an explosive charge connected to a cellular phone. The 
fire was extinguished, but had the truck exploded, destruction and death would 
have resulted.  
 
• February 2007: Insurgents in Iraq incorporated canisters of liquefied chlorine into 
vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. The blast left several dead and scores 
suffering from exposure to the dispersed chlorine in an area of Baghdad. 
 
• April 2007: A suicide truck bomb loaded with chlorine gas exploded in Ramadi killing 
as many as 30 people, many of them children, a security official said. The truck, a 
fuel tanker loaded with the toxic gas, struck in the late morning of the Muslim day 
of prayer when children off from school usually play in the street and adults run 
errands and visit before going to the mosque at midday. 
 
 
What are the potential costs of a hazmat attack? 
 
The consequences of an attack using hazardous materials could be significant.  A FMCSA 
study explored the “per event” potential economic impact of intentional and non-
intentional releases of hazardous materials.3  The study examined the potential 
consequences as measured by the following parameters. 
 
• Fatalities and injuries. 
 
• Property Damage: Damage to the truck, to other involved vehicles, and to other 
public and private property. 
 
• Product Loss: Quantity and value of the hazardous materials lost during a spill. 
 
• Environmental damage. 
 
• Evacuation: Predominantly short-term relocation of people and business operations. 
 
• Cleanup: Stopping the spread of a release and removing spilled materials. 
 
• Traffic Delay: Additional travel time experienced by the motoring public due to 
delays caused by the incident. 
 
• Business Disruption: Businesses having to reduce or cease operations because the 
facility is inaccessible, supplies cannot be received, or other constraints imposed by 
the incident. 
 
The study presented the following estimates of the economic consequences of a terrorist 
attack using different types of hazmat shipments. 
  
 Figure 1. Estimated conomic consequence of terrorist attacks. 
 
 
Hazardous Material Load Type 
 
Reasonable Worst-Case Hazmat Attack 
Consequences 
 
Bulk Fuel 
 
$3.7 Billion 
 
 
Less Than Load High Hazard 
 
$2.1 Billion 
 
 
Bulk Chemicals 
 
$16.3 Billion 
 
 
Truckload Explosives 
 
$13.3 Billion 
 
 
To put the FMCSA numbers into context, the economic consequences of two terrorist 
attacks in the U.S. - the 1993 New York World Trade Center (WTC) and the 1995 
Oklahoma City Federal Building – can be examined. 
 
                                                            
3 Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field Operational Test Volume II: Evaluation Final Report 
Synthesis. 2004 pgs 70-71 
A terrorist attack using a 
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• The 1993 WTC bombing killed six people, injured over 1,000, and resulted in over 
$113 million in loss of life and bodily injury, and over $510 million in insured losses 
(based on figures from the Federal Emergency Management Agency). Total losses 
are estimated to be $623 million. 
 
• The Oklahoma City bombing killed 168 people, injured 601, and resulted in $560 
million in loss of life and bodily injury, and over $125 million in insured losses. Total 
losses are estimated to be $685 million. 
 
Vehicles used in the transportation of hazardous materials typically have much larger 
capacities than the vehicles used in these two incidents. If larger vehicles were used to 
carry out a terrorist act, the damage would have been far worse. If highly hazardous 
materials were involved and released in a directed attack, it could result in far greater 
numbers of casualties and damage to property over a larger area. 
 
Another example of the economic consequence of directed attacks in the United States, 
albeit attack(s) using airplanes against buildings as opposed to trucks, is the September 
11, 2001 attack(s) on the WTC.  According to the FMCSA, the Government Accounting 
Office (GAO) reviewed eight studies from seven organizations that examined the 
financial impacts of the 9-11 attack on the World Trade Center. The GAO concluded that 
the study conducted by the New York City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce 
provided the most comprehensive estimates: $83 billion in 2001 dollars for direct and 
indirect costs. 
  
 
What is being done to protect the nation’s hazmat supply chain? 
 
The federal government has undertaken a number of initiatives focused on the security 
of the hazmat supply chain.  Federal initiatives include the following. 
 
1. U.S. Transportation Security Administration hazmat driver security checks.  
Under the USA Patriot Act, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
has issued rules that prohibit states from issuing a hazardous materials 
endorsement to a trucker without first determining whether or not the individual 
poses a security risk.  The laws’s intent is to prevent hazmat shipments from falling 
into the hands of individuals that might use them as weapons. 
 
2. U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration hazardous materials 
safety permits.  On June 30, 2004, the U.S. FMCSA issued a rule to establish a 
national safety permit program for motor carriers that transport certain hazardous 
materials in interstate or intrastate commerce. FMCSA’s hazmat permitting 
requirements began a staged phase-in beginning January 1, 2005.  A motor carrier 
must meet three minimal requirements to obtain a hazmat safety permit. 
 
o Satisfactory safety rating. The motor carrier must have a “satisfactory'' safety rating 
assigned by either FMCSA, pursuant to the Safety Fitness Procedures of part 385 of this 
subchapter, or the State in which the motor carrier has its principal place of business, if the 
State has adopted and implemented safety fitness procedures that are equivalent to the 
procedures in subpart A of part 385 of this subchapter. 
 
o Satisfactory security program. The motor carrier must establish that it has a 
satisfactory security program, including:  
 
• A security plan meeting the requirements of part 172, subpart I of this title. The 
security plan must address how the carrier will ensure the security of the written 
route plan required by this part; 
 
• A communications system installed on each motor vehicle used to transport a 
hazardous material listed in Sec.  385.403(a) of this subpart that enables the vehicle 
operator to immediately contact the motor carrier during the course of transportation 
of the hazardous material, and each operator must be trained in the use of the 
communications system; and Hazmat employees who have all successfully completed 
the security training required in Sec.  172.704(a)(4) of 49 CFR.  
 
o Registration with RSPA. The motor carrier must be registered with RSPA in accordance 
with subpart G of part 107 of 49 CFR. 
 
3. H.R. 1: Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007. Section 1554 of the act directs the Secretary, through the TSA Administrator,  
The attack on the World Trade 
Towers on 9/11 cost more 
than $80 Billion. 
Hazmat carriers have to 
meet minimal requirements 
to obtain hazmat safety 
permits including a 
satisfactory security 
program. 
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to develop a program to facilitate the tracking of motor carrier shipments of security-
sensitive materials and to equip vehicles used in such shipments with technology that 
provides frequent or continuous communications, vehicle position location and tracking 
capabilities, and a feature that allows the driver to broadcast an emergency distress 
signal. 
 
 
How is Kentucky’s hazmat supply chain structured? 
 
Kentucky sits in the middle of one of the nation’s busiest transportation corridors.  Major 
interstate highways including I-64, I-65, and I-75 cut through the state carrying over 
70,000 semi-tractor trailer trucks daily.  The Ohio River and the Mississippi River border 
Kentucky and carry much of the nation’s barge traffic.  In addition, several major rail 
lines including CSX and Norfolk Southern have major rail lines through the state and 
hazmat shipments are regularly routed through the middle of Kentucky’s urban areas.  
In Lexington, for example, 30 railcars a day carry hazardous materials through the heart 
of the city.4 
 
U.S. Department of Transportation data on state truck tonnage indicates that only six 
states have more truck tonnage than Kentucky.  DOT data also indicates that about 60% 
of the truck tonnage on Kentucky’s roads is through traffic – a relatively high 
percentage.  Figure 2 illustrates freight flows to, from and within Kentucky. 
 
 
Figure 2. Freight flows to, from, and within Kentucky by truck (Federal Highway Administration) 
 
 
 
 
Kentucky has a number of facilities that produce or store significant amounts of 
hazardous materials.  These include petrochemical facilities in western Kentucky, 
eastern Kentucky, and Louisville.  In addition to its petrochemical facilities, Kentucky is 
also home to the Bluegrass Army Depot near Richmond and the Paducah Gaseous 
Diffusion Plant.  The Bluegrass Army Depot is a repository for nerve agents.  The 
Paducah Diffusion Plant produces low-enriched uranium fuel for commercial nuclear 
power plants. 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 “Hazmat Spills ‘Significant Risk,’ Officials Says”, February 20, 2007 
http://www.redorbit.com/news/display/?id=846932  
Kentucky is a key transit 
state for the interstate 
movement of hazardous 
materials by truck, barge, 
and rail. 
Kentucky produces (or 
stores) a significant amount 
of hazardous materials that 
could be used as weapons of 
mass destruction. 
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How likely is it that groups residing in Kentucky have the means and 
organizational skill to launch an attack on the hazmat supply chain? 
 
A major terrorist action involving hazardous materials in Kentucky will take considerable 
organizational skill and funding.  As noted above, Kentucky does not have a large  
foreign-born population, and it is unlikely that a significant number of well-organized 
and well-funded “terrorist cells” reside within the state. 
 
The threat of domestic terrorism is also low.  There are domestic groups or individuals of 
concern in the state but none are likely to be organized well enough or suitably funded 
to initiate an action of concern.   
 
 
Should Kentucky officials be concerned about threats to its hazmat supply 
chain? 
 
Even though Kentucky might not be home to domestic or foreign-born terrorist groups 
that have the means and organizational skill to launch an attack on the hazmat supply 
chain, there are still significant threats to the hazmat supply chain in Kentucky.   
 
Kentucky is a major transit state for hazmat shipments.  A huge amount of goods pass 
through Kentucky on its interstate highway system.  Barges hauling hazardous materials 
travel past major port cities on the Ohio River and the Mississippi River and trains 
transporting hazardous materials pass through all of Kentucky’s major metropolitan 
areas.  Also, a significant amount of dangerous hazardous materials are produced or 
stored in Kentucky. 
 
In Kentucky’s case, terrorist groups that are intent on attacking the hazmat supply chain 
are likely to come into Kentucky from out of state.  In fact, Kentucky might well be a 
“magnet” for out-of-state terrorists seeking to launch attacks using hazardous materials.  
As noted previously, an attack on the hazmat supply chain could come about by theft, 
diversion, or interception.  The hazmat attack scenarios listed below serve as examples 
of the potential attractiveness of Kentucky’s hazmat supply chain to terrorists. 
 
1. Petrochemical facilities in the state represent an attractive target for terrorists 
either as a source of materials for use as a weapon of mass destruction or as a fixed 
target (i.e. destruction in place). 
 
2. The Bluegrass Army Depot and the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant produce or 
store hazardous materials that could serve as exceptionally dangerous weapons of 
mass destruction. 
 
3. Kentucky is home to major tourist and sporting venues that draw huge numbers of 
people (see Figure 3).  These venues are potentially attractive targets for terrorists 
using hazardous materials as weapons of mass destruction. 
 
4. Numerous hazmat shipments travel daily by rail through the heart of Kentucky’s 
largest cities.  Terrorists could intercept tank cars and release of their contents in 
crowded urban areas. 
 
5. Terrorists could intercept barges hauling hazmat shipments on the Ohio River and 
the Mississippi River and release their contents in crowded urban areas or use the 
barge and its contents as a floating bomb. 
 
6. Kentucky’s interstate road system might also serve as a magnet for terrorists.  
Hazmat shipments traveling on the Kentucky’s roads could be intercepted and used 
by terrorists.  In addition, Kentucky’s interstate road system offers terrorists an 
efficient transportation route for moving dangerous materials through Kentucky to 
high value targets in the Northeast, Southeast or Midwest.  5   
 
Figure 4 further describes each of the six attack scenarios listed above. 
 
Figure 3. Kentucky is home to major sporting and tourist events. 
                                                            
5 For example, concern that Kentucky’s interstate road system might be used as the delivery route for radioactive 
WMDs led the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to install radiation 
detectors at a number of truck weigh stations on Kentucky’s interstate highway system. 
A terrorist action in 
Kentucky involving 
hazardous materials would 
probably be carried out by 
groups residing outside the 
state. 
Kentucky is a “magnet” for 
terrorists seeking to attack 
the hazmat supply chain. 
 
Hazardous materials in 
Kentucky are vulnerable to 
theft, diversion, or 
interception. 
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Events Event Date Location Est. Attendance 
Kentucky Derby (race day – Churchill 
Downs)  May Louisville, JEFFERSON 160,000 
Thunder Over Louisville April Louisville, JEFFERSON 800,000 
Kentucky Oaks Horse Race  April Louisville, JEFFERSON 110,000 
Keeneland Track Spring/Fall Meet April/October Lexington, FAYETTE 15,000 
Churchill Downs Spring/Fall Meet 
April –July 
October-November Louisville, JEFFERSON 15,000 
University of Kentucky Football Games  August - December Lexington, FAYETTE 70,000 
University of Kentucky Basketball Games  November - March Lexington, FAYETTE 25,000 
University of Louisville Football Games  August - December Louisville, JEFFERSON 45,000 
University of Louisville Basketball Games  November - March Louisville, JEFFERSON 19,000 
Meijer 300 NASCAR Race 6/14/2008 Sparta, GALLATIN 66,000 
Meijer Indy 300 Race 8/9/2008 Sparta, GALLATIN 66,000 
PGA’s Ryder Cup Golf Tournament  9/16-9/21, 2008 Louisville, JEFFERSON 240,000 
Alltech FEI World Equestrian Games  9/25 – 10/10, 2010 Lexington, FAYETTE 800,000 
 
 
 
Figure  4. Hazmat Attack Scenarios in Kentucky 
 
Scenarios 
 
Target 
 
Means 
 
Impacts 
 
 
Theft or diversion of bulk 
chemical shipment from 
Kentucky-based petrochemical 
plant. 
 
 
Major metropolitan area or 
major tourist or sports event. 
 
Theft or diversion of hazmat 
truck shipment. Release 
and/or detonation of truck 
contents. 
 
 
Fatalities and injuries.  
 
Destruction of hazardous 
materials on-site at fixed 
facilities. 
 
 
Petrochemical plants in 
Louisville, eastern Kentucky, 
or western Kentucky. 
 
 
Theft, release or detonation 
of hazardous materials found 
on site. 
 
Fatalities and injuries. 
Significant damage to 
infrastructure.   
 
Theft (by force) of nerve agents 
(Bluegrass Depot) or radioactive 
materials (Paducah). 
 
 
Major metropolitan area or 
major tourist or sports event. 
 
Theft of agents on site, or 
hijacking of from hazmat 
carrier. 
 
Fatalities and injuries.   
 
Interception of train hauling 
hazardous materials. 
 
 
Major metropolitan area or 
target of interest adjacent to 
railway. 
 
 
Hijacking of train while en 
route to destination.  
 
Fatalities and injuries.   
 
Interception of barge hauling 
hazardous materials. 
 
 
Metropolitan river ports on 
Ohio River or strategic 
infrastructure (bridges, 
locks). 
 
 
Hijacking of barge while en 
route to destination. 
 
Fatalities and injuries.  
Destruction of ports or 
strategic infrastructure. 
 
Attack of major tourist or 
sporting venues using 
hazardous materials as WMD. 
 
 
Heavily populated events, 
such as those indicated in 
Figure 1.3. 
  
 
Release or detonation of 
stolen hazardous material. 
 
Fatalities and injuries.  
Disruption of high profile 
event. 
 
Transport of radioactive 
materials through Kentucky by 
truck. 
 
Kentucky’s Interstate and 
Highway System 
 
Relaying hijacked material 
through Kentucky. 
 
Unmonitored and 
dangerous transportation. 
 
••• 
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Appendix G 
 
Kentucky Revised Statutes 
Hazardous Materials 
http://www.lrc.ky.gov/krs/titles.htm 
 
174.400 Legislative intent. 
Due to the central geographical location of the Commonwealth with respect to the hazardous materials industry, 
and since most predictions indicate that the amount of hazardous material in transport should substantially 
increase in the future, it is the intent of KRS 174.405 to 174.425 to provide for the public health and safety of the 
citizens and to protect the environment of the Commonwealth when any hazardous material is being transported 
within, or, in the case of radioactive materials, within or through this state. 
 
Effective: July 15, 1994 
History: Amended 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 99, sec. 2, effective July 15, 1994. – Created 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 384, sec. 1, 
effective July 15, 1980. 
 
 
174.410 Administrative regulations and agreements with other cabinets. 
 
(1) The secretary shall be responsible for controlling and regulating the movement of all radioactive materials and 
the intrastate transport of other hazardous materials transported by all carrier modes within the Commonwealth. 
 
(2) The secretary, in consultation with the secretary of the Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet and the 
secretary of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, shall adopt by reference or in entirety, the Federal 
Hazardous Materials Transportation Regulations, 49 C.F.R. (1978), as amended, to effectively carry out the intent 
of KRS 174.400 to 174.425. 
 
(3) The cabinet and the Justice Cabinet shall cooperate with and assist the Environmental and Public Protection 
Cabinet in implementing and enforcing the transportation provisions of any state hazardous waste regulations 
promulgated pursuant to KRS Chapter 224. The specific nature and details of the assistance effort shall be 
established by a formal cooperative agreement acceptable to the cabinets, and all activities shall occur in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement. The agreement shall address and include, but not necessarily be 
limited to, the following items: 
 
(a) As a part of routine and periodic transportation checks and inspections, ensure that shipments of hazardous waste do 
not present a threat to the public or the environment; are accompanied by the required hazardous waste manifest or 
such other shipping or delivery documents as may be acceptable to the Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet; and 
comply with applicable shipping standards; 
 
(b) Upon receipt of a written request from the secretary or general counsel of the Environmental and Public Protection 
Cabinet, actively conduct field investigations relating to the illegal, improper, or unauthorized transport of hazardous 
waste in the state. Such investigations may, at a minimum, include passive and active surveillance, apprehension, and 
reporting, with the scope and extent of each investigation to be previously agreed to by the involved cabinets; 
 
(c) Compile and maintain such necessary records that may normally be required to carry out the provisions of this 
subsection and shall for minor violations report quarterly, and for major violations report weekly, to the Environmental 
and Public Protection Cabinet on the status of the interagency hazardous waste transportation monitoring and 
enforcement activity for irregularities or violations; 
 
(d) Provide any information, evidence, and other support, either in written form or in the form of oral testimony during a 
legal proceeding or both, as may be required by the Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet to fully carry out its 
statutory responsibility under the appropriate sections of KRS Chapter 224; 
 
(e) The Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet shall, unless specifically agreed otherwise, have primary 
responsibility for initiating and conducting all legal proceedings arising from the terms and provisions of this subsection; 
and 
 
(f) The Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet shall provide sufficient training, technical assistance, and other 
support to the appropriate cabinets to prepare representatives of the cabinets to adequately carry out the responsibilities 
set forth in this subsection. 
 
Effective: June 20, 2005 
History: Amended 2005 Ky. Acts ch. 99, sec. 142, effective June 20, 2005. – Amended 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 426, sec. 121, 
effective July 15, 1998. -- Amended 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 99, sec. 4, effective July 15, 1994. -- Created 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 
484, sec. 3, effective July 15, 1980. 
Legislative Research Commission Note (6/20/2005). 2005 Ky. Acts chs. 11, 85, 95, 97, 98, 99, 123, and 181 instruct 
the Reviser of Statutes to correct statutory references to agencies and officers whose names have been changed in 2005 
legislation confirming the reorganization of the executive branch. Such a correction has been made in this section. 
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174.415 Inspection and enforcement program. 
The secretary shall establish an inspection and enforcement program to determine compliance with the provisions 
of KRS 174.400 to 174.425, and any regulations promulgated under KRS 174.410. In carrying out the provisions of 
KRS 174.400 to 174.425, the secretary shall not duplicate the enforcement and inspection activities performed by 
the federal government. 
 
Effective: July 15, 1994 
History: Amended 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 99, sec. 5, effective July 15, 1994. – Created 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 384, sec. 4, 
effective July 15, 1980. 
 
174.420 Carrying of shipping papers and hazardous waste manifest. 
(1) Any person transporting hazardous materials in the Commonwealth shall carry a copy of the shipping papers 
required in 49 C.F.R. (1978), as amended, in the transporting vehicle while in the Commonwealth. 
 
(2) In the event of an accident involving hazardous material, the operator of the vehicle 
shall: 
 
(a) Notify the Kentucky State Police of the accident within one (1) hour, who shall then notify the local jurisdiction and 
any other appropriate state agency with emergency action responsibility, and 
 
(b) Provide the shipping papers to state and local emergency response authorities, and immediately bring to their 
attention the fact that the vehicle is transporting hazardous materials. 
 
(3) In addition to the other requirements of this section, any person transporting hazardous wastes shall carry in 
the transporting vehicle a copy of a manifest in a form approved by the Environmental and Public Protection 
Cabinet. 
 
Effective: July 15, 1994 
History:Amended 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 99, sec. 7, effective July 15, 1994. -- Created 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 384, sec. 5, 
effective July 15, 1980. 
Legislative Research Commission Note (6/20/2005). 2005 Ky. Acts chs. 11, 85, 95, 97, 98, 99, 123, and 181 instruct 
the Reviser of Statutes to correct statutory references to agencies and officers whose names have been changed in 2005 
legislation confirming the reorganization of the executive branch. Such a correction has been made in this section. 
 
 
Kentucky Revised Statutes 
Hazardous Wastes 
http://www.lrc.ky.gov/krs/titles.htm 
 
224.46-012 Registration fee for generator of hazardous waste. 
 
(1) A generator of hazardous waste required by KRS Chapter 224 to register with the cabinet shall be subject to an 
annual registration fee by the cabinet and the fee shall be equal to the cost of review but shall not exceed the 
following amounts: 
 
(a) For one (1) to five (5) waste streams: three hundred dollars ($300); 
(b) For six (6) to ten (10) waste streams: three hundred fifty dollars ($350); 
(c) For eleven (11) to fifteen (15) waste streams: four hundred dollars ($400); 
(d) For sixteen (16) to twenty (20) waste streams: four hundred fifty dollars ($450); 
(e) For twenty-one (21) to twenty-five (25) waste streams: five hundred dollars ($500); 
(f) For twenty-six (26) to thirty (30) waste streams: five hundred fifty dollars ($550); and 
(g) For thirty-one (31) or more waste streams: six hundred dollars ($600). 
 
(2) If a generator of hazardous waste submits to the cabinet a registration to modify waste streams, the following 
fees shall be imposed: 
 
(a) For one (1) to five (5) waste streams: fifty dollars ($50); 
(b) For six (6) to ten (10) waste streams: one hundred dollars ($100); 
(c) For eleven (11) to fifteen (15) waste streams: one hundred fifty dollars ($150); 
(d) For sixteen (16) to twenty (20) waste streams: two hundred dollars ($200); 
(e) For twenty-one (21) to twenty-five (25) waste streams: two hundred fifty dollars ($250); 
(f) For twenty-six (26) to thirty (30) waste streams: three hundred dollars ($300); and 
(g) For thirty-one (31) or more waste streams: three hundred fifty dollars ($350). 
 
(3) If a generator of hazardous waste submits to the cabinet a registration to modify any information other than its 
waste streams, it shall be subject to a fee by the cabinet of fifty dollars ($50). 
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(4) The cabinet shall not impose a fee if a generator of hazardous waste modifies a registration by making a name 
change. 
 
Effective: July 13, 1990 
History: Created 1990 Ky. Acts ch. 471, sec. 2, effective July 13, 1990. 
Formerly codified as KRS 224.1155. 
 
224.46-560 Standards relating to transporters -- Agency cooperation. 
The cabinet shall promulgate regulations establishing standards applicable to transporters of hazardous waste 
regarding record keeping, notification and compliance with the manifest system. The Transportation Cabinet and 
the Justice Cabinet shall cooperate with and assist the cabinet in implementing and enforcing the transportation 
provisions of any state hazardous waste regulations promulgated pursuant to this chapter. The specific nature and 
details of the assistance effort shall be established by a formal cooperative agreement acceptable to the cabinets. 
 
Effective: July 15, 1986 
History: Amended 1986 Ky. Acts ch. 237, sec. 4, effective July 15, 1986. – Created 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 264, sec. 10, 
effective July 15, 1980. 
Formerly codified as KRS 224.873. 
Legislative Research Commission Note. Acts 1986, ch. 237, § 9, provides: "The regulations promulgated under the 
introductory paragraph of subsection (1) of KRS 224.46-510 and under KRS 224.46-560, pursuant to the authority 
granted by sections 2 and 4 of this Act shall be no more stringent than the federal requirements." 
 
224.46-570 Manifest system. 
 
The cabinet shall require the use of a manifest system for the orderly tracking of hazardous wastes from the 
generation site to the site of treatment, storage, and disposal except for coal mining wastes pursuant to KRS 
224.50-760(1)(c). The system shall, at a minimum, require the designation of the generator, each transporter, the 
disposal facility, and the type and quantity of waste involved. The cabinet may establish additional criteria to 
accommodate the manifest system to internal record keeping and to facilitate the monitoring of hazardous waste 
activity within the Commonwealth. 
 
Effective: July 15, 1980 
History: Created 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 264, sec. 9, effective July 15, 1980. 
Formerly codified as KRS 224.874. 
 
224.46-580 Development of statewide programs -- Responsibilities of cabinet -- Hazardous waste 
assessment -- Hazardous waste management fund – Pollution prevention fund -- Response actions to 
release of waste -- Post-closure site integrity. 
 
(1) The General Assembly declares that it is the purpose of this section to promote the development of statewide 
programs, under the responsibility of a single agency, which are intended to protect the health of the citizens and 
the environment of the Commonwealth from present and future threats associated with the management of 
hazardous wastes and the release of toxic chemicals regulated under Title III, Section 313 of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, including disposal, treatment, recycling, storage, and 
transportation. The intent of the General Assembly is to add to and coordinate, and not replace, existing efforts 
and responsibilities in the areas of hazardous waste management, toxic chemical manufacture, processing, or other 
use, and to leave the primary burden and responsibility for hazardous waste and toxic chemical reduction on 
private industry; and further to finance assistance and coordination by imposing assessments on the generation of 
hazardous waste. The assessments are intended to produce a reduction in waste generated; to promote the use of 
new techniques in recycling, treatment, and alternatives other than land disposal; and to place the burden of 
financing additional hazardous waste management activities necessarily undertaken by state agencies on the users 
of those products associated with the generation of hazardous waste. The General Assembly further finds that 
Kentucky's industries need assistance in developing and implementing pollution prevention goals and that a fund 
should be established to provide technical and financial assistance to those industries. 
 
(2) The Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet is given the authority to administer the provisions and 
programs of this section and the responsibility to achieve the purposes of this section. 
 
(3) In addition to all specific responsibilities contained elsewhere in this chapter, the cabinet shall: 
 
(a) Respond effectively and in a timely manner to emergencies created by the release of hazardous substances, as 
defined in KRS 224.01-400, into the environment. The cabinet shall provide for adequate containment and removal of the 
hazardous substances in order that the threat of a release or actual release of the substance may be abated and resultant 
harm to the environment minimized. The provisions of KRS 45A.695 to 45A.725 may be suspended by the cabinet if 
necessary to respond to an environmental emergency. 
 
(b) Provide for post-closure monitoring and maintenance of hazardous waste disposal sites upon termination of post-
closure monitoring and maintenance responsibilities by persons permitted to operate the facility pursuant to this chapter. 
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(c) Identify, investigate, classify, contain, or clean up any release, threatened release, or disposal of a hazardous 
substance where responsible parties are economically or otherwise unavailable to properly address the problem and the 
problem represents an imminent danger to the health of the citizens and the environment of the Commonwealth. 
 
(4) The cabinet shall have the authority to finance the nonfederal share of the cost for clean up of sites under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-510). 
 
(5) The cabinet shall recover, when possible, actual and necessary expenditures incurred in carrying out the duties 
under this section. Any expenditures recovered shall be placed in the hazardous waste management fund. 
 
(6) It is the expressed purpose of this section to accomplish effective hazardous waste and toxic chemical 
management that results in a reduction of the generation of hazardous wastes and the release of toxic chemicals 
within the Commonwealth; further, it is a purpose of this chapter to allocate a portion of the cost of administering 
necessary governmental programs related to hazardous waste and toxic chemical management to those industries 
whose products are reasonably related to the generation of hazardous waste. 
 
(7) There is hereby imposed upon every person engaged within this state in the generation of hazardous waste an 
annual hazardous waste assessment to be determined pursuant to this section according to the quantity by weight 
of hazardous waste generated, except that no assessment shall be levied against generators for any quantity of 
"special wastes," waste oil, or spent material from air pollution control devices controlling emissions from coke 
manufacturing facilities. The assessment shall not be imposed upon any person for any quantities of hazardous 
waste generated by others for which that person is a secondary handler that stores, processes, or reclaims the 
waste. The assessment shall be reported and paid to the Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet for the 
generation of hazardous waste on an annual basis on January 1 of each year. The payment shall be accompanied 
by a report or return in a form that the cabinet may prescribe. If a federal law is enacted which accomplishes or 
purports to accomplish the purposes set forth in this section and which levies an assessment or tax upon any 
business assessed pursuant to this section, the amount of the assessment to be levied upon the business under 
this section shall be reduced by the amount of the federal assessment or tax upon the business. The reduction shall 
only be authorized when funds raised by the federal assessment or tax are made available to the state for any of 
the activities to be funded under this section. If federal moneys are available to carry out the duties imposed by 
subsection (3) of this section, the assessment shall cease to be levied and collected until such time as federal 
moneys are no longer available to the Commonwealth for these purposes. The assessment shall be charged against 
generators of hazardous waste until June 30, 2006. After this date, no further hazardous waste management 
assessment shall be charged against generators. 
 
(8) The assessment on generators shall be one and two-tenths cents ($0.012) per pound if the waste is liquid, or 
two-tenths of a cent ($0.002) per pound if the waste is solid. 
 
(a) Hazardous waste that is injected into a permitted underground injection well shall be assessed on a dry weight basis; 
 
(b) Hazardous waste treated, detoxified, solidified, neutralized, recycled, incinerated, or disposed of on-site shall be 
assessed at one-half (1/2) of the appropriate rate, except for recycled waste used in the steel manufacturing process 
which shall be exempt; 
 
(c) Waste that is subject to regulation under Section 402 or 307B of the Federal Clean Water Act shall be exempt; and 
 
(d) Emission control dust and sludge from the primary production of steel that is recycled by high temperature metals 
recovery or managed by stabilization of metals shall be exempt. 
 
(9) Except for waste brought into the state by a company to an affiliated manufacturing facility of the company 
receiving the waste, any person who transports hazardous waste into the state for land disposal or treatment which 
is generated outside of the state shall pay an assessment to the hazardous waste facility which first receives the 
waste for storage, treatment, or land disposal. The assessment rate shall be identical to the rate described in 
subsection (8) of this section. The facility shall remit the assessment to the cabinet on an annual basis on January 
1 of each year. The payment shall be accompanied by a return the cabinet shall prescribe. 
 
(10) If any generator or hazardous waste facility subject to the provisions of subsection (8) or (9) of this section 
fails or refuses to file a return or furnish any information requested in writing by the cabinet, the cabinet may, from 
any information in its possession, make an estimate and issue an assessment against the generator or hazardous 
waste facility and add a penalty of ten percent (10%) of the amount of the assessment so determined. This penalty 
shall be in addition to all other applicable penalties in this chapter. 
 
(11) If any generator or hazardous waste facility subject to the provisions of subsection (8) or (9) of this section 
fails to make and file a return required by this chapter on or before the due date of the return or the due date as 
extended by the cabinet, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the cabinet, that the failure is due to reasonable 
cause, five percent (5%) of the assessment found to be due by the cabinet shall be added to the assessment for 
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each thirty (30) days or fraction thereof elapsing between the due date of the return and the date on which it is 
filed, but the total penalty shall not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the assessment. 
 
(12) If the assessment imposed by this chapter, whether assessed by the cabinet, or the generator, or any 
installment or portion of the assessment is not paid on or before the date prescribed for its payment, there shall be 
collected, as a part of the assessment, interest upon the unpaid amount at the rate of eight percent (8%) per 
annum from the date prescribed for its payment until payment is actually made to 
the cabinet. 
 
(13) There is hereby created within the State Treasury a trust and agency fund which shall not lapse to be known 
as the hazardous waste management fund. The fund shall be deposited in an interest-bearing account. The cabinet 
shall be responsible for collecting and receiving funds as provided in this section, and all such assessments 
collected or received by the State Treasury shall be deposited in the hazardous waste management fund. All 
interest earned on the money deposited in the fund shall be deposited to the fund. When the State Treasurer 
certifies to the cabinet that the uncommitted balance of the hazardous waste management fund exceeds six million 
dollars ($6,000,000), assessments shall not be collected until the State Treasurer certifies to the cabinet that the 
balance in the hazardous waste management fund is less than three million dollars ($3,000,000). The 
implementation of the cap on the fund shall be suspended from July 13, 1990, until July 1, 1991. In addition, for 
assessments paid after July 1, 1991, the cabinet shall refund or grant a credit against the next assessment to come 
due, on a pro-rated basis, any money collected in one (1) year in excess of the cap. 
 
(14) There is hereby created within the State Treasury a trust and agency account which shall not lapse to be 
known as the pollution prevention fund. The fund shall be placed in an interest-bearing account. The fund shall be 
administered by the Center for Pollution Prevention. The cabinet shall remit to the fund each fiscal year twenty 
percent (20%) of the funds received by the hazardous waste management fund subject to the enacted budget bill. 
The cabinet shall provide to the center estimates of the amount of the hazardous waste assessment expected to be 
collected during each upcoming fiscal year. 
 
(15) Upon request of the secretary, moneys accumulated in the hazardous waste management fund shall be 
released in amounts necessary to accomplish the performance of the duties imposed by subsection (3) of this 
section. However, moneys from the fund shall not be used when federal moneys are available to carry out these 
duties, except when immediate action is required to protect public health or the environment, in which case the 
cabinet shall actively pursue reimbursement of the fund by any available federal moneys. 
 
(16) If any person responsible for a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance fails to take response 
actions or to make reasonable progress in completing response actions ordered by the cabinet, the cabinet may 
bring an action to compel performance or may take appropriate response actions and order the responsible person 
to reimburse the cabinet for the actual costs incurred by the cabinet. 
 
(17) If disposal activities have occurred at a hazardous waste site, the cabinet shall record in the office of the 
county clerk in the county in which a waste site is situated a notice containing a legal description of the property 
that discloses to any potential transferee that the land was used to dispose hazardous waste and that further 
information on the hazardous waste site may be obtained from the cabinet. 
 
(18) No person shall affect the integrity of the final cover, liners, or any other components of any containment 
system after closure of a hazardous waste site on or in which hazardous waste remains without prior written 
approval of the cabinet. 
 
Effective: July 13, 2004 
History:Amended 2004 Ky. Acts ch. 44, sec. 1, effective July 13, 2004. – Amended 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 54, sec. 1, 
effective July 15, 2002. -- Amended 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 351, sec. 1, effective July 14, 2000. -- Amended 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 
460, sec. 8, effective July 15, 1994. -- Amended 1990 Ky. Acts ch. 432, sec. 1, effective July 13, 1990; and ch. 496, sec. 
57, effective July 13, 1990. -- Amended 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 159, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1988. -- Amended 1986 Ky. Acts 
ch. 237, sec. 8, effective July 15, 1986; and ch. 298, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1986. – Amended 1984 Ky. Acts ch. 363, 
sec. 1, effective July 13, 1984. -- Created 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 263, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1980. 
Formerly codified as KRS 224.876. 
Legislative Research Commission Note. See definition of "special wastes" in KRS 224.50-760(1). 
2002-2004 Budget Reference. See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2003 Ky. Acts ch. 156, pt. IX, item 41(a), at 1878; 
and State/Executive Branch Budget Memorandum, 2003 Ky. Acts ch. 143, at 1046 (Final Budget Memorandum, at 669). 
Legislative Research Commission Note (6/20/2005). 2005 Ky. Acts chs. 11, 85, 95, 97, 98, 99, 123, and 181 instruct 
the Reviser of Statutes to correct statutory references to agencies and officers whose names have been changed in 2005 
legislation confirming the reorganization of the executive branch. Such a correction has been made in this section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
